area handbook series 

Jordan 

a country study 




Jordan 

a country study 



Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Helen Chapin Metz 
Research Completed 
December 1 989 




On the cover: Mosaic of a man with a bird, from a Byzantine 
church in Madaba, ca. 500-700 



Fourth Edition, First Printing, 1991. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Jordan : a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of 
Congress ; edited by Helen Chapin Metz. — 4th ed. 

p. cm. — (Area handbook series) (DA pam ; 550-34) 
"Research completed December 1989." 

Includes bibliographical references (pp. 293-305) and index. 

1. Jordan. I. Metz, Helen Chapin, 1928- . II. Library of 
Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Series. IV. Series: DA 
pam ; 550-34. 

DS153.J677 1991 91-6858 
956.9504— dc20 CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-34 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books now being 
prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Con- 
gress under the Country Studies — Area Handbook Program. The 
last page of this book lists the other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Acting Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



111 



Acknowledgments 



The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of the fol- 
lowing individuals who wrote the 1980 edition of Jordan: A Country 
Study: Robert Rinehart, Irving Kaplan, Darrel R. Eglin, Rinn S. 
Shinn, and Harold D. Nelson. Their work provided the organiza- 
tion of the present volume, as well as substantial portions of the text. 

The authors are grateful to individuals in various government 
agencies and private institutions who gave their time, research 
materials, and expertise to the production of this book. Special 
thanks are owed to the Jordan Information Bureau, which provided 
numerous photographs not otherwise credited, as well as photo- 
graphs that served as the basis for the art work in this volume. 
Thanks go also to Dr. Helen Khal for her assistance in obtaining 
both the photographs and some data on Jordanian social welfare 
legislation. 

The authors also wish to thank members of the Federal Research 
Division who contributed directly to the preparation of the manu- 
script. These people include Thomas Collelo, who reviewed all 
drafts and graphic material; Richard F. Nyrop, who reviewed all 
drafts and who served as liaison with the sponsoring agency; and 
Marilyn Majeska, who managed editing and production. Also in- 
volved in preparing the text were editorial assistants Barbara 
Edgerton and Izella Watson. 

Individual chapters were edited by Sharon Costello. Catherine 
Schwartzstein performed the final prepublication editorial review, 
and Shirley Kessel compiled the index. Malinda B. Neale and Linda 
Peterson of the Library of Congress Composing Unit prepared the 
camera-ready copy, under the supervision of Peggy Pixley. 

Invaluable graphics support was provided by David P. Cabitto, 
Sandra K. Ferrell, and Kimberly A. Lord. Harriett R. Blood assisted 
in preparing the final maps. 

The authors would like to thank several individuals who provided 
research and operational support. Arvies J. Staton supplied infor- 
mation on ranks and insignia, and Ly H. Burnham assisted in ob- 
taining demographic data. 



v 



Contents 



Page 



Foreword in 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Country Profile xv 

Introduction xxi 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

Mark Lewis 

THE JORDAN REGION IN ANTIQUITY 5 

ISLAM AND ARAB RULE 10 

OTTOMAN RULE 13 

CONFLICTING NATIONALISMS: ARAB 

NATIONALISM AND ZIONISM 17 

WORLD WAR I: DIPLOMACY AND INTRIGUE 20 

TRANSJORDAN 26 

HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN 29 

Hussein's Early Reign 30 

Crisis and Realignment 34 

Development and Disaster 36 

The Guerrilla Crisis 38 

WAR AND DIPLOMACY 44 

THE RABAT SUMMIT CONFERENCE AND AFTER 46 

Relations with the Palestine Liberation 

Organization 50 

Jordanian-Syrian Relations 50 

The Camp David Accords and Inter- Arab Politics ... 52 

JORDAN IN THE 1980s 55 

The Islamic Revolution and a New Arab 

Alignment 55 

In Search of a Solution to the Palestinian Problem ... 57 

Economic Austerity 58 

The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon 59 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 63 

Julie M. Peteet 

GEOGRAPHY 66 

Boundaries 66 



vii 



Topography 67 

Climate 71 

POPULATION 72 

THE ORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY: COHESION 

AND CONFLICT 76 

Ethnicity and Language 77 

Tribes and Tribalism 81 

Villages 86 

Palestinians 90 

Urban Areas and Urbanization 92 

Migration 93 

KINSHIP, FAMILY, AND THE INDIVIDUAL 95 

Family and Household 95 

Family Relationships 97 

Changing Social Relations and Values 100 

Women and Work 101 

RELIGIOUS LIFE 103 

Early Development of Islam 104 

Tenets of Sunni Islam 106 

Islam in Social Life 109 

Islamic Revival 110 

Religious Minorities 112 

EDUCATION 114 

HEALTH AND WELFARE 117 

Chapter 3. The Economy 125 

Robert Scott Mason 

STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF THE ECONOMY ... 128 

GDP by Sector 129 

The Late 1980s 133 

THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT 137 

A Mixed Economy 138 

The Budget 141 

Development Planning 142 

LABOR FORCE 145 

Labor Emigration 145 

Remittance Income 145 

Labor Force and Unemployment 146 

INDUSTRY 147 

Manufacturing 149 

Industrial Policy 149 

Electricity Generation 153 

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS 154 

Transportation 154 



Vlll 



Telecommunications 158 

NATURAL RESOURCES 160 

Phosphates 160 

Potash 161 

Oil and Gas 161 

Water 164 

AGRICULTURE 166 

Agricultural Development 167 

Cropping and Production 168 

Livestock 170 

INTERNATIONAL TRADE 170 

Trade Balance 170 

Composition of Exports and Imports 170 

Direction of Trade 173 

BANKING AND FINANCE 174 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 179 

Eric Hooglund 

THE CONSTITUTION 182 

THE GOVERNMENT 183 

The King 185 

The Council of Ministers 187 

The Legislature 188 

The Judiciary 191 

Local Administration 192 

THE POLITICAL SETTING 193 

The Political Elite 193 

Political Dissent and Political Repression 197 

The Palestinians and the Palestine Liberation 

Organization 198 

FOREIGN POLICY 209 

Relations with Israel 209 

Relations with Arab States 212 

Relations with the United States 215 

Relations with Other Countries 218 

Membership in International Organizations 219 

MEDIA 219 

Chapter 5. National Security 221 

Jean R. Tartter 

SECURITY: A PERENNIAL CONCERN 224 

Dimensions of the Military Threat 225 

Internal Security 229 

The Palestinian Factor 232 

ix 



THE MILITARY HERITAGE 233 

Historical Role 234 

World War II to 1967 235 

June 1967 War and Aftermath 236 

THE MILITARY IN NATIONAL LIFE 238 

THE ARMED FORCES 241 

Command Structure 241 

Army 243 

Air Force 247 

Defense Spending 250 

PERSONNEL: COMPOSITION, RECRUITMENT, 

AND TRAINING 251 

Conscription 254 

Women in the Armed Forces 255 

Conditions of Service 255 

Ranks and Insignia 256 

Training and Education 256 

People's Army and Reserves 257 

MILITARY RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES . . 259 

Meeting Jordan's Equipment Needs in the 1980s .... 260 

Military Cooperation with the United States 261 

Military Cooperation with Other Arab States 263 

THE INTERNAL SECURITY SYSTEM 265 

Police Forces 265 

General Intelligence Department 269 

CRIMINAL JUSTICE 270 

Criminal Code 272 

Incidence of Crime 273 

Procedures in Criminal Law 274 

Martial Law Courts 276 

Penal System 276 

Appendix. Tables 279 

Bibliography 293 

Glossary 307 

Index 3ii 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of Jordan, 1989 xx 

2 The Jordan Valley in Biblical Times 8 

3 Mandate Allocations at the San Remo Conference, 

April 1920 24 

4 Topography and Drainage 70 

5 Population of the East Bank by Age and Sex, 1987 74 



x 



6 United Nations Relief and Works Agency Camps in Jordan, 



1989 78 

7 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector of Origin, 

1978 and 1987 132 

8 Land Use and Other Economic Activities, 1989 148 

9 Transportation System, 1989 156 

10 Government Organization, 1989 184 

11 Abbreviated Genealogy of the Hashimite Family, 1989 .... 186 

12 Structure of the Palestine Liberation Organization 

(PLO), 1989 204 

13 Comparison of Force Strengths in the Middle East, 1988 . . 228 

14 Organization of National Defense, 1989 244 

15 Major Military Installations, 1988 246 

16 Military Ranks and Insignia, 1989 258 



XI 



Preface 



Like its predecessor, this study is an attempt to treat in a con- 
cise and objective manner the dominant social, political, economic, 
and military aspects of contemporary Jordanian society. Sources 
of information included scholarly journals and monographs, offi- 
cial reports of governments and international organizations, 
newspapers, and numerous periodicals. Chapter bibliographies ap- 
pear at the end of the book; brief comments on some of the more 
valuable sources suggested as possible further reading appear at 
the end of each chapter. Measurements are given in the metric sys- 
tem; a conversion table is provided to assist those readers who are 
unfamiliar with metric measurements (see table 1, Appendix). A 
glossary is also included. 

The transliteration of Arabic words and phrases follows a modi- 
fied version of the system adopted by the United States Board on 
Geographic Names and the Permanent Committee on Geographic 
Names for British Official Use, known as the BGN/PCGN sys- 
tem. The modification is a significant one, however, in that dia- 
critical markings and hyphens have been omitted. Moreover, some 
personal and place names, such as King Hussein, Jordan River, 
and Petra, are so well known by these conventional names that 
their formal names — Husayn, Nahr al Urdun, and Batra, respec- 
tively, are not used. 



xiii 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. 

Short Form: Jordan. 

Term for Citizens: Jordanian(s). 

Capital: Amman. 

Date of Independence: May 25, 1946 (as Transjordan). 

Geography 

Size: About 91,880 square kilometers. 



xv 



Topography: Most of East Bank (see Glossary) consists of arid 
desert. Dead Sea lowest point on surface of earth (more than 400 
meters below sea level). Jabal Ramm (1,754 meters) is Jordan's 
highest point. Except for short coastline on Gulf of Aqaba, coun- 
try landlocked. 

Society 

Population: In 1987 East Bank population — about 70 percent 
urban — 2.9 million with annual growth rate variously given as be- 
tween 3.6 and 4 percent. 

Languages: Almost all Jordanians speak a dialect of Arabic as 
mother tongue; increasing numbers speak or understand Modern 
Standard Arabic. Most of those people who have another native 
language (e.g., Circassians, Armenians) also speak Arabic. 

Ethnic Groups: Significant distinction between Palestinians (see 
Glossary) — estimated 55 to 60 percent of population — and Trans- 
jordanians (see Glossary). Small numbers of non- Arabs originat- 
ing elsewhere include Circassians, Shishans (Chechens), Armenians, 
and Kurds. 

Religion: Most Jordanians Sunni (see Glossary) Muslims; about 
2,000 Shia (see Glossary) Muslims. Christians (Eastern Orthodox, 
Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Roman Catholics, a few Prot- 
estants) constitute between 5 and 8 percent of population. Also other 
small religious groups, such as Druzes and Bahais. 

Education: First six years (primary) and next three years (prepara- 
tory) compulsory and free; grades ten through twelve (secondary) 
also free. In 1987 more than 900,000 students enrolled in 3,366 
schools with approximately 39,600 teachers. Nearly 68 percent of 
adult population literate; nearly 100 percent of ten-to-fifteen age- 
group literate. 

Health: Water shortage and concomitant sanitary problems con- 
tribute to health problems. Steady increase in health facilities and 
medical personnel in major urban areas. Following adoption of 
primary health care concept, facilities and personnel better distrib- 
uted in rural areas than in past. In 1986 life expectancy at birth 
was sixty-five years. 

Economy 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): In 1987 estimated at slightly more 
than US$5 billion; in 1988 about US$2,000 per capita; GDP real 
growth rate in 1989 estimated at 2 to 3 percent. 



xvi 



Currency and Exchange Rates: 1 Jordanian dinar (JD) = 1 ,000 
fils. Average exchange rates 1989 US$1 = 571 fils; 1 JD = $1.75 
(see Glossary). 

Government Budget: Forecast in 1989 at JD1.035 billion, includ- 
ing a JD122 million deficit. 

Fiscal Year: Calendar year. 

Industry: Contributed about 14.6 percent of GDP in late 1980s; 
90 percent of small and large industries concentrated in north be- 
tween Amman and Az Zarqa. Industry consisted mainly of small 
establishments with few large companies accounting for much of 
employment and value added. In 1989 largest industries phosphate 
mining, fertilizers, potash, cement, oil refining, and electric power 
generation; most such firms partially government owned. Jordan 
turning in late 1980s to light-manufactured goods and technical 
industries, such as pharmaceuticals. 

Agriculture: Main crops cereals, vegetables, fruit. Self-sufficient 
in poultry and eggs. Dependent on imports for substantial part of 
food supply. 

Imports: In 1987 JD915.5 million. Major commodities: oil, food- 
stuffs, machinery, and transportation equipment, mostly from 
Western Europe, United States, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. 

Exports: In 1987 JD248.8 million. Major commodities: phosphates, 
potash, fertilizers, fruits, and vegetables to member countries of Arab 
Cooperation Council, Asian countries, and European countries. 

Transportation and Communications 

Roads: In 1989 more than 7,500 kilometers, of which 5,500 kilo- 
meters asphalted; remainder gravel and crushed stone. Two major 
roads: north-south Desert Highway from Amman to Al Aqabah; 
east-west highway from Al Mafraq to Iraqi border. 

Railroads: In 1989 619 kilometers of 1 -meter narrow gauge, sin- 
gle track; newer spur lines to connect old Hijaz Railway with phos- 
phate mines and port of Al Aqabah. 

Port: Al Aqabah on Gulf of Aqaba contains sections for general 
cargo, phosphates in bulk, and potash and fertilizers. 

Airports: In 1989 nineteen usable airports, of which fourteen had 
permanent surface runways. Two major airports: Queen Alia In- 
ternational Airport, thirty kilometers south of Amman, and old 



xvn 



international airport at Marka, King Abdullah Airport, used 
primarily by Royal Jordanian Air Force. 

Pipelines: In 1989 total of 209 kilometers, consisting mainly of 
segment of Trans- Arabian Pipeline (Tapline) and connecting link 
to refinery at Az Zarqa. 

Telecommunications: In 1989 government-owned communica- 
tions system included telephones, telex, telegraph, fax, and televi- 
sion. Telephone service being improved, with more than 200,000 
telephones in service and 85,000 customers awaiting phones; one 
Atlantic Ocean Intelsat station; one Indian Ocean Intelsat station; 
one Arabsat station. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Constitution of 1952 grants king both executive and 
legislative powers. Between 1967 and 1989, King Hussein has ruled 
as almost absolute monarch. Bicameral legislature, National Assem- 
bly, consists of Senate appointed by king and popularly elected 
House of Representatives. In late 1989 first national election since 
1967 held. National Assembly met in December 1989. In July 1988, 
government renounced claims to reassert sovereignty over West 
Bank, under Israeli military occupation since June 1967 War, and 
turned over responsibility for links with West Bank to Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO). Subsequently, Jordan recognized 
PLO's declaration of independent Palestinian state in West Bank 
and Gaza Strip. 

Politics: Political parties banned from 1957 to 1990; political group- 
ings, in addition to existent Muslim Brotherhood, began to form 
for 1989 elections. Latent pressures for political participation, 
especially among Palestinians, who were underrepresented in top 
layers of narrowly based, Transjordanian-dominated power struc- 
ture. 

Justice: Court system consisted of civil, religious, and special courts. 
Tribal law abolished in 1976. No jury system; judges decide mat- 
ters of law and fact. 

Administrative Divisions: Jordan divided into eight governorates 
or provinces. Governorates further subdivided into districts, sub- 
districts, municipalities, towns, and villages. 

Foreign Affairs: Jordan traditionally maintained close relations 
with United States, Britain, and other Western countries. During 
1980s, however, Jordan expanded relations with Soviet Union, 



xviii 



while remaining strongly committed to pan-Arabism and closely 
aligned with countries such as Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: In 1988 armed forces totaled about 85,300; com- 
ponents were army, 74,000; navy, 300; and air force, 11,000. Na- 
tional Service Law of 1976 required two years' service by males 
at age eighteen or when education completed; liberal exemptions 
granted for medical or compassionate reasons. 

Major Tactical Military Units: Army had two armored divisions, 
two mechanized divisions (each division had three brigades), a 
Royal Guards Brigade, a Special Forces airborne brigade, and in- 
dependent artillery and air defense battalions. Air force had four 
fighter ground-attack squadrons, two fighter squadrons, one ad- 
vanced training squadron with backup combat potential, one trans- 
port squadron, and four helicopter squadrons. Navy, an integral 
part of army with coast guard mission, operated five coastal patrol 
boats in Gulf of Aqaba; three larger armed craft ordered in 1987. 

Major Equipment: Bulk of armored vehicles, artillery, and anti- 
tank missiles provided by United States; additional tanks from Brit- 
ain; tactical air defense missiles from Soviet Union; fixed Hawk 
air defense missiles from United States. Combat aircraft consisted 
of newer French-manufactured Mirages and older United States 
F-5s. 

National Security Costs: Defense budget of JD256 million 
(US$763 million) in 1988, although not all assistance from Arab 
states — mainly Saudi Arabia — recorded in budget. Defense budget 
constituted 22 percent of total government spending in 1987. 

Internal Security Forces: National police, known as Public Secu- 
rity Force, estimated to total 4,000 in 1988, under Ministry of In- 
terior in peacetime but subordinated to Ministry of Defense in event 
of war. Internal and external security responsibility of General 
Intelligence Directorate, civilian agency headed by senior army 
officer reporting directly to prime minister and King Hussein. 



xix 



Mediterranean . 
Sea 



J ) 



Lake 
Tiberius 



UmTED NATIONS 
. DISENGAGEMENT 
OBSERVER FOffce 20NE 

SYR I A 




IRAQ 



y 



■ GOLAN HEtGiiTS 
Psraetfocxajpteof 

Irbidl. 



w 




IRBID - 

l Al Mafraq 



/AL MAFRAQ 



/WEST SANK V 

* Salf^ ® ^ A?2a«?a 
111^ ^ Amman 

AMMAN 



R A E \J^_ALKARAK i 



I AtTafilah^ 
W, AT TAFILAH ■ 



l 

r 



MAAN 




SAUDI ARABIA 



\ 



\ 



UDl ARABIA 



• — International boundary 
— Governorate boundary 

1949 Armistice line 

•• 1967 Cease-fire line 
National capital 
Governorate capital 

25 50 Kilometers 



"SO mi 




32 H 



Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Jordan, 1989 



xx 



Introduction 



THE PRESENT KINGDOM of Jordan has had a separate exis- 
tence for almost seventy years, from the time of the creation in 1921 
of the Amirate of Transjordan under Abdullah of the Hashimite 
(also seen as Hashemite) family, the grandfather of King Hussein. 
To form Transjordan, the Palestine Mandate was subdivided along 
the Jordan River-Gulf of Aqaba line. At its creation, Jordan was 
an artificial entity because inhabitants of northern Jordan have 
traditionally associated with Syria, those of southern Jordan have 
associated with the Arabian Peninsula, and those of western Jor- 
dan have identified with Palestinians in the West Bank (see Glos- 
sary). Moreover, the area that constituted Jordan in 1990 has served 
historically as a buffer zone between tribes living to the west of 
the Jordan River as far as the Mediterranean Sea and those roam- 
ing the desert to the east of the Jordan River. Over the centuries, 
the area has formed part of various empires; among these are 
the Assyrian, Achaemenid, Macedonian, Nabataean, Ptolemaic, 
Roman, Ghassanid, Muslim, Crusader, and Ottoman empires. 

Transjordan' s creation reflected in large measure a compromise 
settlement by the Allied Powers after World War I that attempted 
to reconcile Zionist and Arab aspirations in the area. Britain 
assumed a mandate over Palestine and Iraq, while France became 
the mandatory power for Syria and Lebanon. In a British govern- 
ment memorandum of 1922, approved by the League of Nations 
Council, Jewish settlement in Transjordan was specifically excluded. 

As Transjordan moved toward nationhood, Britain gradually 
relinquished control, limiting its oversight to financial and foreign 
policy matters. In March 1946, under the Treaty of London, Trans- 
jordan became a kingdom and a new constitution replaced the 1928 
Organic Law. Britain continued to subsidize the Arab Legion, a 
military force established in 1923. In the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, 
the Arab Legion gained control for Transjordan of the West Bank, 
including East Jerusalem. The war added about 450,000 Palestin- 
ian Arab refugees as well as approximately 450,000 West Bank 
Arabs to the roughly 340,000 East Bank (see Glossary) Arabs in 
Jordan. In December 1948, Abdullah took the title King of Jor- 
dan, and he officially changed the country's name to the Hash- 
emite Kingdom of Jordan in April 1949. The following year he 
annexed the West Bank. 

Abdullah was assassinated in Jerusalem in July 1951. Abdul- 
lah's son, Talal, who was in ill health, briefly succeeded to the throne 



xxi 



before being obliged to abdicate in favor of his son, Hussein, in 
1952. Hussein, who had been studying in Britain, could not legally 
be crowned until he was eighteen; in the interim he attended the 
British Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst and returned to Jor- 
dan in 1953 to become king. 

The survival of Hussein as king of Jordan represents one of the 
longest rules in the Arab world, thirty- seven years. Hussein's sur- 
vival has entailed a keen sense of what is politically possible; mov- 
ing cautiously and seeking to build consensus, he has exercised 
skillful diplomacy, both domestically and regionally. For Hussein 
survival has involved achieving a balance between more liberal 
Palestinians and more traditionally oriented Transjordanians, par- 
ticularly the loyal beduin tribes of the East Bank, as well as negotiat- 
ing a place for Jordan among the Baathist regimes of Syria and 
Iraq, the Arab nationalism of Gamal Abdul Nasser and Egypt's 
successor governments, and the conservative rulers of Saudi Arabia 
and the Persian Gulf states. Moreover, Jordan has the longest 
border with Israel of any Arab state. Although Jordan has never 
signed a peace treaty with Israel, having lost the West Bank and 
East Jerusalem to Israel in the June 1967 War, Hussein neverthe- 
less achieved an unofficial working relationship with Israel con- 
cerning the West Bank. 

Despite Hussein's preference for cautious consensus, he is capable 
of decisive action when the maintenance of Hashimite rule is threat- 
ened. He took such action in connection with the Palestine Liber- 
ation Organization (PLO) guerrilla groups (fedayeen) in Jordan, 
based in the refugee camps, who became almost a state within a 
state. Intermittent fighting occurred from 1967 onward, with Israel 
engaging in reprisal raids against Jordan for fedayeen operations 
launched from Jordan, and the fedayeen increasingly directing their 
efforts against the Jordanian government rather than against Israel. 
Ultimately, in September 1970 a civil war broke out, martial law 
was reaffirmed, and as many as 3,500 persons are thought to have 
died. Despite various cease-fire agreements, sporadic fighting con- 
tinued through July 1971, when the Jordanian government ordered 
the fedayeen either to leave Jordan or to assume civilian status. 
Isolated by the other Arab states because of its repression of the 
fedayeen, Jordan gradually had to repair relations with those coun- 
tries because they constituted the major source of its financial aid. 

In the process of maintaining Jordan's tenuous position in the 
region, Hussein's basic orientation has been pro- Western; he has 
sought economic and military assistance from the United States 
and Britain in particular. When arms purchases were blocked by 
the United States Congress, however, he did not hesitate to buy 



xxii 



weapons from the Soviet Union. Regionally, following the Arab 
world's boycott of Egypt as a result of Anwar as Sadat's signing 
the Camp David Accords with Israel in 1978, Hussein sought a 
more significant leadership role. Fearful of Syria, which had inter- 
vened in Jordan in 1970, and apprehensive over the 1979 Iranian 
Islamic Revolution's destabilizing influence on the area, Hussein 
strongly supported Iraq in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War and estab- 
lished friendly relations with Iraqi president Saddam Husayn. 

Hussein's precarious balancing act has resulted, to a significant 
degree, from Jordan's disparate population. According to unoffi- 
cial estimates (the government does not provide a breakdown of 
statistics on East Bank and West Bank inhabitants), from 55 to 
60 percent of Jordan's population is Palestinian. Moreover, in con- 
trast to the strong rural element in Jordan's early history, accord- 
ing to the World Bank (see Glossary) in the late 1980s about 70 
percent of the population was urban, one-third of the total resid- 
ing in the capital of Amman (see fig. 1). Tribal relations charac- 
terized pre- 1948 Transjordan, extending to village dwellers and 
many in the cities as well as rural areas. Such relations hindered 
the assimilation of West Bank Palestinians, who by the 1980s had 
established substantial economic and cultural influence in Jordan 
and who tended to be more liberal regarding the role of women. 
The government sought to minimize distinctions between people 
from the East Bank and those from the West Bank in large part 
by upgrading education; in 1989 Jordan had the highest number 
of students per capita of any country except the United States. A 
societal problem Jordan faced, however, was the disrespect for tech- 
nical education and manual labor as opposed to academic educa- 
tion. Despite this difficulty, Jordan regarded its educated work force 
as its major economic asset. Having such a work force enabled Jor- 
dan to provide skilled and professional workers to other Arab states, 
particularly those in the Persian Gulf, and worker remittances were 
a leading source of gross national product (GNP — see Glossary). 
In 1988 such remittances exceeded US$1 billion. 

Jordan's relatively small population of fewer than 3 million per- 
sons in 1987 resulted in a limited domestic market unable to achieve 
economies of scale; thus, Jordan needed to develop export mar- 
kets. Apart from its labor force, which the government actively 
encouraged to seek work abroad in view of scanty domestic em- 
ployment opportunities, Jordan's principal natural resource con- 
sisted of phosphates — it was the world's third largest phosphates 
producer — and potash. It also was actively engaged in a search for 
oil and gas; small amounts of both had been discovered. These ex- 
tractive industries, however, required large capital investments 



xxin 



beyond the capability of Jordan's private sector. In consequence, 
the government not only played the key role in development plan- 
ning but also became a major economic participant, ultimately shar- 
ing in forty semipublic companies, contrary to its avowed advocacy 
of free enterprise. In addition, Jordan benefited from the Civil War 
in Lebanon that began in 1975 and the war's troubled aftermath, 
which heightened Jordan's role as a provider of banking, insur- 
ance, and professional services formerly supplied by Lebanon. 

Jordan's long-term plans called for economic self-sufficiency, and 
the king's brother, Crown Prince Hasan, and the Jordan Tech- 
nology Group that he founded in 1988 were key elements in Jor- 
dan's economic endeavors. The surface prosperity of the early 
1980s, however, was ended by the downturn of oil prices in the 
late 1980s, the resulting return home from the Persian Gulf of thou- 
sands of Jordanian workers, the decrease in Arab subsidies to Jor- 
dan (from more than US$1 billion in 1981 to about US$400 million 
in 1990), and Jordan's increasing debt (estimated in early 1990 
at between US$6 and US$8 billion). Austerity was reflected in the 
1988-89 devaluation of the dinar (for value of the dinar — see Glos- 
sary) by more than 40 percent to counter the black market, the 
freezing of the exchange rate, and increased import duties on lux- 
ury goods. These measures, combined with the reduction of sub- 
sidies on many basic commodities to comply with International 
Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary) requirements led to riots by 
East Bankers and beduins in several towns in late 1989. Jordan 
had been obliged to reduce subsidies as part of an economic stabili- 
zation program so as to qualify for a US$79.3 million IMF credit. 
IMF loan endorsement was a precondition for Jordan's rescheduling 
payment on many of its outstanding loans and obtaining new loans 
of more than US$300 million from the World Bank, Japan, and 
the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). Furthermore, 
Jordan was sharply affected by the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 
1988; during the war, because of its good transportation facilities, 
especially between the port of Al Aqabah and Amman, Jordan 
served as the primary transshipment point for goods destined for 
Iraq. 

The development of service industries, of industries involving 
import substitution, and of export industries, such as industrial 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals that required technical expertise, 
was an economic necessity for Jordan because its agricultural poten- 
tial was very limited — the greater part of the country is desert. 
Moreover, Jordan was facing a water shortage in the near future. 
With a population estimated to be growing by at least 3.6 per- 
cent per year, plus expanded industrial use of water, some experts 



xxiv 



estimated that the demand for water could outstrip supply by the 
early 1990s. Jordan's attempt to stimulate exports was a major factor 
in its formation in early 1989 of the Arab Cooperation Council, 
consisting of Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, and the Yemen Arab Republic 
(North Yemen), with headquarters in Amman. This regional 
arrangement, however, promised relatively little economic advan- 
tage because the participants tended to produce similar goods. In 
spite of all of its efforts, Jordan continued to rely heavily on for- 
eign aid, which in the 1980s constituted between 30 and 40 per- 
cent annually of government revenue before borrowing. 

Economic reasons thus shaped not only Jordan's domestic de- 
velopment and employment policies — the government was the larg- 
est single employer, accounting for more than 40 percent of the 
work force — but also its foreign policy because of Jordan's depen- 
dence on foreign aid. Although Jordan is a constitutional monarchy, 
the king has extensive legal powers that allow him to shape policy 
by appointing the prime minister, other cabinet ministers, and the 
thirty-member Senate, as well as by dismissing the National Assem- 
bly (composed of the Senate and the eighty-member House of 
Representatives) and ruling by decree if he sees fit. Traditionally, 
prime ministers have come from East Bank families loyal to the 
Hashimites. The House of Representatives originally had equal 
representation from both the East Bank and the West Bank; prior 
to the elections of November 1989, no general election had been 
held for more than twenty- two years (since the June 1967 War) 
in view of the impossibility of elections in the Israeli-occupied West 
Bank. Experts believe that a major reason for holding the 1989 
elections was to defuse discontent, reflected in the 1989 riots, among 
beduins and East Bankers traditionally loyal to the crown. 

Although martial law remained in effect, the 1989 elections were 
free, the king having released all political prisoners in a general 
amnesty in the first half of 1989. Elections were preceded by con- 
siderable press criticism of government policies and active cam- 
paigning by 647 candidates. Among the criticisms was that of 
disproportionate representation: electoral districts were so drawn 
as to give greater weight to rural areas at the expense of cities. 
Political parties had been banned since 1957 so candidates ran with 
only informal affiliations. To the government's chagrin, twenty 
Muslim Brotherhood adherents, fourteen Islamists with other 
affiliations, and ten secular antigovernment candidates were elected, 
leaving progovernment representatives in the minority. The suc- 
cess of the Muslim Brotherhood was not surprising because it was 
the only organized quasi-political organ participating in the elec- 
tions and because the PLO intentionally remained on the sidelines. 



xxv 



The Muslim Brotherhood appealed to the poor particularly and 
advocated jihad, or holy war, against Israel to liberate the West 
Bank. Many observers believed that the Muslim Brotherhood gar- 
nered protest votes primarily and that genuine Brotherhood sym- 
pathizers were relatively few. It should be noted, however, that 
Jordan is an overwhelmingly Muslim country. More than 90 per- 
cent of the population are Sunni (see Glossary) Muslims; there are 
some Shishans who are Shia (see Glossary) Muslims; and the re- 
mainder of the population is made up of a small number of Chris- 
tians of various sects, Druzes, and Bahais. 

In November 1989, the king named as prime minister Mudar 
Badran, considered to have better Islamic links than his predeces- 
sor, Zaid ibn Shakir. Badran succeeded in forming a cabinet that 
included two independent Islamists and two leftist nationalists from 
the Democratic Bloc, a new informal political group, but he was 
obliged to make some concessions to the Muslim Brotherhood, such 
as bringing Jordanian law closer to Islamic sharia law. A major 
task facing the new government is the drawing up of the National 
Charter (Mithaq al Watani), a statement of principles to guide the 
country's political system. This charter is to be devised by sixty 
representatives of various political persuasions appointed by the 
king in May 1990. The charter is expected to stress popular loyalty 
to the monarchy and to limit the existence of political parties con- 
trolled by external influences, such as the Communist Party of 
Jordan. 

Because of Jordan's large Palestinian population, a major aspect 
of its external relations concerns its dealings with the PLO. Fol- 
lowing the 1970-71 civil war, relations between Jordan and the 
PLO were strained, but in 1975 Hussein and PLO chief Yasser 
Arafat agreed to end recriminations. The king, however, refused 
to allow the PLO to reestablish a military or political presence in 
Jordan. Jordan was formally linked to the peace process as a result 
of the signature of the 1978 Camp David Accords, and a number 
of meetings occurred between Hussein and Arafat. When the PLO 
was expelled from Lebanon in 1982, Hussein relaxed his restric- 
tions and allowed some PLO presence in Jordan. The Palestine 
National Council met in Amman in November 1984, strengthen- 
ing Arafat's position with the more moderate PLO elements. 

Cooperation between Hussein and Arafat continued with the 
signing in February 1985 of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian agree- 
ment on a peace framework. By terms of the agreement, the PLO 
would represent Palestinians but be part of a joint Jordanian- 
Palestinian delegation at an international peace conference. Hus- 
sein, who has long supported United Nations (UN) Security Council 



xxvi 



Resolution 242 setting forth terms for a Middle East settlement, 
sought to persuade Arafat to endorse publicly both UN resolutions 
242 and 338, which implicitly recognize Israel's right to exist. 
Arafat's failure to do so eroded their relationship, and Hussein 
ended the Jordanian-PLO agreement in February 1986. Both Hus- 
sein and Arafat vied for influence in the West Bank in 1986 and 
1987, but the intifadah, or Palestinian uprising, which began in 
December 1987, showed the tenuous nature of West Bank support 
for Hussein. As a result of this weak support and the resolutions 
of the June 1988 Arab summit conference in Algiers that provided 
funds to support West Bank Palestinians through the PLO, in July 
1988 Hussein formally abandoned Jordan's claim to the West Bank. 

Jordan has stressed its support of the Arab cause in general, and 
its relations with most of the Arab states have been cordial, particu- 
larly relations with Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Hus- 
sein had advocated Egypt's reintegration into the Arab family of 
nations as early as 1981 — Egypt was expelled from the League of 
Arab States (Arab League) in 1978, following the Camp David 
Accords. Jordan was one of the first Arab states to reestablish diplo- 
matic relations with Egypt, doing so in 1984; after this date, rela- 
tions between Hussein and Egyptian president Husni Mubarak 
became close. A friendly relationship with Iraq had arisen out of 
Jordan's support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War. Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait, also having hereditary royal families, were the major con- 
tributors of financial aid to Jordan, in accordance with resolutions 
reached at Arab summit conferences. (At the Arab summit con- 
ference held in Baghdad in late May 1990, Hussein obtained 
renewed commitments of financial support for Jordan from vari- 
ous participants.) Jordan's relations with Syria were correct but 
distant. Despite the restoration of diplomatic relations with Libya 
in June 1990, relations remained somewhat tense because of Lib- 
yan support of anti-Hussein Palestinian guerrilla groups since 1970. 

Potential threats to Jordan's external and internal security led 
to Jordan's devoting approximately 30 percent of government 
spending to national security. In view of his military training and 
qualification as a jet pilot, Hussein took a keen personal interest 
in Jordan's armed forces, both as regards top military appointments 
and materiel purchases. Because of Jordan's military tradition, dat- 
ing back to the establishment of the Arab Legion in 1923, in 1990 
the Jordan Arab Army was a well-trained and disciplined force with 
impressive firepower although it had not seen battle since 1971. 
Historically, Israel has been seen as Jordan's primary threat. Since 
the latter half of 1989, Hussein has stressed repeatedly the danger 



xxvii 



to the stability of the area, particularly to the West Bank and to 
Jordan, of the influx of thousands of Soviet Jewish immigrants to 
Israel. 

In principle, two-year military service was compulsory for Jor- 
danian males, but the number called up annually was limited by 
economic considerations and potential inductees could postpone 
service to complete higher education. Jordan also provided quali- 
fied military personnel to a number of other Arab states, especially 
those of the Arabian Peninsula, and trained their nationals in Jor- 
danian military institutions. 

Jordan's internal security forces, which like the military dated 
back to the Arab Legion, operated under constitutional legal re- 
straints. The Public Security Force, the national police, came under 
the Ministry of Interior and was traditionally commanded by a 
senior army general. Other than maintaining law and order, the 
police and the General Intelligence Department monitored poten- 
tially disruptive elements in the population, such as left-wing fac- 
tions and right-wing Muslim extremists. 

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 found Jordan 
itself in a difficult situation, hard pressed both economically and 
politically. The enforcement of austerity measures in accordance 
with IMF loan requirements had improved Jordan's balance of pay- 
ments position, but because of the decrease in the transit trade across 
Jordan to Iraq after the Iran-Iraq War ended and the return of 
Jordanian workers from the Persian Gulf states resulting from the 
downturn of oil prices, Jordanian unemployment had increased 
to between 15 and 20 percent. Economic austerity measures had 
widened the gap between the "haves" and the "have nots" and 
had caused discontent among elements of the population tradition- 
ally loyal to the monarchy: the beduins and the East Bankers. 

To some extent, the discontent had been countered by the op- 
portunity for political expression reflected in the November 1989 
elections and by the king's ability to devote more time to East Bank 
problems following his giving up claim to the West Bank. The lat- 
ter action minimized to some degree the competing nationalisms 
of Jordanians and Palestinians. The election results, however, in- 
dicated a marked degree of dissatisfaction with the government. 
This dissatisfaction was seen in the growing criticism of corrup- 
tion among government officials and the demand for trials of those 
involved. There was also resentment that martial law as well as 
limitations to press freedom remained in force. Members of the 
middle class particularly seemed to have gained an awareness that 
the liberties they enjoyed were based primarily on the king's benevo- 
lence rather than on acknowledged democratic rights and a system 



xxvin 



of checks and balances on what appeared to be increasingly cen- 
tralized authority. The urban majority of the population considered 
themselves underrepresented in the National Assembly, and the 
conservative religious elements felt that little had been done to make 
existing legislation conform with Islam. The victories of the left 
in elections of professional associations and trade unions in late 
1989 and early 1990 indicated the growing public role of the left. 

Organized political parties began to come into existence after 
the November 1989 elections. One of the first political entities to 
be formed, in July 1990, was a leftist grouping, the Arab Jordanian 
Nationalist Democratic Bloc (AJNDB), composed of Marxists, pan- 
Arab nationalists, and independent leftists. In August the 
Democratic Unity and Justice Party was formed, advocating the 
"liberation of occupied Palestinian Arab territory" by force and 
a strong role for government in a free economy. In contrast to these 
leftist inclined groups, in October the Muslim Brotherhood and 
other Islamists announced the formation of the Arab Islamic Coa- 
lition. The Jordanian Democratic Unity Party, an offshoot of the 
leftist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a member of 
the overall PLO organization, came into being in November. Thus, 
it was not surprising that in early January 1991 , responding to these 
political realities, Prime Minister Badran announced that five Mus- 
lim Brotherhood members and two AJNDB members were being 
incorporated into the cabinet. The king also announced his approval 
in early January of the National Charter that endorsed constitu- 
tional rule, political pluralism, and the legalization of political 
parties. 

Regionally, Jordan found itself between Scylla and Charybdis. 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the United States 
response in sending forces to Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf 
and encouraging UN economic sanctions against Iraq put Jordan 
in a quandary. In accordance with the UN resolution, it closed 
the port of Al Aqabah to Iraq, and Hussein announced that Jor- 
dan refused to recognize Iraq's annexation of Kuwait. But Jordan 
expressed reservations concerning the Arab League resolution to 
endorse the sending of an Arab force to Saudi Arabia. 

Hussein saw his role as that of an active mediator between Sad- 
dam Husayn and both the other Arab states and the West. Be- 
tween August 1990 and late January 1991, the king held countless 
meetings with Western and Arab world leaders, including Presi- 
dent Bush in mid- August. Initially, Hussein sought to promote an 
"Arab solution" to the Gulf crisis. Disappointed at the failure of 
this effort, he pursued an "Islamic solution" involving Islamic states 
outside the Arab world, and after the war began on January 16 



xxix 



he strove to end the conflict. This policy resulted from a number 
of factors. The king shared the view of the majority Palestinian 
element of Jordan's population that the West, led by the United 
States, was using a double standard in denouncing Iraq's inva- 
sion of Kuwait to the point that it was willing to go to war, while 
ignoring Palestinian grievances over Israel's occupation policies 
in the West Bank. This stance made the king popular with Pales- 
tinians, as did permission for the September holding of a pro- Iraqi 
conference by Jordanians and representatives of several major PLO 
groups, sponsored by the AJNDB. Yasser Arafat's August endorse- 
ment of Saddam Husayn had, however, created a rift in the PLO 
as well as cut off Saudi financial assistance to the PLO. Hussein 
also had a longstanding fear that Israel planned to make Jordan 
the substitute Palestinian state — this aim had been stated on numer- 
ous occasions by prominent members of Prime Minister Yitzhak 
Shamir's Likud Bloc — thus leading to the downfall of the Hashi- 
mite monarchy. The Gulf crisis was seen as a focus that would divert 
attention from the Israeli-Palestinian question and allow Israel 
greater latitude to pursue such a course of action. Both of these 
elements were reflected in the king's request to Jordanian par- 
liamentarians in August to refer to him as "sharif" Hussein, 
demonstrating the king's view that the Gulf crisis represented a 
conflict between the Arab sovereignty and foreign domination simi- 
lar to the situation that his greatgrandfather, Sharif Hussein of 
Mecca, faced at British hands in 1925. 

Perhaps the most important reason for the king's seeking to 
reconcile the conflict was the economic consequence to Jordan of 
the crisis and the subsequent war. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
created a stream of refugees, primarily Arab and Asian expatriate 
workers and their dependents, who had been living in Iraq and 
Kuwait. These persons entered Jordan at the rate of more than 
10,000 per day, a total of more than 500,000 as of late September; 
they required food and shelter before most could be repatriated. 
This influx further strained Jordan's economy, in part because 
promised Western financial contributions to help defer costs of the 
humanitarian enterprise were slow in arriving. For example, Jor- 
dan was obliged to ration subsidized foods such as rice, sugar, and 
powdered milk at the beginning of September. Meanwhile, the boy- 
cott of Iraq had a major impact on Jordan because Iraq had been 
Jordan's principal export market and its major source of cheap oil 
(providing almost 90 percent of Jordan's oil), whereas Kuwait had 
been Jordan's second largest market. 

Furthermore, Saudi Arabia, which had provided substantial eco- 
nomic support to Jordan in the past, was so angered over Jordan's 



xxx 



failure to back it in its dispute with Iraq that it cut off oil exports 
to Jordan on September 20 and shortly afterward expelled twenty 
Jordanian diplomats. In turn, in early October Jordan closed its 
borders to trucks bound for Saudi Arabia and instituted fuel aus- 
terity conservation measures. The crisis also resulted in a drama- 
tic drop in tourism income, a major component of Jordan's GDP. 
The situation caused Minister of Finance Basil Jardanah in the 
latter half of September to estimate that Jordan would lose US$2. 1 
billion the first year of the boycott and would need US$1 .5 billion 
(by January this figure had been revised to US$2 billion) in aid 
to avoid economic collapse. He made a strong plea for financial 
aid to the UN and the West in general; various Western nations 
and Japan promised loans. 

In early January, reflecting Jordan's concern over being caught 
between Iraq and Israel and the tension prevailing, Jordan mobi- 
lized its armed forces and transferred a number of troops from the 
east to the Jordan Valley, indicating that it considered the threat 
from Israel to be the more serious. As the deadline for Iraqi with- 
drawal from Kuwait came on January 15, Jordan announced that 
it would protect its land and air borders against external aggression. 

Whatever the final outcome of the crisis resulting from Iraq's 
annexation of Kuwait, Middle East alignments have changed ap- 
preciably, and the fiction of Arab unity has been destroyed. Jor- 
dan's position in the midst of this regional dilemma has been 
rendered more precarious than it has been for many years. 



January 29, 1991 Helen Chapin Metz 



xxxi 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 



Mosaic of a man in a boat, from the Byzantine Church of Saint Lots 
and Saint Prokopius at Khirbat al Muhayyat, ca. 550 



JORDAN'S LOCATION as a buffer zone between the settled 
region of the Mediterranean littoral west of the Jordan River and 
the major part of the desert to the east contributed significantly 
to the country's experience in ancient and more recent times. Un- 
til 1921 , however, Jordan had a history as a vaguely defined terri- 
tory without a separate political identity. Its earlier history, closely 
associated with the religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, 
therefore comes under the histories of the contending empires of 
which it often formed a part. 

By the time the area was conquered by the Ottoman Empire 
in the sixteenth century, the inhabitants of three general geographic 
regions had developed distinct loyalties. The villagers and town 
dwellers of Palestine, west of the Jordan River, were oriented to 
the major cities and ports of the coast. In the north of present-day 
Jordan, scattered villagers and tribesmen associated themselves with 
Syria while the tribesmen of southern Jordan were oriented toward 
the Arabian Peninsula. Although most of the populace were Arab 
Muslims, the integration of peoples with such differing backgrounds 
and regional characteristics hampered the creation of a cohesive 
society and state. 

In 1921 the Amirate of Transjordan was established under British 
patronage on the East Bank by the Hashimite (also seen as Hashe- 
mite) prince Abdullah ibn Hussein Al Hashimi, who had been one 
of the principal figures of the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman 
Empire during World War I. Direct British administration was 
established in Palestine, where Britain (in the Balfour Declaration 
of 1917) had pledged to implement the founding of a Jewish 
homeland. 

In 1947 Britain turned the problem of its Palestine Mandate over 
to the United Nations (UN). The UN passed a resolution that 
provided for the partition of the mandate into an Arab state, a Jew- 
ish state, and an international zone. When on May 14, 1948, the 
British relinquished control of the area, the establishment of the 
State of Israel was proclaimed. Transjordan' s Arab Legion then 
joined the forces of other Arab states that had launched attacks on 
the new state. The end of the 1948-49 hostilities — the first of five 
Arab-Israeli wars — left Transjordan in control of the West Bank 
(see Glossary) and the Old City of Jerusalem. Abdullah changed 
the name of the country to Jordan, proclaimed himself king, and 
in 1950 annexed the West Bank. In the June 1967 War (known 



3 



Jordan: A Country Study 

to Israelis as the Six-Day War), Israel seized the West Bank and 
reunited Jerusalem. In late 1989, the area remained under Israeli 
occupation (see fig. 1). 

The dominant characteristic of the Hashimite regime has been 
its ability to survive under severe political and economic stress. 
Major factors contributing to the regime's survival have included 
British and United States economic and military aid and the per- 
sonal qualities first of King Abdullah and then of his grandson, 
Hussein ibn Talal ibn Abdullah ibn Hussein Al Hashimi. King 
Hussein has been a skillful politician who has dealt adroitly with 
foreign and domestic crises by using caution and by seeking con- 
sensus. One exception to this style of policy making occurred dur- 
ing the 1970-71 batde against Palestinian resistance fighters, when 
the king ordered his mostly beduin-manned army to remove com- 
pletely the Palestinian guerrillas, even after neighboring Arab states 
had called for a cease-fire. 

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, regional events severely 
tested Jordan's stability. The election of the more hawkish Likud 
government in Israel and the expansion of Israeli settlements in 
the West Bank lent urgency to Hussein's quest for an Arab-Israeli 
territorial settlement. Arab ostracism of Egypt following the 1978 
signing of the Camp David Accords and the 1979 Treaty of Peace 
Between Egypt and Israel ended Jordan's alliance with the Arab 
world's most politically influential and militarily powerful state. 
Jordan's vulnerability increased significantly in February 1979, 
when Shia radicals overthrew Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi of 
Iran. The Iranian revolutionaries threatened to expunge Western 
influences from the region and to overthrow non-Islamic Arab 
governments such as that of Jordan. Less than two years later, Iran 
and Iraq were embroiled in a costly war that caused a further shift- 
ing of Arab alliances; Jordan and the Arab states of the Persian 
Gulf sided with Iraq, while Syria supported Iran. Syrian-Jordanian 
relations deteriorated and nearly erupted in military conflict dur- 
ing the 1981 Arab summit conference in Amman, when Syrian 
president Hafiz al Assad accused Hussein of aiding the antigovern- 
ment Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. Finally, the downward slide 
of world oil prices that began in 1981 drained Jordan's economy 
of the large quantities of Arab petrodollars that had stirred eco- 
nomic development throughout the 1970s. 

The turmoil besetting the Arab states in the 1980s presented Jor- 
dan with both risks and opportunities. With the traditional Arab 
powers either devitalized or, in the case of Egypt, isolated, Jordan 
was able to assume a more prominent role in Arab politics. 



4 



Historical Setting 



Moreover, as the influence of Jordan's Arab neighbors waned, Hus- 
sein pursued a more flexible regional policy. 

The weakness of the Arab states, however, enabled the Begin 
government in Israel to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy 
and to accelerate the pace of settlements in the occupied territo- 
ries. Thus, between 1981 and 1982, the Arab states reacted apathet- 
ically to Israel's attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, its annexation 
of the Golan Heights, and its June 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Is- 
raeli aggressiveness and Arab passivity combined to raise fears in 
Jordan that Israel might annex the occupied territories and drive 
the Palestinians into Jordan. These fears were fueled by frequent 
references by Israel's hawkish Minister of Agriculture Ariel Shar- 
on to Jordan as a Palestinian state. 

The Jordan Region in Antiquity 

The Jordan Valley provides abundant archaeological evidence 
of occupation by paleolithic and mesolithic hunters and gatherers. 
A people of neolithic culture, similar to that found around the 
Mediterranean littoral, introduced agriculture in the region. By 
the eighth millennium B.C., this neolithic culture had developed 
into a sedentary way of life. Settlements at Bayda on the East Bank 
and Jericho on the West Bank date from this period and may have 
been history's first "cities." Bronze Age towns produced a high 
order of civilization and carried on a brisk trade with Egypt, which 
exercised a dominant influence in the Jordan valley in the third 
millennium. This thriving urban culture ended after 2000 B.C., 
when large numbers of Semitic nomads, identified collectively as 
the Amorites, entered the region, which became known as Ca- 
naan. Over a period of 500 years, the nomads encroached on the 
settled areas, gradually assimilated their inhabitants, and — by the 
middle of the second millennium — settled in the Jordan Valley, 
which became a Semitic language area. At about this time, Abra- 
ham (known to the Arabs as Ibrahim) and his household entered 
the area from the direction of Mesopotamia. The Canaanites and 
others referred to this nomadic group of western Semites as the 
habiru, meaning wanderers or outsiders. The name Hebrew proba- 
bly derived from this term. More abrupt was the incursion of the 
Hyksos from the north, who passed through Canaan on their way 
to Egypt. 

After recovering from the Hyksos invasion, Egypt attempted to 
regain control of Syria, but its claim to hegemony there was con- 
tested by the empire-building Hittites from Anatolia (the central 
region of modern Turkey). The prolonged conflict between these 
two great powers during the fifteenth to thirteenth centuries B.C. 



5 



Jordan: A Country Study 

bypassed the East Bank of the Jordan, allowing for the develop- 
ment of a string of small tribal kingdoms with names familiar from 
the Old Testament: Edom, Moab, Bashan, Gilead, and Ammon, 
whose capital was the biblical Rabbath Ammon (modern Amman). 
Although the economy of the countryside was essentially pastoral, 
its inhabitants adapted well to agriculture and were skilled in metal- 
lurgy. The Edomites worked the substantial deposits of iron and 
copper found in their country, while the land to the north was fa- 
mous for its oak wood, livestock, resins, and medicinal balms. The 
towns profited from the trade routes crisscrossing the region that 
connected Egypt and the Mediterranean ports with the southern 
reaches of the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf. 

Midway through the thirteenth century B.C., Moses is believed 
to have led the Exodus of the Israelites from Egypt and to have 
governed them during their forty-year sojourn in the Sinai Penin- 
sula. When they were barred by the Edomites from entering Ca- 
naan from the south, the Israelites marched north toward Moab. 
Under Joshua, they crossed west over the Jordan River. The con- 
quest of Canaan by the Israelite tribes was completed between 1220 
and 1 190 B.C. The tribes of Gad and Reuben and half of the tribe 
of Manasseh were allocated conquered land on the East Bank. At 
about this time the Philistines, sea peoples who originated from 
Mycenae and who ravaged the eastern Mediterranean, invaded 
the coast of Canaan and confronted the Israelites in the interior. 
It was from the Philistines that Palestine derived its name, preserved 
intact in the modern Arabic word falastin. 

Late in the eleventh century B.C. , the Israelite tribes submitted 
to the rule of the warrior-king Saul. Under his successor David 
(ca. 1000-965 or 961 B.C.), Israel consolidated its holdings west 
of the Jordan River, contained the Philistines on the coast, and 
expanded beyond the old tribal lands on the East Bank. Ancient 
Israel reached the peak of its political influence under David's son, 
Solomon (965-928 B.C. or 961-922 B.C.), who extended the bor- 
ders of his realm from the upper Euphrates in Syria to the Gulf 
of Aqaba in the south. Solomon, the first biblical figure for whom 
historical records exist outside the Bible, exploited the mineral 
wealth of Edom, controlled the desert caravan routes, and built 
the port at Elat to receive spice shipments from southern Arabia. 
With Solomon's passing, however, his much reduced realm divided 
into two rival Jewish kingdoms: Israel in the north and Judah 
(Judea), with its capital at Jerusalem, in the south. The history 
of the Jordan region over the next two centuries was one of con- 
stant conflict between the Jewish kingdoms and the kingdoms on 
the East Bank (see fig. 2). 



6 



Historical Setting 



In 722 B.C. Israel fell to the Assyrian king, Shalmaneser, ruler 
of a mighty military empire centered on the upper Tigris River. 
As a result, the Israelites were deported from their country. Judah 
preserved its political independence as a tributary of Assyria, while 
the rest of the Jordan region was divided into Assyrian-controlled 
provinces that served as a buffer to contain the desert tribes — a 
function that would be assigned to the area by a succession of for- 
eign rulers. 

Assyria was conquered in 612 B.C., and its empire was absorbed 
by the Neo-Babylonian Empire in Mesopotamia. Judah was taken 
by Nebuchadnezzar, who destroyed Jerusalem in 586 B.C. and car- 
ried off most of the Jewish population to Babylon. Within fifty years, 
however, Babylon was conquered by the Persian Cyrus II. The 
Jews were allowed to return to their homeland, which, with the rest 
of the Jordan region, became part of the Achaemenid Empire. 

The Achaemenids dominated the whole of the Middle East for 
two centuries until the rise of Macedonian power under Alexander 
the Great. With a small but well- trained army, Alexander crossed 
into Asia in 334 B.C., defeated Persia's forces, and within a few 
years had built an empire that stretched from the Nile River to 
the Indus River in contemporary Pakistan. After his death in 323 
B.C., Alexander's conquests were divided among his Macedonian 
generals. The Ptolemaic Dynasty of pharaohs in Egypt and the line 
of Seleucid kings in Syria were descended from two of these 
generals. 

Between the third century B.C. and the first century A.D., the 
history of Jordan was decisively affected by three peoples: Jews, 
Greeks, and Nabataeans. The Jews, many of whom were return- 
ing from exile in Babylonia, settled in southern Gilead. Along with 
Jews from the western side of the Jordan and Jews who had re- 
mained in the area, they founded closely settled communities in 
what later became known in Greek as the Peraea. The Greeks were 
mainly veterans of Alexander's military campaigns who fought one 
another for regional hegemony. The Nabataeans were Arabs who 
had wandered from the desert into Edom in the seventh century 
B.C. Shrewd merchants, they monopolized the spice trade between 
Arabia and the Mediterranean. By necessity experts at water 
conservation, they also proved to be accomplished potters, metal- 
workers, stone masons, and architects. They adopted the use of 
Aramaic, the Semitic lingua franca in Syria and Palestine, and 
belonged entirely to the cultural world of the Mediterranean. 

In 301 B.C. the Jordan region came under the control of the 
Ptolemies. Greek settlers founded new cities and revived old ones 
as centers of Hellenistic culture. Amman was renamed Philadelphia 



7 



Jordan: A Country Study 




Historical Setting 



in honor of the pharaoh Ptolemy Philadelphia. Urban centers 
assumed a distinctly Greek character, easily identified in their 
architecture, and prospered from their trade links with Egypt. 

The East Bank was also a frontier against the rival dynasty of 
the Seleucids, who in 198 B.C. displaced the Ptolemies through- 
out Palestine. Hostilities between the Ptolemies and Seleucids en- 
abled the Nabataeans to extend their kingdom northward from their 
capital at Petra (biblical Sela) and to increase their prosperity based 
on the caravan trade with Syria and Arabia. 

The new Greek rulers from Syria instituted an aggressive poli- 
cy of Hellenization among their subject peoples. Efforts to sup- 
press Judaism sparked a revolt in 166 B.C. led by Judas (Judah) 
Maccabaeus, whose kinsmen in the next generation reestablished 
an independent Jewish kingdom under the rule of the Hasmone- 
an Dynasty. The East Bank remained a battleground in the con- 
tinuing struggle between the Jews and the Seleucids. 

By the first century B.C. , Roman legions under Pompey method- 
ically removed the last remnants of the Seleucids from Syria, con- 
verting the area into a full Roman province. The new hegemony 
of Rome caused upheaval and eventual revolt among the Jews while 
it enabled the Nabataeans to prosper. Rival claimants to the Has- 
monean throne appealed to Rome in 64 B.C. for aid in settling 
the civil war that divided the Jewish kingdom. The next year Pom- 
pey, fresh from implanting Roman rule in Syria, seized Jerusa- 
lem and installed the contender most favorable to Rome as a client 
king. On the same campaign, Pompey organized the Decapolis, 
a league of ten self-governing Greek cities also dependent on Rome 
that included Amman, Jar ash, and Gadara (modern Umm Qays), 
on the East Bank. Roman policy there was to protect Greek in- 
terests against the encroachment of the Jewish kingdom. 

When the last member of the Hasmonean Dynasty died in 37 
B.C., Rome made Herod king of Judah. With Roman backing, 
Herod (37-4 B.C.) ruled on both sides of the Jordan River. Af- 
ter his death the Jewish kingdom was divided among his heirs and 
gradually absorbed into the Roman Empire. 

In A.D. 106 Emperor Trajan formally annexed the satellite 
Nabataean kingdom, organizing its territory within the new Roman 
province of Arabia that included most of the East Bank of the Jor- 
dan River. For a time, Petra served as the provincial capital. The 
Nabataeans continued to prosper under direct Roman rule, and 
their culture, now thoroughly Hellenized, flourished in the second 
and third centuries A.D. Citizens of the province shared a legal 
system and identity in common with Roman subjects throughout 
the empire. Roman ruins seen in present-day Jordan attest to the 



9 



Jordan: A Country Study 

civic vitality of the region, whose cities were linked to commercial 
centers throughout the empire by the Roman road system and 
whose security was guaranteed by the Roman army. 

After the administrative partition of the Roman Empire in 395, 
the Jordan region was assigned to the eastern or Byzantine Em- 
pire, whose emperors ruled from Constantinople. Christianity, 
which had become the recognized state religion in the fourth cen- 
tury, was widely accepted in the cities and towns but never de- 
veloped deep roots in the countryside, where it coexisted with 
traditional religious practices. 

In the sixth century direct control over the Jordan region and 
much of Syria was transferred to the Ghassanids, Christian Arabs 
loyal to the Byzantine Empire. The mission of these warrior-nomads 
was to defend the desert frontier against the Iranian Sassanian 
Empire to the east as well as against Arab tribes to the south; in 
practice, they were seldom able to maintain their claim south of 
Amman. The confrontations between Syrian, or northern, Arabs — 
represented by the Ghassanids — and the fresh waves of nomads 
moving north out of the Arabian Peninsula was not new to the his- 
tory of the Jordan region and continued to manifest itself into the 
modern era. Contact with the Christian Ghassanids was an im- 
portant source of the impulse to monotheism that flowed back into 
Arabia with the nomads, preparing the ground there for the in- 
troduction of Islam. 

Islam and Arab Rule 

By the time of his death in A.D. 632, the Prophet Muhammad 
and his followers had brought most of the tribes and towns of the 
Arabian Peninsula under the banner of the new monotheistic 
religion of Islam (literally, submission), which was conceived of 
as uniting the individual believer, the state, and the society under 
the omnipotent will of God. Islamic rulers therefore exercised both 
temporal and religious authority. Adherents of Islam, called Mus- 
lims (those who submit to the will of God), collectively formed the 
House of Islam, or Dar al Islam (see Early Development of Islam, 
ch. 2). 

Arab armies carried Islam north and east from Arabia in the 
wake of their rapid conquest, and also westward across North Afri- 
ca. In 633, the year after Muhammad's death, they entered the 
Jordan region, and in 636, under Khalid ibn al Walid, they crushed 
the Byzantine army at the Batde of Uhud at the Yarmuk River. 
Jerusalem was occupied in 638, and by 640 all Syria was in Arab 
Muslim hands. Conversion to Islam was nearly complete among 
Arabs on the East Bank, although the small Jewish community in 



10 



The Monastery, or Dir, at Petra, 
a 2, 000-year-old Nabataean city 



The Treasury, 
or Khaznah, at Petra 




11 



Jordan: A Country Study 

Palestine and groups of Greek and Arab Christians were allowed 
to preserve their religious identities. Arabic soon supplanted Greek 
and Aramaic as the primary language of the region's inhabitants 
in both town and countryside. 

Muhammad was succeeded as spiritual and temporal leader of 
all Muslims by his father-in-law, Abu Bakr, who bore the tide caliph 
(successor or deputy) for two years. Under Umar (A.D. 634-44), 
the caliphate began efforts to organize a government in areas newly 
conquered by the Muslims. The Quran, Islam's sacred scripture, 
was compiled during the caliphate of Uthman (644-56), whose reign 
was brought to an end by an assassin. Uthman was succeeded by 
Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law Ali, the last of the four so- 
called orthodox caliphs, who was also assassinated in 661. 

A dispute over the caliphal succession led to a permanent schism 
that split Islam into two major branches — the Sunni (see Glossary) 
and the Shia (see Glossary). The Shias supported the hereditary 
claim of Ali and his direct descendants, whereas the Sunnis favored 
the principle of consensual election of the fittest from the ranks of 
the ashrqf (or shurfa — nobles; sing., sharif — see Glossary). Muslims 
in the Jordan region are predominantly Sunni. 

After Ali's murder, Muawiyah — the governor of Syria and leader 
of a branch of Muhammad's tribe, the Quraysh of Mecca — 
proclaimed himself caliph and founded a dynasty — the Umayyad — 
that made its capital in Damascus. The Umayyad caliphs governed 
their vast territories in a personal and authoritarian manner. The 
caliph, assisted by a few ministers, held absolute and final authority 
but delegated extensive executive powers to provincial governors. 
Religious judges (qadis) administered Islamic law (sharia) to which 
all other considerations, including tribal loyalties, were theoreti- 
cally subordinated. 

The Umayyad Dynasty was overthrown in 750 by a rival Sunni 
faction, the Abbasids, who moved the capital of the caliphate to 
Baghdad. The Jordan region became even more of a backwater, 
remote from the center of power. Its economy declined as trade 
shifted from traditional caravan routes to seaborne commerce, 
although the pilgrim caravans to Mecca became an important source 
of income. Depopulation of the towns and the decay of sedentary 
agricultural communities, already discernible in the late Byzan- 
tine period, accelerated in districts where pastoral Arab beduins, 
constantly moving into the area from the south, pursued their no- 
madic way of life. Late in the tenth century A.D. the Jordan region 
was wrested from the Abbasids by the Shia Fatimid caliphs in Egypt. 
The Fatimids were in turn displaced after 1071 by the Seljuk Turks, 
who had gained control of the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad. 



12 



Historical Setting 



The Seljuk threat to the Byzantine Empire and a desire to seize 
the holy places in Palestine from the Muslims spurred the Christi- 
an West to organize the First Crusade, which culminated in the 
capture of Jerusalem in 1099. The crusaders subsequently estab- 
lished the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, a feudal state that extended 
its hold to the East Bank. The crusaders used the term Outre Jour- 
dain (Beyond Jordan) to describe the area across the river from 
Palestine — an area that was defended by a line of formidable cas- 
tles like that at Al Karak. 

In 1174 Salah ad Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub — better known in the 
West as Saladin— deposed the last Fatimid caliph, whom he had 
served as grand vizier, and seized power as sultan of Egypt. A Sunni 
scholar and experienced soldier of Kurdish origin, Saladin soon 
directed his energies against the crusader states in Palestine and 
Syria. At the decisive Battle of Hattin on the west shore of Lake 
Tiberias (Sea of Galilee), Saladin annihilated the crusaders' army 
in 1187 and soon afterward retook Jerusalem. 

Saladin 's successors in the Ayyubid Sultanate quarreled among 
themselves, and Saladin' s conquests broke up into squabbling petty 
principalities. The Ayyubid Dynasty was overthrown in 1260 by 
the Mamluks (a caste of slave- soldiers, mostly of Kurdish and Cir- 
cassian origin), whose warrior- sultans repelled the Mongol incur- 
sions and by the late fourteenth century held sway from the Nile 
to the Euphrates. Their power, weakened by factionalism within 
their ranks, contracted during the next century in the face of a 
dynamic new power in the Middle East — the Ottoman Turks. 

Ottoman Rule 

Mamluk Egypt and its possessions fell to the Ottoman sultan, 
Selim I, in 1517. The Jordan region, however, stagnated under 
Ottoman rule. Although the pilgrim caravans to Mecca continued 
to be an important source of income, the East Bank was largely 
forgotten by the outside world for more than 300 years until Euro- 
pean travelers "rediscovered" it in the nineteenth century. 

For administrative purposes Ottoman domains were divided into 
provinces {vilayets) that were presided over by governors (pashas). 
The governors ruled with absolute authority, but at the pleasure 
of the sultan in Constantinople. Palestine was part of the vilayet 
of Beirut, and Jerusalem was administered as a separate district 
(sanjak) that reported directly to the sultan. The East Bank com- 
prised parts of the vilayets of Beirut and Damascus. The latter was 
subdivided into four sanjaks: Hama, Damascus, Hawran, and Al 
Karak. Hawran included Ajlun and As Salt and Al Karak com- 
prised the area mostly south of Amman. The territory south of the 



13 



Columns and temple ruins at Jarash, second century A.D. 

Greco-Roman city north of Amman 



15 



Jordan: A Country Study 

Az Zarqa River down to Wadi al Mawjib was under the control 
of the pasha of Nabulus, who was under the vilayet of Beirut. 

From 1831 until 1839, Ottoman rule was displaced by that of 
Muhammad Ali — pasha of Egypt and nominally subject to the 
sultan — when his troops occupied the region during a revolt against 
the Sublime Porte, as the Ottoman government came to be known. 
Britain and Russia compelled Muhammad Ali to withdraw and 
they restored the Ottoman governors. 

The Ottomans enforced sharia in the towns and settled coun- 
tryside, but in the desert customary tribal law also was recognized. 
Because of the unitary nature of Islamic law — encompassing reli- 
gious, social, civil, and economic life — it was inconceivable that 
it could be applied to non-Muslims. The Ottoman regime used 
the millet system, which accorded non-Muslim communities the 
right to manage their personal affairs according to their own reli- 
gious laws. The European powers also concluded separate treaties 
(capitulations) with the Porte whereby their consuls received ex- 
traterritorial legal jurisdiction over their citizens and clients in the 
Ottoman Empire. In addition, France claimed the special right to 
protect the sultan's Roman Catholic subjects, and Russia to pro- 
tect the sultan's more numerous Orthodox subjects, 
i At every level of the Ottoman system, administration was es- 
sentially military in character. On the East Bank, however, Otto- 
man rule was lax and garrisons were small. Ottoman officials were 
satisfied as long as order was preserved, military levies were provid- 
ed when called for, and taxes were paid. These goals, however, 
were not easily achieved. To stabilize the population, in the late 
1800s the Ottomans established several small colonies of 
Circassians — Sunni Muslims who had fled from the Caucasus 
region of Russia in the 1860s and 1870s (see Ethnicity and Lan- 
guage, ch. 2). Although the Ottoman sultan in Constantinople was 
the caliph, Ottoman officials and soldiers were despised by the 
Arabs, who viewed them as foreign oppressors. Truculent shaykhs 
regularly disrupted the peace, and the fiercely independent beduins 
revolted frequently. In 1905 and again in 1910, serious uprisings 
were suppressed only with considerable difficulty. 

In 1900 the Porte, with German assistance, began construction 
of the Hijaz Railway. By 1908 the railroad linked Damascus with 
the holy city of Medina. Its purpose was to transport Muslim pil- 
grims to Mecca and to facilitate military control of the strategic 
Arabian Peninsula. To protect the railroad, the Porte increased 
its Ottoman military presence along the route and, as it had done 
earlier to safeguard caravan traffic, subsidized rival Arab tribal 
shaykhs in the region. 



16 



Historical Setting 



Conflicting Nationalisms: Arab Nationalism and 
Zionism 

In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, two separate 
movements developed that were to have continuing effects for all 
of the Middle East — the Arab revival and Zionism. Both move- 
ments aimed at uniting their peoples in a national homeland. They 
were to converge and confront each other in Palestine where, it 
was initially thought by some, they could each achieve their aspi- 
rations in an atmosphere of mutual accommodation. The two move- 
ments would, in fact, prove incompatible. 

By 1875 a small group of Western-oriented Muslim and Chris- 
tian Arab intellectuals in Beirut were urging the study of Arab his- 
tory, literature, and language to revive Arab identity. By means 
of secretly printed and circulated publications they attempted to 
expose the harsh nature of Ottoman rule and to arouse an Arab 
consciousness in order to achieve greater autonomy or even in- 
dependence. The idea of independence always was expressed in 
the context of a unified entity — "the Arab nation' ' as a whole. After 
only a few years, however, Ottoman security operations had sti- 
fled the group's activities. 

At about the same time, a Jewish revival that called for the return 
of the Jews in the Diaspora to their historic homeland was finding 
expression in Europe. The impulse and development of Zionism 
were almost exclusively the work of European Jews. In 1897 The- 
odor Herzl convened the First Zionist Congress at Basel, Switzer- 
land, where the Zionist Organization was founded with the stated 
aim of creating "for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured 
by public law." As a result of Zionist efforts, the number of Jews 
in Palestine rose dramatically to about 85,000, or 12 percent of 
the total population, by the start of World War I. 

The increased Jewish presence and the different customs of the 
new settlers aroused Arab hostility. The rising tension between 
Jewish settler and Arab peasant did not, however, lead to the 
establishment of Arab nationalist organizations. In the Ottoman- 
controlled Arab lands the Arab masses were bound by family, trib- 
al, and Islamic ties; the concepts of nationalism and nation-state 
were viewed as alien Western categories. Thus, a political im- 
balance evolved between the highly organized and nationalistic 
Jewish settlers and the relatively unorganized indigenous Arab 
population. 

A few Western-educated Arab intellectuals and military officers 
did form small nationalist organizations demanding greater local 
autonomy. The major impetus for the coming together of these 



17 



Jordan: A Country Study 

educated Arabs was their discontent with the rule of Sultan Abdul 
Hamid II (reigned 1876-1909). 

In 1908 a group of reform-minded nationalist army officers in 
Constantinople, known as the Young Turks, forced Sultan Abdul 
Hamid II to restore the 1876 Ottoman constitution. The next year 
the Young Turks deposed Hamid in favor of his malleable brother, 
Mehmed V. Under the constitution, Ottoman provinces were 
represented by delegates elected to an imperial parliament. The 
restoration of the constitution and installation of Mehmed V initial- 
ly generated a wave of good feeling among the empire's non-Turkish 
subjects and stimulated expectations of greater self-government. 

It soon became clear, however, that the Young Turks, led by 
Enver Pasha, were bent instead on further centralizing the Otto- 
man administration and intensifying the ''Turkification'' of the 
Ottoman domains. Arab opposition to the Turkish nationalist poli- 
cies asserted itself in two separate arenas: among urban intellectu- 
als and in the countryside. One source of opposition developed 
among Arab intellectuals in Cairo, Beirut, and Damascus, who 
formulated the ideas of a new Arab nationalism. The primary mov- 
ing force behind this nascent Arab nationalist movement was op- 
position to the policies of Sultan Abdul Hamid. The removal of 
Sultan Abdul Hamid by the Committee of Union and Progress 
(the umbrella organization of which the Young Turks was the major 
element) was widely supported by Arab nationalists. The commit- 
tee's program of institutional reform and promised autonomy raised 
Arab nationalist hopes. 

After 1908, however, it quickly became clear that the national- 
ism of Abdul Hamid' s successors was Turkish nationalism bent 
on Turkification of the Ottoman domain rather than on granting 
local autonomy. In response, Arab urban intellectuals formed clan- 
destine political societies such as the Ottoman Decentralization 
Party, based in Cairo; Al Ahd (The Covenant Society), formed 
primarily by army officers in 1914; and Jamiat al Arabiyah al Fatat 
(The Young Arab Society), known as Al Fatat (The Young Arabs), 
formed by students in 1911. The Arab nationalism espoused by 
these groups, however, lacked support among the Arab masses. 

A more traditional form of opposition emerged among the re- 
mote desert tribes of Jordan and the Arabian Peninsula, which were 
politically inarticulate but resentful of foreign control. The link be- 
tween the urban political committees and the desert tribesmen was 
Hussein ibn Ali Al Hashimi, the grand sharif and amir of Mecca 
and hereditary custodian of the Muslim holy places. Hussein, head 
of the Hashimite branch of the Quraysh tribe, claimed descent from 
the Prophet. Hussein and his sons Abdullah and Faisal (who had 



18 



The street of columns at Jarash 



19 



Jordan: A Country Study 

been educated as members of the Ottoman elite as well as trained 
for their roles as Arab chieftains) had spent the years 1893 to 1908 
under enforced restraint in Constantinople. In 1908 Abdul Hamid 
II appointed Hussein amir of Mecca and allowed him and his sons 
to return to the Hijaz, the western part of present-day Saudi Ara- 
bia. Some sources contend that Hussein's nomination was suggested 
by the Young Turks, who believed that he would be a stabilizing 
influence there, particularly if he were indebted to them for his 
position. In his memoirs, however, Abdullah stated that Abdul 
Hamid II named his father in preference to a candidate proposed 
by the Young Turks. Hussein reportedly asked for the appoint- 
ment on the grounds that he had an hereditary right to it. From 
the outset, Abdullah wrote, his father was at odds with the attempts 
of the Young Turk regime to bring the Hijaz under the central- 
ized and increasingly secularized administration in Constantino- 
ple. Once in office, Hussein proved less tractable than either the 
sultan or the Turkish nationalists had expected. 

Abdullah and Faisal established contact with the Arab nation- 
alists in Syria. Faisal delivered to his father the so-called Damas- 
cus Protocol in which the nationalists, who appealed to Hussein 
as "Father of the Arabs" to deliver them from the Turks, set out 
the demands for Arab independence that were used by Faisal in 
his subsequent negotiations with the British. In return, the nation- 
alists accepted the Hashimites as spokesmen for the Arab cause. 

World War I: Diplomacy and Intrigue 

On the eve of World War I, the anticipated break-up of the en- 
feebled Ottoman Empire raised hopes among Arab nationalists. 
The Arab nationalists wanted an independent Arab state covering 
all the Ottoman Arab domains. The nationalist ideal, however, 
was not very unified; even among articulate Arabs, competing vi- 
sions of Arab nationalism — Islamic, pan- Arab, and statist — 
inhibited coordinated efforts at independence. 

Britain, in possession of the Suez Canal and playing a dominant 
role in India and Egypt, attached great strategic importance to the 
region. British Middle East policy, however, espoused conflict- 
ing objectives; as a result, London became involved in three dis- 
tinct and contradictory negotiations concerning the fate of the 
region. 

In February 1914, Abdullah visited Cairo, where he held talks 
with Lord Kitchener, the senior British official in Egypt. Abdul- 
lah inquired about the possibility of British support should his father 
raise a revolt against the Turks. Kitchener's reply was necessarily 
noncommittal because Britain then considered the Ottoman Empire 



20 



Historical Setting 



a friendly power. War broke out in August, however, and by 
November the Ottoman Empire had aligned with Germany against 
Britain and its allies. Kitchener was by then British secretary of 
state for war and, in the changed circumstances, sought Arab sup- 
port against the Turks. In Cairo, Sir Henry McMahon, British 
high commissioner and Kitchener's successor in Egypt, carried on 
an extensive correspondence with Hussein. 

In a letter to McMahon in July 1915, Hussein specified that the 
area under his independent "Sharifian Arab Government" should 
consist of the Arabian Peninsula (except Aden, a British colony), 
Palestine, Lebanon, Syria (including present-day Jordan), and Iraq. 
In October McMahon replied on behalf of the British government. 
McMahon declared British support for postwar Arab independence, 
subject to certain reservations, and "exclusions of territory not en- 
tirely Arab or concerning which Britain was not free to act without 
detriment to the interests of her ally France." The territories as- 
sessed by the British as not purely Arab included "the districts of 
Mersin and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to the west 
of the districts of Damascus, Horns, Hama, and Aleppo." 

As with the later Balfour Declaration, the exact meaning of the 
McMahon pledge was unclear, although Arab spokesmen have 
maintained that Palestine was within the area guaranteed indepen- 
dence as an Arab state. In June 1916, Hussein launched the Arab 
Revolt against the Ottoman Empire and in October proclaimed 
himself "king of the Arabs," although the Allies recognized him 
only as king of the Hijaz, a tide rejected by most peninsular Arabs. 
Britain provided supplies and money for the Arab forces led by 
Abdullah and Faisal. British military advisers also were detailed 
from Cairo to assist the Arab army that the brothers were organiz- 
ing. Of these advisers, T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) was 
to become the best known. 

While Hussein and McMahon corresponded over the fate of the 
Middle East, the British were conducting secret negotiations with 
the French and the Russians over the same territory. Following 
the British military defeat at the Dardanelles in 1915, the Foreign 
Office sought a new offensive in the Middle East, which it thought 
could only be carried out by reassuring the French of Britain's in- 
tentions in the region. In February 1916, the Sykes-Picot Agree- 
ment (officially the "Asia Minor Agreement") was signed, which, 
contrary to the contents of the Hussein-McMahon correspondence, 
proposed to partition the Middle East into French and British zones 
of control and interest. Under the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Pales- 
tine was to be administered by an international "condominium" 



21 



Jordan: A Country Study 

of the British, French, and Russians, whereas Transjordan would 
come under British influence. 

The final British pledge, and the one that formally committed 
Britain to the Zionist cause, was the Balfour Declaration of Novem- 
ber 1917. The Balfour Declaration stated that Britain viewed with 
favor "the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the 
Jewish People." After the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Palestine had 
taken on increased strategic importance because of its proximity 
to the Suez Canal, where the British garrison had reached 300,000 
men, and because of the planned British attack from Egypt on Ot- 
toman Syria. As early as March 1917, Lloyd George was deter- 
mined that Palestine should become British and he thought that 
its conquest by British troops would abrogate the Sykes-Picot Agree- 
ment. The new British strategic thinking viewed the Zionists as 
a potential ally capable of safeguarding British imperial interests 
in the region. 

The British pledge transformed Zionism from a quixotic dream 
into a legitimate and achievable undertaking. For these reasons 
the Balfour Declaration was widely criticized throughout the Arab 
world, and especially in Palestine, as contrary to the British pledges 
contained in the Hussein-McMahon correspondence. The word- 
ing of the document itself, although painstakingly devised, was in- 
terpreted differently by different people. Ultimately, it was found 
to contain two incompatible undertakings: establishment in Pales- 
tine of a national home for the Jews and preservation of the rights 
of existing non-Jewish communities. The incompatibility of these 
two goals sharpened over the succeeding years and became irrecon- 
cilable. 

In November 1917, the contents of the Sykes-Picot Agreement 
were revealed by the Bolshevik government in Russia. Arab con- 
sternation at the agreement was palliated by British and French 
reassurances that their commitments to the Arabs would be hon- 
ored and by the fact that Allied military operations were progress- 
ing favorably. Hussein had driven the Turkish garrison out of 
Mecca in the opening weeks of the Arab Revolt. Faisal's forces 
captured Al Aqabah in July 1917, and the British expeditionary 
force under General Sir (later Field Marshal Viscount) Edmund 
Allenby entered Jerusalem in December. Faisal accepted the mili- 
tary subordination of his army to overall British command, but 
for him the fighting was essentially a war of liberation in which 
Britain was actively cooperating with the Arabs. The British com- 
mand, however, considered the Arab army an adjunct to the Al- 
lied offensive in Palestine, intended primarily to draw Turkish 
attention to the East Bank while Allenby mopped up resistance in 



22 



Historical Setting 



Galilee and prepared for a strike at Damascus. In September 1918, 
the British army decisively defeated the Turks at Megiddo (in con- 
temporary Israel), and an Arab force under Lawrence captured 
Daraa, thus opening the way for the advance into Syria. Faisal 
entered Damascus on October 2, and the Ottoman government 
consented to an armistice on October 3 1 , bringing the war in that 
theater to a close. 

Between January 1919 and January 1920, the Allied Powers met 
in Paris to negotiate peace treaties with the Central Powers. At 
the conference, Amir Faisal (representing the Arabs) and Chaim 
Weizmann (representing the Zionists) set forth their cases. Weiz- 
mann and Faisal reached a separate agreement on January 3, 1919, 
pledging the two parties to cordial cooperation; however, Faisal 
wrote a proviso on the document in Arabic that his signature de- 
pended upon Allied war pledges regarding Arab independence. 
Since these pledges were not fulfilled to Arab satisfaction after the 
war, most Arab leaders and spokesmen have not considered the 
Faisal- Weizmann agreement as binding. 

President Woodrow Wilson appointed an American panel, the 
King-Crane Commission, to investigate the disposition of Otto- 
man territories and the assigning of mandates. After extensive sur- 
veys in Palestine and Syria, the commission reported intense 
opposition to the Balfour Declaration among the Arab majority 
in Palestine and advised against permitting unlimited Jewish im- 
migration or the creation of a separate Jewish state. The commis- 
sion's report in August 1919 was not officially considered by the 
conference, however, and was not made public until 1922. 

Mandate allocations making Britain the mandatory power for 
Palestine (including the East Bank and all of present-day Jordan) 
and Iraq, and making France the mandatory power for the area 
of Syria and Lebanon, were confirmed in April 1920 at a meeting 
of the Supreme Allied Council at San Remo, Italy (see fig. 3). The 
terms of the Palestine Mandate reaffirmed the Balfour Declara- 
tion, called on the mandatory power to "secure establishment of 
the Jewish national home," and recognized "an appropriate Jew- 
ish agency" to advise and cooperate with British authorities toward 
that end. The Zionist Organization was specifically recognized as 
that agency. Hussein and his sons opposed the mandate's terms 
on the grounds that Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant 
adopted at Versailles had endorsed the Wilsonian principle of self- 
determination of peoples and thereby, they maintained, logically 
and necessarily supported the cause of the Arab majority in 
Palestine. 



23 



Jordan: A Country Study 




Figure 3. Mandate Allocations at the San Remo Conference, April 
1920 



For the British government, pressed with heavy responsibilities and 
commitments after World War I, the objective of mandate adminis- 
tration was the peaceful development of Palestine by Arabs and Jews 
under British control. To Hussein, cooperation with the Zionists had 
meant no more than providing a refuge for Jews within his intended 
Arab kingdom. To Zionist leaders, the recognition in the mandate 
was simply a welcome step on the way to attainment of a separate 
Jewish national state. A conflict of interests between Arabs and Jews 
and between both sides and the British developed early in Palestine 
and continued thereafter at a rising tempo throughout the mandate 
period. 

After the armistice, the Allies organized the Occupied Enemy 



24 



Historical Setting 



Territory Administration to provide an interim government for 
Palestine, Syria, and Iraq. In July 1919, the General Syrian Con- 
gress convened in Damascus and called for Allied recognition of 
an independent Syria, including Palestine, with Faisal as its king. 
When no action was taken on the proposal, the congress in March 
1920 unilaterally proclaimed Syria independent and confirmed 
Faisal as king. Iraqi representatives similarly announced their coun- 
try's independence as a monarchy under Abdullah. The League 
of Nations Council rejected both pronouncements, and in April 
the San Remo Conference decided on enforcing the Allied man- 
dates in the Middle East. French troops occupied Damascus in July, 
and Faisal was served with a French ultimatum to withdraw from 
Syria. He went into exile, but the next year was installed by the 
British as king of Iraq. 

At the same time, Abdullah was organizing resistance against 
the French in Syria, arousing both French ire and British conster- 
nation. Assembling a motley force of about 2,000 tribesmen, he 
moved north from Mecca, halting in Amman in March 1920. In 
October the British high commissioner for Palestine called a meeting 
of East Bank shaykhs at As Salt to discuss the future of the region, 
whose security was threatened by the incursion of Wahhabi sec- 
tarians (adherents of a puritanical Muslim sect who stressed the 
unity of God) from Najd in the Arabian Peninsula. It became clear 
to the British that Abdullah, who remained in Amman, could be 
accepted as a ruler by the beduin tribes and in that way be dis- 
suaded from involving himself in Syria. 

In March 1921, Winston Churchill, then British colonial secre- 
tary, convened a high-level conference in Cairo to consider Mid- 
dle East policy. As a result of these deliberations, Britain subdivided 
the Palestine Mandate along the Jordan River-Gulf of Aqaba line. 
The eastern portion — called Transjordan — was to have a separate 
Arab administration operating under the general supervision of 
the commissioner for Palestine, with Abdullah appointed as amir. 
At a follow-up meeting in Jerusalem with Churchill, High Com- 
missioner Herbert Samuel, and Lawrence, Abdullah agreed to 
abandon his Syrian project in return for the amirate and a sub- 
stantial British subsidy. 

A British government memorandum in September 1922, ap- 
proved by the League of Nations Council, specifically excluded Jew- 
ish setdement from the Transjordan area of the Palestine Mandate. 
The whole process was aimed at satisfying wartime pledges made 
to the Arabs and at carrying out British responsibilities under the 
mandate. 



25 



Jordan: A Country Study 

Transjordan 

At its inception in 1921, the Amirate of Transjordan had fewer 
than 400,000 inhabitants. Of this number, about 20 percent lived 
in four towns each having populations of from 10,000 to 30,000. 
The balance were farmers in village communities and pastoral no- 
madic and seminomadic tribespeople. The amirate 's treasury oper- 
ated on British financial aid established on the basis of an annual 
subsidy. A native civil service was gradually trained with British 
assistance, but government was simple, and Abdullah ruled directly 
with a small executive council, much in the manner of a tribal 
shaykh. British officials handled the problems of defense, finance, 
and foreign policy, leaving internal political affairs to Abdullah. 
To supplement the rudimentary police, in 1921 a reserve Arab force 
was organized by F. G. Peake, a British officer known to the Arabs 
as Peake Pasha. This Arab force soon was actively engaged in sup- 
pressing brigandage and repelling raids by the Wahhabis. In 1923 
the police and reserve force were combined into the Arab Legion 
as a regular army under Peake 's command (see The Military 
Heritage, ch. 5). 

In 1923 Britain recognized Transjordan as a national state 
preparing for independence. Under British sponsorship, Transjor- 
dan made measured progress along the path to modernization. 
Roads, communications, education, and other public services slowly 
but steadily developed, although not as rapidly as in Palestine, which 
was under direct British administration. Tribal unrest remained 
a persistent problem, reaching serious proportions in 1926 in the 
Wadi Musa-Petra area. In the same year, Britain attached senior 
judicial advisers to Abdullah's government, and formed the Trans- 
jordan Frontier Force. This body was a locally recruited unit of 
the British Army assigned to guard the frontier and was distinct 
from the Arab Legion (see The Military Heritage, ch. 5). 

Britain and Transjordan took a further step in the direction of 
self-government in 1928, when they agreed to a new treaty that 
relaxed British controls while still providing for Britain to oversee 
financial matters and foreign policy. The two countries agreed to 
promulgate a constitution — the Organic Law — later the same year 
and in 1929 to install the Legislative Council in place of the old 
executive council. In 1934 a new agreement with Britain allowed 
Abdullah to set up consular representation in Arab countries, and 
in 1939 the Legislative Council formally became the amir's cabi- 
net, or council of ministers. 

In 1930, with British help, Jordan launched a campaign to stamp 
out tribal raiding among the beduins. A British officer, John Bagot 



26 



Historical Setting 



Glubb (better known as Glubb Pasha), came from Iraq to be 
second in command of the Arab Legion under Peake. Glubb orga- 
nized a highly effective beduin desert patrol consisting of mobile 
detachments based at strategic desert forts and equipped with good 
communications facilities. When Peake retired in 1939, Glubb suc- 
ceeded to full command of the Arab Legion. 

Abdullah was a faithful ally to Britain during World War II. 
Units of the Arab Legion served with distinction alongside British 
forces in 1941 overthrowing the pro-Nazi Rashid Ali regime that 
had seized power in Iraq and defeating the Vichy French in Syria. 
Later, elements of the Arab Legion were used in guarding British 
installations in Egypt. 

During the war years, Abdullah — who never surrendered his 
dream of a Greater Syria under a Hashimite monarchy — took part 
in the inter-Arab preliminary discussions that resulted in the for- 
mation of the League of Arab States (Arab League) in Cairo in 
March 1945. The original members of the League of Arab States 
were Transjordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, 
and Yemen. 

In March 1946, Transjordan and Britain concluded the Treaty 
of London, under which another major step was taken toward full 
sovereignty for the Arab state. Transjordan was proclaimed a king- 
dom, and a new constitution replaced the obsolete 1928 Organic 
Law. Abdullah's application for membership in the UN was dis- 
approved by a Soviet Union veto, which asserted that the country 
was not fully independent of British control. A further treaty with 
Britain was executed in March 1948, under which all restrictions 
on sovereignty were removed, although limited British base and 
transit rights in Transjordan continued, as did the British subsidy 
that paid for the Arab Legion. 

By 1947 Palestine was one of the major trouble spots in the British 
Empire, requiring a presence of 100,000 troops to maintain peace 
and a huge maintenance budget. On February 18, 1947, Foreign 
Minister Ernest Bevin informed the House of Commons of the 
government's decision to present the Palestine problem to the UN. 
On May 15, 1947, a special session of the UN General Assembly 
established the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine 
(UNSCOP), consisting of eleven members. UNSCOP reported on 
August 31 that a majority of its members supported a geographi- 
cally complex system of partition into separate Arab and Jewish 
states, a special international status for Jerusalem, and an eco- 
nomic union linking the three members. Supported by both the 
United States and the Soviet Union, this plan was adopted by the 
UN General Assembly in November 1947. Although it considered 



27 



Jordan: A Country Study 

the plan defective in terms of expectations from the mandate agreed 
to by the League of Nations twenty-five years earlier, the Zionist 
General Council stated its willingness in principle to accept parti- 
tion. The Arab League Council, meeting in December 1947, said 
it would take whatever measures were required to prevent im- 
plementation of the resolution. Abdullah was the only Arab ruler 
willing to consider acceptance of the UN partition plan. 

Amid the increasing conflict, the UN Implementation Commis- 
sion was unable to function. Britain thereupon announced its inten- 
tion to relinquish the mandate and withdrew from Palestine on May 
14, 1948. On the same day, the Declaration of the Establishment 
of the State of Israel was proclaimed in Jerusalem. Palestinian Arabs 
refused to set up a state in the Arab zone. 

In quick succession, Arab forces from Egypt, Transjordan, Iraq, 
Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia advanced into Israel. Except 
for the British-trained Arab Legion, they were composed of inex- 
perienced and poorly led troops. Abdullah, the sole surviving leader 
of the Arab Revolt of World War I, accepted the empty title of 
commander in chief of Arab forces extended to him by the Arab 
League. His motive for ordering the Arab Legion into action was 
expressly to secure the portion of Palestine allocated to the Arabs 
by the 1947 UN resolution. The Arab Legion, concentrated on 
the East Bank opposite Jericho, crossed the Jordan on May 15 and 
quickly captured positions in East Jerusalem and its environs. The 
Legion also created a salient at Latrun northwest of Jerusalem to 
pinch the Israeli supply line into the city. Abdullah had been par- 
ticularly insistent that his troops must take and hold the Old City 
of Jerusalem, which contained both Jerusalem's principal Mus- 
lim holy places and the traditional Jewish Quarter. Other Arab 
Legion units occupied Hebron to the south and fanned out through 
Samaria to the north (Samaria equates to the northern part of the 
West Bank — see Glossary). By the end of 1948, the areas held by 
the Arab Legion and the Gaza Strip, held by the Egyptians, were 
the only parts of the former Mandate of Palestine remaining in 
Arab hands. 

Early in the conflict, on May 29, 1948, the UN Security Coun- 
cil established the Truce Commission headed by a UN mediator, 
Swedish diplomat Folke Bernadotte, who was assassinated in Jerusa- 
lem on September 17, 1948. He was succeeded by Ralph Bunche, 
an American, as acting mediator. The commission, which later 
evolved into the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization- 
Palestine (UNTSOP), attempted to devise new settlement plans 
and arranged truces. Armistice talks were initiated with Egypt in 
January 1949, and an armistice agreement was established with 



28 



Historical Setting 



Egypt on February 24, with Lebanon on March 23, with Trans- 
jordan on April 3, and with Syria on July 20. Iraq did not enter 
into an armistice agreement but withdrew its forces after turning 
over its positions to Transjordanian units. 

Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 

The population of Transjordan before the war was about 340,000. 
As a result of the war, about 500,000 Palestinian Arabs took refuge 
in Transjordan or in the West Bank. Most of these people had 
to be accommodated in refugee camps, which were administered 
under the auspices of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
(UNRWA) for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, set up in 1949. 
In addition there were about 500,000 indigenous residents of the 
West Bank. 

In December 1948, Abdullah took the title of King of Jordan, 
and in April 1949 he directed that the official name of the country — 
East Bank and West Bank — be changed to the Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan, a name found in the 1946 constitution but not until then 
in common use. In April 1950, elections were held in both the East 
Bank and the West Bank. Abdullah considered the results favora- 
ble, and he formally annexed the West Bank to Jordan, an impor- 
tant step that was recognized by only two governments: Britain 
and Pakistan. Within the Arab League, the annexation was not 
generally approved, and traditionalists and modernists alike con- 
demned the move as a furtherance of Hashimite dynastic ambitions. 

Abdullah continued to search for a long-term, peaceful solution 
with Israel, although for religious and security reasons he did not 
favor the immediate internationalization of Jerusalem. He found 
support for this position only from Hashimite kinsmen in Iraq. Na- 
tionalist propaganda, especially in Egypt and Syria, denounced him 
as a reactionary monarch and a tool of British imperialism. 

The Arab League debates following the Jordanian annexation 
of the West Bank were inconclusive, and Abdullah continued to 
set his own course. The residual special relationship with Britain 
continued, helping to keep the East Bank relatively free from dis- 
turbance. Although not yet a member of the UN, Jordan support- 
ed the UN action in Korea and entered into an economic 
developmental aid agreement with the United States in March 1951 , 
under President Harry S Truman's Point Four program. 

On July 20, 1951, Abdullah was assassinated as he entered the 
Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem for Friday prayers. His grandson, 
fifteen-year-old Prince Hussein, was at his side. Before the assas- 
sin was killed by the king's guard, he also fired at Hussein. The 
assassin was a Palestinian reportedly hired by relatives of Hajj Amin 



29 



Jordan: A Country Study 



al Husayni, a former mufti of Jerusalem and a bitter enemy of Ab- 
dullah, who had spent World War II in Germany as a pro-Nazi 
Arab spokesman. Although many radical Palestinians blamed Ab- 
dullah for the reverses of 1948, there was no organized political 
disruption after his murder. The main political question confront- 
ing the country's leaders was the succession to the throne. 

Abdullah's second son, Prince Naif, acted temporarily as regent, 
and some support existed for his accession to the throne. Naifs 
older brother, Prince Talal, was in Switzerland receiving treat- 
ment for a mental illness diagnosed as schizophrenia. It was widely 
believed that Abdullah would have favored Talal so that the suc- 
cession might then pass more easily to Talal' s son, Hussein. Accord- 
ingly, the government invited Talal to return and assume the duties 
of king. During his short reign, Talal promulgated a new Consti- 
tution in January 1952. Talal showed an inclination to improve 
relations with other Arab states, and Jordan joined the Arab 
League's Collective Security Pact, which Abdullah had rejected. 
Talal was popular among the people of the East Bank, who were 
not aware of his periodic seizures of mental illness. But the king's 
condition steadily worsened, and in August the prime minister 
recommended to a secret session of the Jordanian legislature that 
Talal be asked to abdicate in favor of Hussein. Talal acceded to 
the abdication order with dignity and retired to a villa near Istan- 
bul, where he lived quietly until his death in 1972. 

Hussein, who was a student at Harrow in Britain, returned 
immediately to Jordan. Under the Constitution he could not be 
crowned because he was under eighteen years of age, and a regen- 
cy council was formed to act on his behalf. Before he came to the 
throne, he attended the British Royal Military Academy at Sand- 
hurst. When he was eighteen years old by the Muslim calendar, 
he returned to Jordan and in May 1953 formally took the constitu- 
tional oath as king. 

Hussein's Early Reign 

The chief influences that guided the young Hussein were the 
example and teachings of his grandfather and his own education 
in conservative English schools. Although Jordan was a constitu- 
tional monarchy, as king Hussein had extensive legal powers. For 
example, the Constitution allowed him to dismiss the National 
Assembly and to appoint the prime minister and other ministers. 
In addition, he enjoyed the traditional support of the East Bank 
beduin tribes. Considered the backbone of the Hashimite monar- 
chy, the Arab Legion was composed of intensely loyal beduins, 
whose equipment and salaries were paid for by Britain. 



30 



Historical Setting 



The majority of Jordan's population, however, did not consist 
of beduins. Between one-half and two-thirds of Hussein's subjects 
were Palestinians, whereas the government elite was mostly from 
the East Bank. This elite was more conservative and traditional 
in its political attitudes than the Palestinians, whose spokespersons 
often reflected a radical brand of Arab nationalism. In Cairo the 
successful coup d'etat carried out by the Egyptian Free Officers 
movement (headed by Gamal Abdul Nasser) had overthrown the 
monarchy in July 1952 and established a republic. Palestinians, 
who generally blamed Britain, the United States, and the Hashi- 
mites for their misfortunes, regarded Nasser as a champion of Arab 
nationalism. 

As border incidents with Israel escalated into a succession of 
reprisals and counterreprisals between Palestinian infiltrators and 
Israeli security forces, Hussein's problems grew. The Arab Legion 
tried to secure the armistice line and prevent infiltration, but its 
numbers were inadequate to provide complete and continuous 
coverage of the border. In response to the terrorist attacks, Israel 
adopted the technique of massive retaliation that often went deep 
into Jordanian territory (see The Guerrilla Crisis, this ch.). 

In 1953 and early 1954, Israel tentatively accepted a United States 
plan (the Eric Johnston Plan) for distribution of the water taken 
from the Jordan River. Although the plan was recognized as tech- 
nically sound from an engineering standpoint, ultimately it was 
rejected by Jordan and the other Arab states concerned because 
it involved cooperation with — and the implied recognition of — 
Israel. Given the stress of inter- Arab political relationships, it was 
impracticable for Jordan to initiate a settlement with Israel, even 
though there were strong incentives to do so. 

Britain agreed to a new financial aid arrangement with Jordan in 
1954 in which London evinced an interest in coordinating mili- 
tary and economic aid to Amman, with Jordanian participation, 
in the context of an overall Middle Eastern defense system. In 
February 1955, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan joined Britain 
in signing the Baghdad Pact, which ultimately became the Central 
Treaty Organization (CENTO). A high-ranking British military 
delegation visited Amman to discuss conditions under which Jordan 
might also become a participant. The purpose of the visit was gener- 
ally known, and Arab nationalist propaganda, especially from Pales- 
tinians and Radio Cairo, raised a storm of protest denouncing the 
pact and the monarchy as 4 'tools of Western imperialism" and a 
4 'sellout to the Jews." In December Hussein asked Hazza al Majali 
to form a government. Majali came from a distinguished family 
of tribal shaykhs and was known to be pro- Western. Shortly after 



31 



Jordan: A Country Study 

forming his cabinet, he stated unequivocally that he intended to 
take Jordan into the Baghdad Pact. Three days of demonstrations 
and rioting in Amman began after the announcement, and the Arab 
Legion was called in to restore order. The Majali government 
resigned after only a week in power, and it became clear that Jor- 
dan would not become a signatory of the Baghdad Pact. 

In March 1956, Hussein, responding to the public reaction 
against joining the British- sponsored Baghdad Pact, attempted to 
show his independence from Britain by dismissing Glubb as com- 
mander of the Arab Legion. Glubb 's dismissal precipitated a diplo- 
matic crisis that threatened to isolate Hussein from his principal 
benefactor, Britain. Relations were strained for many years 
although the British subsidy was not withdrawn. 

Hussein designated Ali Abu Nuwar, an officer known for his 
nationalist sympathies, as Glubb 's successor in the Arab Legion. 
The name of the force was officially changed to the Jordan Arab 
Army, and British officers were phased out of the service (see World 
War II to 1967, ch. 5). 

Border incidents with Israel were a continuing source of anxi- 
ety in 1956. In October an Israeli task force, supported by aircraft 
and artillery, attacked the West Bank village of Qalqilyah, killing 
forty-eight persons in reprisal for a guerrilla attack in Israel. Pales- 
tinians clamored for war, and in this crisis atmosphere Jordanian 
politics ventured into anti-Western nationalism. 

In the parliamentary elections of October 21 , 1956, the Nation- 
al Socialist Party received a plurality of votes, and Hussein desig- 
nated its leader, Sulayman Nabulsi, as prime minister. Several 
National Front Party (Communist Party of Jordan) members and 
members of the Baath Party (Arab Socialist Resurrection Party) 
also gained seats in the National Assembly, although independents 
and the older, conservative parties were represented about equal- 
ly with the leftists and nationalists. Nabulsi was an ardent admirer 
of Nasser and shaped the policies of his government accordingly. 
Nonetheless, when Israel attacked Egyptian forces in the Sinai 
Peninsula on October 29 and after British and French forces land- 
ed at Port Said on November 5, Nabulsi suddenly proved indeci- 
sive. Hussein proposed that Jordan attack Israel at once but Nasser 
discouraged him from wasting Jordan's forces in a war that by then 
was already lost. British participation in the attack on Egypt made 
it politically imperative that Jordan end its special relationship with 
Britain. 

Under the Arab Solidarity Agreement that resulted from the Arab 
summit meeting in Cairo in January 1957, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
and Syria undertook to pay Jordan the equivalent of US$35.8 



32 



A fresco from the palace of an eighth century 
Umayyad caliph at Qasr Amrah, east of Amman 



million annually for ten years, with Saudi Arabia paying an amount 
equivalent to that paid by Egypt and Syria together. The money 
would effectively free Jordan from the British subsidy. Saudi Ara- 
bia, however, made only one quarterly payment; Egypt and Syria 
made no payments. The Anglo-Jordanian Agreement of March 
1957 abrogated the basic Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1948, termi- 
nated the British subsidy, and initiated the turnover of British 
installations and the withdrawal of all British troops still in Jordan. 

In early 1957, Jordan's internal political scene shaped up as a 
power struggle between the monarchy and the Nasserist Nabulsi 
government. Hussein and the conservatives suspected that Nabulsi 
was maneuvering to abolish the monarchy. Nabulsi began negoti- 
ations to open diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and ob- 
tain Soviet arms aid. In April, as political tension increased, 
Hussein, exercising his constitutional prerogative, demanded the 
resignation of the Nabulsi government. 

The situation was further confused when Ali Abu Nuwar, the 
commander of the Jordan Arab Army (then still popularly known 
in English as the Arab Legion), made a statement to Said al Mufti, 
who was then attempting to form a caretaker government. Said 
al Mufti misinterpreted the statement to be an ultimatum that any 



33 



Jordan: A Country Study 



new cabinet be approved by the army. A sequence of dramatic 
events followed that became known as the "Az Zarqa affair. " The 
public in Amman, sensing the explosive political atmosphere, be- 
came restive. Rumors that the king was dead spread at the main 
army base at Az Zarqa. Taking Abu Nuwar with him to demon- 
strate that he, the king, was very much alive and that he, not Abu 
Nuwar, was in control Hussein set off for Az Zarqa. En route he 
met several truckloads of troops, who were overjoyed at seeing the 
king alive but who demanded the execution of Abu Nuwar. At Abu 
Nuwar' s request, Hussein allowed him to retreat to the safety of 
the royal palace. Continuing to Az Zarqa, Hussein spent several 
hours amid wildly enthusiastic troops anxious to demonstrate their 
loyalty to him and to the throne; he returned to Amman after reas- 
suring and quieting the troops. On the next day, Abu Nuwar fled 
the country. During the balance of April, several cabinet crises oc- 
curred, as the remnants of the Nabulsi faction fought a rearguard 
action against Hussein. Ibrahim Hashim, a Hussein loyalist, even- 
tually succeeded in forming a government and outlawed all politi- 
cal party activity. 

Hussein had won a remarkable political victory. What had mat- 
tered most was the loyalty of the combat units of the army, and 
that loyalty clearly belonged to the king. But Jordan was 
beleaguered — Nasserites were arrayed against the king, the Brit- 
ish subsidy was gone, the Arab Solidarity Agreement had evapo- 
rated, and the rift was wider than ever between the East Bank and 
the West Bank. To counteract these disabilities, Hussein unequivo- 
cally placed his country in the Western camp and sought a new 
source of aid — the United States. 

Crisis and Realignment 

The United States replaced Britain as Jordan's principal source 
of foreign aid, but it did so without a bilateral treaty or other for- 
mal alliance mechanisms. In April 1957, the White House offi- 
cially noted that President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary 
of State John Foster Dulles regarded "the independence and in- 
tegrity of Jordan as vital." Although Hussein did not specifically 
request aid under the Eisenhower Doctrine — by which the United 
States pledged military and economic aid to any country asking 
for help in resisting communist influence — he did state publicly 
that Jordan's security was threatened by communism. Within 
twenty-four hours of Hussein's request for economic assistance, 
Jordan received an emergency financial aid grant of US$10 mil- 
lion from the United States — the first of a long series of United 



34 



Historical Setting 



States grants. Washington expanded existing development aid pro- 
grams and initiated military aid. 

In seeking a viable, long-term arrangement for political stabili- 
ty in the face of the hostile, Nasser- style revolutionary national- 
ism then prevalent in the Middle East, Jordan turned to neighboring 
Iraq. Iraq, far larger and more populous than Jordan, was also 
far wealthier because of its oil and other resources. Iraq had usually 
supported Jordan in Arab councils, although without deep involve- 
ment, since the 1948 war. Its conservative government had taken 
Iraq into the Bagdad Pact in 1955 to ensure continued Western 
support against the Soviet Union or, more particularly, against rad- 
ical movements. 

On February 1, 1958, Egypt and Syria announced the integra- 
tion of their two countries to form the United Arab Republic 
(UAR). This development was greeted with great enthusiam by 
the new nationalist advocates of Arab unity, but it made the posi- 
tion of conservative or moderate regimes more perilous. The ini- 
tial phase of Jordanian-Iraqi negotiation was quickly concluded, 
and on February 14, 1958, Hussein and his cousin, King Faisal 
II, issued a proclamation joining the Hashimite kingdoms of Iraq 
and Jordan in a federation called the Arab Union. Faisal was to 
be head of state and Hussein deputy head of state. 

The Arab Union, however, was short-lived. The Hashimite 
monarchy in Iraq was overthrown on July 14, 1958, in a swift, 
predawn coup executed by officers of the Nineteenth Brigade under 
the leadership of Brigadier Abd al Karim Qasim and Colonel Abd 
as Salaam Arif. The coup was triggered when King Hussein, fearing 
that an anti-Western revolt in Lebanon might spread to Jordan, 
requested Iraqi assistance. Instead of moving toward Jordan, 
Colonel Arif led a battalion into Baghdad and immediately pro- 
claimed a new republic and the end of the old regime. An Iraqi 
motorized brigade under the command of Brigadier Qasim seized 
control of Baghdad. King Faisal and other members of the Iraqi 
royal family were murdered. Hussein, enraged and overcome by 
shock and grief, threatened to send the Jordanian army into Iraq 
to avenge Faisal's murder and restore the Arab Union. His civilian 
ministers, however, advised against taking this course. In Iraq the 
army and police supported the coup, and Qasim became president- 
dictator, taking Iraq out of the Arab Union and the Baghdad Pact. 

Jordan was isolated as never before. Hussein appealed both to 
the United States and to Britain for help. The United States insti- 
tuted an airlift of petroleum, and Britain flew troops into Amman 
to stabilize the regime. Ironically, these aircraft overflew Israel, 
because clearances for alternate routes over Arab countries could 



35 



Jordan: A Country Study 

not be obtained in time. These events in Iraq and Jordan coincid- 
ed with the landing of United States troops in Lebanon to bolster 
the regime there. 

For some weeks, the political atmosphere in Jordan was explo- 
sive, but the government kept order through limited martial law. 
The army continued its unquestioning loyalty to the king, and the 
Israeli frontier remained quiet. 

The ensuing two-year period of relative tranquility was broken 
in August 1960 when the pro-Western prime minister, Hazza al 
Majali who had been reappointed in May 1959, was killed by the 
explosion of a time bomb concealed in his desk. Analysts speculat- 
ed that the conspirators expected the killing to generate a public 
uprising. It had precisely the opposite effect; beduin troops who 
moved into Amman maintained order, and Hussein appointed a 
new conservative prime minister, Bahjat at Talhuni. The plot was 
traced to Syria and further identified with Cairo. Four suspects 
were caught, convicted, and hanged, and the army made a show 
of force. In June 1961, Talhuni was replaced by Wasfi at Tal to 
improve relations with Egypt, after Cairo implicated Amman for 
influencing Damascus' s decision to secede from the United Arab 
Republic. 

Development and Disaster 

By early 1964, Arab governments and Palestinian spokesmen 
had become alarmed by an Israeli project to draw water from Lake 
Tiberias to irrigate the Negev Desert. Nasser invited the Arab heads 
of state to attend a summit conference in Cairo in January 1964 
at which the principal issue was the Jordan water question. Despite 
Syria's militant rhetoric, the conference rejected the idea of provok- 
ing a war because — it was argued — the Arab states lacked a uni- 
fied military command. Instead, three alternative courses of action 
were approved: the diversion of the tributary sources of the Jor- 
dan River north of Lake Tiberias in Lebanon and Syria; the es- 
tablishment of the United Arab Command under an Egyptian 
commander; and the recognition of the new Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO), headed by a former Jerusalem lawyer, Ah- 
mad Shuqayri (also cited as Shukairi), as the representative of Pales- 
tinian resistance against Israel. The Cairo Conference of January 
1964 ended in an euphoric atmosphere of goodwill and brotherhood. 

Talhuni became prime minister for the second time in July 1964, 
pledging his government to implement the spirit of the Cairo Con- 
ference "according to the king's instructions." Jordan cultivated 
friendship with Egypt. In May 1965, Jordan joined nine other Arab 
states in breaking relations with the Federal Republic of Germany 



36 



Historical Setting 



(West Germany) because of its recognition of Israel. Jordan and 
Saudi Arabia signed an agreement in August defining for the first 
time the boundary between the two countries. Under this agree- 
ment, Jordan gave up some territory in the southeast but was able 
to gain an extension of about eighteen kilometers down the gulf 
from the crowded port of Al Aqabah. 

Almost from the start, trouble developed between the PLO and 
Hussein's government. Shuqayri, famous for his often hysterical 
political rhetoric, had organized the PLO in Jerusalem in 1964 with 
the objective of liberating Palestine in cooperation with all Arab 
states but without interfering in their internal affairs or claiming 
sovereignty in the West Bank. Conflict arose because the PLO at- 
tempted to assume quasi-governmental functions, such as taxing 
Palestinians and distributing arms to villagers in the West Bank 
and among the refugees, acts that infringed on Jordanian 
sovereignty. The guerrilla organization, Al Fatah, was formed in 
Damascus with Syrian assistance in December 1957, under the 
leadership of Yasir Arafat. 

Jordanian policy since 1949 had been to avoid border incidents 
and terrorism that would generate Israeli reprisals. Al Fatah and 
the PLO, however, carried out raids and sabotage against Israel 
without clearance from either the United Arab Command or Jor- 
dan. These attacks, although planned in Syria, most often were 
launched into Israel by infiltration through Lebanon or Jordan. 
Israeli reprisals against selected West Bank targets became harsh- 
er and more frequent from May 1965 onward. Meanwhile, Syri- 
an propaganda against Hussein became increasingly strident. In 
July 1966, when Hussein severed official endorsement and sup- 
port for the PLO, both that organization and the Syrian govern- 
ment turned against him. In reprisal for the terrorist attacks by 
the fedayeen (Palestinian guerrillas), in November Israel assault- 
ed the West Bank village of As Samu. Israel was censured by the 
UN, but public rioting against the Jordanian government broke 
out among the inhabitants of the West Bank. The levels of rioting 
exceeded any previous experience. As in the past, Hussein used 
the army to restore public order. Political pressure against Hus- 
sein mounted, however, along with armed clashes on the Syrian- 
Jordanian border. 

Tension also mounted on the Syria-Israel border, where a land 
and air engagement took place on April 7, 1967. Syria and Jordan 
severely criticized Egypt for failing to send support. In mid-May 
Egypt commenced an extensive military build-up in Sinai in 
response to Syrian allegations that Syria was in imminent danger 
of invasion by Israel. Nasser declared a state of emergency on 



37 



Jordan: A Country Study 

May 16 and two days later demanded removal of the United Na- 
tions Emergency Force (UNEF) from Sinai, where it had served 
as a peacekeeping force since 1957. The UN secretary general acced- 
ed to Nasser's demand. 

On May 23-24, Nasser announced the closure to Israeli ship- 
ping of the Strait of Tiran at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, 
a measure that Israel immediately declared to be an act of war. 
Hussein quickly decided that this time it would be impossible for 
Jordan to stay out of the impending conflict. He hurriedly proceeded 
to Cairo and on May 30 signed a military alliance with Egypt. Hus- 
sein's move represented a response to political pressures at home 
and the fulfillment of basic pan- Arab commitments. The alliance 
put the Jordanian army under the field command of an Egyptian 
general officer. 

On June 5, Israel launched a preemptive attack against Egyp- 
tian forces deployed in Sinai. The Israeli prime minister, Levi 
Eshkol, attempted in vain to contact Hussein through UN chan- 
nels to keep him out of the war. The Egyptian field marshal in overall 
command of Arab forces ordered Jordanian artillery to open fire 
on Israeli positions, and Jordan's small air force conducted a bomb- 
ing raid in the Tel Aviv area. Within hours, however, Israeli war- 
planes had effectively eliminated the Arab air forces on the ground. 
After only two days of combat, Jordan's main armored unit had 
been defeated. Hard fighting continued, as Hussein was determined 
to hold as much ground as possible in the event that a cease-fire 
was arranged. By the time he agreed to a truce on June 7, Israeli 
forces had seized the West Bank and the Old City of Jerusalem. 

Of all the Arab belligerents, Jordan, which could least afford 
it, lost most in the war. Government figures listed over 6,000 troops 
killed or missing. During the short war, about 224,000 refugees — 
many of whom had first been refugees from the 1948-49 war — 
fled from the West Bank to the East Bank. One-third to one-half 
of the country's best agricultural land and its main tourist attrac- 
tions were lost to Israel. On June 27, the Israeli parliament (Knesset) 
formally annexed the Old City of Jerusalem, an act that the United 
States and many other nations refused to recognize. 

The Guerrilla Crisis 

In the wake of the June 1967 War, Hussein's government faced 
the critical problems of repairing a shattered economy, providing 
for the welfare of the refugees, obtaining external aid, readjusting 
foreign policy, and rebuilding the armed forces. Internally, 
however, the major problem was the continuing confrontation with 
the several Palestinian guerrilla organizations. 



38 



Historical Setting 



The Arab League heads of state met in Khartoum at the end 
of August 1967. The conference reached four major decisions gener- 
ally considered to represent the views of Arab moderates: resump- 
tion of oil production, which some oil-producing states had 
suspended during the war; continued nonrecognition of and non- 
negotiation with Israel, individually and collectively; continued 
closure of the Suez Canal and the elimination of all foreign mili- 
tary bases in Arab territory; and provision of financial subsidies 
to Egypt and Jordan by Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Kuwait. The 
total annual subsidy promised for the indefinite future amounted 
to the equivalent of US$378 million, of which Jordan was to receive 
about US$112 million. Donor states at first regularly paid their 
shares in quarterly installments, but Libya and Kuwait withdrew 
their support to Jordan during the 1970-71 war between the Jor- 
danian government and the fedayeen. 

In addition to the Khartoum subsidies, Jordan also received 
grants from Qatar, and the shaykhdom of Abu Dhabi, and a spe- 
cial grant of US$42 million from Saudi Arabia for arms purchases. 
Aid also came from Britain and West Germany, with whom Jor- 
dan had resumed relations. Although direct United States aid had 
been terminated, substantial long-term government loans were ex- 
tended to Jordan for emergency relief, development, and military 
assistance. In February 1968, the United States resumed arms ship- 
ments to Jordan. Jordan narrowly averted financial disaster. 

After months of diplomatic wrangling, on November 22, 1967, 
the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 242 as a guideline 
for a Middle East settlement. The principal provisions of the reso- 
lution proclaimed the inadmissability of territorial acquisition by 
war; withdrawal of Israeli forces from areas occupied in the June 
1967 war; termination of all states of belligerency; acknowledgment 
of the sovereignty of all states in the area — including Israel — within 
secure and recognized boundaries; freedom of navigation on all 
international waterways in the area; and a just settlement of the 
refugee problem. Jordan, Egypt, and Israel all accepted this reso- 
lution in principle but each country interpreted it differently (see 
Relations with Arab States, ch. 4). 

King Hussein has been the most consistent advocate of UN Reso- 
lution 242. He viewed it as the most viable means by which the 
Palestinian problem could be resolved while also preserving an im- 
portant Jordanian role in the West Bank. 

The intractability of the Palestinian problem has been due in 
large part to the widely differing perspectives that evolved after 
the June 1967 War. For the Israelis, in the midst of the nationalist 
euphoria that followed the war, talk of exchanging newly captured 



39 



Jordan: A Country Study 

territories for peace had little public appeal. The government of 
Levi Eshkol followed a two-track policy with respect to the territo- 
ries that would continue under future Labor Party governments: 
on the one hand, it stated a willingness to negotiate, while on the 
other, it laid plans to create Jewish settlements in the disputed ter- 
ritories. Thus, immediately following the war, Eshkol stated that 
he was willing to negotiate " everything" for a full peace, which 
would include free passage through the Suez Canal and the Strait 
of Tiran and a solution to the refugee problem in the context of 
regional cooperation. This was followed in November 1967 with 
his acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 242. At the same 
time, Eshkol' s government announced plans for the resettlement 
of the Old City of Jerusalem and of the Etzion Bloc (kibbutzim 
on the Bethlehem- Hebron road wiped out by Palestinians in the 
1948-49 War), and for establishing kibbutzim in the northern sector 
of the Golan Heights. Plans also were unveiled for new neighbor- 
hoods around Jerusalem, near the old buildings of Hebrew Univer- 
sity and near the Hadassah Hospital on Mount Scopus. 

The 1967 defeat radicalized the Palestinians, who had looked 
to the Arab countries to defeat first the Yishuv (the Jewish com- 
munity of Palestine before 1948) and after 1948 the State of Is- 
rael, so that they could regain their homeland. The PLO had no 
role in the June 1967 War. After the succession of Arab failures 
in conventional warfare against Israel, however, the Palestinians 
decided to adopt guerrilla warfare tactics as the most effective 
method of attacking and defeating Israel. In February 1969, Arafat 
(who remained the leader of Al Fatah) became head of the PLO. 
By early 1970, at least seven guerrilla organizations were identi- 
fied in Jordan. One of the most important organizations was the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) led by 
George Habash. Although the PLO sought to integrate these var- 
ious groups and announced from time to time that this process had 
occurred, they were never effectively united (see The Palestinians 
and the PLO, ch. 4). 

At first by conviction and then by political necessity, Hussein sought 
accommodation with the fedayeen and provided training sites and 
assistance. In Jordan's internal politics, however, the main issue 
between 1967 and 1971 was the struggle between the government 
and the guerrilla organizations for political control of the country. 
Based in the refugee camps, the fedayeen virtually developed a state 
within a state, easily obtaining funds and arms from both the Arab 
states and Eastern Europe and openly flouting Jordanian law. 

As the guerrilla effort mounted, Israel retaliated quickly and with 
increasing effectiveness. In March 1968, an Israeli brigade attacked 



40 



Historical Setting 



the Jordanian village of Al Karamah, said to be the guerrilla capi- 
tal. Although the brigade inflicted damage, it was driven back and 
in the process suffered substantial losses. The incident boosted Pales- 
tinian morale and gave the PLO instant prestige within the Arab 
community. In reprisal, Israel launched heavy attacks on Irbid in 
June 1968 and on As Salt in August. It soon became obvious to 
the PLO that the generally open terrain of the West Bank did not 
provide the kind of cover needed for classic guerrilla operations. 
Moreover, the Palestinian population residing in the territories had 
not formed any significant armed resistance against the Israeli oc- 
cupation. By late 1968, the main fedayeen activities in Jordan 
seemed to shift from fighting Israel to attempts to overthrow 
Hussein. 

A major guerrilla- government confrontation occurred in Novem- 
ber 1968 when the government sought to disarm the refugee camps, 
but civil war was averted by a compromise that favored the Pales- 
tinians. The threat to Hussein's authority and the heavy Israeli 
reprisals that followed each guerrilla attack became a matter of grave 
concern to the King. His loyal beduin army attempted to suppress 
guerrila activity, which led to sporadic outbursts of fighting be- 
tween the fedayeen and the army during the first half of 1970. In 
June 1970, an Arab mediation committee intervened to halt two 
weeks of serious fighting between the two sides. 

In June Hussein designated Abd al Munim Rifai to head a 
"reconciliation" cabinet that included more opposition elements 
than any other government since that of Nabulsi in 1957. Although 
the composition of the cabinet maintained a traditional balance be- 
tween the East Bank and the West Bank, it included a majority 
of guerrilla sympathizers, particularly in the key portfolios of de- 
fense, foreign affairs, and interior. But the king's action did not 
reflect a new domestic policy; rather, it indicated Hussein's hope 
that a nationalist cabinet would support peace negotiations gener- 
ated by a proposed UN peace mission to be conducted by Gunnar 
Jarring. On June 9, 1970, Rifai and Arafat signed an agreement 
conciliatory to the fedayeen. According to its provisions, the govern- 
ment allowed the commandos freedom of movement within Jor- 
dan, agreed to refrain from antiguerrilla action, and expressed its 
support for the fedayeen in the battle against Israel. In return, the 
commandos pledged to remove their bases from Amman and other 
major cities, to withdraw armed personnel from the Jordanian cap- 
ital, and to show respect for law and order. 

Small-scale clashes continued throughout the summer of 1970, 
however; and by early September, the guerrilla groups controlled 
several strategic positions in Jordan, including the oil refinery near 



41 



Jordan: A Country Study 

Az Zarqa. Meanwhile, the fedayeen were also calling for a gener- 
al strike of the Jordanian population and were organizing a civil 
disobedience campaign. The situation became explosive when, as 
part of a guerrilla campaign to undermine the Jarring peace talks 
to which Egypt, Israel, and Jordan had agreed, the PFLP launched 
an airplane hijacking campaign. 

Within the space of two hours on September 6, PFLP gangs 
hijacked a TWA jet, a Swissair jet, and made an unsuccessful at- 
tempt to seize control of an El Al airplane. About two hours later, 
another PFLP group hijacked a Pan Am jet and forced the crew 
to fly to Beirut airport, where the airplane landed almost out of 
fuel. The next day the airliner was flown to the Cairo airport, where 
it was blown up only seconds after the 176 passengers and crew 
had completed their three-minute forced evacuation. 

King Hussein viewed the hijackings as a direct threat to his 
authority in Jordan. In response, on September 16 he reaffirmed 
martial law and named Brigadier Muhammad Daud to head a cabi- 
net composed of army officers. At the same time, the king appointed 
Field Marshal Habis al Majali, a fiercely proroyalist beduin, com- 
mander in chief of the armed forces and military governor of Jor- 
dan. Hussein gave Majali full powers to implement the martial 
law regulations and to quell the fedayeen. The new government 
immediately ordered the fedayeen to lay down their arms and to 
evacuate the cities. On the same day, Arafat became supreme com- 
mander of the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), the regular mili- 
tary force of the PLO. 

During a bitterly fought ten-day civil war, primarily between 
the PLA and Jordan Arab Army, Syria sent about 200 tanks to 
aid the fedayeen. On September 17, however, Iraq began a rapid 
withdrawal of its 12,000-man force stationed near Az Zarqa. The 
United States Navy dispatched the Sixth Fleet to the eastern 
Mediterranean, and Israel undertook "precautionary military 
deployments" to aid Hussein, if necessary, against the guerrilla 
forces. Under attack from the Jordanian army and in response to 
outside pressures, the Syrian forces began to withdraw from Jor- 
dan on September 24, having lost more than half their armor in 
fighting with the Jordanians. The fedayeen found themselves on 
the defensive throughout Jordan and agreed on September 25 to 
a cease-fire. At the urging of the Arab heads of state, Hussein and 
Arafat signed the cease-fire agreement in Cairo on September 27. 
The agreement called for rapid withdrawal of the guerrilla forces 
from Jordanian cities and towns to positions "appropriate" for con- 
tinuing the battle with Israel and for the release of prisoners by 
both sides. A supreme supervisory committee was to implement 



42 



Historical Setting 



the provisions of the agreement. On September 26, Hussein ap- 
pointed a new cabinet; however, army officers continued to head 
the key defense and interior ministries. 

On October 13, Hussein and Arafat signed a further agreement 
in Amman, under which the fedayeen were to recognize Jordani- 
an sovereignty and the king's authority, to withdraw their armed 
forces from towns and villages, and to refrain from carrying arms 
outside their camps. In return the government agreed to grant am- 
nesty to the fedayeen for incidents that had occurred during the 
civil war. 

The civil war caused great material destruction in Jordan, and 
the number of fighters killed on all sides was estimated as high as 
3,500. In spite of the September and October agreements, fight- 
ing continued, particularly in Amman, Irbid, and Jarash, where 
guerrilla forces had their main bases. Hussein appointed Wasfi at 
Tal as his new prime minister and minister of defense to head a 
cabinet of fifteen civilian and two military members. The cabinet 
also included seven Palestinians. Tal, known to be a staunch op- 
ponent of the guerrilla movement, was directed by Hussein to com- 
ply with the cease-fire agreements; furthermore, according to 
Hussein's written directive, the government's policy was to be based 
on ' 'the restoration of confidence between the Jordanian authori- 
ties and the Palestinian resistance movement, cooperation with the 
Arab states, the strengthening of national unity, striking with an 
iron hand at all persons spreading destructive rumors, paying special 
attention to the armed forces and the freeing of the Arab lands oc- 
cupied by Israel in the war of June 1967." The closing months 
of 1970 and the first six months of 1971 were marked by a series 
of broken agreements and by continued battles between the guer- 
rilla forces and the Jordanian army, which continued its drive to 
oust the fedayeen from the populated areas. 

Persistent pressure by the army compelled the fedayeen to with- 
draw from Amman in April 1971 . Feeling its existence threatened, 
Al Fatah abandoned its earlier posture of noninvolvement in the 
internal affairs of an Arab state and issued a statement demand- 
ing the overthrow of the Jordanian "puppet separatist authority." 
In a subsequent early May statement, it called for "national rule" 
in Jordan. Against this background of threats to his authority, Hus- 
sein struck at the remaining guerrilla forces in Jordan. 

In response to rumors that the PLO was planning to form a 
government-in-exile, Hussein in early June directed Tal to "deal 
conclusively and without hesitation with the plotters who want to 
establish a separate Palestinian state and destroy the unity of the 
Jordanian and Palestinian people." On July 13, the Jordanian 



43 



Jordan: A Country Study 

army undertook an offensive against fedayeen bases about fifty 
kilometers northwest of Amman in the Ajlun area — the fedayeen 's 
last stronghold. Tal announced that the Cairo and Amman agree- 
ments, which had regulated relations between the fedayeen and 
the Jordanian governments, were no longer operative. On July 19, 
the government announced that the remainder of the bases in north- 
ern Jordan had been destroyed and that 2,300 of the 2,500 fedayeen 
had been arrested. A few days later, many of the captured Pales- 
tinians were released either to leave for other Arab countries or 
to return to a peaceful life in Jordan. Hussein became virtually 
isolated from the rest of the Arab world, which accused him of harsh 
treatment of the fedayeen and denounced him as being responsi- 
ble for the deaths of so many of his fellow Arabs. 

In November members of the Black September terrorist group — 
who took their name from the civil war of September 1970 — avenged 
the deaths of fellow fedayeen by assassinating Prime Minister Tal 
in Cairo. In December the group again struck out against Hus- 
sein in an unsuccessful attempt on the life of the Jordanian ambas- 
sador to Britain. Hussein alleged that Libya's Colonel Muammar 
al Qadhafi was involved in a plot to overthrow the monarchy. 

In March 1973, Jordanian courts convicted seventeen Black Sep- 
tember fedayeen charged with plotting to kidnap the prime minister 
and other cabinet ministers and to hold them hostage in exchange 
for the release of a few hundred fedayeen captured during the civil 
war. Hussein subsequently commuted the death sentences to life 
imprisonment "for humanitarian reasons" and, in response to out- 
side Arab pressures, in September released the prisoners — including 
their leader Muhammad Daud Auda (also known as Abu Daud) — 
under a general amnesty. 

War and Diplomacy 

After his victory over the fedayeen, Hussein sought to reestab- 
lish his authority in the country and his image in the Arab world 
through the implementation of dynamic domestic and foreign poli- 
cies. In September 1971, he announced the formation of the Jor- 
danian National Union to serve as the nation's sole authorized 
political organization, representing — at least in theory — both banks 
of the Jordan. The union was not a political party in the traditional 
sense but, according to the king, would be used "as a melting pot 
for the Jordanian people." With the exception of communists, 
Marxists, and "other advocates of foreign ideologies," all citizens 
were eligible for membership within the union, which would "pro- 
vide constructive opposition from within its own ranks." 



44 



Historical Setting 



Hussein also introduced a plan for the creation of a federation 
to be called the United Arab Kingdom. Under the plan, the West 
Bank and the East Bank would become autonomous provinces 
within the sovereign Hashimite kingdom. Seats in the National 
Assembly would continue to be divided equally among represen- 
tatives of the two regions. The PLO repudiated the United Arab 
Kingdom and the Jordanian National Union, and neither plan was 
ever implemented. 

Hussein paid a state visit to the United States in February 1973 
during which President Richard M. Nixon assured him of his 
"firm . . . support for Jordan" and promised increased econom- 
ic and military aid. During interviews Hussein, who earlier had 
called for United States intervention to bring about a comprehen- 
sive Middle East settlement, reaffirmed that he contemplated no 
partial or separate agreements with Israel that would be prejudi- 
cial to Arab unity, but he left the door open for bilateral talks and 
condemned the PLO for its divisive influence. On his return to 
Amman, Hussein reemphasized that all of East Jerusalem must 
be returned but offered to put the holy places there under interna- 
tional supervision. 

At the Arab summit in Cairo in September 1973, a reconcilia- 
tion mediated by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia took place among 
Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, the "front-line" or confrontation states 
against Israel. On October 6, less than a month after the meeting, 
Egyptian and Syrian armies launched simultaneous attacks across 
the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights that caught the Israelis by 
surprise. After initially threatening to break through Israel's in- 
ner defenses, the Syrians were checked and then thrown back by 
an Israeli counteroffensive that drove to within thirty kilometers 
of the strong defense emplacements surrounding Damascus. By 
October 10, Jordan had mobilized nearly 70,000 men, forcing 
Israeli troops to deploy in the West Bank. Hussein did not open 
a third front against Israel, but he sent 3,000 Jordanian troops in 
two armored brigades to the Golan front on October 1 3 , and they 
saw limited action under Syrian command in fighting near Lake 
Tiberias. More than 25,000 regular Palestinian troops also were 
engaged under separate command. 

With the Arab armies in retreat, the Soviet Union called a spe- 
cial session of the UN Security Council on October 21 to impose 
an immediate cease-fire. Although accepted by Israel and Egypt, 
the cease-fire did not become effective for another three days. 
On the northern front, Israeli troops retained control of the Golan 
Heights, and in the southwest they had opened bridgeheads across 
the Suez Canal and occupied more than 1,500 square kilometers 



45 



Jordan: A Country Study 

of territory in Egypt. UN Security Council Resolution 338, sub- 
mitted on October 22, reiterated the Security Council's position 
on Israeli-occupied territory, first expressed in Resolution 242 in 
1967. 

At a postmortem on the fourth Arab-Israeli war held in Novem- 
ber in Algiers, the Jordanian representative stressed that the cease- 
fire did not mean peace and called again for Israel to evacuate the 
occupied territories that combined Arab forces had failed to win 
back in battle. Over Jordanian protests, the summit conference 
voted to recognize the PLO as the legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people. Hussein, who conceded in Amman that he did 
not claim to speak for the Palestinians, supported their right to self- 
determination — "but," he added, "only after the occupied terri- 
tories are liberated." 

Hussein stated on more than one occasion his willingness to leave 
the liberation of the West Bank to the PLO, but he pointedly boy- 
cotted a meeting with PLO officials in Cairo at which Egypt and 
Syria were expected to deal with the PLO as the "only legitimate 
representatives" of the Palestinian people — a position that Hus- 
sein admitted he had no alternative but to accept in practice. Presi- 
dent Anwar as Sadat of Egypt, however, warned the PLO that its 
refusal to cooperate with Hussein could lead to an Arab civil war 
on a broader scale than that of 1970-71. When the Palestinians 
refused to compromise their claim to total sovereignty in the West 
Bank, Hussein requested a postponement of the Arab summit 
scheduled for Rabat in October 1974. The purpose of the summit 
was to give formal recognition to the PLO's role. In an abrupt turn- 
about in policy, Egyptian foreign minister Ismail Fahmi respond- 
ed by declaring that Egypt now opposed the return of the West 
Bank to Jordan and accepted without reservation the PLO claim 
to represent the Palestinian people. 

The Rabat Summit Conference and After 

The Rabat Summit conference in October 1974 brought together 
the leaders of twenty Arab states, including Hussein, and represen- 
tatives of the PLO. PLO leaders threatened a walkout if their 
demands for unconditional recognition were not met. The PLO 
required a statement from the conference that any Palestinian 
territory liberated by Arab forces would be turned over to the 
"Palestinian people" as represented by their organization. Jordan 
protested, pointing out that recognition on these terms would give 
the PLO sovereignty over half of the population in the East Bank 
and that in fact the annexation of the West Bank had been approved 
by popular vote. 



46 



Historical Setting 



A compromise solution was adopted that nonetheless favored 
PLO interests. The conference formally acknowledged the right 
of the Palestinian people to a separate homeland but without specify- 
ing that its territory was restricted to the West Bank. Most impor- 
tant, the PLO was for the first time officially recognized by all the 
Arab states as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestini- 
an people." The Arab heads of state also called for close cooperation 
between the front-line states and the PLO but prohibited interfer- 
ence by other Arab states in Palestinian affairs. 

The Rabat Summit declaration conferred a mantle of legitima- 
cy on the PLO that was previously absent. It gave official Arab 
recognition to PLO territorial claims to the West Bank and un- 
ambiguously put the fate of the Palestinian people solely in the hands 
of the PLO. Hussein opposed the declaration, although he even- 
tually signed it under intense Arab pressure and after the Arab 
oil-producing states promised to provide Jordan with an annual 
subsidy of $US300 million. Despite his acquiescence to the Rabat 
declaration and subsequent statements in support of the PLO, Hus- 
sein persisted in viewing the declaration as an ambiguous docu- 
ment that was open to differing interpretations. The PLO, along 
with the rest of the Arab world, viewed Hussein's consent at Rabat 
as a renunciation of Jordanian claims to the West Bank. Hussein 
nonetheless continued to have aspirations concerning Jordanian 
control of the occupied territories. The wide gulf separating the 
two views was the major source of tension between the PLO and 
Jordan throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s. 

Following the Rabat Summit, the PLO scored an impressive 
political victory in the international arena. In late November 1974, 
the UN recognized PLO representation of the Palestinian people, 
and PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat addressed the General Assem- 
bly in Arabic, his pistol at his side. In addition, in a joint commu- 
nique issued the same month, President Gerald R. Ford of the 
United States and General Secretary of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev acknowledged the "legitimate 
interests" of the Palestinians in accordance with the UN resolu- 
tions. Nonetheless, a UN draft resolution in 1976 proposing to 
reaffirm the right of the Palestinians to self-determination — and 
including the right to establish an independent state — was vetoed 
in the Security Council by the United States, which called instead 
for a "reasonable and acceptable definition of Palestinian interests." 

After the Rabat Summit, Hussein stressed the need for Jorda- 
nian political self-sufficiency. He told his subjects, "A new reality 
exists and Jordan must adjust to it. The West Bank is no longer 
Jordanian." But having surrendered title to half his kingdom at 



47 



Jordan: A Country Study 

the behest of the Arab states, Hussein confessed concern that the 
East Bank might become a "substitute Palestine," swallowed up 
as the balance of political power there shifted to its Palestinian 
majority. 

The tone of Hussein's approach to the Palestinians in the East 
Bank changed markedly following the Rabat Summit. He advised 
that the resident Palestinians — estimated at 900,000 or more — 
must choose between Jordanian citizenship or Palestinian identi- 
ty. No attempt would be made to oust those who chose the latter, 
he said, and they would be permitted to remain in Jordan as 
"guests." He also insisted that any Palestinian choosing to keep 
his Jordanian citizenship must be allowed to do so without endan- 
gering his rights in the West Bank; he further promised that any 
Palestinian living in the East Bank who chose to identify his in- 
terests with those of the "Palestinian people" could do so without 
jeopardizing his rights as a Jordanian citizen. 

In response to the new political situation following the Rabat 
Summit, Hussein reorganized Jordan's political and administra- 
tive institutions. On November 9, he amended the Constitution 
to give the king authority to dissolve the House of Representatives 
(also called the Chamber of Deputies — see The Legislature, ch. 
4) and to delay elections as he saw fit. Using this constitutional 
prerogative, Hussein dissolved the lower house of the National 
Assembly — the elected House of Representatives — when it had 
completed its work on November 23. The House of Representa- 
tives, half of whose sixty members represented West Bank consti- 
tuencies, could no longer function without undermining the newly 
recognized representative status of the PLO. The Constitution was 
amended to provide for the indefinite postponement of elections 
for a new House of Representatives so as to avoid elections in the 
East Bank alone, which if held would have symbolized the final 
separation of the West Bank from Jordan. In addition to dissolv- 
ing the House of Representatives, Hussein directed Prime Minister 
Zaid ar Rifai to form a new government that did not include Pales- 
tinians from the West Bank. No move was made, however, to 
relieve Palestinians in the Jordanian army, where they composed 
one-third of the officer corps, albeit mostly in noncombatant func- 
tions (see Personnel: Composition, Recruitment, and Training, 
ch. 5). The government also continued to pay the salaries of 6,000 
civil servants and teachers in the West Bank, which amounted to 
about US$40 million a year. 

As a result of Hussein's partial reversal from the commitments 
made at Rabat, Jordanian-PLO relations deteriorated throughout 
much of 1975. At the year's end, however, the Palestine National 



48 




The Timna arches in the Wadi al Jayb, southern Jordan 

Council, meeting in Damascus, backed an effort to reconcile its 
differences with Hussein. The broadcast of antiregime propagan- 
da was temporarily suspended and, although PL A units remained 
stationed in Jordan in military camps, the PLO accepted restric- 
tions on its political and military presence there. At the Arab summit 
conference held at Cairo in January 1976, Jordan and the PLO 
once again were embroiled in a dispute over Jordan's role in 
negotiating an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. Jordan 
declared that it had no responsibility for negotiating such a with- 
drawal. In response, the PLO resumed its hostile propaganda short- 
ly after the meeting. 

In February 1976, Hussein summoned an extraordinary session 
of the National Assembly — attended by about half of the represen- 
tatives elected from the West Bank — to enact legislation enabling 
the king to postpone indefinitely the general elections scheduled 
for later in the month. The king's spokespersons explained that 
the action was necessary because of "compelling circumstances" 
that prevailed in the country. That same month, Hussein abolished 
the Jordanian National Union. 

In July Zaid ar Rifai, who had led the government since 1973, 
stepped down as prime minister. Hussein replaced him with Mu- 
dar Badran, chief of the royal court. The Badran government set 
up the Bureau of Occupied Homeland Affairs, headed by former 
members of parliament from West Bank constituencies, ostensibly 



49 



Jordan: A Country Study 

to coordinate and advise on relations with Palestinians in Israeli- 
occupied territory. The government also conducted discussions on 
the renewed possibility of some form of federation between the West 
Bank and the East Bank. The PLO charged that the newly created 
Bureau of Occupied Homeland Affairs had been formed to channel 
support to pro-Jordanian candidates in municipal elections to be held 
in the West Bank in April 1977. Badran denied these allegations and 
reaffirmed Jordan's commitment to the concept that the Palestini- 
ans themselves must decide the future of the West Bank. PLO-backed 
candidates won an overwhelming victory in the April elections. 

Relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization 

The recrudescent tension between Jordan and the PLO was symp- 
tomatic of their differing visions of an Arab-Israeli setdement. Jor- 
dan accepted UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 as the 
basis for any settlement, including the question of Palestinian na- 
tional rights. Within this framework, Jordan demanded total Is- 
raeli withdrawal from all territories occupied in 1967; a solution 
to the refugee problem either by repatriation or compensation; the 
right of Palestinians to self-determination; and mutual guarantees 
for peace. The PLO consistently rejected both 242 and 338 on the 
grounds that the Palestinian people are only mentioned in the reso- 
lutions as refugees and not as a people deserving a national home- 
land. 

On the issue of self-determination, Hussein agreed with the PLO 
that the Palestinians had the right to establish "a national and po- 
litical entity," but he refrained from giving his support to a fully 
independent Palestinian state, which he saw as a direct threat, par- 
ticularly if headed by the PLO. Moreover, he believed that if he 
could neutralize the PLO, the West Bank and Gaza Strip popula- 
tions would accept an arrangement based on his own federation plan. 

Despite his desire to be the primary Arab negotiator over the 
territories, Hussein also realized that his role in any future negoti- 
ations required a clear mandate from the Arab states. He could 
not deviate too far from the Arab consensus concerning the oc- 
cupied territories for fear of losing badly needed economic aid or 
instigating military attacks from Iraq and Syria. As a result, Hus- 
sein chose to participate in the proposed October 1 , 1977, Geneva 
Conference on the Middle East as a "confrontation state" but not 
as the representative of the Palestinians. 

Jordanian-Syrian Relations 

Despite along history of hostility, between 1975 and 1977 Jor- 
dan's major regional ally was Syria. During 1975 Jordan and 



50 



Historical Setting 



Syria agreed to coordinate their defense, foreign policy, econom- 
ic, information, education, and cultural activities. They established 
a joint military command to provide a single defensive line against 
Israel. Syria halted anti-Hussein propaganda and imposed restric- 
tions on Syrian-based Palestinian activities that might be consid- 
ered prejudicial to Jordan's sovereignty. 

The marked improvement in relations between Hussein and Syri- 
an president Hafiz al Assad primarily reflected a shared desire to 
minimize the role of the PLO in any future Middle East peace 
negotiations. Despite the commitments made at Rabat, neither Jor- 
dan nor Syria wanted the PLO to emerge from Middle East peace 
talks as leader of a proposed Palestinian national entity in the oc- 
cupied territories. Their opposition to the PLO, however, stemmed 
from very different sources. Jordan opposed the PLO because of 
conflicting territorial objectives; Hussein wanted to reintegrate the 
West Bank as a part of a pre- 196 7 Jordan. Assad opposed a PLO- 
led ministate because he feared that such an entity would reduce 
Syria's regional role and would significantly lessen the chances of 
Syria regaining the Golan Heights. At the same time, Damascus 
rejected Hussein's claims to the West Bank and vehemendy opposed 
any Jordanian attempts to reach a separate peace agreement with 
Israel. This position severely limited the flexibility of Jordanian 
diplomacy and ultimately divided Jordan and Syria. 

In 1975 Lebanon became engulfed in a bloody civil war that had 
major ramifications for the regional political balance. Like the Black 
September incident of 1970, the Lebanese Civil War pitted a rapidly 
expanding Palestinian political infrastructure against a sovereign 
Arab state. Between September 1970 and 1975, the Palestinians 
created in Lebanon a " state within a state." They had their own 
military establishment, an autonomous political structure, and 
separate collection of taxes. Unlike Jordan in 1970, however, Leb- 
anon had a weak and badly divided political structure. As a result, 
in the spring of 1975, after a number of skirmishes with Lebanese 
Christian militias, the Palestinians allied with an array of leftist 
Lebanese forces and began an offensive. In the spring of 1976, it 
appeared that the Palestinians and their leftist allies would win the 
fighting. President Assad, fearing a radical Palestinian force on 
Syria's southern border, entered the fray on the side of the Chris- 
tians and tilted the military balance in their favor. Jordan supported 
the Syrian intervention, fearing that a Palestinian victory would 
give the PLO a base of operations from which to destabilize the 
region. 

Jordan's relationship with Syria also improved as Jordan became 
increasingly disenchanted with its relationship with the United 



51 



Jordan: A Country Study 

States. Since the early 1970s, Jordan had negotiated for the pur- 
chase of a US$540 million air defense system from the United States 
to be financed by Saudi Arabia. When the United States Congress 
objected to the arms sale, Hussein commented that relations with 
his one-time sponsor had reached "a sad crossroads." In 1976, 
with Syrian encouragement, he traveled to Moscow to sound out 
the Soviet Union on its willingness to provide a similar system. 
In the face of persuasive American and Saudi lobbying, Hussein 
eventually opted to purchase the American Improved Hawk air 
defense system (see Military Cooperation with the United States, 
ch. 5). His trip to Moscow, however, marked a significant improve- 
ment in Jordanian-Soviet relations and was a factor in his deci- 
sion to support the concept of a Middle East peace conference 
attended by both the Soviet Union and the United States. 

The Camp David Accords and Inter-Arab Politics 

During the spring of 1977, the international climate strongly sup- 
ported some type of superpower-sanctioned settlement to the Arab- 
Israeli dispute. Newly elected United States president Jimmy Carter 
and Soviet leader Brezhnev advocated a comprehensive Arab-Israeli 
settlement that would include autonomy for the Palestinians. On 
October 1 , 1977, in preparation for a reconvened Geneva Confer- 
ence, the United States and the Soviet Union issued a joint state- 
ment committing themselves to a comprehensive settlement 
incorporating all parties concerned and all questions. The proposed 
summit, however, was preempted by events in Egypt. 

Jordan, like the rest of the Arab states, was taken by surprise 
by President Sadat's decision to travel to Jerusalem in November 
1977. Hussein, however, muted his criticism of the Egyptian presi- 
dent's historic trip and called on the Arab states to reserve judg- 
ment. The king feared that an outright rejection of the Egyptian 
initative might provoke an alienated Sadat to seek a separate agree- 
ment with Israel. He also saw many positive elements in Sadat's 
opening statement to the Knesset, such as his rejection of a separate 
settlement to the Palestinian problem, his emphasis on the need 
to find a solution to the Palestinian problem, the recognition of 
Jordan's special relationship with the West Bank, and the proposal 
to incorporate Jordan, rather than the PLO, into the peace process. 

Despite his enthusiasm for Sadat's speech, Hussein was reluc- 
tant to join the Egyptian-Israeli peace process. He feared that by 
joining the negotiations he would isolate Jordan in the Arab world, 
incur Syria's wrath, and potentially destabilize Palestinians on the 
East Bank with little possibility for Jordanian gains. Moreover, 



52 



Historical Setting 



Hussein did not want to represent Palestinian interests at such 
negotiations unless he had a clear Arab and Palestinian mandate 
to do so. 

The final version of the Camp David Accords signed by Egypti- 
an president Sadat, Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin, and 
United States president Carter separated the issues of the future 
of the West Bank and the return of Sinai. Whereas the sections 
dealing with the return of Sinai were very explicit, the sections on 
the West Bank were vague and open to various interpretations. 
They called for Egypt, Israel, and "the representatives of the Pales- 
tinian people to negotiate about the future of the West Bank and 
Gaza." A five-year period of "transitional autonomy" was called 
for "to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority." The 
agreement also called for peace talks between Israel and its other 
Arab neighbors, particularly Syria. 

The Camp David Accords fell far short of meeting even Jordan's 
minimal demands. Hussein expressed anger that Jordan was in- 
cluded in the Camp David framework without his prior knowledge 
or approval. He viewed the division of the accords into two agree- 
ments with no linkage between Israel's withdrawal from Sinai and 
progress on the Palestinian issue as a sign that Sadat was more 
interested in regaining Sinai than in brokering a viable peace set- 
tlement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Hussein was fur- 
ther alienated from the Camp David peace process because Israel 
refused to negotiate over East Jerusalem, insisted on its rights to 
establish settlements in the occupied territories, and reserved the 
right to demand sovereignty over those areas at the end of the tran- 
sition period. 

Following the signing of the Camp David Accords, Jordan ac- 
cepted an Iraqi invitation — accompanied by a US$30 million Iraqi 
grant — to attend the Baghdad Conference. The summit confer- 
ence's decision to allot to Jordan the relatively large sum of US$1 .25 
billion per year helped keep Jordan in the Arab fold. At the Bagh- 
dad Conference held in November 1978, the Arab states unequivo- 
cally rejected the Camp David Accords and officially ostracized 
Egypt from the Arab League. 

Jordanian- Egyptian relations deteriorated even further after the 
signing of the Treaty of Peace Between Egypt and Israel in March 
1979. The Israeli government's limited view of Palestinian auton- 
omy became apparent shortly after the peace treaty was signed. 
In April the Begin government approved two new settlements be- 
tween Ram Allah and Nabulus, established civilian regional councils 
for the Jewish setdements in the territories, and prepared autono- 
my plans in which Israel would keep exclusive control over the West 



53 



Jordan: A Country Study 



Bank's water, communications, roads, public order, and immigra- 
tion into the territories. The acceleration of settlements, the growth 
of an increasingly militaristic Jewish settier movement, and Israel's 
stated desire to retain complete control over resources in the terri- 
tories precluded the participation in the peace process of either 
moderate Palestinians, such as the newly formed National Guidance 
Committee composed of West Bank mayors, or of Hussein. The 
PLO refused from the beginning to participate in the peace process. 

In response, the Jordanian government recalled its ambassador 
from Cairo on March 28 and on April 1 it severed diplomatic re- 
lations with Egypt. Not all ties were broken, however; the Jorda- 
nian and Egyptian airlines still flew about ten flights a week between 
their respective cities and, most important, Egyptian workers in 
Jordan continued to enjoy the same status as before. The Jordani- 
an media and public officials intensified anti-Israel rhetoric, showing 
particular hostility toward the United States for supporting the ac- 
cords. Hussein's greatest fear was that, with Egypt removed from 
the Arab-Israeli military balance, Israel might be tempted to trans- 
form the East Bank into an "alternative homeland" for the Pales- 
tinians. Jordanian fears were fueled when, at the end of March 
1979, Israeli minister of agriculture Ariel Sharon issued a state- 
ment to the effect that the Palestinians ought to take over Jordan 
and establish a government there. 

Hussein, although fully backing the Baghdad accords, sought 
a very different objective than the more hard-line Arab states such 
as Syria and Iraq. His goal was not to punish Egypt or overthrow 
Sadat, but rather to set up an alternative strategy to the Camp David 
framework supported by an Arab consensus that would provide 
a more equitable and viable solution to the Middle East conflict. 
The essence of the Jordanian alternative was to return the Pales- 
tinian problem either to the UN Security Council or to the Gene- 
va Conference where all the relevant parties — including the United 
States, the Soviet Union, and the European Economic 
Community — could work together in reaching a comprehensive 
Middle East peace plan. 

Hussein's attempt to develop a united Arab stand did not suc- 
ceed. At the Tunis Summit of November 1979, in the face of strong 
Syrian objections, Hussein was unable to mobilize an Arab con- 
sensus behind an alternative to the Camp David Accords. Syrian 
president Assad's strong objections to Hussein's proposal marked 
the beginning of rapid deterioration in Syrian-Jordanian relations. 
Hussein was further rebuffed when Assad revived the Steadfast- 
ness and Confrontation Front consisting of Syria, Libya, Algeria, 
the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), and 



54 



Historical Setting 



the PLO. The Syrian leader accused Jordan of supporting Syrian 
elements of the Muslim Brotherhood, which had been involved in 
a series of attacks against his regime. Although Syria continued 
to be a major Soviet ally in the Middle East, Jordan joined nearly 
the entire Arab world in condemning the Soviet invasion of Af- 
ghanistan. Finally, Syria, unlike Jordan, was unwilling to partici- 
pate in any alternative to the Camp David Accords. 

Jordan in the 1980s 

The overthrow of the shah of Iran in February 1979 and the emer- 
gence of Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini caused grave 
concern in Amman. The vehement anti-Western, antimonarchi- 
cal, Islamic revolutionary fervor sweeping Iran throughout 1979 
cast a threatening shadow over Jordan. Not only was Hussein a 
monarch allied with the West, but also he had been a close ally 
of the shah for many years. 

The Islamic Revolution and a New Arab Alignment 

Hussein followed a two-track policy to counteract the looming 
Iranian threat. One track was domestic; the other, foreign. Domes- 
tically, he made a more concerted effort to appear religiously ob- 
servant in public and to emphasize Islam in the day-to-day life of 
Jordan. He also increased financial support for mosques and Is- 
lamic charities and encouraged the payment of zakat (the Muslim 
religious tax) by exempting those who paid it during the month 
of Ramadan from 25 percent of their income tax. In addition, dur- 
ing the month of Ramadan some of the provincial governors closed 
down bars and night clubs on some religious holidays and banned 
films described as obscene. 

For most of his reign, Hussein had appeased the Muslim Brother- 
hood and other Islamic groups in Jordan as a way of counterbalanc- 
ing the more radical and, in his view, more destabilizing groups 
such as the communists, Baathists, and Nasserists. Although the 
Muslim Brotherhood came out in support of the Islamic Revolu- 
tion in Iran, the organization in Jordan was not prepared to 
challenge openly the authority of the Hashimite regime that op- 
posed the Iranian Revolution. 

Hussein altered Jordan's Arab alignments in response to the new 
regional balance of power caused by the Islamic Revolution in Iran, 
the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and the growing rift with Syria. 
The focus of Jordan's new regional outlook was improved rela- 
tions with Iraq. Both countries saw ominous implications in the 
developments in Iran. Moreover, with Egypt no longer in the Arab 
fold, Jordan sought an Arab military alliance capable of deterring 



55 



Jordan: A Country Study 

a more militaristic regime in Israel from meddling in Jordanian 
affairs. Hussein also needed Iraqi support to stave off the Syrian 
threat, which had grown significantly during 1980. Finally, Bagh- 
dad and Amman feared the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and 
its implications for the regional balance of power. 

After a series of high-level meetings in the early 1980s, a wide 
range of exchanges took place . Iraq greatly increased economic as- 
sistance to Jordan and discussed a possible project for supplying 
Jordan with water from the Euphrates. The outbreak of the Iran- 
Iraq War in September 1980 further tightened relations. From the 
beginning of the war, Jordan was the most outspoken of the Arab 
states supporting Iraq. The Iraqi connection became increasingly 
important as tensions mounted between Jordan and Syria. Between 
September 1980 and late 1981, Jordan reportedly received US$400 
million in economic aid from Iraq. In October 1981, an Iraqi- 
Jordanian Joint Committee for Economic and Technical Cooper- 
ation was set up. Jordan's most demonstrative act of support for 
the Iraqi war effort occurred in January 1982 when Hussein an- 
nounced the formation of the Yarmuk Brigade, a Jordanian force 
of volunteers that pledged to fight for Iraq. 

Throughout 1982, as Iran scored significant victories in the Iran- 
Iraq War, Jordan substantially increased its support to Iraq. Al 
Aqabah replaced the besieged Iraqi port of Basra as Iraq's major 
marine transportation point. During 1981 and 1982, the turmoil 
besetting the Arab states both benefited and threatened Jordan. 
Egypt, the most populous and militarily strongest Arab country, 
was ostracized; Syria faced serious domestic unrest and a growing 
rebellion in Lebanon; Iraq seemed to be losing its war with Iran 
and was in danger of losing strategically important territory in the 
south; Syria and Iraq were hostile to each other; and the Persian 
Gulf states were suffering from the downturn in world oil prices. 
The weakness of the other Arab states enabled Jordan to play a 
more important role in Arab politics and allowed Hussein to pur- 
sue a more flexible regional diplomacy. 

Jordan's improved status in the Arab world resulted in Amman 
hosting its first Arab summit in November 1981. Hussein report- 
edly hoped to obtain a breakthrough on the Palestinian question 
and to mobilize support for the Iraqi war effort. The summit, 
however, was boycotted by members of the Steadfastness and Con- 
frontation Front led by Syria. In addition, Syria had massed troops 
on the Jordanian border. Hussein countered by mobilizing a force 
of equal strength on the Syrian border. Although the situation was 
eventually defused through Saudi mediation efforts, the potential 
for future Syrian -Jordanian conflict remained. 



56 



Historical Setting 



In Search of a Solution to the Palestinian Problem 

Jordan's relations with the PLO have reflected the conflicting 
territorial claims of the Palestinians and Jordan. Since the June 
1967 War, both the PLO and Jordan have staked claims to the 
West Bank and East Jerusalem. Although Hussein and the PLO, 
like the rest of the Arab world, have rejected Israeli suzerainty over 
the territories, they differed widely on how the occupied territo- 
ries should be administered and by whom. 

Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, Jordan asserted its 
role in the lives of West Bank Palestinians in various ways. Jor- 
dan distributed financial assistance, oversaw the freedom of move- 
ment of people and merchandise across the bridges of the Jordan 
River, assumed the role of protector of the rights of the popula- 
tion under Israeli occupation, and sought the condemnation of Is- 
rael in the international community for alleged acts of injustice 
against the people of the West Bank. Beginning in 1979, individu- 
als from the West Bank, like other Jordanian citizens, were required 
to obtain new identity cards to benefit from Jordanian government 
services and to obtain Jordanian passports. Mutual mistrust, 
however, had prevented agreement between Jordan and the PLO 
on any form of long-term political cooperation beyond the joint 
distribution of funds to the occupied territories. 

Jordanians, however, remained adamantiy opposed to the feda- 
yeen reestablishing bases in Jordan from which to launch guerrilla 
operations against Israel. Hussein feared that Israel, maintain- 
ing a distinct military advantage over the badly divided Arab states, 
would launch punishing reprisal raids against Jordan if guerril- 
la operations were to resume. This appraisal was strongly rein- 
forced by the Israeli air raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in June 
1981. 

During the second half of 1980, talk of the so-called "Jordanian 
option" revived because of the approaching elections in Israel, Presi- 
dent Ronald Reagan's election victory in the United States, and 
talk of a new European initiative in the Middle East. On the sur- 
face, the Jordanian option resembled Hussein's version of a set- 
tlement with Israel; it envisioned Jordan acting as the major Arab 
interlocutor in a peace settlement with Israel. Jordan, however, 
could not outwardly appear as if it were breaking away from the 
Arab fold and usurping Palestinian prerogatives, unless it were likely 
that concessions made by Jordan would be reciprocated by Israel. 
Given the right-wing Likud government in power in Israel, Hus- 
sein surmised that such Israeli territorial concessions would not be 
forthcoming. 



57 



Jordan: A Country Study 

As a result, Jordan's public posture on the Palestinian question 
was ambiguous. In public statements acknowledging PLO represen- 
tation of the Palestinian people Hussein frequently emphasized the 
important role Jordan had played in the Palestinian struggle against 
Israel. Moreover, he rarely identified the PLO as the "sole" legiti- 
mate representative of the Palestinians. 

Economic Austerity 

Since the creation of Transjordan in 1921, the nation had de- 
pended on external economic aid. This dependence rendered it eco- 
nomically vulnerable. For many years the economy was underwrit- 
ten by Britain. By the early 1950s, after Jordan had officially 
annexed the West Bank, foreign aid accounted for 60 percent of 
government revenues. The crucial event for the Jordanian econo- 
my, as it was for the Arab world as a whole, was the quadrupling 
of world oil prices that followed the October 1973 War. Possess- 
ing little oil of its own, Jordan nonetheless became inexorably linked 
to the volatile world oil market. Between 1973 and 1981, direct 
Arab budget support rose more than sixteen-fold, from US$71.8 
million to US$1,179 billion. In the same period, the value of Jor- 
danian exports jumped almost thirteen-fold, from US$57.6 mil- 
lion to US$734.9 million. In addition, Jordan sent to the Persian 
Gulf states an estimated 350,000 doctors, engineers, teachers, and 
construction workers who by 1981 had sent back home more than 
US$1 billion. Even after deducting the outward flow of dinars from 
the 125,000 foreign workers inside Jordan holding agricultural and 
unskilled jobs, net worker remittances rose from US$15 million 
in 1970 to US$900 million in 1981 (see Structure and Dynamics 
of the Economy, ch. 3). 

The accelerated pace of economic growth fueled by the oil price 
increases of the 1970s also caused inflation and growing import 
bills. Most important for Jordan, the economic boom years of the 
1970s raised popular expectations of continued economic prosperity. 
As a result, when world oil prices began spiraling downward in 
the early 1980s, the government halted many large-scale construc- 
tion projects, slashed food and other subsidies, and significantly 
reduced public employment. These actions stirred public dissatis- 
faction. 

Hussein's response to the rise in public discontent was to ease 
restrictions on the political process. First, in 1981 he increased mem- 
bership of the National Consultative Council (NCC) from sixty 
to seventy-five. The NCC had been created in April 1978 to fulfill 
the legislative functions of the dissolved House of Representatives. 
The NCC, however, was empowered only to debate and discuss 



58 



Historical Setting 



bills and had no authority to make laws. As a result, the enlarge- 
ment of the NCC's membership did not appease the opposition 
seeking democratic reforms. In addition, in March 1982 a new 
weekly publication, Al Ufuq (Horizons), campaigned for greater 
democratic freedom and for the reestablishment of political par- 
ties banned since 1957 (see Political Dissent and Political Repres- 
sion, ch. 4). Two political groups were formed: the Arab 
Constitutional Alignment and the Arab National group. Both 
groups called for greater public participation in the affairs of state. 

The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon 

The June 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon significantly altered 
Jordan's geostrategic position. Israel's willingness to remove PLO 
bases from Lebanon by force, despite widespread international criti- 
cism, raised apprehensions that Israel might launch an offensive 
against Jordan. The Arab states, weakened by internal rivalries, 
the Iran-Iraq War, and Egypt's isolation, did not respond force- 
fully to the Israeli actions. Hussein viewed the Lebanon invasion 
as part of a pattern of more aggressive Israeli policies that includ- 
ed the 1981 bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor, confrontations 
with Syria, and an ambitious settlement policy in the occupied ter- 
ritories. The government of Menachem Begin, unlike its predeces- 
sors, was willing to use force to attain its territorial objectives. This 
led to concerns that Israel might have designs on Jordan, or that 
the PLO, after having its major base of operations in Lebanon de- 
stroyed, might attempt to reestablish itself in Jordan. Hussein also 
feared that Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank was rapid- 
ly reducing the chances of an acceptable settlement there. 

To many Middle East experts, the increase in settlements, their 
strategic location, the militancy of many of the Israeli settlers, the 
rise of religious nationalism inside the political mainstream in Israel, 
and the expansionary views of the Likud leadership lent urgency 
to the need to reach a negotiated settlement. Jordan hoped to con- 
vince the Reagan administration to push policy makers in Jerusa- 
lem toward an acceptable peace settlement. 

On September 1, 1982, President Reagan launched the Rea- 
gan Plan. Hussein applauded the new American proposal, seeing 
in it a clear break from the Camp David framework. In announc- 
ing the new plan, Reagan stated that "it was the firm view of the 
United States that self-government by the Palestinians of the West 
Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan offers the best chance 
for a durable and lasting peace, ' ' specifying that the United States 
would not support the establishment of a Palestinian state. The 



59 



Jordan: A Country Study 

Reagan Plan also stressed UN Resolution 242, stating that the reso- 
lution applied to all fronts, including the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip, and that the final status of Jerusalem should be decided 
through negotiation. 

The war in Lebanon and the publication of the Reagan Plan 
ushered in a new symbiosis in Jordanian-PLO relations. Hussein 
needed PLO acceptance of Jordan's participation in the peace 
process in the framework of the Reagan Plan; PLO chairman Yasir 
Arafat, considerably weakened by the PLO's devastating defeat 
in the war in Lebanon, needed Jordanian support to gain access 
to the political process. In October 1982, Hussein and Arafat be- 
gan a series of meetings designed to formulate a joint response to 
the Reagan Plan. These negotiations centered around the forma- 
tion of a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to future peace talks, 
and—because neither Israel nor the United States recognized the 
PLO-6n the extent to which the PLO would be directiy associated 
with this delegation. Jordan proposed that the PLO appoint West 
Bank residents who were not members of the PLO to represent 
the Palestinians. In November 1982, agreement was reached on 
the formation of a Higher Jordanian-Palestinian Committee headed 
by Prime Minister Mudar Badran and Arafat. 

Because of conflicting objectives sought by Arafat and Hussein, 
the joint Palestinian-Jordanian committee never materialized. 
Whereas Hussein saw the proposed confederation as a means to 
reestablish Jordanian control over the West Bank, Arafat viewed 
the negotiations as a means to gain PLO sovereignty over the oc- 
cupied territories. In addition, Hussein and Arafat required evi- 
dence that Washington was willing to pressure Israel to make 
significant territorial concessions. Meanwhile, Israeli troops still 
occupied part of southern Lebanon, and the Israeli government 
had not made any commitments on the settiement issue. Moreover, 
given Iran's recent victories in its war with Iraq, tensions with Syria, 
and a depressed world oil market, Hussein could not isolate Jor- 
dan by unilaterally participating in the Reagan Plan without some 
show of Israeli flexibility. 

Following Hussein's decision in April 1983 not to join the Rea- 
gan Plan, Jordan increasingly criticized Washington's inability to 
apply pressure on Israel to halt settlements in the West Bank. United 
States-Jordanian relations were further strained in May 1983 when 
the Reagan administration lifted a ban on the sale of F- 1 6 aircraft 
to Israel. The ban had been imposed to pressure Israel to with- 
draw its forces from Lebanon. The United States opposed a Jor- 
danian draft resolution submitted to the UN Security Council in 
July 1983 asserting the illegality of Israeli settlement activity in the 



60 



Historical Setting 



West Bank, and relations between the two countries were further 
soured by the signing in November 1983 of a new agreement on 
strategic cooperation between Israel and the United States. 

Syria emerged from the war in Lebanon as a pivotal regional 
power, able and willing to play a role in the affairs of neighboring 
Arab states. Whereas Syrian power was on the rise, Jordan's most 
powerful Arab ally, Iraq, seemed to be losing its costly war with 
Iran. Hussein tried to counterbalance the Syrian threat by mak- 
ing overtures to President Husni Mubarak of Egypt, but did not 
yet reestablish diplomatic relations. Hussein hoped that Mubarak, 
who had replaced Sadat after the latter' s assassination in Septem- 
ber 1981, would bring Egypt back into the Arab fold after Sinai 
was returned to Egypt in September 1982. 

High-level talks between Egypt and Jordan occurred regularly 
throughout 1983 and 1984. In addition, Egyptian newspapers, 
banned in Jordan after the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, were al- 
lowed into the country in October 1983. Also, Jordan and Egypt 
signed a trade protocol in December 1983 and discussed the ex- 
pansion of scientific and agricultural cooperation. Finally, in Sep- 
tember 1984, Jordan officially announced the resumption of 
diplomatic relations with Egypt. 

* * * 

Philip K. Hitti's History of the Arabs from the Earliest Times to the 
Present is a classic survey of the subject by an eminent historian. 
Much material on the origin and development of the Transjorda- 
nian amirate is found in J.C. Hurewitz's The Struggle for Palestine 
and Christopher Sykes's Crossroads to Israel, 1917-1948. For a scho- 
larly analysis of the growth of Arab nationalism, see Zeine N. 
Zeine's The Emergence of Arab Nationalism and The Struggle for Arab 
Independence, which may be used to supplement George Antonius's 
more familiar The Arab Awakening. Glubb's Legion, by Godfrey Lias, 
is a sympathetic, popular treatment of the activities of the Arab 
Legion. Sir John Bagot Glubb's memoir, A Soldier with the Arabs, 
is both entertaining and informative. Another firsthand British ac- 
count of Jordan's historical development is Charles Johnston's The 
Brink of Jordan. Both King Abdullah and his grandson, Hussein, 
have provided readable memoirs that can be studied profitably in 
conjunction with more objective scholarly works. Peter Snow, a 
British journalist, has written the most accessible biography of 
Hussein. 

Two excellent scholarly books focusing on Britain's role in the 
development of Jordan were published in the late 1980s. These are 



61 



Jordan: A Country Study 

Mary C. Wilson's King Abdullah, Britain, and the Making of Jordan 
and Avi Shlaim's highly controversial Collusion Across the Jordan, 
which depicts secret Zionist- Hashimite collaboration over the final 
settlement of Palestine. Another useful work covering the early his- 
tory of Jordan is Uriel Dann's Studies in the History of Transjordan, 
1920-1949. Avi Plascov's The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan, 
1948-1957 offers an interesting analysis of the Palestinian refugee 
problem. 

A solid general survey of Jordan is Peter Gubser's Jordan. The 
Jordan sections in the Middle East Contemporary Survey provide fair- 
ly detailed coverage of political and economic events. Robert B. 
Satloff s Troubles on the East Bank: Challenges to the Domestic Stability 
of Jordan focuses on the more recent history of Jordan. Bernard 
Avishai's articles on Jordan in the New York Review of Books during 
the early 1980s provide keen insights into contemporary Jordani- 
an history. (For further information and complete citations, see 
Bibliography.) 



62 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 



Mosaic of a gazelle from a Byzantine church in Amman, ca. 500-700 



WHEN THE AMIRATE of Transjordan was created by the Brit- 
ish in 1921, the vast majority of the people consisted of an assort- 
ment of tribally organized and tribally oriented groups, some of 
whom were sedentary cultivators and some nomadic or semino- 
madic. The total population was fewer than 400,000 people. By 
1988 nearly 3,000,000 people, more than half of whom were Pales- 
tinians, inhabited the region east of the Jordan River-Dead Sea- 
Gulf of Aqaba line, referred to as the East Bank (see Glossary). 
The term Palestinians refers narrowly to citizens of the British man- 
dated territory of Palestine (1922-48). In general usage, however, 
the term has come to refer to Muslims or Christians indigenous 
to the region between the Egyptian Sinai and Lebanon and west 
of the Jordan River-Dead Sea-Gulf of Aqaba line who identify them- 
selves primarily as Palestinians. Narrowly defined, the term Trans- 
jordanian referred to a citizen of the Amirate of Transjordan 
(1921-46). Generally speaking, however, a Transjordanian was con- 
sidered a Muslim or Christian indigenous to the East Bank region, 
which was within the approximate boundaries of the contemporary 
state of Jordan. The formerly rural society of Jordan had been trans- 
formed since independence into an increasingly urban one; by 1985 
nearly 70 percent of the population resided in urban centers that 
were growing at an annual rate of between 4 and 5 percent. 

In the late 1980s, class polarization was increasingly evident. 
Nonetheless, a variety of social forces (such as national identity 
and regional or tribal affiliation) continued to cut across class lines. 
The uprooting of so many East Bank citizens from their places of 
origin contributed to social fragmentation. In addition to the Pales- 
tinians, who retained a strong sense of national identity and out- 
rage at the loss of their homeland, many Transjordanians had 
migrated from their rural and/or desert villages to urban centers 
in search of work for themselves and education for their children. 
Many Transjordanians thus shared a sense of loss and rootiessness. 

Probably the most important force supporting cohesion and in- 
tegration was the Arab-Islamic cultural tradition common to all 
but a few members of the society. Arabic, a potent force for unity 
throughout the Middle East, was the mother tongue of the over- 
whelming majority of residents. Also, more than 90 percent of the 
population adhered to Sunni (see Glossary) Islam. These common- 
alities, although important, have been insufficient to forge an in- 
tegrated society. 



65 



Jordan: A Country Study 

Every year since the late 1950s, increasing numbers of Jordan's 
youth have received formal training in the country's rapidly ex- 
panding education system. By the late 1980s, all children aged six 
years to twelve years were attending free and compulsory primary 
schools. Nearly 80 percent of children between the ages of thir- 
teen and fifteen attended three-year preparatory schools, also free 
and compulsory. But possession of an education, once a near cer- 
tain vehicle for upward mobility, no longer guaranteed employ- 
ment. Unemployment was probably one of the most critical issues 
facing Jordan in the late 1980s. It was accompanied by growing 
political frustration and radicalization over the Palestinian upris- 
ing (intifadah) in the Israeli-occupied West Bank (see Glossary). 

Geography 

The territory of Jordan covers about 91,880 square kilometers. 
Until 1988, when King Hussein relinquished Jordan's claim to the 
West Bank, that area was considered part of Jordan, although only 
officially recognized as such by Britain and Pakistan. At that time 
the West Bank — which encompasses about 5,880 square kilometers — 
had been under Israeli occupation since the June 1967 War between 
Israel and the states of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. 

Jordan is landlocked except at its southern extremity, where near- 
ly twenty- six kilometers of shoreline along the Gulf of Aqaba pro- 
vide access to the Red Sea. A great north-south geological rift, 
forming the depression of Lake Tiberias (Sea of Galilee), the Jor- 
dan Valley, and the Dead Sea, is the dominant topographical 
feature. 

Boundaries 

Except for small sections of the borders with Israel and Syria, 
Jordan's international boundaries do not follow well-defined natural 
features of the terrain. The country's boundaries were established 
by various international agreements, and, with the obvious excep- 
tion of the border with Israel, none was in dispute in early 1989. 

The de jure border with Israel is based on the Armistice line 
agreed on in April 1949 by Israel and what was then Transjordan, 
following negotiations held under the auspices of a United Nations 
(UN) mediator. In general, the border represents the battle posi- 
tions held by Transjordanian and Israeli forces when a cease-fire 
went into effect and has no relation to economic or administrative 
factors. Until the Israeli occupation of the West Bank that occurred 
during the June 1967 War (also known as the Six-Day War), the 
demarcation line divided the city of Jerusalem, with Jordan hold- 
ing the Old City and most of the holy places. 



66 



The Society and Its Environment 



Jordan's boundaries with Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia do not 
have the special significance that the border with Israel does; these 
borders have not always hampered tribal nomads in their move- 
ments, yet for a few groups borders did separate them from tradi- 
tional grazing areas and water sources. By the time political 
boundaries were drawn across the deserts around Transjordan af- 
ter World War I, most of the nomadic tribes in that region had 
long-established areas lying within the confines of the new state. 
To accommodate the few cases where tribal peoples traditionally 
had moved back and forth across the country's borders, agreements 
with neighboring countries recognized the principle of freedom of 
grazing and provided for a continuation of migratory practices, 
subject to certain regulations. 

The border between Jordan and Saudi Arabia (only partially 
delimited by a series of agreements between Britain and the govern- 
ment of what eventually became Saudi Arabia) was first formally 
defined in the Hadda Agreement of 1925. In 1965 Jordan and Saudi 
Arabia concluded a bilateral agreement that realigned and delimited 
the boundary. The realignment resulted in some exchange of ter- 
ritory, and Jordan's coastline on the Gulf of Aqaba was length- 
ened by about eighteen kilometers. The new boundary enabled 
Jordan to expand its port facilities and established a zone in which 
the two parties agreed to share petroleum revenues equally if oil 
were discovered. The agreement also protected the pasturage and 
watering rights of nomadic tribes inside the exchanged territories. 

Topography 

The country consists mainly of a plateau between 700 and 1 ,000 
meters high, divided into ridges by valleys and gorges, and a few 
mountainous areas. Fractures of the earth's surface are evident in 
the great geological rift that extends southward from the Jordan 
Valley through the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea, gradually dis- 
appearing south of the lake country of East Africa. Although an 
earthquake-prone region, as of early 1989 no severe shocks had 
been recorded for several centuries. 

By far the greatest part of the East Bank is desert, displaying 
the land forms and other features associated with great aridity. Most 
of this land is part of the great Syrian (or North Arabian) Desert 
(see fig. 4). There are broad expanses of sand and dunes, particu- 
larly in the south and southeast, together with salt flats. Occasion- 
al jumbles of sandstone hills or low mountains support only meager 
and stunted vegetation that thrives for a short period after the scanty 
winter rains. These areas support little life and are the least popu- 
lated regions of Jordan. 



67 



Jordan: A Country Study 

The drainage network is coarse and incised. In many areas the 
relief provides no eventual outlet to the sea, so that sedimentary 
deposits accumulate in basins where moisture evaporates or is ab- 
sorbed in the ground. Toward the depression in the western part 
of the East Bank, the desert rises gradually into the Jordanian 
Highlands — a steppe country of high, deeply cut limestone plateaus 
with an average elevation of about 900 meters. Occasional sum- 
mits in this region reach 1,200 meters in the northern part and 
exceed 1 ,700 meters in the southern part; the highest peak is Jabal 
Ramm at 1 ,754 meters. These highlands are an area of long-settled 
villages. Until about the 1940s, persons living in these villages de- 
pended upon rain-fed agriculture for their livelihood. 

The western edge of this plateau country forms an escarpment 
along the eastern side of the Jordan River-Dead Sea depression 
and its continuation south of the Dead Sea. Most of the wadis that 
provide drainage from the plateau country into the depression carry 
water only during the short season of winter rains. Sharply incised 
with deep, canyonlike walls, the wadis, whether wet or dry, can 
be formidable obstacles to travel. 

The Jordan River is short, but from its mountain headwaters 
(approximately 160 kilometers north of the river's mouth at the 
Dead Sea) the riverbed drops from an elevation of about 3,000 
meters above sea level to more than 400 meters below sea level. 
Before reaching Jordanian territory the river forms Lake Tiber- 
ias, the surface of which is 212 meters below sea level. The Jordan 
River's principal tributary is the Yarmuk River. Near the junc- 
tion of the two rivers, the Yarmuk forms the boundary between 
Israel on the northwest, Syria on the northeast, and Jordan on the 
south. The Az Zarqa River, the second main tributary of the Jor- 
dan River, rises and empties entirely within the East Bank. 

A 380-kilometer-long rift valley runs from the Yarmuk River 
in the north to Al Aqabah in the south. The northern part, from 
the Yarmuk River to the Dead Sea, is commonly known as the 
Jordan Valley. It is divided into eastern and western parts by the 
Jordan River. Bordered by a steep escarpment on both the eastern 
and the western side, the valley reaches a maximum width of 
twenty-two kilometers at some points. The valley is properly known 
as the Al Ghawr (the depression, or valley, also seen as Al Ghor; 
see Water, ch. 3). 

The rift valley on the southern side of the Dead Sea is known 
as the Southern Ghawr and the Wadi al Jayb (popularly known 
as the Wadi al Arabah). The Southern Ghawr runs from Wadi 
al Hammah, on the south side of the Dead Sea, to Ghawr Faya, 
about twenty-five kilometers south of the Dead Sea. Wadi al Jayb 



68 



The Society and Its Environment 



is 180 kilometers long, from the southern shore of the Dead Sea 
to Al Aqabah in the south. The valley floor varies in level. In the 
south, it reaches its lowest level at the Dead Sea (more than 400 
meters below sea level), rising in the north to just above sea level. 
Evaporation from the sea is extreme because of year-round high 
temperatures. The water contains about 250 grams of dissolved 
salts per liter at the surface and reaches the saturation point at 1 10 
meters. 

The Dead Sea occupies the deepest depression on the land sur- 
face of the earth. The depth of the depression is accentuated by 
the surrounding mountains and highlands that rise to elevations 
of 800 to 1,200 meters above sea level. The sea's greatest depth 
is about 430 meters, and it thus reaches a point more than 825 
meters below sea level. A drop in the level of the sea has caused 
the former Lisan Peninsula to become a land bridge dividing the 
sea into separate northern and southern basins. 

Climate 

The major characteristic of the climate is the contrast between 
a relatively rainy season from November to April and very dry 
weather for the rest of the year. With hot, dry, uniform summers 
and cool, variable winters during which practically all of the precipi- 
tation occurs, the country has a Mediterranean-style climate. In 
general, the farther inland from the Mediterranean Sea a given 
part of the country lies, the greater are the seasonal contrasts in 
temperature and the less rainfall. Atmospheric pressures during 
the summer months are relatively uniform, whereas the winter 
months bring a succession of marked low pressure areas and ac- 
companying cold fronts. These cyclonic disturbances generally move 
eastward from over the Mediterranean Sea several times a month 
and result in sporadic precipitation. 

Most of the East Bank receives less than twelve centimeters of 
rain a year and may be classified as a dry desert or steppe region. 
Where the ground rises to form the highlands east of the Jordan 
Valley, precipitation increases to around thirty centimeters in the 
south and fifty or more centimeters in the north. The Jordan Val- 
ley, lying in the lee of high ground on the West Bank, forms a nar- 
row climatic zone that annually receives up to thirty centimeters 
of rain in the northern reaches; rain dwindles to less than twelve 
centimeters at the head of the Dead Sea. 

The country's long summer reaches a peak during August. Janu- 
ary is usually the coolest month. The fairly wide ranges of tem- 
perature during a twenty-four-hour period are greatest during 
the summer months and have a tendency to increase with higher 



71 



Jordan: A Country Study 

elevation and distance from the Mediterranean seacoast. Daytime 
temperatures during the summer months frequently exceed 36°C 
and average about 32 °C. In contrast, the winter months — 
November to April — bring moderately cool and sometimes cold 
weather, averaging about 13°C. Except in the rift depression, frost 
is fairly common during the winter, and it occasionally snows in 
Amman. 

For a month or so before and after the summer dry season, hot, 
dry air from the desert, drawn by low pressure, produces strong 
winds from the south or southeast that sometimes reach gale force. 
Known in the Middle East by various names, including the kham- 
sin, this dry, sirocco-style wind is usually accompanied by great 
dust clouds. Its onset is heralded by a hazy sky, a falling barome- 
ter, and a drop in relative humidity to about 10 percent. Within 
a few hours there may be a 10°C to 15°C rise in temperature. These 
windstorms ordinarily last a day or so, cause much discomfort, and 
destroy crops by desiccating them. 

The shammal, another wind of some significance, comes from 
the north or northwest, generally at intervals between June and 
September. Remarkably steady during daytime hours but becom- 
ing a breeze at night, the shammal may blow for as long as nine 
days out of ten and then repeat the process. It originates as a dry 
continental mass of polar air that is warmed as it passes over the 
Eurasian landmass. The dryness allows intense heating of the earth's 
surface by the sun, resulting in high daytime temperatures that 
moderate after sunset. 

Population 

Official Jordanian statistics gave a 1987 population figure of 
2,896,800 for the East Bank. A 1982 population of 2,399,300 thus 
indicated an annual growth rate of between 3.6 and 4 percent. Unit- 
ed Nations statistics projected a peak in the annual growth rate 
at 4. 1 1 percent in the period from 1990 to 1995, followed by a steady 
decline to 2.88 percent in 2020. 

Rapid development in the provision of health care services dur- 
ing the 1970s and 1980s led to a decline in the crude death rate 
from 17 per 1,000 population in 1965 to 7 per 1,000 population 
by 1986 (see Health and Welfare, this ch.). During the same peri- 
od, the infant mortality rate, a major indicator of a country's de- 
velopment and health status, dropped from 115 to 46 per 1,000 
live births. In 1986 life expectancy at birth was sixty-five years (sixty- 
three for males and sixty-seven for females). The lowered death 
rate, a high birth rate, and lowered infant mortality rate combined 
to generate a major demographic problem in the late 1980s. At 



72 



The Society and Its Environment 



the end of the decade, more than half Jordan's population was 
below fifteen years of age (see fig. 5). This situation strained the 
country's already limited resources, and employment for the bur- 
geoning group of young people became increasingly difficult to 
provide. 

Accurate demographic figures were difficult to compile because 
of the substantial number of Jordanians residing and working 
abroad and the continuous flow of West Bank Palestinians with 
Jordanian passports back and forth between the East and West 
banks. According to the United Nations Relief and Works Agen- 
cy (UNRWA) for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, about 
224,000 people were admitted to UNRWA refugee camps in the 
East Bank immediately after the June 1967 War. In 1986 UNRWA 
cited 826,128 registered refugees living on the East Bank, of whom 
about 205,000 were living in refugee camps. 

The exact number of Palestinians living on the East Bank was 
unknown. Estimates usually ranged from 60 to 70 percent of the 
total population. Official government statistics did not distinguish 
between East Bank and West Bank Jordanians (see Palestinians, 
this ch.). 

The government did not have an officially articulated popula- 
tion policy or birth control program. Rather, in 1979 it adopted 
a ' 4 child spacing program" that was designed to improve the health 
of mother and child but not specifically to lower the fertility rate. 
This noninterventionist approach considered family planning to 
be one component of an integrated maternal-child health and 
primary health care program. Government clinics and private med- 
ical services delivered family planning services upon request, and 
contraceptives were widely available at low cost. In 1987 there were 
116 maternal-child health care centers — up from 93 in 1983 — 
providing prenatal and postnatal care and a wide range of birth 
control information. 

Jordan's high population growth can be attributed primarily to 
high fertility rates. In 1986 the World Bank (see Glossary) calcu- 
lated this rate as 6.0 births for each woman over the span of her 
reproductive years, one of the highest fertility rates in the region. 
This rate was projected to decline to 4.2 births by the year 2000. 
The fertility rate varied, however, between women residing in rural 
and urban areas and according to educational attainment. Edu- 
cated women tended to marry at a slightly older age than unedu- 
cated women, and this delay contributed to a lower fertility rate. 
Urban women achieved lower fertility rates through modern 
methods of contraception, particularly the pill. Fertility rates were 
lowest in Amman, higher in smaller urban areas such as Irbid 



73 



Jordan: A Country Study 



AGE-GROUP 



70 and over 












65-69 












60-64 












55-59 




MALES 




FEMALES 




50-54 






■ssss ■ 






45-49 












40-44 












35-39 












30-34 












25-29 












20-24 








15-19 








10-14 




5-9 




0-4 





300 200 1 00 1 00 200 300 

POPULATION IN THOUSANDS 



Source: Based on information from Jordan, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 
1987, Amman, 1988, 18. 

Figure 5. Population of the East Bank by Age and Sex, 1987 

and Az Zarqa, and highest in rural areas. In rural areas modern 
contraceptive usage was lower, although breast-feeding, which 
serves to delay the return of fertility, was extended for a longer 
period than in the cities. World Bank data indicated that 27 per- 
cent of married women of child-bearing age were using contracep- 
tion in the 1980s. 

A woman was expected to have to bear five children, including 
at least two sons, in fairly rapid succession. Women gained status 
and security in their marital household by bearing children. Accord- 
ing to a study conducted in the early 1980s by Jordanian anthro- 
pologists Seteney Shami and Lucine Taminian in a poor, squatter 
area in Amman, reproductive behavior was subject to several fac- 
tors. If a woman had given birth to two or more sons, she might 
begin to space her pregnancies or stop bearing children for a while. 
Household structure — nuclear, extended, or multiple family — also 
appeared to be a crucial factor in determining fertility. The presence 
of other women in a household encouraged women to bear more 
children to improve their relative position in the household. 

The overall population density for the East Bank in 1987 was 
established at about thirty persons per square kilometer. There was 
wide regional variation and the rate of urbanization was high. East 



74 



The Society and Its Environment 



of Al Mafraq, in an area encompassing almost two- thirds of the 
country, no towns had a population of more than 10,000. The bulk 
of Jordan's population was centered in the governorate of Amman 
and the smaller urban areas of Irbid, As Salt, and Az Zarqa. The 
1987 population totals of the eight governorates ranged from 
1,203,000 in Amman to 101,000 in the Maan Governorate. Ac- 
cording to World Bank figures, about 70 percent of the popula- 
tion lived in urban areas. The nation's capital, Amman, accounted 
Tor more than one-third of the total population. Rapid urbaniza- 
tion appeared to be the result of a high fertility rate and rural-urban 
migration. If urbanization continued at the high annual rate of 4 
to 5 percent, it was estimated that by the year 2000, nearly three- 
fourths of the population could be living in Amman, Az Zarqa, 
Irbid, As Salt, and Ar Ramtha. 

The remainder of the population resided in villages scattered in 
an uneven pattern throughout Jordan. The nomadic and semino- 
madic population was very small, at most 2 to 3 percent of the popu- 
lation. The clearest concentrations of villages were in the fertile 
northwest corner and the Jordan Valley. Village size varied marked- 
ly from region to region. At one time, size related to the produc- 
tive capacity of the surrounding farmland. Larger villages were 
located in the more fertile, generally irrigated regions where fami- 
ly members could reach their fields with relative ease. While vil- 
lage populations continued to grow, rural-urban migration drained 
off a steady stream of young men and sometimes whole families. 
Villages provided litde employment for their residents, and agricul- 
ture as a way of life had declined precipitously since the 1950s. 

Camps of nomadic and seminomadic beduins still existed in the 
late 1980s. Nomadic tribes were found mainly in the desert area 
east of a line from Al Mafraq to Maan. The area, about 400 kilo- 
meters long and 250 kilometers wide, is known as the badiya (pi., 
bawaadi, meaning desert or semidesert). Seminomadic beduins were 
located in the Al Ghawr and near Irbid. These seminomads 
descended to the Jordan Valley in the winter because of its warm 
climate and grazing ground for their herds. Traditionally, many 
of these seminomads also farmed plots of land in the valley. In the 
summer, they moved their herds up into the hills to avoid the in- 
tense heat. 

The native inhabitants of the Jordan Valley are known as Al 
Ghawarna, or people of Al Ghawr. Prior to the June 1967 War, 
the valley was home to about 60,000 people engaged in agricul- 
ture and pastoralism. In 1971 the population had declined to 5,000 
as a result of the June 1967 War and the 1970-71 conflict between 
the Palestinian guerrillas and the Jordanian armed forces (see The 



75 



Jordan: A Country Study 

Guerrilla Crisis, ch. 1). By 1979, however, the population had 
reached 85,000 as a result of government development efforts 
designed to attract people to settle in this area. 

Refugee camps emerged in the wake of the Arab-Israeli War 
of 1948. The original refugee settlements were tent camps, but in 
most places tents were replaced by rows of galvanized steel, alu- 
minum, and asbestos shelters. There were initially five refugee 
camps — Irbid, Az Zarqa, Amman New (Al Wahdat), Al Karamah 
(later dismantled), and Jabal al Hussein — but six additional emer- 
gency camps were established for refugees from the June 1967 
War — Al Hisn, Suf, Jarash, Baqah, Talbiyah, and Marka. Most 
of the camps were located near major cities in the northwest (see 
fig. 6). 

The Organization of Society: Cohesion and Conflict 

In the pre- 1948 East Bank, the dominant sociopolitical order was 
tribalism. Tribalism was characteristic not only of the beduin 
nomads and seminomads upon whom the Hashimite (also seen as 
Hashemite) rulers relied for support, but also of many of the vil- 
lage people and even those who were technically urban. After 1948 
this sociocultural system was inundated by masses of Palestinians, 
largely sedentary village and town dwellers, many of them literate 
and well educated. The sheer numbers of Palestinians who came 
to the East Bank after 1948 and the comparatively simple econo- 
my and society of the indigenous Transjordanians made the as- 
similation of the Palestinians to the local patterns improbable. 
Indeed, some analysts have argued that by the early 1970s Pales- 
tinians had established a cultural dominance in the East Bank. In 
any case, by the late 1980s, Palestinians had considerable economic 
and cultural influence. 

Jordanians responded in part to the development of Palestinian 
economic and cultural elites by upgrading education. By the late 
1980s, the gap between Transjordanian and Palestinian educational 
achievements had narrowed considerably. Jordan's position also 
was changing in the global political economy. Agriculture and 
nomadism had gradually given way to more viable livelihoods based 
on skilled labor, secular education, and increasing levels of litera- 
cy. Labor migration, particularly of the skilled and educated, was 
a key factor in social mobility in the 1970s and 1980s. A concomi- 
tant shift in values was apparent: prestige was increasingly associat- 
ed with modern occupations, and education came to be seen as 
the key to social mobility. 

Aside from the fundamental distinction between Jordanians of East 
Bank origin and those of Palestinian origin, other sociocultural 



76 



The Society and Its Environment 



distinctions or affiliations were evident in Jordanian society, in- 
cluding ethnic and regional origins, gender, class, tribe, religion, 
and life-style (e.g., nomadic, village, or urban). These various pat- 
terns of affiliations structured the ways in which Jordanians relat- 
ed to one another and gave rise to different sorts of individual 
identity. For example, most Christian Jordanians were Arabs and 
shared many cultural habits and values with Muslim Jordanians. 
Their sense of identity, however, was based less on Islamic in- 
fluences than that of Muslim Jordanians. Christians interacted daily 
with Muslims, working, studying, and socializing together. But 
intermarriage between Muslims and Christians remained infrequent 
in the late 1980s. Little information was available on the extent 
to which these social interactions contributed to conflict or tension. 
The most that observers could conclude was that religious differ- 
ences carried a potential for conflict. 

Class structure in Jordan was exceedingly difficult to assess. 
Many social divisions, such as East Bank or Palestinian origins and 
identity, tribal affiliation, ethnicity, and rural or urban lifestyle, 
cut across class divisions. The forces of the political economy in 
the late 1970s and 1980s were forging embryonic classes; however, 
it was debatable to what extent they were self-conscious and co- 
hesive. 

Class structure in Jordan resembled a pyramid. At the top was 
a small, wealthy group comprising large landowners, industrialists, 
leading financial figures, and members of their families. The oil 
boom of the 1970s and early 1980s also had created a new class 
of wealthy Jordanians who made large amounts of money abroad, 
which was displayed by conspicuous consumption at home in Jor- 
dan. Just below this group were professionals, army officers, and 
government officials who lived a somewhat less grand but still com- 
fortable life. White-collar workers, schoolteachers, and returning 
migrants struggled to retain a style of life that separated them so- 
cially from the small shopkeepers and artisans below them. At the 
bottom of the pyramid, a large lower class included increasing num- 
bers of the unemployed. The system of family support tended to 
cushion unemployed university graduates and professionals from 
falling into the ranks of the poor. 

Ethnicity and Language 

In the late 1980s, several ethnic and religious groups coexisted 
on the East Bank. Roughly 5 to 8 percent of the total population 
were Christians (see Religious Minorities, this ch.). Of these, most 
were Arabs, including a small number — unique among Chris- 
tians in the Middle East — who recently had been pastoral nomads. 



77 



Jordan: A Country Study 




Figure 6. United Nations Relief and Works Agency Camps in Jordan, 1989 

The largest group of non-Arab Christians were the Armenians, 
perhaps 1 percent of the population, who resided primarily in Ir- 
bid and Amman. 

The Circassians, a Sunni Muslim community of approximately 

78 



The Society and Its Environment 



25,000 people, were descendants of families brought from the region 
of the Caucasus Mountains when Caucasian territory was ceded 
to Russia in the 1880s. By encouraging the Circassians to settle 
in northern Jordan, the Ottomans sought to provide an element 
loyal to the sultan that could counterbalance the beduins. Circas- 
sians originally settled in Amman and the then-abandoned city of 
Jarash. Despite their small numbers, they have long been impor- 
tant in government, business, and the military and security forces. 
In 1938, for example, Circassians constituted 7.3 percent of the 
non-British government officials in Transjordan. Twenty-six of the 
thirty-three cabinets between 1947 and 1965 included one or more 
Circassians. Circassian families included prominent landowners 
and leaders in commerce and industry. Peter Gubser, a United 
States authority on Jordan, contended in 1983 that the Circassi- 
ans were not ' 'politically assertive as a group, ' ' although they were 
known for "their loyalty to the Hashemites." It is likely, however, 
that their relative cultural and economic importance diminished 
with the increasing predominance of the Palestinians, on the one 
hand, and the improved education level of the Jordanians, on the 
other. The Circassians remained heavily represented in senior mili- 
tary ranks, however, which caused some resentment among other 
Jordanians. All Circassians spoke Arabic, and the rate of inter- 
marriage between Arab Jordanians and Circassians was high. 

Another, much smaller group originating in the Caucasus was 
the Shishans (also seen as Chechens), whose roughly 2,000 mem- 
bers were Shia (see Glossary) Muslims, the only representatives 
of this branch of Islam in Jordan. Another religious minority were 
small numbers of Arabic-speaking Druze villagers. A few Arabic- 
speaking Kurds lived in several northern villages. 

A category of immigrants different from the Palestinian refu- 
gees may be noted. Between the early 1920s and the late 1940s, 
some hundreds of families, perhaps more, settled in Transjordan, 
having left Palestine, Syria, and the Hijaz region in Saudi Ara- 
bia. Arabs, and usually Sunni Muslims, they were nevertheless 
only partially integrated into the local communities in which they 
lived. This incomplete assimilation occurred in part because they 
were foreigners in the context of the tribal structure of such com- 
munities, and in part because, as merchants, most were looked at 
askance by tribally oriented groups. Generally, they tended to marry 
among themselves or with persons of similar origin. In the 1980s, 
however, most of these families had lived in the East Bank for nearly 
three generations, and the tribal system that had excluded them 
had become less significant within the society. 



79 



Jordan: A Country Study 

All Jordanians, regardless of ethnicity or religion, speak Ara- 
bic, the official language of Jordan. Throughout the Arab world, 
the language exists in three forms: the classical Arabic of the Qu- 
ran, the literary language developed from the classical and known 
as Modern Standard Arabic, and the local form of the spoken lan- 
guage. Modern Standard Arabic has virtually the same structure 
wherever it is used, although its pronunciation and lexicon may 
vary locally. Educated Arabs tend to know two forms of Arabic — 
Modern Standard Arabic and their own dialect of spoken Arabic. 
Even uneducated Arabic speakers usually can comprehend the 
general meaning of something said in Modern Standard Arabic 
although they cannot speak it themselves and often have difficulty 
understanding specific expressions. Classical Arabic is known chiefly 
to scholars; many people have memorized Quranic phrases by rote 
but cannot speak the classic form. 

Dialects of spoken Arabic vary gready throughout the Arab world. 
Most Jordanians speak a dialect common to Syria, Lebanon, 
Jordan, and parts of Iraq and, like people speaking other dialects, 
they proudly regard theirs as the best. (Small numbers of nomads 
traversing Jordan from Saudi Arabia may speak a dialect akin to 
one used in that country.) Few people believe that their dialect is 
actually good Arabic in the sense of conforming to the ideal. 
Although they converse in colloquial Arabic, they generally agree 
that the written form of Modern Standard Arabic is superior to 
the spoken form because it is closer to the perfection of the Quran- 
ic language. Arabs generally believe that the speech of the beduins 
resembles the purer classical form most closely and that the local 
dialects used by the settled villagers and townspeople are unfor- 
tunate corruptions. 

Within a given region, slight differences in speech distinguish 
a city dweller from a villager and more significant ones distinguish 
either of these from a nomad. Even within the villages, various 
quarters often display unique pronunciations, idioms, and vocabu- 
lary specialized to particular lifestyles. Grammatical structure may 
differ as well. 

Arabic is a Semitic language related to Aramaic, Hebrew, vari- 
ous Ethiopic languages, and others. Rich in synonyms, rhythmic, 
highly expressive and poetic, Arabic can have a strong emotional 
effect on its speakers and listeners. As the language of the Quran, 
believed by Muslims to be the literal word of God, it has been the 
vehicle for recounting the historic glories of Islamic civilization. Ara- 
bic speakers are more emotionally attached to their language than 
are most peoples to their native tongues. Poetic eloquence was one 
of the most admired cultural attainments and signs of cultivation 



80 



The Society and Its Environment 



in the Arab world, among rural people, sedentary and nomadic, 
as well as among literate city dwellers. Arabic speakers long have 
striven to display an extensive command of traditional phrases and 
locutions. Beauty of expression was highly valued, and the speak- 
er and writer traditionally sought an elaboration and circumlocu- 
tion in«both spoken and written forms that Westerners might find 
flowery or verbose. 

Tribes and Tribalism 

Before the events of the post- World War II period thrust it onto 
the center stage of international affairs, the territory that is now 
the East Bank was first a provincial backwater of the Ottoman Em- 
pire and later a small and weak desert amirate. Straddling the tran- 
sitional area between the ■ 'desert and the sown," it participated 
only marginally in the social and intellectual changes that began 
sweeping the Arab world during the nineteenth century (see Otto- 
man Rule, ch. 1). Although ringed by the hinterlands of such major 
cities as Jerusalem and Damascus, Jordan lacked a significant ur- 
ban center of its own until the late 1940s; consequendy, it did not 
display artistically, intellectually, commercially, or governmentally 
the sophisticated form of Arab culture characteristic of urban life. 
The basic form of social organization in Transjordan was tribal, 
and the social relations among the various nomadic and semino- 
madic tribes and between them and villagers (many of whom were 
also tribally organized) were based on trade and the exchange of 
tribute for protection. 

In 1983 Gubser classified Jordanians along a continuum: no- 
madic, seminomadic, semisedentary, and sedentary. Nomads, or 
beduins, were a fully nomadic group whose livelihood was based 
on camel herding. Tribes and animals existed in a symbiotic rela- 
tionship; the camels supplied much of the food and other needs 
of the beduins, while the tribespeople assured the animals' survival 
by locating and guiding them to adequate pasturage. This fine adap- 
tation to an extremely demanding ecological niche required a 
versatile, portable technology that was, in its way, extremely 
sophisticated. It also required a high degree of specialized knowledge 
and a flexible social structure that could be expanded and contracted 
according to need. The beduins, however, were also dependent 
upon settled communities — villages, towns, and cities — for trad- 
ing animals and their products for goods they did not produce. 

Tribal social structure, as described by tribal members, was based 
on the ramification of patrilineal ties among men. In reality, 
matrilineal ties also were significant in providing access to material 



81 



Jordan: A Country Study 

and social resources. The ideological dimension to patrilineality 
became more apparent when endogamy, or marriage within the 
group, was considered. The preference for endogamy — historically 
prevalent in the Middle East, especially for paternal cousin mar- 
riage in the first instance and then in descending levels of 
relatedness — gives rise to a network of kin relations that are both 
maternal and paternal at the same time. Ultimately, the kinship 
system takes on many characteristics of a bilateral system. De- 
scent and inheritance, however, are traced in a patrilineal fashion. 

Tribes in Jordan were groups of related families claiming de- 
scent from a supposed founding ancestor. Within this overall loyalty, 
however, descent from intermediate ancestors defined several lev- 
els of smaller groups within each tribe. Tribespeople described their 
system as segmentary; that is, the tribe resembled a pyramid com- 
posed of ascending segments, or levels, each of which was both a 
political and a social group. At some point, each unit automatical- 
ly contained within it all units of the lower level. Ideally, in the 
event of conflict, segments would unite in an orderly fashion from 
the lowest level to the highest as conflict escalated. In reality, the 
system was not so orderly; tribal segments underwent fission, and 
in the event of conflict, fusion did not necessarily follow the ideal 
pattern. The pattern of unity was much more varied and complex. 

Beduins traditionally have placed great importance on the con- 
cept of honor (ird). Slight or injury to a member of a tribal group 
was an injury to all members of that group; likewise, all members 
were responsible for the actions of a fellow tribal member. Honor 
inhered in the family or tribe and in the individual as the represen- 
tative of the family or tribe. Slights were to be erased by appropri- 
ate revenge or through mediation to reach reconciliation based on 
adequate recompense. 

Beduins had specific areas for winter and summer camping that 
were known to be the territory of a specific tribe. Seminomadic 
groups raised sheep and goats and moved much shorter, well- 
defined distances; they also practiced some agriculture. But the 
semisedentary groups were more involved in agriculture than either 
nomads or seminomadic peoples. Parts of a semisedentary group 
moved during different seasons, while others in the group remained 
in permanent abodes. 

By the 1980s, these differences among beduin groups were 
minimal. Substantial numbers of nomads and seminomads had in- 
creasingly adopted a sedentary way of life. In his 1981 study of 
one section of the Bani Sakhar tribe, Joseph Hiatt noted that set- 
dement began in the post-World War I period and expanded rapidly 
after the mid-1950s. In this case and many others, sedentarization 



82 



King Talal Dam, Jordan River Valley 



was neither completely voluntary nor a result of an official settle- 
ment policy. Rather, it appeared to be a natural response to chang- 
ing political and economic circumstances, particularly the formation 
and consolidation of the state. In some cases, the administrative 
policies of the state disrupted the nomads' traditional pastoral econ- 
omy. For example, national borders separated the nomads from 
grazing lands and permanent wells. The creation of a standing army 
that recruited nomads diluted labor once available for herding. Edu- 
cation had a similar effect. As the nomads took up agriculture and 
as private titles to land were granted, the nomads' traditional rela- 
tionship to tribal territory decreased. Faced with these obstacles 
to a pastoral way of life, nomads increasingly chose alternative oc- 
cupations, particularly in the military, and the sedentarization 
process accelerated. 

Government policies encouraged settlement by providing school- 
ing, medical services, and the development of water resources. The 
decrease in the number of nomads continued despite the influx of 
pastoralists from the Negev Desert after the founding of Israel. By 
the early 1970s, the beduin tribes constituted no more than 5 per- 
cent of Jordan's population. That proportion had dwindled to less 
than 3 percent by the late 1970s. Their small numbers, however, 
did not correspond to their cultural and political importance in Jordan. 

Despite the near-disappearance of the nomadic way of life, tri- 
bal social structure and organization have not necessarily been 



83 



Jordan: A Country Study 

transformed as drastically. Hiatt contended that tribal organization 
actually was reinforced during the initial process of sedentarization 
because the tribe itself was the basis for allocation of land. Lead- 
ership patterns have changed significantly, however, as govern- 
ment-appointed officials have assumed many of the tasks formerly 
associated with the position of shaykh (see Glossary). In the end, 
tribal social structure was weakened; individual tides to land, which 
can be rented or sold to outsiders, and individual employment dilut- 
ed lineage solidarity and cohesiveness. 

Some indication of the recent status and aspirations of beduin 
groups, both settled and nomadic, was provided by a 1978 survey 
by a team from the University of Jordan. Among the beduins 
studied, males increasingly were engaged in more or less seden- 
tary occupations. Many were in the government or the army. The 
researchers found that most beduin parents wanted a different way 
of life for their children. Willingness to setde was contingent upon 
settlement being more advantageous than the nomadic way of life. 
For the beduins, settlement often meant a continued association 
with livestock raising and its attendant requirements of access to 
food and water. These hopes and wishes seemed to be consistent 
with the government's strategy for a revitalized livestock (sheep 
and goat) industry. 

The beduin attitude toward education was two-sided and reflected 
the difficulty of adapting to a new way of life. Early observers not- 
ed that an army career tended to motivate beduins to acquire an 
education. Some, such as the French ethnographer Joseph Chel- 
hod, argued that "an educated beduin means an abandoned tent." 
Implied was abandonment of the entire beduin way of life. Many 
beduin parents interviewed in the 1978 survey were concerned that 
the education of their children beyond a certain level would threaten 
the survival of the family. They feared that "an educated child 
would naturally emigrate to work or pursue further studies in Am- 
man or even outside the country." At the same time, these par- 
ents acknowledged that "the best future of their children lay in 
education and in living and working in a settled society close to 
the country's urban centers. " It is not altogether clear whether the 
beduins who have acquired enough education for an ordinary career 
in the army have abandoned their allegiance to their families and 
tribes or whether they have permanently rejected the beduin style 
of life. 

Jordan was unique among primarily sedentary Middle Eastern 
countries in that, at least until the mid-1970s, the Hashimite govern- 
ment gained its most significant political support from the beduin 
tribes. Mindful of the intensely personal nature of his ties with the 



84 



The Society and Its Environment 



beduins, Hussein visited them often, socializing in their tents and 
playing the role of paramount tribal shaykh. People of beduin ori- 
gin constituted a disproportionate share of the army; that dispropor- 
tion continued to prevail at the higher command levels in the 
mid-1980s (see The Military in National Life, ch. 5). The oppor- 
tunity for a lucrative, secure career that also carried high prestige 
and conformed to traditional martial tribal attitudes has for over 
half a century drawn recruits from the desert, first into the Arab 
Legion under the British and later into its successor force, the Jor- 
dan Arab Army. Army service was an important influence for so- 
cial change among nomadic tribes because it fostered desire for 
education and often provided the wherewithal for adaptations to 
factors affecting the pastoral economy. For example, army pay could 
permit a beduin family to buy a truck as a substitute for or in ad- 
dition to camels, or to invest in the economically more significant 
sheep. 

Observers in the 1980s noted that a process of detribalization 
was taking place in Jordan, whereby the impact of tribal affiliation 
on the individual's sense of identity was declining. Sedentariza- 
tion and education were prime forces in this process. Smaller 
groups, such as the extended family and clan, were gradually replac- 
ing tribes as primary reference groups. The weakening of tribal 
affiliation and identity led to the questioning of support for the 
Hashimite regime. Tribal shaykhs no longer could guarantee the 
support of tribal members, particularly the younger ones. This 
process was uneven, however, with some tribes displaying more 
cohesiveness than others. 

The term tribalism was much in use in the 1980s. The intelligentsia 
proposed that meritocracy rather than tribalism be the basis of selec- 
tion in the 1984 parliamentary by-elections. Anthropologist Lin- 
da Layne compared the intelligentsia's views of tribalism with the 
electoral behavior of the beduins. Layne defined the intelligent- 
sia's interpretation of tribalism as 4 'the placing of family ties be- 
fore all other political allegiances" and concluded that tribalism 
"is therefore understood to be antithetical to loyalty to the State." 
Layne recognized the prominent role of tribalism in the 1984 elec- 
tion but stated that this was not at odds with a modern political 
system. Rather, in reconstructing their identity in a modern Jor- 
danian state, Layne held that the beduins were maintaining a tribal- 
ism suffused with new elements such as a narrower role for tribal 
shaykhs in national politics and new sources of political legitima- 
cy. Beduin electoral behavior was not homogeneous along tribal 
lines, evidence that tribal shaykhs could no longer automatically 
deliver the votes of their fellow tribesmen and women. In this sense, 



85 



Jordan: A Country Study 

Layne found no tension between the beduin's identity as tribes- 
man or tribeswoman and as citizen; rather, these were complemen- 
tary forms of identity. 

Tribalism and tradition also lent legitimacy to Hashimite rule. 
The legitimacy of tradition, considered almost synonymous with 
beduin or tribal culture, has been defended as part of the near 
sacrosanct foundations of the state and as central to cultural heritage. 
In the 1985 public exchange between King Hussein and Minister 
of Information Layla Sharaf, Hussein responded to Sharaf s calls 
for liberalizing the law, particularly lifting censorship and dilut- 
ing the influence of tribalism in society. In the 1980s, a debate raged 
among Jordanians and observers of Jordanian society over the ap- 
propriate role tribal influence and tradition should play in a modern 
state. In early 1985, in the midst of this debate, King Hussein pub- 
licly supported the role of the tribe and tradition in Jordan's past 
and future by stating, ' 'Whatever harms tribes is considered harm- 
ful to us. Law will remain closely connected to norms, customs, 
and traditions. . . . Our traditions should be made to preserve the 
fabric of society. Disintegration of tribes is very painful, negative 
and subversive." 

Thus, the role of tribes and tribalism, although transformed, re- 
mained a fundamental pillar of both society and political culture 
in the late 1980s. Although numerically few Jordanians lived the 
traditional life of the nomadic beduin, the cultural traditions based 
on this life-style were hardly diminished. Indeed, conceptions of 
modern Jordanian cultural and national identity were deeply in- 
tertwined with the country's beduin heritage. 

Villages 

The principles of organization in settled communities resembled 
those of the beduins in that villages were organized around kin 
groups. The resemblance to nomadic groups was closest in the vil- 
lages of central and southern Jordan. There villagers retained, in 
somewhat loose form, a tribal form of organization. Most villagers 
lived in the much more densely settled north, where tribal organi- 
zation in the late 1980s remained significant only among the re- 
cently settled. 

In most northern villages, the descendants of a common, rela- 
tively distant ancestor formed a hamula (pi. , hamail, meaning a clan). 
The hamula ordinarily had a corporate identity; it often maintained 
a guesthouse, its members usually resided in a distinguishable quar- 
ter or neighborhood, and it acted in concert in village, and often 
regional, political affairs. The hamula was the repository of family 
honor and tended to be endogamous. Some villages in the north 



86 



The Society and Its Environment 



were dominated by one hamula; that is, everyone in a village be- 
longed to the same descent group. Sometimes several smaller ha- 
mail also resided in a village dominated by one large hamula. Other 
villages were characterized by the presence of several hamail of nearly 
equal numerical size and importance in village political affairs and 
landholdings. In some northern regions, a large hamula might have 
sections in several villages. 

Intermediate kin groups existed below the level of the hamula and 
above that of the household. In many cases, a group of closely relat- 
ed households, descendants of a relative closer than the founder 
of the hamula, formed entities called lineages (or branches). A still 
smaller unit was the luzum, a close consultation group, usually com- 
posed of several brothers and their families. A father's brothers' 
sons and their families could be included in or even constitute the 
luzum. This group had the most significance for everyday life in 
the village. Members of a hamula, especially those spread over sever- 
al villages, sometimes saw each other only on occasions such as 
weddings, births, deaths, religious holidays, or a conflict involv- 
ing a hamula member. Anthropologist Richard Antoun found the 
luzum to be the significant unit in a variety of matters in the com- 
munity he studied; its members were responsible for paying truce 
money in cases where honor had been violated. This was the group 
that acted as a support system for the individual in the event of 
need, providing access to resources such as land, bridewealth, or 
financial aid in the event of illness or to pay for schooling. 

Lineages and luzums varied in size and sometimes overlapped 
in functions. For example, a large luzum sometimes carried the 
weight of a smaller lineage in village politics, and it could be difficult 
to distinguish them. Kin groups, even at the level of lineages, were 
not homogenous in terms of class; some members could be quite 
well off and others rather poor. This internal differentiation in- 
creased as some members migrated to urban areas or abroad in 
search of work, entered the army, or sought higher education (see 
Migration, this ch.). 

Social control and politics in the village traditionally grew out 
of the interactions of kin groups at various levels. Social control 
over individual behavior was achieved through the process of so- 
cialization and a system that imposed sanctions for unacceptable 
behavior. Such sanctions could range from gossip damaging to one's 
reputation and that of one's kin, to censure by one's kin group, 
to penalties imposed by the state for infractions of its criminal codes. 

Respected elder males from the various hamail (or lineages if the 
village were populated predominantly by members of one hamula) 
provided leadership in villages. They often made decisions by 



87 



Jordan: A Country Study 

consensus. With the formation and consolidation of the state, tradi- 
tional leaders lost some power, but they continued in the late 1980s 
to mediate conflicts, and state officials often turned to them when 
dealing with village affairs. In cases of conflict in the village, lead- 
ers of the appropriate kin sections of groups attempted to mediate 
the problem through kinship ties. Such leaders were usually elder- 
ly men respected for their traditional wisdom and knowledge of 
customs, or slightly younger, secularly educated men, or persons 
in intermediate positions between the two. If the conflict escalated 
or involved violence, the state, through the police and the court 
system, tended to become involved. The state encouraged recourse 
to traditional forms of mediation sometimes as an alternative and 
sometimes as an accompaniment to processing the case through 
the court system. 

The mukhtar, or headman, of a small village linked the villagers 
with the state bureaucracy, especially if there were no village or 
municipal council. The mukhtar' 's duties included the registering 
of births and deaths, notarizing official papers for villagers, and 
assisting the police with their investigations in the village. Where 
there were municipal or village councils, generally in villages with 
a population of 3,000 or more, the mukhtar had little influence. In- 
stead, the councils — bodies elected by the villagers — allocated 
government authority and village resources. Young, educated men 
from influential families, whose fathers may have been traditional 
leaders in the village, often ran the councils. 

As villages increasingly became integrated into the state economic 
and political system, social stratification grew. Traditionally, large 
landowners were able to command labor, surplus, and services as 
well as social deference from less wealthy villagers. However, a var- 
iety of village and religious customs eased this apparent class 
differentiation. Religious teachings and practices, such as the giv- 
ing of alms and the distribution of gifts at the festival marking the 
end of Ramadan and at other festival seasons, emphasized the 
responsibility of the prosperous for the less fortunate (see Religious 
Life, this ch.). Wealth also implied an obligation to provide a place 
for men to gather and for visitors to come, in order to maintain 
the standing of the village as a whole. Events such as weddings 
were occasions for the wealthy to provide feasts for the whole village. 

In the late 1980s, social change had strained village structure 
and values. The older generation's uncontested control of the eco- 
nomic resources necessary for contracting marriage, participating 
in politics, and even earning a livelihood had guaranteed their 
authority. The decline in significance of agriculture as a way of 
life and the appearance of other opportunities led many younger 



88 



Women cleaning wool at Samar, 
northwest of Amman 
Courtesy Julie Peteet 




A village scene with a mosque 
in the background 
Courtesy Julie Peteet 




89 



Jordan: A Country Study 

people into other pursuits. As a result, some "agricultural" vil- 
lages eventually contained a majority of men engaged in other kinds 
of work. Earning an income independent of their elders' control 
and often considerably larger than the older generation could com- 
mand, such young people were in a position to challenge their 
elders' authority. Nevertheless, in the late 1980s, the individual 
still remained enmeshed in a network of family relations and obli- 
gations. The young deferred less frequently to their elders in deci- 
sions about life choices than had been the custom, but respect for 
parents and elders remained evident. 

Palestinians 

Jordanians tended to refer to Palestinians as persons who fled 
or were driven from Palestine during the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 
and the June 1967 War. Some immigrants from Palestine who had 
entered Jordan in preceding centuries, however, were so thoroughly 
integrated into the local society as to be indistinguishable from their 
neighbors. The Majalis, for more than a century the leading tribe 
in Al Karak area, came originally from Hebron. For political and 
social purposes, they and others like them were considered Jorda- 
nians. Other Palestinians from Hebron, who came to Al Karak 
as merchants well before 1948, remained to a considerable degree 
outsiders, for the most part taking their spouses from the Hebron 
area and maintaining economic and other ties there. 

Al Karak is not representative of the impact of Palestinians on 
East Bank society and culture. In 1948 the population of the East 
Bank was about 340,000. The 1950 annexation of the West Bank 
increased the population by about 900,000. This increase includ- 
ed the West Bank population itself (around 400,000 to 450,000) 
and about 450,000 refugees from those areas of Palestine that be- 
came Israel in 1948. In addition, many thousands of Palestinians 
not classified as refugees entered Jordan after 1948. As a result of 
the June 1967 War, in 1967 an additional 250,000 to 300,000 West 
Bank Palestinians entered Jordan as refugees. 

Most of the refugees, inside and outside refugee camps, continued 
to live in Amman and areas to the north. In 1986 UNRWA reported 
that 826,128 Palestinians were registered as refugees in the East 
Bank; of these, nearly one-fourth resided in camps. Many other 
refugees lived on the fringes of the economy in urban areas. 

A substantial number of Palestinians had the kind of education 
and entrepreneurial capacity that enabled them to achieve substan- 
tial economic status. A few brought some of their wealth from Pales- 
tine. Some became large landowners or businessmen, whereas 
others became professionals or technicians. A number worked for 



90 



The Society and Its Environment 



the government, often in posts requiring prior training. Many Pales- 
tinians were merchants on a small or medium scale, craftsmen or 
skilled workers, or peasants. 

Whatever the social or economic status of Palestinians in the East 
Bank, their sense of national identity had aroused much debate. 
Such identity depended on international and regional political de- 
velopments with respect to the Palestine question, the interests of 
Palestinians themselves on the East Bank, and the balancing act 
of the government between East Bank Jordanians and those of 
Palestinian origin. One observer indicated that the regime had an 
interest in perpetuating the idea of a Palestinian majority so that 
East Bank Jordanians would continue to perceive Hussein as en- 
suring their interests and that of the East Bank. 

An autonomous Palestinian political identity did not begin to 
assert itself until the mid-1960s. In the 1950s, no political organi- 
zation existed around which a specifically Palestinian identity could 
be articulated. Pan-Arabism was a dominant mode of political ex- 
pression, and the Hashimite regime strongly promoted Jordanian 
sovereignty over Palestinian affairs and identity. Nevertheless, and 
in spite of a security apparatus that kept a close watch on political 
affairs, Palestinian national identity emerged and grew. The loss 
of the West Bank in 1967 and the repressive Israeli occupation con- 
tributed to nationalist sentiments, as did the Jordanian govern- 
ment's repression of opposition political movements. The rise in 
the mid-1960s of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and 
its international recognition furthered this nationalist climate. The 
PLO offered an organizational format to Palestinian political iden- 
tity separate from a Jordanian identity. The 1970-71 war between 
the fedayeen (Arab guerrillas) and the Jordanian government and 
the 1974 Rabat Summit further enhanced Palestinian nationalist 
sentiment (see The Palestinians and the PLO, ch. 4). 

Wide divergences in political identity and sentiment existed 
among the Palestinians in the East Bank. Factors influencing a per- 
son's identity included the date of arrival in the East Bank, whether 
the person was a refugee or lived in a camp, and the degree of the 
person's economic success. The merchants and professionals who 
came prior to 1948 generally identified closely with the East Bank. 
Refugees who came in 1948 but who did not reside in the camps 
and were government employees or successful professionals or 
businesspeople tended to be tacit supporters of the regime and to 
invest heavily in homes and businesses. More militant were the 
refugees who arrived in the wake of the June 1967 War, including 
those refugees who were not living in camps. Persons residing in 



91 



Jordan: A Country Study 

the camps tended to be the most militant. They were the poorest 
and had the least stake in the survival of the Hashimite regime. 

Socioeconomic and political events in the late 1980s converged 
to fuel growing frustration with East Bank political policies. The 
reduced flow of remittances to Jordan from expatriate workers in 
the oil-producing states was a source of anxiety for the regime. For 
refugees living in the camps and for urban squatters, the econom- 
ic downturn led to greater poverty, compounded by the high un- 
employment rate in the East Bank. 

The Palestinian uprising {intifadah) in the occupied territories 
caused the Hashimite regime concern. The continuation of the up- 
rising and the occupation seemed likely to radicalize less prosper- 
ous Palestinians in the East Bank. 

Urban Areas and Urbanization 

From ancient times, Middle Eastern society has been charac- 
terized by the interaction of nomads and peasants with the urban 
centers. The region's highest achievements in cultural, political, 
economic, and intellectual life took place in the vibrant cosmopolitan 
centers. Arab-Islamic claims to be one of the world's major civili- 
zations rest largely on the products of city populations. 

No major urban center existed in what is now Jordanian terri- 
tory until the late 1940s. East Bank towns served as local markets 
and administrative centers rather than as centers of high culture. 
Truncated by external political considerations rather than by in- 
ternal social or cultural realities, the East Bank consequently lacked 
the kind of long-established metropolis that for centuries had domi- 
nated other parts of the Middle East. 

Amman, the major city of the East Bank, had ancient roots, but 
in the 1980s it was scarcely more than a generation old as a modern 
city. The Circassians were the first permanent inhabitants of Am- 
man, settling there in 1878. In 1921 Amir Abdullah ibn Hussein 
Al Hashimi established his capital in Amman. It passed its first 
decades as a provincial trading center and garrison on the margin 
of the desert. In 1943 Amman had only 30,000 inhabitants. As 
capital of the new kingdom of Jordan, Amman grew over the next 
three decades into a booming, overcrowded metropolitan center. 
Population growth was largely a function of the influx of Palestin- 
ians since 1948. A high birth rate and internal migration, however, 
have also been prominent features of the urbanization process (see 
Population, this ch.). 

In 1989 Amman lacked both the old quarters characteristic 
of most Middle Eastern cities and an established urban popula- 
tion with a unified cultural outlook and an organic bond to the 



92 



The Society and Its Environment 



indigenous society of the area. Its people were a mixture of all the 
elements of the country. Circassians and Christians, rather than 
Muslim Transjordanians, set the tone before the arrival of the Pales- 
tinians, who in the late 1980s probably constituted 60 to 80 per- 
cent of its population. The smaller towns of the East Bank retained 
a good deal of the traditional kin- and quarter-based social organi- 
zation characteristic of Middle Eastern towns. 

In rapidly urbanizing areas such as Amman, the quasi-paternal 
relationship of the rich to the poor had begun to break down, and 
the old egalitarian values had given way to class distinctions based 
on income and style of life. Increasingly evident, class polariza- 
tion was fueled by remittances from those working abroad. Remit- 
tances were invested in residential property, thus driving up the 
cost of land and housing. New urban areas, dotted with lavish stone 
villas and supermarkets and boutiques supplied with expensive im- 
ported items, coexisted with overcrowded areas where a jumble 
of buildings housed the multitudes of the lower-middle class and 
the poor. Furthermore, Western culture had introduced foreign 
ideas among the educated that gradually estranged them from the 
culture of the masses. Cultural and recreational facilities, for ex- 
ample, were limited to the well-to-do because of the high mem- 
bership fees in the clubs that provided them. 

Migration 

In the late 1980s, Jordan experienced more than one form of 
migration. Large segments of the labor force worked abroad, and 
rural-urban migration continued unabated. In rural areas, sub- 
stantial numbers of men were employed outside the village or were 
engaged in military service. 

Jordan often has been referred to by economists as a labor- 
exporting country. With the oil boom of the 1970s in the Persian 
Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia, substantial numbers of the well- 
educated and skilled labor force, from both rural and urban areas, 
temporarily emigrated for employment. Government figures for 
1987 stated that nearly 350,000 Jordanians were working abroad, 
a remarkably high number for such a small domestic population. 
Approximately 160,900 Jordanians resided in Saudi Arabia alone. 
Most of the Jordanians working abroad were of Palestinian origin. 

The typical Jordanian migrant was a married male between 
twenty and thirty-nine years of age. His education level was higher 
than that of the average person on the East Bank. More than 30 
percent of those working abroad were university graduates, and 
40 percent were in professional positions. The average stay abroad 



93 



Jordan: A Country Study 

ranged from 4.5 years to 8 years, and the attraction of work abroad 
was the higher salary. Unlike most male migrants in the Middle 
East, Jordanian migrants had a greater tendency to take their fam- 
ilies with them to their place of employment. 

Migration from Jordan was not a recent phenomenon. As early 
as the late nineteenth century, Jordanian villagers were migrating 
abroad. Migration abroad since the 1960s has generally been to 
Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing Gulf states. Although most 
of those migrant workers came from urban areas, more data is avail- 
able on the rural migrants. 

The authors of a 1985 study of the effects of migration on a vil- 
lage in the northwest noted that more than 10 percent of families 
had at least one member working abroad and 32 percent of male 
heads of household were serving in the armed forces. Many others 
held jobs in nearby urban centers and commuted between the village 
and their place of employment. Of village migrants to the oil- 
producing states, more than half were employed in the public sec- 
tor, particularly in teaching and in the military security forces. As 
of the late 1980s, both of these areas faced a decline in employment 
if the oil-producing states continued to reduce their foreign labor force. 

Labor migration in the 1970s and 1980s did not necessarily in- 
dicate a migrant's alienation from the village or a weakening of 
his ties with fellow villagers. Nearly 75 percent of rural migrants 
had a relative or village friend in the place of employment abroad. 
In fact, migrants tended to facilitate the process for others, acting 
as points of contact for individuals who migrated later. Migration 
did not radically alter the authority of absent males in their house- 
holds, whether rural or urban. Wives made many daily household 
decisions, but, in most cases, major decisions awaited consulta- 
tion with the husband. The flow of remittances to the village was 
also a strong indication of the continuing ties between a migrant 
and his family. 

Remittances were used overwhelmingly by both rural and ur- 
ban migrants to pay off debts and then to invest in residential 
property. The many new villa- style houses built in and around Am- 
man and Irbid and in the villages reflected the large numbers of 
men working abroad and the presence of ' 'oil money. ' ' In the north- 
west highlands, the purchase of property and the subsequent build- 
ing of housing reduced the area of cultivable land. In contrast, in 
the Jordan Valley remittances figured prominently in investments 
in agricultural technologies. Returning rural migrants resided for 
the most part in the village and worked in Irbid, casting doubt on 
projections that international labor migration would contribute sig- 
nificantly to further urbanization in the Amman area. 



94 



The Society and Its Environment 



Since the 1970s, increasing numbers of villagers had migrated 
to Amman. Most of them had remained poor and had shallow roots 
in the city. A significant land shortage, lack of job opportunities 
in rural areas, and the availability of education and health resources 
in Amman had sent a steady stream of villagers toward the city, 
overcrowding its housing and overtaxing its resources. Urban hous- 
ing for the city's poor was neither readily available nor afford- 
able. Rural migrants, however, maintained close ties with their 
natal villages. On Fridays (the official day off in Jordan) and dur- 
ing holidays, the villages were witness to family reunions of men 
who worked in the cities during the week and returned home at 
week's end. 

Kinship, Family, and the Individual 

In the late 1980s, social life and identity in Jordan centered 
around the family. The household was composed of people relat- 
ed to one another by kinship, either through descent or marriage, 
and family ties extended into the structure of clans and tribes. 
Individual loyalty and the sense of identity arising from family mem- 
bership coexisted with new sources of identity and affiliation. The 
development of a national identity and a professional identity did 
not necessarily conflict with existing family affiliations. Although 
rapid social mobility strained kin group membership, kinship units 
were sometimes able to adapt to social change. 

Gender and age were important determinants of social status. 
Although the systematic separation of women from men was not 
generally practiced, all groups secluded women to some extent. The 
character of gender-based separation varied widely among different 
sectors of society; it was strictest among the traditional urban middle 
class and most flexible among the beduins, where the exigencies 
of nomadic life precluded segregation. However, the worlds of men 
and women intersected in the home. Age greatly influenced an in- 
dividual man or woman's standing in society; generally, attaining 
an advanced age resulted in enhanced respect and social stature. 

The formation of an educated middle class that included increas- 
ing numbers of educated and working women led in the late 1980s 
to some strains in the traditional pattern. Men and women now 
interacted in public — at school and in the universities, in the work- 
place, on public transportation, in voluntary associations, and at 
social events. 

Family and Household 

The extended family continued to be a viable form of house- 
hold in the late 1980s. More families had begun to live in nuclear 



95 



Jordan: A Country Study 

households, but Jordanians continued to rely on extended kin 
relations for a variety of purposes, which can be described as ex- 
changes. Exchanges might include financial support; job infor- 
mation; social connections; access to strategic resources; marital 
partners; arrangements, protection, and support in the event of 
conflict; child care and domestic services; and emotional sustenance. 
In turn, an individual's social identity and loyalty continued to 
be oriented largely to the family. 

Formally, kinship was reckoned patrilineally, and the household 
usually was based on blood ties between men. There was no one 
form of family; and household structure changed because of births, 
deaths, marriages, and migration. A household could consist of 
a married couple, their unmarried children, and possibly other rela- 
tives such as parents, or a widowed parent or an unmarried sister. 
Alternatively, a household could consist of parents and their mar- 
ried sons, their wives, and their children. At the death of the father, 
each married son ideally established his own household to begin 
the cycle again. Although the kinship system was considered 
patrilineal, maternal kin also were significant. 

Because the family was central to social life, all children were 
expected to marry at the appropriate age, and eligible divorced or 
widowed persons were expected to remarry. Marriage conferred 
adult status on both men and women. The birth of children fur- 
ther enhanced this status, especially for women, who then felt more 
secure in their marital households. Polygyny was practiced in only 
a minority of cases and was socially frowned upon. 

Traditionally, the individual subordinated his or her personal 
interests to those of the family. The importance of the group out- 
weighed that of the individual. In the late 1980s, it was still un- 
common for a man to live apart from a family group unless he were 
a migrant worker or a student. Grown children ordinarily lived 
with parents or relatives until marriage. Children were expected 
to defer to the wishes of their parents. 

Marriage was a family affair rather than a personal choice. Be- 
cause the sexes ordinarily did not mix much socially, young men 
and women had few acquaintances among the opposite sex, 
although among beduins a limited courtship was permitted. Par- 
ents traditionally arranged marriages for their children, finding a 
mate either through the family or their social contacts. In the late 
1980s, this pattern had changed substantially (see Changing So- 
cial Relations and Values, this ch.). 

Among village and tribal populations, the preferred marriage 
partner was the child of the father's brother. In most areas, a man 
had a customary right to forbid his father's brother's daughter from 



96 



The Society and Its Environment 



marrying an outsider if he wished to exercise his right to her hand. 
If the ideal cousin marriage was not possible, marriage within the 
patrilineal kin group was the next best choice. Such endogamous mar- 
riages had several advantages for the parties: the bridewealth pay- 
ments demanded of the groom's kin tended to be smaller; the family 
resources were conserved; the dangers of an unsuitable match were 
minimized; and the bride was not a stranger to her husband's house. 

A University of Jordan medical department study in the late 1980s 
pointed to a 50 percent rate of family intermarriage: 33 percent of 
marriages were between first-degree relatives, 7 percent between 
second-degree relatives, and 10 percent were within the extended fam- 
ily. Nonetheless, in the 1980s, endogamous marriages had declined 
in frequency; previous rates of intermarriage may have been as high 
as 95 percent. Increasing female education and employment allowed 
young people more opportunities to meet and marry outside family 
arrangements. Also, there was growing awareness that genetic 
problems could arise in the offspring of endogamous marriages. 

In Islam, marriage is a civil contract rather than a sacrament. 
Representatives of the bride's interests negotiate a marriage agree- 
ment with the groom's representatives. The future husband and 
wife must give their consent. Young men often suggest to their par- 
ents whom they would like to marry; women usually do not do 
so but have the right to refuse a marriage partner of their parents' 
choice. The contract establishes the terms of the union, and, if they 
are broken, outlines appropriate recourse. Special provisions in- 
serted into the contract become binding on both parties. 

Islam gives to the husband far greater leeway than to the wife 
in terms of polygyny and in matters of divorce. For example, a 
man may legally take up to four wives at one time provided he 
can treat them equally; a woman can have only one husband at 
a time. A man may divorce his wife by repeating ' T divorce thee' ' 
three times before witnesses and registering the divorce in court; 
a woman can instigate divorce only under very specific circum- 
stances. Few women seek divorce because of the difficulty of tak- 
ing a case to court, the stigma attached to a divorced woman, and 
the possibility of a woman's losing custody of her children. In the- 
ory and as a matter of public appearance, men exercise authority 
over women. That authority, however, is not as absolute as once 
thought. Women wield considerable power within the home and 
decision making often is a joint affair between husband and wife. 

Family Relationships 

The social milieu in which a Jordanian family lived significant- 
ly affected the position of the wife and her degree of autonomy. 



97 



Jordan: A Country Study 



In rural agricultural areas and among the urban poor, women ful- 
filled important economic functions. Traditionally, some women 
of poor urban families worked outside the home, and rural wom- 
en performed a wide variety of tasks in the household and in the 
fields. Such women occupied a position of relative importance and 
enjoyed a modicum of freedom in their comings and goings with- 
in the village or neighborhood. Although casual social contact 
between the sexes of the kind common in the West was infrequent, 
segregation of the sexes was less pronounced than in traditional 
towns. Among the traditional urban bourgeoisie, women fulfilled 
fewer and less important economic functions. Artisan and merchant 
families earned their living from the skills of the men. Women's 
responsibilities were more confined to the home. Among the new 
urban middle class, women occupied a variety of positions, some 
of them contradictory. Some women of this class were educated 
and employed, and enjoyed a fair measure of mobility within 
society; others, also educated and skilled, lived a more sheltered 
life, with minimal mobility. Both groups of women frequently were 
seen in the streets wearing Islamic dress (see Women and Work, 
this ch.). 

The allocation of space within the home was often gender- specific. 
The houses of prosperous urban and rural families traditionally 
contained distinct men's and women's areas: the reception room 
where the men of the family entertained male guests and the wom- 
en's quarters from which adult males other than relatives and ser- 
vants were excluded. Less wealthy urban or rural families were 
unable to conform as easily to the standards of segregation. They 
could not afford the extra room for male gatherings. In poorer rural 
areas, men and women often socialized together in the house. 

Status within the household varied considerably depending on 
sex, age, and type of household. In principle, men had greater au- 
tonomy than women. Their movements in public were freer, and 
their personal decisions were more their own. Within the house- 
hold, however, younger males were subject to the authority of senior 
males, their grandfathers, fathers, and uncles. Decisions about edu- 
cation, marriage, and work remained family affairs. Older wom- 
en exerted substantial authority and control over children and 
adolescents, the most powerless sector within a household. 

Household structure, whether nuclear or extended, also deter- 
mined the extent to which women wielded power in a household. 
In a household with multiple married women, senior women held 
more power and could exert more control over younger wives. 
Younger women often preferred to live in a nuclear household 



98 



The Society and Its Environment 



where they had more autonomy in running the household and in 
child rearing. They were then more subject, however, to the direct 
control of the husband and had to manage the household alone 
without the help of other women. 

Children were given much affection and attention. Although not 
spared spanking and occasional harsh scolding, children were in- 
dulged and given much physical affection by household members 
and neighbors alike. Their behavior was tolerated with amusement 
until close to the ages of four and five. Children then were expect- 
ed to assume some responsibilities in the household. Little girls at 
this age began to help their mothers with household chores and 
to care for younger children. 

Segregation by gender was tied closely to the concept of honor (ird). 
In most Arab communities, honor inhered in the descent group — 
the family and, to a varying extent, the lineage or clan. Honor could 
be lost through the failure of sisters, wives, and daughters to behave 
properly (modestiy) and through the failure of men to exert self- 
restraint over their emotions toward women. For women, the con- 
straints of modesty were not confined to sexual matters. Also, wom- 
en could be held accountable for a loss of honor although they might 
not have had any obvious responsibility in the matter. Loud speech, 
a woman's bearing or dress, or her appearing in public places could 
lead to a loss of honor. For men, overt expressions of emotions (such 
as romantic love) that revealed vulnerability to women could cause 
a man's strength to be questioned, leading to a loss of honor. Men 
were expected to be above such matters of the heart. A wife's failure 
to behave properly reflected on the honor of her husband and his 
kin, but even more on her father and brothers and others of the group 
from which she came. A man's failure to conform to the norms of 
self-control and invulnerability to women shamed his immediate 
and extended kin group. 

Above all, honor was a matter of reputation. Perceptions were 
as important as actions or events. An offense against honor could 
be very lightly punished if it appeared that only the person's fami- 
ly knew of it. Harsher steps were required if persons outside the 
family knew of the offense or believed it to have occurred. 

The penalties for violation of the honor code differed for men 
and women. Custom granted the males of a family the right to kill 
female kin known to have engaged in illicit sexual relations. A more 
common practice, however, was for the families involved to ar- 
range a hasty marriage. Men who lost honor through their actions 
were ostracized and lost face and standing in the community. 

On the one hand, the segregation of women worked to minimize 
the chances that a family's honor would be lost or diminished. On 



99 



Jordan: A Country Study 

the other hand, the education of women and their participation 
in a modern work force tended to erode the traditional concept of 
honor by promoting the mingling of the sexes in public life. 

Changing Social Relations and Values 

Relations between men and women, along with all other aspects 
of Jordanian society, had begun to change as people adopted values, 
attitudes, and customs much different from those traditional in the 
country. As new ideas reached all sectors of society, new percep- 
tions and practices began to appear. 

Increased social and physical mobility have undermined the 
familial ties and the values that subordinated the individual to the 
kin group. A growing individualism has appeared, especially among 
the educated young. Many young people prefer to set up their own 
household at marriage rather than live with their parents. Labor 
migration has had a considerable impact on family structure and 
relations. In some cases, where men migrate without their fami- 
lies, their wives and children see the husband only once or twice 
a year when he visits. If the wife and children live alone, this ar- 
rangement leads to increased responsibility and autonomy for wom- 
en. Also, the children in such families grow up without knowing 
their fathers well. When the wife and children live with the migrant's 
extended family, they are usually under the authority of her hus- 
band's family. 

Some of the most marked social changes have affected women's 
roles. In urban areas, young women have begun to demand greater 
freedom and equality than in the past, although traditional prac- 
tices still broadly govern their lives. Since the 1960s, women have 
become more active outside the home. In the 1980s, girls' school 
enrollment was nearly parallel to that of boys, and female gradu- 
ates entered the work force in increasing numbers (see Education, 
this ch.). Girls who attended school were not as closely chaperoned 
as they formerly were, although they rarely went out with friends 
in the evening. Educated women also tended to marry later, often 
after working for several years. The average age of marriage for 
women had risen from the mid- teens to the early twenties; the aver- 
age age for males was between twenty-six and twenty-eight years. 
The narrowing of the gap in age between marriage partners signi- 
fied a changing conception of the conjugal unit and its relation to 
the larger family group. Companionship and notions of romantic 
love were playing a greater role in marital arrangements than 
heretofore. Marriages were still a family affair, but the relation- 
ship between man and wife was assuming increasing significance. 
This change reflected a dilution in the strength of families as 



100 



The Society and Its Environment 



social units with corporate interests that subordinated those of the 
individual. 

By the late 1980s, some observers had noted that couples tend- 
ed to want fewer children. This trend appeared to parallel the 
changes in women's position in society and shifts in the political 
economy, which had implications for family structure, relations, 
and values. Women's education and employment patterns meant 
that child rearing was no longer the only role open to women. The 
need for dual-income households pointed to a decrease in the 
amount of time women could devote to child rearing. In the tran- 
sition from an agricultural and pastoral society to one based on 
services, where literacy was a must, children required longer peri- 
ods of education and thus were dependent for extended periods 
upon their families. Large families were no longer as economical- 
ly feasible or desirable as in the past. 

The spread of the nuclear household encouraged the detachment 
of the individual from the demands of the extended family. At the 
same time, social security lessened the dependence of the aged on 
their children and other relatives. The functions of the extended 
family, however, were not necessarily diminished; given econom- 
ic upheavals and a weak infrastructure for state social services, Jor- 
danians continued to rely upon the extended family, even if many 
of its members resided in nuclear units. 

Generational conflicts, which observers believed to be increasing, 
strained family relations when young people attempted to adopt stan- 
dards and behavior different from those of their parents. Modern, 
secular education, with its greater emphasis on utility and efficien- 
cy, tended to undermine respect for the wisdom of age and the light- 
ness of tradition. Male wage earners also were less dependent on older 
males for access to resources such as land and bridewealth. 

Women and Work 

Despite a seemingly conservative milieu, the number of women 
working outside the home increased in the 1980s. Women formed 
a little over 12 percent of the labor force in 1985. Many poor and 
lower-class women worked out of economic necessity, but a substan- 
tial number of working women came from financially secure fami- 
lies. According to the Ministry of Planning, the proportion of women 
working in professional and technical jobs was high. In 1985 women 
constituted 35.4 percent of technical workers and 36. 1 percent of cler- 
ical staff. Women were least represented in agriculture and produc- 
tion. Women's increased access to education had led them to greater 
aspirations to work outside the home. Moreover, inflation had made 
the dual-income family a necessity in many cases. 



101 



Jordan: A Country Study 

Jordanian women served as a reserve labor force and were en- 
couraged to work during the years of labor shortages when eco- 
nomic expansion and development plans were high on the 
government's priority list. In a 1988 study of women and work 
in Jordan, journalist Nadia Hijab argued that cultural attitudes 
were not the major constraint on women's employment; rather, 
need and opportunity were more significant factors. 

Most employed women were single. Unmarried women, in par- 
ticular, were initially considered a source of untapped labor. Yet 
cultural constraints clearly militated against women working in 
agriculture, industry, and construction — areas of low prestige, but 
also the sections with the most critical labor shortages. Develop- 
ment programs for women focused on technical training. Hijab 
mentions that a typical project was "to train women on the main- 
tenance and repair of household appliances." 

To make work more attractive to women with children, the 
government discussed amending the labor laws to improve condi- 
tions. Such proposed amendments included granting more mater- 
nity leave and providing day-care facilities at the workplace. In 
addition, the media encouraged a more liberal attitude to wom- 
en's working. Women's employment gained further legitimacy 
through national ceremonies sponsored by the government and the 
royal family honoring women's work. 

The critical years of labor shortages were 1973 to 1981. By the 
mid-1980s, the situation had changed as unemployment surged. 
With the onset of high unemployment, women were asked to return 
to their homes. Publicly and privately, Jordanians hotly debated 
whether women should work. Letters to the editors of daily 
newspapers argued for and against women's working. Some govern- 
ment leaders had decided that women should return to their homes. 
Discussion about amending labor laws was shelved, and Hijab ob- 
served that by 1985 there was "almost an official policy" to en- 
courage married women to stay at home. Then Prime Minister 
Zaid ar Rifai bluntly suggested in 1985 that working women who 
paid half or more of their salary to foreign maids who sent the cur- 
rency abroad should stop working. 

Differences in attitude towards women's employment frequent- 
ly were based on the conditions of work. In a study of attitudes 
toward women and work, Jordanian sociologist Mohammad Bar- 
houm found that resistance was least to women working in tradition- 
ally female occupations such as teaching, nursing, and secretarial 
work. He believed the change in attitude resulted from increased 
educational opportunities for girls and their parents' realization 



102 



Women weaving a carpet 



that education was as important for girls as for boys, especially in 
the event of widowhood or divorce. The erosion of male wages, 
no longer adequate to support a family, had also been a promi- 
nent factor in legitimizing female employment. 

The impact of women's employment on relations within the 
family remained difficult to assess in 1989. Employment and con- 
tribution to family income accorded women a greater voice in fam- 
ily matters. The traditional division of labor between men and 
women within the family often remained relatively untouched when 
women worked. Women's work at home was often taken up by 
other women rather than shared between men and women. Women 
earning lower incomes relied on their extended network of fe- 
male relatives to help with child care and housework, while upper 
and middle income women hired maids (usually foreigners from 
the Philippines, Sri Lanka, or Egypt) to tend to their homes and 
children. 

Religious Life 

More than 90 percent of Jordanians adhered to Sunni Islam in 
the late 1980s. Although observance was not always orthodox, de- 
votion to and identification with the faith was high. Islam was the 
established religion, and as such its institutions received govern- 
ment support. The 1952 Constitution stipulates that the king and 
his successors must be Muslims and sons of Muslim parents. 



103 



Jordan: A Country Study 

Religious minorities included Christians of various denominations, 
a few Shia Muslims, and even fewer adherents of other faiths. 

Early Development of Islam 

In A.D. 610, Muhammad, a merchant belonging to the Hash- 
imite branch of the ruling Quraysh tribe in the Arabian town 
of Mecca, began to preach the first of a series of revelations grant- 
ed him by God through the angel Gabriel and to denounce the poly- 
theism of his fellow Meccans. Because the town's economy was 
based in part on a thriving pilgrimage business to the Kaaba, the 
sacred structure around a black meteorite, and the numerous pa- 
gan shrines located there, Muhammad's vigorous and continuing 
censure eventually earned him the bitter enmity of the town's lead- 
ers. In 622 he was invited to the town of Yathrib, which came to 
be known as Medina (the city) because it was the center of his ac- 
tivities. The move, or hijra (known in the West as the hegira), marks 
the beginning of the Islamic era. The Muslim calendar, based on 
the lunar year, begins in 622. In Medina, Muhammad — by this 
time known as the Prophet — continued to preach, eventually defeat- 
ed his detractors in battle, and consolidated both the temporal and 
spiritual leadership of all Arabia in his person before his death in 
632. 

After Muhammad's death, his followers compiled those of his 
words regarded as coming directly from God into the Quran, the 
holy scripture of Islam. Others of his sayings and teachings as 
recalled by those who had known Muhammad (a group known as 
the Companions) became the hadith. The precedent of his personal 
behavior was set forth in the sunna. Together the Quran, the hadith, 
and the sunna form a comprehensive guide to the spiritual, ethi- 
cal, and social life of an orthodox Sunni Muslim. 

During his lifetime, Muhammad was both spiritual and tem- 
poral leader of the Muslim community; he established Islam as a 
total and all-encompassing way of life for human beings and soci- 
ety. Muslims believe that Allah revealed to Muhammad the rules 
governing proper behavior and that it therefore behooves them to 
live in the manner prescribed by the law, and it is incumbent upon 
the community to strive to perfect human society according to holy 
injunctions. Islam traditionally recognizes no distinction between 
religion and state, and no distinction between religious and secu- 
lar life or religious and secular law. A comprehensive system of 
religious law (sharia — see Glossary) developed gradually during 
the first four centuries of Islam, primarily through the accretion 
of precedent and interpretation by various judges and scholars. Dur- 
ing the tenth century, however, legal opinion began to harden into 



104 



The Society and Its Environment 



authoritative doctrine, and the figurative bab at ijtihad (gate of in- 
terpretation) gradually closed, thenceforth eventually excluding flex- 
ibility in Islamic law. Within the Jordanian legal system, sharia 
remains in effect in matters concerning personal status (see The 
Judiciary, ch. 4). 

After Muhammad's death, the leaders of the Muslim commu- 
nity consensually chose Abu Bakr, the Prophet's father-in-law and 
one of his earliest followers, as caliph, or successor. At that time, 
some persons favored Ali, the Prophet's cousin and husband of 
his daughter Fatima, but Ali and his supporters (the so-called Shiat 
Ali or Party of Ali) eventually recognized the community's choice. 
The next two caliphs — Umar, who succeeded in 634, and Uthman, 
who took power in 644 — enjoyed recognition of the entire commu- 
nity. When Ali finally succeeded to the caliphate in 656, Muawiyah, 
governor of Syria, rebelled in the name of his murdered kinsman 
Uthman. After the ensuing civil war, Ali moved his capital to 
Mesopotamia, where a short time later he, too, was murdered. 

Ali's death ended the period in which the entire community of 
Islam recognized a single caliph. Upon Ali's death, Muawiyah 
proclaimed himself caliph from Damascus. The Shiat Ali, however, 
refused to recognize Muawiyah or his line, the Umayyad caliphs; 
in support of claims by Ali's line to a presumptive right to the 
caliphate based on descent from the Prophet, they withdrew and 
established a dissident sect known as the Shia. 

Originally political in nature, the differences between the Sun- 
ni and Shia interpretations rapidly took on theological and meta- 
physical overtones. Ali's two sons, Hasan and Husayn, became 
martyred heroes to the Shias and repositories of the claims of Ali's 
line to mystical preeminence among Muslims. The Sunnis retained 
the doctrine of the selection of leaders by consensus, although Arabs 
and members of the Quraysh, Muhammad's tribe, predominated 
in the early years. Reputed descent from the Prophet, which King 
Hussein claims, continued to carry social and religious prestige 
throughout the Muslim world in the 1980s. Meanwhile, the Shia 
doctrine of rule by divine right became more and more firmly es- 
tablished, and disagreements over which of several pretenders had 
a truer claim to the mystical powers of Ali precipitated further 
schisms. Some Shia groups developed doctrines of divine leader- 
ship far removed from the strict monotheism of early Islam, in- 
cluding beliefs in hidden but divinely chosen leaders with spiritual 
powers that equaled or surpassed those of the Prophet himself. 

The early Islamic polity was intensely expansionist, fueled both 
by fervor for the new religion and by economic and social factors. 



105 



Jordan: A Country Study 

Conquering armies and migrating tribes swept out of Arabia, 
spreading Islam. By the end of Islam's first century, Islamic ar- 
mies had reached far into North Africa and eastward and north- 
ward into Asia. The territory of modern Jordan, among the first 
to come under the sway of Islam, was penetrated by Muslim ar- 
mies by A.D. 633 (see Islam and Arab Rule, ch. 1). 

Although Muhammad had enjoined the Muslim community to 
convert the infidel, he had also recognized the special status of the 
"people of the book," Jews and Christians, whose own revealed 
scriptures he considered revelations of God's word and which con- 
tributed in some measure to Islam. Jews and Christians in Muslim 
territories could live according to their own religious law, in their 
own communities, and were exempted from military service if they 
accepted the position of dhimmis, or tolerated subject peoples. This 
status entailed recognition of Muslim authority, additional taxes, 
prohibition on proselytism among Muslims, and certain restric- 
tions on political rights. 

Social life in the Ottoman Empire, which included Jordan for 
400 years, revolved around a system of millets, or religious com- 
munities (see Ottoman Rule, ch. 1). Each organized religious 
minority lived according to its own personal status laws under the 
leadership of recognized religious authorities and community lead- 
ers. These recognized leaders also represented the community to 
the rest of society and the polity. This form of organization 
preserved and nourished cultural differences that, quite apart from 
theological considerations, distinguished these communities. 

Tenets of Sunni Islam 

The shahada (testimony) succinctly states the central belief of Is- 
lam: "There is no god but God (Allah), and Muhammad is his 
Prophet." This simple profession of faith is repeated on many ritual 
occasions, and recital in full and unquestioning sincerity designates 
one a Muslim. The God preached by Muhammad was not a new 
deity; Allah is the Arabic term for God rather than a particular 
name. Muhammad denied the existence of the many minor gods 
and spirits worshiped before his prophecy, and he declared the om- 
nipotence of the unique creator, God. Islam means submission to 
God, and one who submits is a Muslim. Being a Muslim also in- 
volves a commitment to realize the will of God on earth and to 
obey God's law. 

Muhammad is the "seal of the Prophets"; his revelation is said 
to complete for all time the series of biblical revelations received 
by Jews and Christians. Muslims believe God to have remained 
one and the same throughout time, but that men strayed from his 



106 



The Society and Its Environment 



true teaching until set right by Muhammad. Prophets and sages 
of the biblical tradition, such as Abraham (Ibrahim), Moses (Musa), 
and Jesus (Isa), are recognized as inspired vehicles of God's will. 
Islam, however, reveres as sacred only the message, rejecting Chris- 
tianity's deification of the messenger. It accepts the concepts of guard- 
ian angels, the Day of Judgment, general resurrection, heaven and 
hell, and eternal life of the soul. 

The duties of the Muslim — corporate acts of worship — form the 
five pillars of Islamic faith. These are shahada, affirmation of the 
faith; salat, daily prayer; zakat, almsgiving; sawm, fasting during the 
month of Ramadan; and hajj, pilgrimage to Mecca. These acts of 
worship must be performed with a conscious intent and not out 
of habit. Shahada is uttered daily by practicing Muslims, affirming 
their membership in the faith and expressing an acceptance of the 
monotheism of Islam and the divinity of Muhammad's message. 

The believer is to pray in a prescribed manner after purifica- 
tion through ritual ablutions at dawn, midday, midafternoon, sun- 
set, and nightfall. Prescribed genuflections and prostrations 
accompany the prayers, which the worshiper recites facing toward 
Mecca. Prayers imbue daily life with worship, and structure the 
day around an Islamic conception of time. Whenever possible, men 
pray in congregation at the mosque under a prayer leader and on 
Fridays they are obliged to do so. Women also may attend public 
worship at the mosque, where they are segregated from the men, 
although most frequently women pray at home. A special func- 
tionary, the muezzin, intones a call to prayer to the entire com- 
munity at the appropriate hours; those out of earshot determine 
the proper time from the position of the sun. 

In the early days of Islam, the authorities imposed a tax on per- 
sonal property proportionate to one's wealth; this was distributed 
to the mosques and to the needy. In addition, free-will gifts were 
made. While still a duty of the believer, almsgiving in the twen- 
tieth century has become a more private matter. Properties con- 
tributed by pious individuals to support religious activities are 
usually administered as religious foundations, or waqfs. 

The ninth month of the Muslim calendar is Ramadan, a period 
of obligatory fasting that commemorates Muhammad's receipt of 
God's revelation, the Quran. Fasting is an act of self-discipline that 
leads to piety and expresses submission and commitment to God. 
Fasting underscores the equality of all Muslims, strengthening sen- 
timents of community. During this month all but the sick, weak, 
pregnant or nursing women, soldiers on duty, travelers on neces- 
sary journeys, and young children are enjoined from eating, drinking, 



107 



Jordan: A Country Study 

smoking, or sexual intercourse during the daylight hours. Official 
work hours often are shortened during this period, and some bus- 
inesses close for all or part of the day. Since the months of the lu- 
nar calendar revolve through the solar years, Ramadan falls at 
various seasons in different years. A fast in summertime imposes 
considerable hardship on those who must do physical work. Each 
day's fast ends with a signal that light is insufficient to distinguish 
a black thread from a white one. Id al Fitr, a three-day feast and 
holiday, ends the month of Ramadan and is the occasion of much 
visiting. 

Finally, Muslims at least once in their lifetime should, if possi- 
ble, make the hajj to the holy city of Mecca to participate in spe- 
cial rites held during the twelfth month of the lunar calendar. The 
Prophet instituted this requirement, modifying pre-Islamic custom 
to emphasize sites associated with Allah and Abraham, father of 
the Arabs through his son Ishmael (Ismail). The pilgrim, dressed 
in a white, seamless garment (ihram), abstains from sexual rela- 
tions, shaving, haircutting, and nail paring. Highlights of the pil- 
grimage include kissing the sacred black stone; circumambulation 
of the Kaaba, the sacred structure reputedly built by Abraham that 
houses the stone; running seven times between the mountains Safa 
and Marwa in imitation of Hagar, Ishmael' s mother, during her 
travail in the desert; and standing in prayer on Mount Arafat. These 
rites affirm the Muslim's obedience to God and express intent to 
renounce the past and begin a new righteous life in the path of 
God. The returning male pilgrim is entitled to the honorific "hajj" 
before his name and a woman the honorific "hajji." Id al Adha 
marks the end of the hajj month. 

The permanent struggle for the triumph of the word of God on 
earth, jihad, represents an additional general duty of all Muslims. 
This concept is often taken to mean holy war, but most Muslims 
see it in a broader context of civil and personal action. Besides 
regulating relations between the human being and God, Islam regu- 
lates the relations of one human being to another. Aside from specif- 
ic duties, Islam imposes a code of ethical conduct encouraging 
generosity, fairness, honesty, and respect and explicitly propounds 
guidance as to what constitutes proper family relations. In addi- 
tion, it forbids adultery, gambling, usury, and the consumption 
of carrion, blood, pork, and alcohol. 

A Muslim stands in a personal relationship to God; there is 
neither intermediary nor clergy in orthodox Islam. Those men who 
lead prayers, preach sermons, and interpret the law do so by vir- 
tue of their superior knowledge and scholarship rather than be- 
cause of any special powers or prerogatives conferred by ordination. 



108 



The Society and Its Environment 



Any adult male versed in prayer form is entitled to lead prayers — a 
role referred to as imam (see Glossary). 

Islam in Social Life 

Despite a strong identification with and loyalty to Islam, reli- 
gious practices varied among segments of Jordan's population. 
This unevenness in practice did not necessarily correlate with a 
rural-urban division or differing levels of education. The religious 
observance of some Jordanians was marked by beliefs and prac- 
tices that were sometimes antithetical to the teachings of Islam. 
Authorities attributed at least some of these elements to pre-Islamic 
beliefs and customs common to the area. 

In daily life, neither rural dwellers nor urbanites were overly 
fatalistic. They did not directly hold God responsible for all occur- 
rences; rather, they placed events in a religious context that im- 
bued them with meaning. The expression inshallah (God willing) 
often accompanied statements of intention, and the term bismallah 
(in the name of God) accompanied the performance of most im- 
portant actions. Such pronouncements did not indicate a ceding 
of control over one's life or events. Jordanian Muslims generally 
believed that in matters that they could control, God expected them 
to work diligently. 

Muslims have other ways of invoking God's presence in daily 
life. Despite Islam's unequivocal teaching that God is one and that 
no being resembles him in sanctity, some people accepted the no- 
tion that certain persons (saints) have baraka, a special quality of 
personal holiness and affinity to God. The intercession of these be- 
ings was believed to help in all manner of trouble, and shrines to 
such people could be found in some localities. Devotees often visited 
the shrine of their patron, especially seeking relief from illness or 
inability to have children. 

Numerous spiritual creatures were believed to inhabit the world. 
Evil spirits known as jinn — fiery, intelligent beings that are capa- 
ble of appearing in human and other forms — could cause all sorts 
of malicious mischief. For protection, villagers carried in their cloth- 
ing bits of paper inscribed with Quranic verses (amulets), and they 
frequently pronounced the name of God. A copy of the Quran was 
said to keep a house safe from jinn. The "evil eye" also could be 
foiled by the same means. Although any literate Muslim was able 
to prepare amulets, some persons gained reputations as being par- 
ticularly skilled in prescribing and preparing them. To underscore 
the difficulty in drawing a fine distinction between orthodox and 
popular Islam, one only need note that some religious shaykhs were 



109 



Jordan: A Country Study 



sought for their ability to prepare successful amulets. For exam- 
ple, in the 1980s in a village in northern Jordan, two elderly shaykhs 
(who also were brothers) were famous for their abilities in specific 
areas: one was skilled in warding off illness among children; the 
other was sought for his skills in curing infertility (see Health and 
Welfare, this ch.). 

Their reverence for Islam notwithstanding, Muslims did not al- 
ways practice strict adherence to the five pillars. Although most 
people tried to give the impression that they fulfilled their religious 
duties, many people did not fast during Ramadan. They general- 
ly avoided breaking the fast in public, however. In addition, most 
people did not contribute the required proportion of alms to sup- 
port religious institutions, nor was pilgrimage to Mecca common. 
Attendance at public prayers and prayer in general increased dur- 
ing the 1980s as part of a regional concern with strengthening Is- 
lamic values and beliefs. 

Traditionally, social segregation of the sexes prevented women 
from participating in much of the formal religious life of the com- 
munity. The 1980s brought several changes in women's religious 
practices. Younger women, particularly university students, were 
seen more often praying in the mosques and could be said to have 
carved a place for themselves in the public domain of Islam. 

Although some women in the late 1980s resorted to unorthodox 
practices and beliefs, women generally were considered more reli- 
giously observant than men. They fasted more than men and prayed 
more regularly in the home. Education, particularly of women, 
diminished the folk- religious component of belief and practice, and 
probably enhanced observance of the more orthodox aspects of Islam. 

Islamic Revival 

The 1980s witnessed a stronger and more visible adherence to 
Islamic customs and beliefs among significant segments of the popu- 
lation. The increased interest in incorporating Islam more fully 
into daily life was expressed in a variety of ways. Women wearing 
conservative Islamic dress and the head scarf were seen with greater 
frequency in the streets of urban as well as rural areas; men with 
beards also were more often seen. Attendance at Friday prayers 
rose, as did the number of people observing Ramadan. Ramadan 
also was observed in a much stricter fashion; all public eating es- 
tablishments were closed and no alcohol was sold or served. Police 
responded quickly to infractions of the rules of Ramadan. Those 
caught smoking, eating, or drinking in public were reprimanded 
and often arrested for a brief period. 



110 



The Society and Its Environment 



Women in the 1980s, particularly university students, were ac- 
tively involved in expressions of Islamic revival. Women wearing 
Islamic garb were a common sight at the country's universities. 
For example, the mosque at Yarmuk University had a large wom- 
en's section. The section was usually full, and women there formed 
groups to study Islam. By and large, women and girls who adopt- 
ed Islamic dress apparently did so of their own volition, although 
it was not unusual for men to insist that their sisters, wives, and 
daughters cover their hair in public. 

The adoption of the Islamic form of dress did not signify a return 
to segregation of the sexes or female seclusion. Indeed, women who 
adopted Islamic clothing often were working women and students 
who interacted daily with men. They cited a lag in cultural atti- 
tudes as part of the reason for donning such dress. In other words, 
when dressed in Islamic garb they felt that they received more 
respect from and were taken more seriously by their fellow students 
and colleagues. Women also could move more readily in public 
if they were modestly attired. Increased religious observance also 
accounted for women's new style of dress. In the 1980s, Islamic 
dress did not indicate social status, particularly wealth, as it had 
in the past; Islamic dress was being worn by women of all classes, 
especially the lower and middle classes. 

Several factors gave rise to increased adherence to Islamic prac- 
tices. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Middle East region saw a 
rise of Islamic observance in response to economic recession and 
to the failure of nationalist politics to solve regional problems. In 
this context, Islam was an idiom for expressing social discontent. 
In Jordan, opposition politics had long been forbidden, and since 
the 1950s the Muslim Brotherhood had been the only legal politi- 
cal group. These factors were exacerbated by King Hussein's public 
support for the shah of Iran in his confrontation with Ayatollah 
Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini and the forces of opposition, 
by continued relations with Egypt in the wake of the 1979 Treaty 
of Peace Between Egypt and Israel, and by the king's support for 
Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War. 

Although Islamic opposition politics never became as widespread 
in Jordan as in Iran and Egypt, they were pervasive enough for 
the regime to act swiftly to bring them under its aegis. By the close 
of the 1970s and throughout the 1980s, government-controlled tel- 
evision regularly showed the king and his brother Hasan attend- 
ing Friday prayers. The media granted more time to religious 
programs and broadcasts. Aware that the Islamic movement might 
become a vehicle for expressing opposition to the regime and 
its policies, and in a move to repair relations with Syria, in the 



111 



Jordan: A Country Study 

mid-1980s the government began to promote a moderate form of 
Islam, denouncing fanatical and intolerant forms. 

Religious Minorities 

Jordan's Constitution guarantees freedom of religious beliefs. 
Christians formed the largest non-Muslim minority. Observers es- 
timated in the late 1970s that the Christian community — comprising 
groups of several denominations — constituted roughly 5 to 8 per- 
cent of the population. The principal points of concentration of 
the East Bank's indigenous Christians were a number of small towns 
in the "sown," such as Al Karak, Madaba, As Salt, and Ajlun 
(see fig. 1). Christians also lived in Amman and other major cities. 

Overwhelmingly Arabic in language and culture, many Chris- 
tians belonged to churches whose liturgical languages were, until 
recently, other than Arabic. With some exceptions, the lower cler- 
gy were Arabs, but the higher clergy were rarely so. In the past, 
Christians were disproportionately represented among the educated 
and prosperous. With increased access to education for all of the 
East Bank's peoples, this disproportion was less significant in the 
1980s. 

As of 1989, religious conflict had not been a problem in Jordan. 
The influence of Islamic observance that made itself felt in Jordan 
in the late 1970s and 1980s had not given rise to religious tensions. 
As a minority in a largely Muslim society, however, Christians 
were affected by Islamic practices. With the stricter observance of 
Ramadan in the 1980s, hotels and restaurants were prohibited by 
the government from serving liquor to local Christians or foreign- 
ers. Restaurants that formerly had remained open during the day 
to serve such persons were closed. The press and television also 
gave a greater emphasis to religion. 

The largest of the Christian sects in the late 1980s, accounting 
for roughly half of all Jordanian Christians, was that part of the 
Eastern Orthodox complex of churches that falls under the patri- 
arch of Jerusalem. With an elaborately organized clerical hierar- 
chy, the patriarchate administered most of the Christian shrines 
in Jerusalem and the West Bank. The parent church of Eastern 
Orthodoxy was the Greek Orthodox Church, and the liturgical 
language of the church in the patriarchate of Jerusalem included 
both Greek and Arabic. The higher clergy, including the patri- 
arch, were predominantly of Greek descent, but the priests were 
native speakers of Arabic. Because of the typically national organi- 
zation of orthodox churches, the relatively small numbers of Syri- 
ans and Armenians adhering to orthodoxy had their own churches. 



112 




Training in catering at a community college in Amman 

The Greek Catholic Church (Melchite, also seen as Melkite; 
Catholics of the Byzantine rite) in Jordan was headed by the patri- 
arch of Antioch, Jerusalem, and Alexandria, who in turn was sub- 
ject to the authority of the pope in Rome. The clergy generally 
were Arabs, and Arabic was used in most of the liturgy. Most Greek 
Catholics lived in the West Bank, but one diocese — that of Petra- 
Philadelphia, the latter an old Greek name for Amman — had its 
seat in Amman. 

The Roman Catholic Church had its own patriarch, who was 
also subject to papal authority. Several other Catholic groups, each 
headed by a patriarch who was in turn subordinate to Rome, were 
represented. These included several hundred Syrian Catholics and 
Armenian Catholics. 

The approximately 1 1 ,000 members of various Protestant denom- 
inations had been converted primarily from the Orthodox and 
Catholic churches. Muslims rarely converted to another faith. In 
the rural areas, conversions from one Christian group to another 
usually involved an entire kin-based group of some size. Such con- 
versions often caused stress between the converting group and 
another group of which it was part or with which it was allied. In- 
dividual conversions in such areas were rare. The effect of urbani- 
zation on this pattern has not been examined. 

Protestant communities, generally established by North American 
and European missionary activities, also were represented by the 



113 



Jordan: A Country Study 

personnel of various international organizations. Some Protestant 
groups established schools and hospitals and constructed a few 
churches. The Christian churches also had their own ecclesiastical 
courts that decided matters of alimony, divorce, annulment, and 
inheritance. 

Non-Christian religious minorities in the late 1980s included a 
small community of Druzes who lived in an area near the Syrian 
border. They were members of a sect that originally had derived 
from the Ismaili branch of Shia Islam. Ismailis were Shias who 
believed that Imam Muhammad ibn Ismail (died ca. A.D. 765), 
the Seventh Imam, was the last Imam, as opposed to others who 
recognized Twelve Imams. The Druzes, primarily located in the 
mountains of Lebanon and in southwestern Syria, have many secret 
beliefs and maintain that Hakim, the sixth Fatimid caliph, was 
divine in nature and is still alive in hiding. A small settlement 
of Bahais inhabited the village of Al Adasiyah in the northern 
Jordan Valley. The Shishans, a group whose origins lie in the 
Caucasus Mountains, were Shias. Estimates in the early 1980s 
placed the number of Shishans at 2,000. 

Education 

The government's good intentions in the area of education con- 
tended with straitened financial circumstances, a rapidly changing 
labor force, and the demographic problem of a youthful popula- 
tion (53 percent of the population was below the age of fifteen in 
1988). Nevertheless, significant progress had been made in vari- 
ous spheres. Education has been a stated priority of the govern- 
ment for a number of years. In 1986 government expenditures on 
education were 12.2 percent of the national budget. Education has 
become widely available, although some observers have questioned 
both the quality of the instruction and the appropriateness of the 
curriculum to the economy's requirements. Recognizing the need 
to supply training more suited to realistic employment prospects 
and to improve the level of teacher training, the government was 
continuing to strengthen vocational and technical education and 
to provide in-service training for its teachers. 

In 1921, when the Amirate of Transjordan was created, educa- 
tional facilities consisted of twenty-five religious schools that pro- 
vided a rather limited education. By 1987 there were 3,366 schools, 
with more than 39,600 teachers and an enrollment of 919,645 stu- 
dents. Nearly one- third of the population in 1987 was involved in 
education as a teacher or a student at home or abroad (see table 
2, Appendix). In 1985 nearly 99 percent of the nation's six- to 
twelve-year-olds were in the primary cycle, nearly 79 percent of 



114 



The Society and Its Environment 



the twelve- to fifteen-year-olds were in the preparatory cycle, and 
37 percent of the fifteen- to eighteen-year-olds were in the second- 
ary cycle (see table 3, Appendix). Progress in literacy was 
impressive. The Encyclopedia of the Third World, edited by George 
T. Kurian, reported that in the mid-1980s Jordan had a 67.6 per- 
cent literacy rate, 81 percent for males and 59.3 percent for fe- 
males. The gap between rural and urban areas in terms of literacy 
was closing, but rural levels remained below those of the urban 
areas; Maan Governorate lagged behind other rural areas. 

Education was free and compulsory for children between the ages 
of six and fifteen. The educational ladder consisted of four parts: 
primary (grades one through six); preparatory (grades seven 
through nine); secondary (grades ten through twelve); and post- 
secondary (all higher education). Promotion from the compulsory 
cycle to the more specialized secondary schools was controlled by 
a standardized written examination, as was passage from second- 
ary to the postsecondary programs. The Ministry of Education, 
which controlled all aspects of education (except community col- 
leges), administered the examinations. For grades one through 
twelve, nearly 75 percent of the students attended the free govern- 
ment schools in the late 1980s; about 15 percent attended the 
UNRWA schools, also free; and about 10 percent attended pri- 
vate schools. In 1987 the Department of Statistics reported that 
there were 194 UNRWA schools and 682 private schools. 

The primary curriculum stressed basic literacy skills. Subjects 
taught included reading and writing in Arabic; religion (Islam for 
Muslims and the appropriate religion for non-Muslims); arithmetic; 
civics and history, with emphasis on the history of the Arabs and 
the concept of the Arab nation; geography, with emphasis on the 
Arab countries; science; music; physical education; and drawing 
for male students and embroidery for females. In the fifth grade, 
English was added to the official curriculum (although many private 
schools taught it earlier) and some schools offered French. Within 
the primary cycle, promotion from grade to grade was required 
by law and was essentially automatic. Children could be held back 
only twice in six years, after which they proceeded to higher grades 
regardless of the quality of their work. 

In the preparatory cycle, work on academic subjects continued, 
both to improve the skills of terminal students and to prepare those 
going on to secondary studies. In addition, vocational education 
began on a limited basis. Each school was required to provide 
at least one course in a vocational subject for each grade. In gener- 
al, each school offered only one vocational option, and all students 
had to take that subject for three periods a week for three years. 



115 



Jordan: A Country Study 



The preparatory curriculum added geometry, algebra, and social 
studies to the academic courses offered in the primary grades. 

On completion of the ninth grade, students could sit for the public 
preparatory examination for promotion to the secondary level. 
Secondary education was somewhat selective in enrollment and 
quite specialized in purpose. This level had both academic (gener- 
al) and vocational divisions; the former was designed to prepare 
students for university-level studies and the latter to train middle- 
level technical personnel for the work force. Within the academic 
curriculum, students further specialized in scientific or literary 
studies. Because of the specialized nature and relatively limited 
number of secondary facilities, male and female students did 
not necessarily attend separate schools. The secondary program 
culminated in the public secondary education examination, which 
qualified students for postsecondary study. 

In 1987 around 69,000 students were enrolled in higher educa- 
tion. Nearly half of these were women. Jordan had four universi- 
ties with a combined enrollment of nearly 29,000; more than 
one-third of the students were women (11,000). The University 
of Jordan in Amman had a 1986-87 enrollment of nearly 13,000 
students; Yarmuk University in Irbid had nearly 12,000 students; 
Jordan University of Science and Technology in Ar Ramtha had 
nearly 3,000 students; and Mutah University near Al Karak had 
an enrollment of about 1,300. 

In the 1980s, Jordan strove to implement an education system 
that would address serious structural problems in its labor force. 
The country faced high rates of unemployment among educated 
young people, particularly in the professions of medicine, engineer- 
ing, and teaching, and also had a need for skilled technical labor. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the government began to expand its voca- 
tional and technical training programs to counteract the skilled labor 
shortage brought about by the large-scale migration of workers to 
high-paying jobs in the oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf 
and Saudi Arabia. In spite of the recession and high unemploy- 
ment among professionals, skilled technical labor remained in short 
supply in the late 1980s. Cultural factors also played a prominent 
role; great prestige attached to academic higher education as op- 
posed to vocational training. 

In response to the need for education reform, the king called 
for a reorientation of education policy to meet the needs of the coun- 
try and the people. Community colleges played an essential role in 
this reorientation. They were consonant with the cultural value 
placed on higher education and also helped provide a skilled 



116 



The Society and Its Environment 



technical labor force. In the early 1980s, the government's teacher 
training institutes and all other private and public training insti- 
tutes were transformed into community colleges. These education 
institutions offered a variety of vocational, technical, and teacher 
training programs and granted associates degrees based on two years 
of study. Upon graduation students were eligible to apply for transfer 
to the university system if they wished. In the late 1980s, more than 
fifty-three community colleges operated under the Ministry of High- 
er Education, which was created in 1985 to regulate the opera- 
tions of all community colleges, although individual colleges were 
administered by a variety of agencies. Scattered throughout the coun- 
try, the community colleges had an enrollment of about 31,000 stu- 
dents, slightly more than half of all students in higher education. 
More than half their students, about 17,000, were women. 

Nearly 100 areas of specialization were offered in nine cate- 
gories of professional study: education, commerce, computers, com- 
munications and transportation, engineering, paramedical technolo- 
gies, agriculture, hotel management, and social service professions. 
According to observers, graduates were able to find employment 
in industry, business, and government. The government sought 
to confront the issue of unemployment among university gradu- 
ates by encouraging more students to join community colleges. In 
1987 the government introduced a career guidance program in the 
secondary schools that explained the country's problems with un- 
employment. 

Most Jordanian students in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union were studying medicine and engineering. Some observers 
have suggested that many of the students in Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union were Palestinians whose education costs were 
being borne by the host government. Observers believed that most 
of the students in Western Europe and the United States were 
being financed by their families and the rest by the government 
of Jordan. Perhaps because of these connections, students from West 
European and American schools tended to obtain the more desir- 
able and prestigious positions on their return home. The perceived 
higher quality of education in the West also was a factor in mak- 
ing these graduates more competitive in the job market. 

Health and Welfare 

Factors affecting the standard of living for the average citizen 
were difficult to assess in early 1989. Information was scanty. Living 
conditions varied considerably according to region, kind of settle- 
ment, social position, and fortune of war. At the high end of the 



117 



Jordan: A Country Study 



spectrum, well-to-do city dwellers appeared to enjoy all the ameni- 
ties of modern life. In cities, basic public services such as water, 
sewage, and electricity were sufficient to meet the needs of most 
residents. Nevertheless, mounting pressure on these services, par- 
ticularly the demand for water, rose steeply during the 1980s and 
was bound to increase as the urban population continued its high 
rate of growth. World Health Organization (WHO) figures indi- 
cated that, in the mid-1980s, the urban population had a 100- 
percent rate of access to safe water within the home or within 1 5 
minutes walking distance; in rural areas the figure was 95 percent. 
Adequate sanitary facilities were available to 100 percent of the 
urban population and to 95 percent of the rural population. The 
rural poor, however, generally lived in substandard conditions. 
Homes in some villages still lacked piped water. At the bottom were 
the poorest of the refugees, many living in camps with minimal 
services. Open sewage ran through dusty, unpaved streets. During 
the late 1970s and the 1980s, electricity was gradually extended 
to nearly all rural areas. 

Diet was generally adequate to support life and activity. Aver- 
age daily caloric intake for adults in the 1980s was 2,968 (117 per- 
cent of the requirement), and protein intake was 52.5 grams, 115 
percent of the daily requirement. Nonetheless, nutritional deficien- 
cies of various kinds reportedly were common. 

The number of health care personnel increased so that by the 
mid-1980s Jordan had a surplus of physicians. The "brain drain," 
or emigration from Jordan of skilled professionals, apparently 
peaked in 1983, after which the number of physicians started a 
gradual climb. According to the WHO, in 1983 Jordan had 2,662 
physicians. In 1987 the Jordan Medical Association reported a 
figure of 3,703, of whom 300 were unemployed. In the early 1980s, 
the medical college of the University of Jordan started to graduate 
students, further increasing the numbers. Fewer opportunities for 
physicians became available in the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia 
because of the recession in these countries. 

In 1987 the Ministry of Health and the Jordan Medical Associ- 
ation, concerned about high unemployment among physicians, put 
forth various suggestions. These included opening more clinics in 
rural areas and assigning physicians to schools, colleges, and large 
industrial concerns. 

Other health care professions showed moderate increases; the 
number of government-employed dentists, for example, increased 
from 75 to 110. Pharmacists, a profession increasingly entered by 
women, nearly tripled in number from thirty-eight in 1983 to 



118 




A child patient at King Hussein Medical Center, Amman 

ninety-six in 1987. Government-employed nurses increased from 
292 to 434 over the same period (see table 4, Appendix). 

In the early 1980s, Jordan had thirty-five hospitals, of which 
about 40 percent were state run. A number of other health facili- 
ties scattered throughout the country included health centers, vil- 
lage clinics, maternal and child care centers, tuberculosis centers, 
and school health services. In 1986 government health expendi- 
tures represented 3.8 percent of the national budget. 

Medical care services were distributed more evenly than in 
the past. Previously most health professionals, hospitals, and tech- 
nologically advanced medical equipment were located in major 
urban areas, such as Amman, Irbid, Ar Ramtha, Az Zarqa, and 
As Salt. People in smaller villages and remote rural areas had 
limited access to professional medical care. With the focus on 
primary health care in the 1980s, the WHO commented that treat- 
ment for common diseases was available within an hour's walk or 
travel for about 80 percent of the population. The expense and in- 
convenience of traveling to major urban areas did, however, hinder 
rural people from seeking more technologically sophisticated med- 
ical care. 

The WHO reported a general decrease in the incidence of dis- 
eases related to inadequate sanitary and hygienic conditions. A 
reduction in the incidence of meningitis, scarlet fever, typhoid, 



119 



Jordan: A Country Study 

and paratyphoid was noted, while an increase was registered in 
infectious hepatitis, rubella, mumps, measles, and schistosomia- 
sis. In the mid-1980s, only one reported case of polio and none 
of diphtheria occurred. Childhood immunizations had increased 
sharply, but remained inadequate. In 1984 an estimated 44 per- 
cent of children were fully immunized against diphtheria, per- 
tussis, and tetanus (DPT); 41 percent had received polio vaccine; 
and 30 percent had been vaccinated against measles. Cholera 
had been absent since 1981. Jordan reported its first three cases 
of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) to the WHO 
in 1987. 

The most frequently cited causes of morbidity in government 
hospitals, in descending frequency, were gastroenteritis, accidents, 
respiratory diseases, complications of birth and the puerperium, 
and urogenital and cardiovascular diseases. Among hospitalized 
patients, the most frequent causes of mortality were heart diseases, 
tumors, accidents, and gastrointestinal and respiratory diseases. 

Traditional health beliefs and practices were prevalent in urban 
and rural areas alike. These practices were the domain of women, 
some of whom were known in their communities for possessing 
skills in treating injuries and curing ailments. Within the family, 
women assumed responsibility for the nutrition of the family and 
the treatment of illness. 

Local health beliefs and practices were important not only for 
their implications in a family's general state of health but also in 
determining when, and if, people would seek modern medical care. 
Local beliefs in the efficacy of healers and their treatments prevented 
or delayed the seeking of medical care. For example, healers often 
treated illness in children by massages with warm olive oil, a harm- 
less procedure but one that often delayed or prevented the seeking 
of medical care. 

Modern medicine had made tremendous inroads, however, into 
popular knowledge and courses of action. People combined tradi- 
tional and modern medical approaches. They sought modern med- 
ical facilities and treatments while simultaneously having recourse 
to traditional health practitioners and religious beliefs. Infertility, 
for example, was often dealt with by seeking the advice of a physi- 
cian and also visiting a shaykh for an amulet. In addition, tradi- 
tional cures such as "closing the back" were used. In this cure, 
a woman healer rubbed a woman's pelvis with olive oil and placed 
suction cups on her back. This acted to "close the back"; an 
"opened back" was believed to be a cause of infertility. 

The acceptance of modern health practices and child care 



120 



The Society and Its Environment 

techniques was closely related to household structure. A study by 
two anthropologists noted that younger, educated women encoun- 
tered difficulties in practicing modern techniques of child health 
care when they resided in extended family households with older 
women present. The authority in the household of older women 
often accorded them a greater voice than the mother in setting pat- 
terns of child care and nutrition and in making decisions on health 
expenditures. 

Discrimination on the basis of gender in terms of nutrition 
and access to health care resources was documented. In a study 
conducted in the mid-1980s, the infant mortality rate for girls 
was found to be significantly higher than for boys. It was also 
noted that male children received more immunizations and were 
taken to see physicians more frequently and at an earlier stage 
of illness than girls. Girls were more apt to die of diarrhea and 
dehydration than males. Malnutrition also was more common 
among female children; boys were given larger quantities and bet- 
ter quality food. In addition, more boys (71 percent) were breast- 
fed than girls (54 percent). 

In the 1980s, government efforts to improve health were often 
directed at women. In the summer, when outbreaks of diarrhea 
among infants and children were common, commercial breaks on 
television included short health spots. These programs advised 
mothers how to feed and care for children with diarrhea and ad- 
vertised the advantages of oral rehydration therapy (ORT) to pre- 
vent and treat the accompanying dehydration. The WHO noted 
that the use of ORT helped lower the fatality rate among those chil- 
dren hospitalized for diarrhea from 20 percent in 1977 to 5 percent 
in 1983. 

During the 1980s, the Ministry of Health launched an antismok- 
ing campaign. Posters warning of the dangers to health could be 
seen in physicians' offices and in government offices and build- 
ings. Success was slow and gradual; for example, cigarettes were 
less frequently offered as part of the tradition of hospitality. 

Social welfare, especially care of the elderly and financial or other 
support of the sick, traditionally was provided by the extended fam- 
ily. Nursing homes for the elderly were virtually unknown and were 
considered an aberration from family and social values and evi- 
dence of lack of respect for the elderly. Social welfare in the form 
of family assistance and rehabilitation facilities for the handicapped 
were a service of the Department of Social Affairs and more than 
400 charitable organizations. Some of these were religiously affiliat- 
ed, and the overwhelming majority provided multiple services. 



121 



Jordan: A Country Study 

UNRWA provided an array of social services, such as educa- 
tion, medical care, vocational training and literacy classes, and 
nutrition centers to registered refugees. 

Government expenditures on social security, housing, and wel- 
fare amounted to 8.6 percent of the budget in 1986. Social securi- 
ty was governed by the Social Security Law of 1978, which was 
being applied in stages to the private sector. As of 1986, all estab- 
lishments employing ten persons or more came under the law's 
provisions. Ultimately the law will apply to all establishments 
employing five or more persons. The employer contributed 10 per- 
cent of salary and the employee contributed 5 percent, and the con- 
tribution covered retirement benefits, termination pay, occupational 
diseases, and work injuries. The plan was for medical insur- 
ance to be included eventually under the social security contribu- 
tion. In April 1988, the Social Security Corporation covered 465,000 
workers employed by approximately 7,000 public and private es- 
tablishments. 

* * * 

Adequate published research in East Bank society and culture 
remained limited as of the late 1980s. Richard T. Antoun's books, 
Arab Village: A Social Structural Study of a Transjordanian Peasant Com- 
munity and Low Key Politics: Local Level Leadership and Change in the 
Middle East, describe a village and its surroundings in the north- 
west corner of the East Bank. Peter Gubser's book, Politics and 
Change in Al-Karak, Jordan: A Study of a Small Arab Town and Its Dis- 
trict, describes a town and its environs in west-central Jordan in 
which tribal organization was still significant. Gubser also has pub- 
lished a very general book, Jordan: Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events, 
on Jordanian history, politics, society, and economy. More recent 
research studies are Linda Layne's "Women in Jordan's Work- 
place" and "Tribesmen as Citizens: 'Primordial Ties' and 
Democracy in Rural Jordan"; Seteney Shami and Lucine Tamin- 
ian's Reproductive Behavior and Child Care in a Squatter Area of Amman; 
NadiaHijab's Womenpower: The Arab Debate on Women at Work; Ian 
J. Seccombe's "Labour Migration and the Transformation of a 
Village Economy: A Case Study from North- West Jordan"; Lars 
Wahlin's "Diffusion and Acceptance of Modern Schooling in Rural 
Jordan"; and Laurie Brand's Palestinians in the Arab World: Institu- 
tion Building and the Search for State. These works provide background 
on a variety of social issues in Jordan such as tribalism, health 
behavior, women and work, labor migration, education, and the 



122 



The Economy 

Palestinians in Jordan. No recent work, however, deals in a com- 
prehensive fashion with the social changes and emerging social forms 
in Jordan in the 1980s. (For further information and complete ci- 
tations, see Bibliography). 



123 



Chapter 3. The Economy 




Mosaic of a man carrying a basket of grapes from the 
Byzantine Church of Saint Lots and Saint Prokopius, 
Khirbat al Muhayyat, ca. 550 



JORDAN, A SMALL NATION with a small population and 
sparse natural resources, has long been known by its Arab neigh- 
bors as their "poor cousin." In the late 1980s, Jordan was com- 
pelled to import not only many capital and consumer goods but 
also such vital commodities as fuel and food. Officials even dis- 
cussed the possibility of importing water. Nevertheless, the Jorda- 
nian economy flourished in the 1970s as the gross domestic product 
(GDP— see Glossary) enjoyed double-digit growth. The economy 
continued to fare well in the early 1980s, despite a recessionary 
regional environment. Indeed, by the late 1980s, Jordanians had 
become measurably more affluent than many of their Arab neigh- 
bors. The 1988 per capita GDP of approximately US$2,000 placed 
Jordan's citizens well within the world's upper-middle income 
bracket. 

Economic prosperity rested on three primary bases. Jordan's sta- 
tus as the world's third largest producer of phosphates ensured a 
steady — if relatively modest — flow of export income that offset some 
of its high import bills. More important, Jordan received billions 
of dollars of invisible or unearned income in the form of inflows 
of foreign aid and remittances from expatriates. These financial 
inflows permitted domestic consumption to outpace production and 
caused the gross national product (GNP — see Glossary) to exceed 
the GDP. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, GNP exceeded GDP 
by 10 percent to 25 percent. High financial inflows from the mid- 
1970s to the mid-1980s allowed Jordan to maintain a low current 
account deficit; in some years it registered a current account sur- 
plus, without much external borrowing and despite trade and bud- 
get deficits. Jordan's economy, therefore, demonstrated many of 
the characteristics of wealthier and more technologically advanced 
rentier economies. Jordan also capitalized on its strategic geographic 
location, its educated work force, and its free enterprise economy 
to become a regional entrepot and transit point for exports and 
imports between Western Europe and the Middle East. Because 
of these factors, it also became a magnet for foreign direct invest- 
ment, and a purveyor of banking, insurance, and consulting ser- 
vices to foreign clients. Jordan's heritage as a merchant middleman 
was centuries-old, dating back to the Nabatean kingdom of Petra. 
Because the economy depended so heavily on the professional ser- 
vice sector and remittance income from expatriates, the government 



127 



Jordan: A Country Study 

sometimes called Jordan's manpower the nation's most valuable 
resource. 

Jordan's economic strategy succeeded during the Middle East 
oil boom of the 1970s. In the late 1980s, however, as the world- 
wide plunge in oil prices persisted, economic problems emerged. 
Foreign aid was cut, remittances declined, and regional trade and 
transit activity was suppressed by lack of demand, leading to a de- 
terioration in the current account. The government was deeply con- 
cerned about the economy's vulnerability to external forces. 
Jordan's economy depended heavily on imported commodities and 
foreign aid, trade, investment, and income. But because plans to 
increase self-sufficiency were only in the early stages of implemen- 
tation, a short-term decline in the national standard of living and 
increased indebtedness loomed as the 1990s approached; observ- 
ers forecast that austerity would replace prosperity. 

Structure and Dynamics of the Economy 

In the late 1980s, despite recent economic setbacks, Jordan re- 
mained more prosperous than many developing countries, and its 
citizens were more affluent than their neighbors from other 
nonpetroleum-exporting countries. Jordan's persistent economic 
viability was surprising in several respects. Measured both in terms 
of population and production, the Jordanian economy was one of 
the smallest in West Asia, according to the United Nations (UN). 
Its population — not including the West Bank (see Glossary) — 
numbered only about 3 million in 1989. Jordan's 1987 gross domes- 
tic product was estimated at less than US$5.5 billion. Furthermore, 
Jordan's natural resources were not nearly as abundant as those 
of other Middle Eastern nations. 

Added to these disadvantages was the incalculable cost to eco- 
nomic development of the regional political and military envi- 
ronment. The economy was dismembered by the 1967 Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank (see The Military Heritage, ch. 5). 
Jordanians regarded the loss of this territory not only as a military 
and political defeat, but also as an enduring economic catastrophe 
that cost them a large part of their infrastructure, resources, and 
manpower. Jordan's defense burden, although only average by 
Middle Eastern standards, was very large by world standards (see 
Defense Spending, ch. 5). The country's 1987 defense expendi- 
ture of US$635 million constituted 22 percent of total government 
spending. 

Despite such handicaps, the economy grew rapidly in the 1970s 
and continued to grow in the early 1980s. According to UN data, 
the annual real (inflation-adjusted) growth rate of GDP averaged 



128 



The Economy 



almost 16.5 percent between 1972 and 1975. The average annual 
growth rate fell to 8.5 percent between 1976 and 1979, then peaked 
at almost 18 percent in 1980. Jordan's economic growth appeared 
more spectacular in percentage terms than in absolute terms be- 
cause it started from low base figures; nonetheless, the pace of eco- 
nomic development was one of the highest in the world during this 
period. Jordan was not a petroleum exporter, a fact that made this 
growth rate all the more phenomenal. 

Jordan dealt relatively well with the recession in the Middle East 
triggered by plummeting petroleum prices. Between 1980 and 1985, 
the average growth rate decelerated to about 4 percent a year, but 
Jordan's economy was able to sustain this growth rate at a time 
when other regional economies, such as those of the oil-producers 
on the Arabian Peninsula, were actually contracting. The boom 
in transit trade to and from Iraq after the start of the Iran-Iraq 
War in 1980 accounted for much of the growth. The immunity 
of the large service sector to demand slowdown also postponed the 
effects of the regional recession. The government, however, con- 
stituted a large component of the service sector. In its role as a 
major customer and employer, the government sustained an arti- 
ficial level of growth through continued deficit spending and a 
relaxed fiscal policy. Despite the extra money and demand that 
the government injected into the economy, GDP growth eventually 
stagnated in the late 1980s. GDP growth in 1989 was estimated 
at only 2 or 3 percent. 

GDP by Sector 

The large contribution of the service sector to GDP, versus the 
small contribution of the industrial and agricultural sectors, has 
long been a source of concern to economic planners. In the late 
1980s, Jordan's aggregate private and public service sector con- 
tinued to contribute about 60 to 65 percent of total GDP. This figure 
was exceeded only in some of the world's most industrially advanced 
market economies. Figures nearly as high were reached by several 
of the world's poorest economies, however, where unproductive 
surplus labor was absorbed into the service sector. Some segments 
of the service sector, such as banking and engineering, relied on 
advanced and sophisticated skills. Nonetheless, the sector's over- 
all contribution to GDP remained roughly constant in the 1970s 
and 1980s, even though its share of total employment increased 
significantly. The relative lack of growth called into question the 
overall efficiency and productivity of the service sector. 

In 1987 the government, which employed more than 40 percent 
of the labor force and more than 67 percent of service sector 



129 



Jordan: A Country Study 

employees, contributed about 18 percent to GDP. Retail and whole- 
sale trade — which included well-developed hotel and restaurant 
subsectors — was the second largest contributor to GDP. This sec- 
tor generated 17 percent of GDP in 1987, a share that had declined 
about 2 percent over the preceding decade. Finance, banking, real 
estate transactions, insurance, and business services made up 8 per- 
cent of GDP. Transportation and communications contributed 
about 11 percent of GDP (see fig. 7). 

Manufacturing, mining, agriculture, and construction — the sec- 
tors that produced consumer or capital goods or inputs — together 
accounted for only about 32 percent or less of GDP. The steady 
growth of manufacturing, which climbed from about 4 percent of 
GDP in 1970 to almost 15 percent in 1987, was regarded as a 
promising sign. Agriculture — including animal husbandry, forestry, 
and fishing — constituted almost 40 percent of GDP in the 1950s 
and about 15 percent of GDP in the early 1970s. By 1987, however, 
its share had declined to 7 percent, which caused the government 
considerable concern. Construction's contribution doubled between 
1970 and 1975, reaching about 8 percent of GDP as spending on 
both public works and private housing increased, and then sta- 
bilized. By 1987 construction had declined to 6 percent. Utilities 
such as electricity and water supply accounted for 3 percent of GDP, 
and mining contributed 4 percent in 1987. 

Jordan's demand structure in terms of GDP consumption was 
distorted. In 1986 the government consumed more than 26 per- 
cent of GDP, a figure that was the fourth highest in the noncom- 
munist world. Private consumption was about 87 percent of GDP, 
also among the highest in the world. Consumption exceeded GDP 
by 13 percent, the highest margin in the world except for the Yemen 
Arab Republic (North Yemen). Jordan's exports of goods and non- 
factor services (i.e., freight, insurance, and travel) amounted to 
49 percent of GDP, and its negative resource gap — the excess of 
imports over exports as a proportion of GDP — was minus 44 per- 
cent, by far the highest in the world. Inflows of capital from exter- 
nal sources financed all gross domestic investment (31 percent of 
GDP) and part of domestic consumption. 

Insofar as consumption exceeded GDP and the difference was 
made up partially by aid and remittances, Jordan did not fully earn 
the growth it experienced in the 1970s and early 1980s. Jordan's 
GDP, which rose from about US$2 billion to US$4 billion during 
the period, was only between 75 percent and 90 percent of its GNP. 
At the same time, annual inflows of unrequited — or, as the Jorda- 
nian government sometimes called them, "unrequested" transfer 
payments — were in some years more than US$1 billion. These 



130 



The Economy 



unearned transfers, in the form of foreign aid and expatriate work- 
er remittances, permitted Jordan to register only a relatively small 
current account deficit. In several years, Jordan actually registered 
current account surpluses despite outspending its GDP by the 
highest margin in the world. In 1980, for example, Jordan had 
a current account surplus of almost US$375 million. As foreign 
aid declined and remittance income tapered off, Jordan suffered 
a current account deficit of US$390 million in 1983. By 1987 the 
current account deficit had shrunk considerably, because a reduced 
trade deficit more than compensated for declining aid and remit- 
tance inflows (see table 5, Appendix). 

The total amount of foreign aid that Jordan received was difficult 
to pinpoint. Jordan never received all the aid it was promised, and 
some aid was in the form of loans at concessionary interest rates 
or in the form of commodities and services. Although the amount 
of aid varied from year to year, it was always substantial. In 1980, 
for example, foreign aid constituted 46 percent of government 
revenue before borrowing; in 1985, it constituted 30 percent of pre- 
borrowing revenue. 

Financial aid was received mostly from the Arab Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (AOPEC). At the Baghdad Con- 
ference in November 1978, seven countries promised to donate 
US$1 .25 billion annually to Jordan for ten years as a "war chest" 
to fund its ongoing confrontation with Israel. Libya and Algeria 
reneged on their commitments from the outset, and Iraq stopped 
paying after the Iran-Iraq War started in 1980. In 1984 Qatar and 
the United Arab Emirates stopped paying except on an ad hoc basis, 
and in 1985 Kuwait suspended its payments. Only Saudi Arabia 
consistently met its payment obligations, which amounted to 
US$360 million per year disbursed in six equal bimonthly install- 
ments. Total Arab aid to Jordan stood at about US$750 million 
in 1980, with aid from non-Arab countries boosting total aid to 
about US$1.3 billion. Arab aid fell to about US$670 million in 
1983 and to about US$320 million in 1984. In 1988, according 
to Jordanian government figures, financial aid totaled about 
US$474 million and development aid and soft loans (bearing no 
interest or interest below the cost of the capital loaned) totaled about 
US$260 million, yielding a total of US$734 million in outside as- 
sistance. This figure included a United States aid package that 
authorized US$28 million of military training, US$20 million in 
budget support, and up to US$80 million in commodity credits. 
The figure also included United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
(UNRWA) for Palestine Refugees in the Near East aid of about 
US$10 million, World Bank soft loans in excess of US$100 million, 



131 



Jordan: A Country Study 



GDP 1 - 1978 = JD471 X million 

(in millions of JD) 



Other Services 

(including social services, 

household services) JD21.6 



Government 
Services/' 

JD95 



Mining 




Agriculture 



Manufacturing 



JD5.2 Utilities 

(electricity, water) 



Construction 



Transportation 
and Communications 



Trade 



GDP 1 - 1987 = JD1686.3 2 million 

(in millions of JD) 



Other Services 

(including social services, 

household services) JD84.0 



Indirect Taxes 



Agriculture 




Transportation 
and Communications 



.JD64.4 Mining 



Manufacturing 



JD48.1 Utilities 

(electricity, water) 

Construction 



Trade 

GDP at factor costs and in current prices; all figures are preliminary. 



For value of the Jordanian dinar - - see Glossary. 



^Industries 
Y/A Services 



Source: Based on information from Jordan, Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 
Amman, April 1979, Table 40; and Jordan, Department of Statistics, Statistical 
Yearbook 1987, 383. 



Figure 7. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector of Origin, 1978 and 1987 



132 



The Economy 



and Arab aid of at least US$350 million. The European Economic 
Community authorized US$112.5 million in aid to Jordan to be 
paid in installments between 1987 and 1991 . Worker remittances, 
the other main source of external income, could not be estimated 
precisely in 1988, but exceeded US$1 billion (see Remittance In- 
come, this ch.). 

Foreign direct investment and reexports, particularly of goods 
destined for Iraq, also contributed to GDP growth. The govern- 
ment of Jordan was one of only a few Arab governments that chose 
to stake its future on an economic system that, if not laissez-faire, 
was by regional standards free, open, and market oriented. In the 
1980s, however, Jordan began to compete for foreign investment 
with Egypt, which was pursuing its own open-door policy. On the 
one hand, Jordan's open-door policy posed risks insofar as the coun- 
try had to compete and cooperate with Arab governments that had 
protectionist and subsidized state-controlled economies. On the 
other hand, the policy was particularly effective because it was so 
rare in the Middle East. Furthermore, with the devastation of Beirut 
after the start of Lebanon's Civil War in 1975, Jordan was at least 
partially successful in replacing that city as a prime regional com- 
mercial center. In this role of merchant middleman, Jordan be- 
came an entrepot and conduit for trade and investment between 
the West and the rest of the Arab world. It encouraged transit trade 
through duty-free zones. Its open-door policy acted as a magnet 
for inflows of foreign direct investment. It provided tax conces- 
sions to both domestic and foreign businesses. Until 1988 it main- 
tained a sound and freely convertible currency backed by substantial 
gold reserves. A sound currency, combined with relative political 
stability, made Jordan a safe haven for Arab bank deposits. Jor- 
dan also established a strong professional service sector, including 
well-developed banking and insurance industries that catered to 
international business. Total net foreign direct and portfolio in- 
vestment in Jordan could not be estimated, however, because for- 
eign investment was offset by capital flight abroad. Estimates of 
Jordanian capital invested abroad ranged from US$4 billion to 
US$40 billion. Net direct investment in Jordan was estimated at 
US$23 million in 1985. 

The Late 1980s 

Superficial economic prosperity masked deep underlying struc- 
tural problems; in the late 1980s, a number of intractable long- 
term economic problems and a host of short-term potential crises 
loomed. In the long range, if Jordan's domestic market could not 
grow sufficiently to permit the economies of scale necessary to 



133 



Jordan: A Country Study 



sustain large manufacturing industries, capital investment and 
manufacturing value added would continue to be low; however, 
this difficulty might be offset if export markets were obtained. Gross 
barter terms of trade would decline further if the volume and value 
of manufactured imports rose faster than the volume and value of 
raw material exports. The merchandise trade deficit would con- 
tinue because imports of certain commodities would continue to 
be necessary far into the future. The standard of living as mea- 
sured by per capita GNP could eventually decrease as modest real 
economic growth was offset by a rapidly growing population. 
Domestic unemployment could increase to more than 9 percent 
as the young population matured and the domestic work force grew. 
Although a price increase for oil could restimulate the Jordanian 
economy by reopening Arabian Peninsula markets for goods and 
services, the resultant increased oil import bill would offset some 
of the gains. In the late 1980s, however, short-term financial prob- 
lems including deflation, debt, and devaluation of the dinar (see 
Glossary), which lost 42.5 percent of its value between October 
1988 and May 1989, commanded the government's attention more 
than did long-term problems. 

Deflation 

The problem of deflation, a sustained fall in overall prices, was 
complex and not readily apparent to the average consumer. Prices 
were stable in 1986, and in 1987 the cost of living index actually 
dropped, albeit by less than 0.5 percent. The greatest drops were 
in housing, food, fuel, and utility costs. Although consumers 
preferred deflation to the double-digit inflation of the early 1980s, 
deflation had ominous implications for an economic downturn. Be- 
cause import costs rose during 1987, average domestic prices fell 
significantly, as much as 10 percent for some goods and services. 
Total prices declined by 0.5 percent. Insofar as growth in domes- 
tic demand had contributed some 60 percent of manufacturing 
growth, business and industry began to suffer. Companies that had 
incurred dinar-denominated debts at high interest rates, expect- 
ing to repay their loans with inflated currency, were expected to 
suffer even more. The low interest rates that disinflation, a reduc- 
tion in inflation, implied could spark even greater capital flight and 
lower remittances. Increased government spending would revive 
aggregate demand but would entail more external borrowing. 

External Debt 

As foreign aid and remittances declined in the 1980s, Jordan start- 
ed to draw down its foreign reserves. In 1980 Jordan's international 



134 



Al Aqabah Port, Jordan 's only seaport 



reserves, including gold and hard currency, totaled US$1.74 bil- 
lion. By 1983 international reserves had shrunk to US$1.24 
billion — US$824 million in currency and US$416 million in gold. 
By 1986 international reserves had been reduced to US$854 mil- 
lion; currency reserves were down to US$438 million, but gold 
reserves remained at previous levels. The Central Bank of Jordan 
(hereafter Central Bank) held about US$130 million, and the rest 
was held by Jordan's private commercial banks. Whereas total in- 
ternational reserves were sufficient to cover six months' worth of 
imports in 1980, by 1986 they equaled only three months' worth 
of imports. 

In the late 1980s, the government resorted to borrowing to 
cushion the economy from the shortfall of outside income. In 1970 
external debt stood at US$120 million. By 1980, however, exter- 
nal debt had risen to about US$1 billion, and in 1986 it stood at 
US$4.13 billion. Total debt outstanding, including undisbursed 
debt (obligations contracted but not yet received as loans), was 
US$4.31 billion. Whereas lower figures were reported by various 
sources, such figures presumably did not count as debt some soft 
loans for development or trade credits that could be construed as 
debt or aid. 

Earlier loans had been contracted at concessional interest rates 
through foreign export credit agencies, other Arab governments, 
and multilateral agencies. Debt to such official creditors rose from 



135 



Jordan: A Country Study 

US$2.3 billion in 1982 to US$2.8 billion by 1986. Beginning in 
1983, however, Jordan started to supplement soft loans from 
governments with commercial credit. In 1982 debt to private cred- 
itors stood at US$512 million, but by 1986 that amount had tri- 
pled to US$1.5 billion. Funds raised on the Eurodollar market 
(dollars held and loaned by European banks) included four com- 
mercial loans obtained between 1983 and 1987. But 1987 Eurodollar 
borrowing totaled US$640 million. 

In part because it had previously borrowed so little, Jordan was 
regarded as a good credit risk. But as the country borrowed more 
and as it turned to private sector creditors, terms tended to stiffen. 
For example, although the average interest rate that Jordan paid 
in 1986 (7.3 percent) was the same as in the early 1980s, the amount 
of debt subject to variable interest rates had doubled to 20 percent 
of total debt; thus, Jordan was more vulnerable to a possible in- 
crease in world interest rates. At the same time, however, almost 
50 percent of all debt remained at concessional interest rates. In 
1986 Jordan paid an estimated US$610.5 million in debt service, 
of which nearly US$431.8 million was for principal and nearly 
US$178.8 million was for interest. These short-term interest and 
principal payments as a percentage of export earnings — the debt 
service ratio — rose from less than 8 percent in 1980 to almost 29 
percent in 1986. 

Devaluation 

Growing external debt, declining remittance income and foreign 
aid, and shrinking foreign currency reserves made Jordanian 
citizens wary of keeping their savings in dinars. King Hussein's 
severance of Jordan's official ties to the West Bank in July 1988 
added to the worries of both foreign investors and citizens about 
the long-term viability of the economy. These concerns culminated 
in a financial crisis in 1988 as Jordanians — especially those of Pales- 
tinian origin — tried to exchange dinars for foreign currencies and 
to move their savings outside the country, circumventing a Cen- 
tral Bank restriction that limited individual Jordanians to sending 
no more than JD5, 000 worth of foreign currency out of the coun- 
try per year for personal use. 

This capital flight brought pressure on the value of the dinar. 
The dinar, pegged to the special drawing right (SDR — see Glos- 
sary), had long been one of the most stable and realistically valued 
currencies in the Middle East. From 1982 to 1987, the dinar varied 
only slightly in value, from about US$2.55 to US$3.04, reflecting 
fluctuations in the value of both the dollar and the dinar. During 
this period, no significant black market for dollars existed. But in 



136 



The Economy 



a one-year period ending in January 1989, the dinar depreciated 
by more than 30 percent, from an official exchange rate of US$2.90 
per dinar to US$1.96. The Central Bank attempted to freeze the 
exchange rate at the latter level, but money changers ignored the 
official rate and opened a black market for United States dollars 
and other foreign currencies. Although the Central Bank eased re- 
strictions on the amount of foreign currency Jordanians could keep 
or bring into the country, it nevertheless was forced to cut the offi- 
cial rate repeatedly, chasing down the value of the dinar. By Febru- 
ary 1989, the official rate had been cut another 10 percent to 
US$1.76, at which point it appeared to stabilize. 

Austerity Measures 

To contain its financial crisis, the Jordanian government em- 
braced several austerity measures in the late 1980s. It froze the 
currency exchange rate and halted the operation of money changers, 
who had facilitated the dinar's drop by ignoring official exchange 
rates and acting as an open black market. In November 1988, the 
government also imposed new import duties of 20 to 30 percent 
on most consumer goods and banned a wide array of so-called lux- 
ury imports, including automobiles, refrigerators, cameras, tele- 
visions, telephones, cosmetics, and cigarettes. The ban on luxury 
imports was to last for at least one year, but statements by Jorda- 
nian officials indicated that it might last considerably longer. Taxes 
and service charges at airports and hotels were increased, as were 
work permit fees for guest workers. The government also adopted 
an austerity budget that cut both current expenditure and develop- 
ment investment (see The Budget, this ch.). Prime Minister Zaid 
ar Rifai sought to reassure Jordanians that the problems were tem- 
porary. In a February 1989 interview, he stated that "the Jorda- 
nian economy is active and suffers no troubles at all. Its troubles 
are financial, not economic." To the extent that this was true, 
however, observers noted that Jordan's successful growth in the 
1970s and early 1980s was likewise more financial than economic. 

The Role of the Government 

In the late 1980s, the government of Jordan remained a staunch 
advocate of free enterprise. Unlike many of its Arab neighbors, 
and for both pragmatic and ideological reasons, Jordan had never 
nationalized businesses, seized private assets without compensa- 
tion, or implemented socialism. But although the economic sys- 
tem was as liberal and market oriented as those of many fully 
developed nations, the government continued to play a large eco- 
nomic role, both in development planning and as a financier. 



137 



Jordan: A Country Study 

A Mixed Economy 

Government encroachment on the economy in the form of owner- 
ship or equity participation in corporations was inevitable and, to 
some extent, inadvertent. The government's role as financier de- 
rived from several interrelated factors. Most important, the govern- 
ment was the only channel through which foreign aid, loans, and 
most expatriate worker remittances were funneled into the coun- 
try. Acting as an intermediary in the distribution of these funds, 
the government acquired a reputation in the private sector for its 
"deep pockets" and fostered in the business world a feeling of 
entitlement to government support in the capitalization of certain 
enterprises. Inadequate private capital investment, resulting in part 
from an entrenched ' 'merchant mentality, " has been a weak point 
in the economy for which the government has had to compensate. 
Moreover, the large amount of capital investment required by some 
extractive industries was beyond the reach of willing private sec- 
tor investors. In some industries, such as telecommunications, 
government ownership was viewed simply as a prerogative. In 
numerous other cases, the government felt compelled to bolster pri- 
vate investor confidence and so stepped in to rescue insolvent pri- 
vate sector companies and banks with an infusion of capital, to buy 
the receivables of exporting companies unable to collect payment 
from foreign customers, and, when publicly held companies went 
bankrupt, to compensate shareholders for the lost value of their 
stocks. In this manner, the government essentially adopted com- 
panies that were abandoned by the private sector. 

Eventually, the government came to preside over a large mixed 
economy of some forty semipublic corporations. The government's 
share of the combined nominal equity of these companies was about 
18 percent, but its share of their combined paid-up capital — a more 
realistic measure of ownership — was over 40 percent. The govern- 
ment had contributed 100 percent of the paid-up capital of eleven 
of the companies, although its share of their nominal capital was 
much lower. These firms included Arab International Hotels, the 
Arab Company for Maritime Transport, the Jordan Cement Fac- 
tories Company, the Arab Investment Company, and a number 
of joint ventures with Iraq and Syria. In six of the companies, the 
government was a minor investor, holding less than 10 percent of 
the equity. The largest company in this group was the Jordan 
Refinery Company, in which the government held only a 3 per- 
cent share. This group also included the Arab Pharmaceutical Man- 
facturing Company and the Jordan Ceramic Company. Public 
investment tended to be highest in those companies with strong 



138 




Women workers in a shoe factory 

domestic and export markets. In 1988 the government was pursu- 
ing plans to offer the government-owned telecommunications in- 
dustry and the national air carrier, Royal Jordanian Airlines, for 
sale to a combination of Jordanian and other Arab private sector 
investors. 

Clearly, the government assumed responsibility for some aspects 
of the economy by default because of lack of investment activity 
and initiative in the private sector. Although total gross fixed cap- 
ital formation was targeted by the 1980-85 Five-Year Plan for Eco- 
nomic and Social Development (known as the 1980-85 Five-Year 
Plan) to grow at about 12 percent annually, it grew at less than 
1 percent per year. Public sector capital investment during the pe- 
riod totaled almost JD60 million, 40 percent more than stipulated 
in the plan, but private and mixed sector capital investment, at 
JD540 million, was only 75 percent of the planned target. The 
declining value of share prices on the Amman Financial Market 
since the early 1980s also indicated low private participation in 
equity markets. 

Government officials have, on occasion, criticized the private 
sector for its unwillingness to make capital investments and its 
general preference for trade and consumption rather than produc- 
tion and investment. Revitalization and expansion of the private 
sector has been a long-standing official development priority. 
Perhaps the government's most important policy tool has been 



139 



Jordan: A Country Study 

Central Bank regulation of bank interest rates on both loans and 
deposits. By setting ceilings on the interest rates that banks can 
charge certain borrowers, the government has tried to channel loans 
to capital- starved enterprises. The government also has encouraged 
foreign direct investment in the hope of stimulating growth of the 
domestic private sector through partnerships and joint ventures with 
foreign companies. 

The incentives that the government has had to provide foreign 
and domestic businesses to invest in the economy have, however, 
run somewhat contrary to the free market philosophy. Under the 
1984 Encouragement of Investment Law, foreign investors were 
permitted to own up to 49 percent of a Jordanian company. In 
certain cases (for example, export-oriented manufacturing enter- 
prises), foreign investors could own all of a Jordanian company. 
To encourage investment, companies received customs exemptions, 
almost complete tax exemption for up to nine years, and unlim- 
ited profit repatriation. In some cases, they were given free land 
and facilities. Free zones granting similar concessions were estab- 
lished near Al Aqabah and near the Syrian border to encourage 
wholly owned Jordanian companies to engage in manufacture for 
export. Five industrial estates throughout the country offered the 
use of government-built infrastructure and extensive government- 
run services to Jordanian companies. 

Although government economic support was weighted toward 
fostering investment, the government also provided subsidies that 
were deemed necessary to guarantee citizens' welfare and politi- 
cal stability. The main government agent for subsidizing and set- 
ting prices was the Ministry of Supply, which was established in 
1974 after merchants hoarded sugar to force up prices. The hoarding 
sparked discontent in the country at large and particularly in the 
armed forces. In the late 1980s, the Ministry of Supply imported 
wheat, meat, and other basic foodstuffs and distributed them at 
subsidized prices and bought crops from Jordanian farmers at 
higher- than-market prices. In the 1989 budget, JD33.2 million was 
allocated to food subsidies alone. The government also subsidized 
fuel, water, and electricity. 

The government repeatedly has stated that it intends to phase 
out subsidies. The import restrictions imposed in 1988, however, 
had almost immediate unintended price effects that necessitated 
further subsidies and price setting. Although the government in- 
tended to ban only luxury imports, merchants began to hoard their 
inventory of imported goods in expectation of future restrictions. 
Hoarding led to sharp and sudden price inflation of such vital items 
as medicines and food. Domestic producers of goods that could 



140 



The Economy 



substitute for imports also raised prices. In 1988 the Ministry of 
Supply announced that for the first time it would set or subsidize 
prices for tea, matches, electrical appliances, construction materi- 
als, and numerous other goods. For similar welfare reasons, un- 
employment was mitigated by public sector hiring, and the public 
payroll swelled to account for more than 40 percent of the work 
force in 1987. 

In 1989 it was difficult to assess whether the government's role 
in the economy was increasing or decreasing. The government's 
forceful intervention with specific restrictions to stabilize the econ- 
omy during the 1988 financial crisis was uncharacteristic. In gen- 
eral, the government appeared uncomfortable with the size of the 
role it was forced to play in the economy. 

The Budget 

The government of Jordan consistently has run budget deficits. 
Domestic revenues were 67 percent of current expenditure in 1980, 
but this figure had improved to 80 percent in 1985. Budgets tended 
to be only approximations of actual expenditure and revenue. The 
government did not present a consolidated budget; that is, the cen- 
tral government budget did not encompass the separate budgets 
of the municipalities and some public institutions. Moreover, central 
government income depended on unpredictable disbursements of 
aid from foreign donors, while spending usually was increased by 
supplemental budgets submitted throughout the year. 

Expenditures 

The discrepancy between income and expenditures appeared each 
year as the difference between the planned and actual budget deficit, 
with disclosure of the latter figure often delayed considerably. For 
example, the 1988 budget called for a JD67 million deficit, but the 
1989 budget planned for aJD122 million deficit. Although the actual 
1988 deficit had not been announced by early 1989, the Ministry 
of Finance disclosed that the planned 1989 deficit represented a 
45 percent reduction from the 1988 level. The minister of finance 
claimed that the government's 1989 assessment of income and 
spending was more realistic than in previous years, and that the 
government was committed to adhering strictly to the budget (see 
table 6, Appendix). 

Years of deficit spending effectively precluded the option of pur- 
suing a relaxed fiscal policy, which Jordan's price deflation might 
have warranted in 1989. The 1989 budget called instead for austerity 
to achieve cuts in spending from 1988 levels. The 1989 budget fore- 
cast an expenditure of JD1 billion, as compared to JD1.1 billion 



141 



Jordan: A Country Study 

in the 1988 budget. Of the 1989 planned expenditure, capital in- 
vestment and development spending were budgeted at JD346.5 mil- 
lion, a cut of JD105 million from the previous year. This cut 
apparently reflected the government's inability to spend the full 
capital budget in 1988 because of the economy's limited absorp- 
tive capacity. Recurrent expenditure was budgeted at JD688.9 mil- 
lion, an increase of about JD65 million over 1988. Insofar as the 
defense component of recurrent expenditure was cut JD4.5 mil- 
lion from 1988, it appeared that other recurrent spending, for ex- 
ample on government salaries and services, was set to increase (see 
table 7, Appendix). 

Revenue and Taxation 

Customs revenues from tariffs and a 15-percent across-the-board 
import surcharge traditionally have been the largest sources of 
domestically generated revenue, accounting for almost 40 percent 
of government income before foreign aid receipts in 1985. Because 
of a narrow tax base and the granting of numerous exemptions, 
direct taxes on income have made only a small contribution to 
government revenue. In 1985 direct taxes accounted for 13 per- 
cent of government revenue, or 4 percent of GDP. Various indirect 
taxes, however, were relatively high, so that indirect and direct 
taxes combined represented 14 percent of GDP. Jordan's revenue 
policy dovetailed with its investment policy. High customs charges 
and indirect taxes were designed to stifle consumer spending, while 
low personal income taxes and even lower business taxes were meant 
to channel the resulting savings to investments. For similar rea- 
sons, domestic borrowing was limited. In 1986 outstanding inter- 
nal public debt was only JD419 million (see table 8, Appendix). 

Total 1989 revenue was projected at JD913 million. Customs 
revenues were expected to contribute JD 155 million, but it was 
possible that the government import ban on luxury goods would 
slash this figure. Other local revenue generated through direct and 
indirect taxes was expected to contribute JD392 million. Foreign 
aid was expected to contribute JD225 million, the same level as 
projected for 1988, although actual aid disbursed to Jordan in 1988 
amounted to JD164 million. Development loans were expected to 
contribute another JD 103 million to 1989 revenues. 

Development Planning 

To the extent that achieving development planning goals de- 
pended on unpredictable inflows of transfer payments, the five- 
year plans were more useful as guides to intentions rather than capa- 
bilities; 37 percent of the total financing requirements for the 



142 



Solar energy plant near Al Aqabah 



1986-90 Five- Year Plan for Economic and Social Development 
(known as the 1986-90 Five-Year Plan) were to be provided by 
aid and remittances. Moreover, even when full funding was avail- 
able, the economy's limited absorptive capacity prevented the 
government from spending the full annual development budget. 

The 1986-90 Five-Year Plan 

In early 1989, it was not feasible to make a comprehensive as- 
sessment of Jordan's progress toward accomplishing the goals of 
its 1986-90 Five- Year Plan. In the past, development goals had 
been ambitious but progress was modest. For example, several 
important goals of the 1980-85 plan were not met: planned GDP 
growth was 1 1 percent per year, but actual growth was about 4 
percent; planned investment growth was about 12 percent per year, 
but actual investment growth was less than 1 percent; and planned 
growth in export of goods and services was 21 percent per year, 
but actual growth was 3.4 percent. 

Total investment spending under the 1986-90 Five- Year Plan 
was targeted at JD3.2 billion, of which the government was to con- 
tribute JD 1.8 billion and the private and mixed sectors JD 1.4 bil- 
lion. National savings were to provide about 36 percent of the plan's 
financing, transfer payments such as aid and remittances were to 
finance about 37 percent, and external borrowing was to finance 
about 26 percent. The plan listed seven broad goals in order of 
priority assigned by the government. The foremost goal was to at- 
tain and sustain a 5-percent rate of GDP growth and to increase 
real per capita GDP by 1 .3 percent per year. The second goal was 
to cap unemployment through the creation of more than 200,000 
new jobs, of which almost 100,000 would be created through 
investment-led economic growth. The remainder were to be created 



143 



Jordan: A Country Study 

through the eviction of foreign guest workers and the emigration 
of Jordanian labor. The third goal was to keep growth in public 
and private consumption below GDP growth so that by 1990 con- 
sumption would equal production. The fourth goal was to increase 
domestically generated government revenue to eliminate deficit 
spending. The fifth goal was to reduce, but not eliminate, the goods 
and services trade deficit. The sixth goal was to strengthen inter- 
Arab economic cooperation through the establishment of interna- 
tional joint ventures and the reduction of trade barriers. Finally, 
the plan called for more equitable distribution throughout the coun- 
try of the benefits of development. 

The plan also listed growth targets for the various economic sec- 
tors, including 46-percent real increases in agricultural income and 
mining income and a 40-percent real increase in manufacturing 
income over the five-year period. The plan envisioned a 2 3 -percent 
real increase in service sector income over the same period. Be- 
cause the goods-producing sectors were to grow faster than the ser- 
vice sector, the latter' s contribution to GDP would be reduced to 
about 61 percent. 

Long-Range Planning 

The 1986-90 Five- Year Plan listed several longer range economic 
goals to be attained by the year 2000. The most important was 
to keep Jordan's economy growing at a rate faster than the projected 
rate of population growth so that gains in the standard of living 
would not be diluted. Assuming a drop in the birthrate over the 
decade beginning in 1990, this objective would entail maintaining 
an annual real (inflation-adjusted) growth rate in GNP of 2 per- 
cent. Another goal was to foster 6-percent annual growth of the 
consumer and capital goods producing sector of the economy 
through the year 2000, so that it would eventually account for more 
than 40 percent of GDP. Manufacturing value added was to be 
increased by substituting domestic materials for imported indus- 
trial and raw material inputs. A related goal was to reduce imported 
goods and services to 56 percent of GDP by the year 2000, down 
from 90 percent in 1985. Technical training was to continue to en- 
sure that the labor force remained among the most skilled and 
professional in the Arab world. Finally, domestic savings were to 
finance an increasing share of investment. The plan also listed sever- 
al socioeconomic priorities for the year 2000: to continue to dis- 
tribute development more equitably throughout the country; to 
make the country's arid desert regions a focus of future develop- 
ment; and to ensure that all citizens had access to health, educa- 
tion, communications services, housing, and utilities. 



144 



The Economy 



Labor Force 

In the late 1980s, Jordan both exported and imported labor. The 
total domestic active labor force in 1987 was about 659,000 work- 
ers. Of this number, approximately 150,000 (23 percent) were for- 
eign guest workers, and approximately 509,000 were Jordanian 
citizens. Concurrently, an estimated 350,000 Jordanians worked 
abroad. In 1988 the number of Jordanians living abroad, includ- 
ing dependents, was estimated at up to 1 million (see table 9, Ap- 
pendix). 

Labor Emigration 

The oil price increases of 1973 and 1974 stimulated tremendous 
labor demand in the Arab petroleum-exporting nations, which 
tended to have small populations. Jordan, suffering from unem- 
ployment and having an educated and skilled work force, was pre- 
pared to fill this vacuum; over the following decade, several hundred 
thousand Jordanians left their country to work in neighboring Arab 
nations (see Migration, ch. 2). About 60 percent of Jordanian 
emigrants worked in Saudi Arabia, about 30 percent worked in 
Kuwait, and most of the remainder found employment in other 
Persian Gulf states. 

Remittance Income 

Remittances to Jordan traditionally have been the largest source 
of foreign currency earnings and a pillar of economic prosperity. 
In 1980 remittance income was US$666 million, but by 1986, ac- 
cording to official statistics published by the Central Bank, remit- 
tance income had increased to an estimated US$1 .5 billion at the 
then-prevailing exchange rate. According to a UN estimate, 
however, Jordan's 1986 remittance income was about US$1 .25 bil- 
lion and subsequently declined slightly. Actual remittance income 
was probably higher because much of the money was funneled back 
to Jordan through unofficial channels. Economist Ian J. Seccombe, 
who has produced authoritative studies of the Jordanian economy, 
estimated that real remittance inflows were perhaps 60 percent 
higher than the official receipts. Another expert, Philip Robins, 
estimated that real remittances could be twice the official receipts. 
Official figures did not include remittances in kind, such as auto- 
mobiles brought back to Jordan and then sold by returning expatri- 
ates, nor remittance income exchanged at money changers rather 
than at banks. 

Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, official statistics 
reported that remittance income exceeded export income, in some 



145 



Jordan: A Country Study 



years by over 200 percent. Remittance income accounted for be- 
tween 25 percent and 33 percent of the liquid money supply, about 
20 percent of the GNP, and exceeded the figures for total govern- 
ment development spending, or total foreign aid receipts. 

As early as the mid-1970s, however, remittance income and labor 
export created economic and demographic distortions. The prob- 
lems were so pronounced that in the 1970s Crown Prince Hasan 
called for the creation of an international fund to compensate Jor- 
dan and other labor-exporting nations for the negative effects of 
emigration. 

The billions of dollars that Jordanian emigrants pumped back 
into their home economy fueled prolonged double-digit inflation, 
especially of housing prices. To rein in inflation and to attract and 
capture remittances, the government tried to tighten the money 
supply by maintaining high interest rates for bank deposits. As a 
consequence, loan costs rose, hampering the investment activity 
of businesses and farms that needed finance. Also, and because 
remittances tended to be spent on imported luxury goods, the mer- 
chandise trade deficit expanded. 

Jordanian labor export also had an unanticipated impact on the 
domestic labor force. Over time, foreign demand grew dispropor- 
tionately for Jordan's most highly educated and skilled technocrats 
and professionals, such as engineers. This "brain drain" caused 
a serious domestic scarcity of certain skills. At the same time, wages 
for unskilled labor were bid up as Jordanian employers competed 
for manual workers. Progress on major infrastructure development 
projects was hampered. For example, according to a United States 
government study, the labor shortage idled heavy equipment on 
the East Ghor (also seen as Ghawr) Canal project for up to 70 per- 
cent of the work day. Ironically, Jordan was obliged eventually to 
import "replacement labor" — usually low-skilled workers from 
Egypt and South Asia — who transferred their wages out of Jor- 
dan. The number of foreign guest workers in Jordan grew com- 
pared to the number of Jordanians working abroad. The foreign 
guest workers also sent home a greater proportion of their wages 
than did the Jordanians working abroad. In the 1970s, such wage 
outflows constituted less than 10 percent of Jordan's remittance 
inflows, but by the late 1980s they offset nearly 25 percent of in- 
flows, neutralizing much of the benefit of labor export. 

Labor Force and Unemployment 

In the late 1980s, after years of internal labor shortages, Jordan 
faced a looming unemployment problem. Throughout the 1970s 



146 



The Economy 



and 1980s, Jordan sustained a high average annual population 
growth rate of between 3.6 and 4 percent. This growth rate was 
augmented by about 0.5 percent per year because of immigration 
into Jordan from the Israeli-occupied West Bank. In 1985 the 
government calculated that the work force would grow 50 percent 
to 750,000 by 1990. In the late 1980s, this prediction was proving 
accurate; about 40,000 people were joining the domestic labor pool 
every year. A combination of GNP growth, increased worker effi- 
ciency, emigration, and attrition created jobs for most new work- 
ers, and unemployment was kept to about 9 percent. 

Experts believed, however, that unemployment and underem- 
ployment would probably increase rapidly in the 1 990s as the labor 
pool continued to grow more quickly than labor demand. In 1986 
only about 20 percent of Jordanian citizens worked or sought work, 
a figure expected to grow dramatically as the youthful population 
aged. In addition, because of the recession in Saudi Arabia and 
the Gulf states caused by slumping oil prices, Jordanians who had 
been working abroad were repatriating and seeking work at home. 
The Ministry of Labor estimated that about 2,500 Jordanians 
returned from abroad in 1986. Another source, however, estimated 
the number of returning workers and their dependents at 35,000 
in 1986. Moreover, women — who in 1986 made up only a little 
more than 12 percent of the working population but almost 50 per- 
cent of secondary school and college enrollment — were expected 
to attempt to join the labor force in growing numbers (see Women 
and Work, ch. 2). The work force had some elasticity in that ap- 
proximately 150,000 foreign guest workers could be sent home and 
their jobs given to Jordanian citizens; but even if all guest workers 
were repatriated, unemployment would persist. By one estimate 
that did not include repatriating Jordanian workers, unemploy- 
ment could grow to 30 percent of the work force in the 1990s in 
the absence of extraordinary government action. 

Therefore, although aware of the problems caused by labor 
emigration, the government remained far more concerned about 
unemployment — and declining remittances — than about the 
problem of emigration. As of 1989, the government had stated ex- 
plicitly that it would continue to permit unrestricted worker 
emigration. 

Industry 

Manufacturing contributed about 14 percent of GDP in the late 
1980s. Much manufacturing activity related to exploitation of natural 
resources and to the mining sector. Although extractive industries 



147 



Jordan: A Country Study 




Figure 8. Land Use and Other Economic Activities, 1989 

were distributed throughout the country, about 90 percent of both 
small and large manufacturing entities were concentrated in the 
north, in an industrial belt between Amman and Az Zarqa (see 
fig. 8). Between 1975 and 1985, total manufacturing value added 
grew at roughly the same rate as GNP, at an annual average rate 
of 13 percent through 1980, then decelerating to about 5 percent. 
Employment in manufacturing grew slowly, and in the late 1980s 
was estimated at slightly more than 50,000, less than 10 percent 
of the working population. For decades the government had em- 
phasized industrial manufacturing development over other eco- 
nomic sectors, but growing excess industrial capacity prompted a 
greater priority to agriculture and water resource development in 
the 1986-90 Five- Year Plan. 



148 



The Economy 



Manufacturing 

The manufacturing sector had two tiers. On one level were the 
large-scale, wholly or partially state-owned industrial establishments 
that produced chemicals, petrochemicals, fertilizers, and mineral 
products. These manufacturing entities included the "big five" com- 
panies that constituted the pillars of the industrial base: the Jordan 
Phosphate Mines Company, the Jordan Fertilizer Industries Com- 
pany, the Arab Potash Company, Intermediate Petrochemical In- 
dustries, the Jordan Cement Factories Company, and also a recently 
enlarged oil refinery at Az Zarqa that employed about 3,000 per- 
sons. The chemical products sector employed about 4,000 workers 
at about seventy facilities. Because these industries were established 
to process the products of Jordan's mining and extractive sector, 
it was difficult to distinguish between the industrial and natural 
resource sectors of the economy (see Natural Resources, this ch.). 

Petroleum refining contributed 39 percent to gross output manu- 
facturing; fertilizers, potash, and other nonmetallic minerals, 13 
percent; industrial chemicals, about 8 percent; and iron, steel, and 
fabricated metal products, about 10 percent. Thus, about 70 per- 
cent of total manufacturing output was closely linked to the min- 
ing and extractive sector. The high contribution of these industries 
to the total value of manufacturing output resulted in part from 
the high underlying value of the natural resource inputs on which 
they were based. The same industries accounted for about 57 per- 
cent of total value added in manufacturing (see table 10, Appendix). 

On the other level were small or medium- sized light manufac- 
turing entities, many privately owned, that produced a wide array 
of consumer products. Many of these entities were cottage indus- 
tries or small bazaar workshops. By one estimate, in 1984 more 
than 75 percent of the approximately 8,500 manufacturing com- 
panies employed fewer than five persons each. The most impor- 
tant, in order of contribution to gross output value, were food 
processing, tobacco and cigarettes, paper and packaging, bever- 
ages, furniture, textiles, and plastics. These companies and other 
smaller industries such as publishing, glass and rubber products, 
electrical equipment, and machinery — each of which contributed 
less than 1 percent of total manufacturing output value — together 
contributed about 30 percent of gross manufacturing output and 
43 percent of manufacturing value added. 

Industrial Policy 

Like most nations with ambitious development plans, Jordan 
pinned its hopes on growth, particularly in the export of manufac- 
tured goods. Although high tariff and nontariff barriers sheltered 



149 



Jordan: A Country Study 

selected industries from competition from lower cost imports, both 
nominal and effective rates of protection generally were low by the 
standards of developing economies. On the one hand, effective pro- 
tection was high for paper and wood products, furniture, and 
apparel. On the other hand, imports of machinery, electrical equip- 
ment, and transport equipment were effectively subsidized. In view 
of its sustained high level of import of manufactured goods, ob- 
servers viewed Jordan's pursuit of import-substitution industriali- 
zation as moderate. 

Jordan's import policy theoretically was designed to promote 
domestic manufacturing industries by ensuring their access to 
cheaper imported capital goods, raw materials, and other inter- 
mediate inputs rather than by granting them monopoly markets. 
The government believed that development of a domestic manufac- 
turing base had to be led by exports because Jordan's small 
population could not generate enough consumer demand for 
manufacturing plants to achieve economies of scale or scope. In 
some cases, consumer demand was too low to justify building even 
the smallest possible facility. Domestic consumer demand alone 
was insufficient to support some manufacturing industries despite 
the relatively high wages paid to Jordanian workers; the high wages 
resulted in increased product costs and diminished export sales of 
manufactured goods. In the late 1980s, according to a Jordanian 
economist, the country continued to experience constant returns 
to scale despite its significant exports. Essentially, Jordan was still 
in the first stage of industrial production, in which the per unit 
costs were high because of limited output. 

The relative contributions to manufacturing expansion made by 
domestic demand growth, export growth, and import substitution 
were difficult to assess accurately. Growth in domestic demand 
stimulated almost 60 percent of manufacturing expansion, export 
growth contributed a moderate 12 percent, and import substitu- 
tion contributed nearly 30 percent. But exports accounted for about 
33 percent of the growth of intermediate goods (fertilizers and other 
inputs) industries and about 25 percent of the growth of consumer 
goods industries. In contrast, external demand contributed virtu- 
ally nothing to growth in the metal products, iron and steel, rub- 
ber, and glass industries; import substitution, domestic demand 
growth, or a combination of the two accounted for all domestic 
manufacturing growth, resulting in self-sufficiency. In the case of 
the furniture, apparel, textile, and industrial chemical industries, 
however, either increased domestic demand, increased foreign de- 
mand, or a combination of both led to simultaneous domestic 
manufacturing growth and increased imports. 



150 



The Economy 



In the 1970s and early 1980s, the government concentrated on 
developing the first tier of the manufacturing sector — the produc- 
tion of chemicals and fertilizers — because, unlike consumer goods, 
these commodities appeared to have guaranteed export markets. 
The government followed this policy although the second tier of 
the manufacturing sector — the production of consumer goods — 
had significantly higher value added. The government strategy was 
to increase value added in exported commodities by producing and 
exporting processed commodities, such as fertilizers from raw phos- 
phates and metal pipes from ore and ingots. Because some other 
Middle Eastern and West Asian nations had adopted the same 
strategy, competition for markets increased at the same time that 
demand slumped. Jordan suffered from declining terms of trade 
as the value of its processed commodity exports fell relative to the 
value of its consumer and capital goods imports. 

In the late 1980s, therefore, Jordan was reassessing its indus- 
trial strategy and searching for potential areas of comparative ad- 
vantage in exporting light-manufactured goods and consumer and 
capital goods that had higher value added. Consumer goods were 
protected in many foreign markets, and Jordanian exports as a per- 
centage of output in the consumer goods sector ranged only be- 
tween 2 percent and 9 percent, as opposed to a range of 12 percent 
to 35 percent in the extractive industry based manufacturing sec- 
tor. Accordingly, Jordan hoped to take advantage of its educated 
work force and increase the manufacture of capital goods that were 
either technical in nature or required engineering and technical 
expertise to manufacture. Those types of products had more ap- 
peal in foreign markets. To promote such development, the govern- 
ment established the Higher Council for Science and Technology, 
which in turn founded the private-sector Jordan Technology Group 
as an umbrella organization for new high-technology companies. 

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the profitability of some cap- 
ital goods industries, measured as a ratio of both gross output value 
and of value added, fell steeply compared to profit ratios in the 
commodities and consumer goods sectors. During the same period, 
profitability of the natural resources sector declined minimally, while 
profitability of the consumer goods sector rose. The capital goods 
sector had been much more profitable than the natural resources 
sector; but by the late 1980s, the two sectors were equally profit- 
able. The main cause of the plunge in profitability among capital 
goods apparently was price inflation of imported intermediate in- 
puts. Especially affected, for example, were the electrical equip- 
ment and plastics industries — precisely the type of technical 
industries that Jordan envisaged as important to its economic future. 



151 



Jordan: A Country Study 

The drop in profitability was not irremediable, however, and 
government officials continued to be optimistic about prospects in 
technical industries, particularly those that were skill intensive and 
labor intensive rather than capital intensive. 

The pharmaceuticals and veterinary medicines industries were 
examples of the new direction of industrial development policy. 
The government-established Arab Pharmaceutical Manufacturing 
Company exported more than 70 percent of its production in 1987. 
A half-dozen other drug and medical equipment companies were 
garnering a large share of the Middle Eastern market in the late 
1980s. Engineering industries also were a development target. In 
1985 this manufacturing sector accounted for about 9 percent of 
manufacturing value added, 14 percent of total manufacturing em- 
ployment, and about US$5 million in export sales. About 95 per- 
cent of the sector was devoted to basic fabrication of metal sheets, 
pipes, and parts. Jordan also exported in limited quantities more 
sophisticated products, such as domestic appliances, commercial 
vehicles, electrical equipment, and machinery; eventually it wanted 
to produce and export scientific equipment and consumer electron- 
ics. Another developing industry was plastic containers and pack- 
aging, of which about one-quarter of output was exported. 

The strategy to boost manufactured exports ultimately had to 
take into account the low manufacturing productivity growth of 
the 1980s. Average annual productivity growth was estimated at 
2 percent to 3 percent, and in 1986 it was a mere 1.4 percent. In 
several specific sectors, productivity was actually falling. Because 
this low or negative growth occurred at a time when labor produc- 
tivity was increasing rapidly, it was attributable to some combina- 
tion of insufficient investment and stagnant domestic and foreign 
demand. Jordan's average industrial capacity utilization, accord- 
ing to a UN report, was about 57 percent, but varied widely ac- 
cording to industry. Pent up consumer demand for some products 
was great enough so that any increase in capacity could be trans- 
lated automatically into increased production and sales. Capacity 
utilization was almost 100 percent for certain chemical and con- 
sumer goods factories, indicating that more investment might be 
warranted, whereas capacity utilization in the production of cer- 
tain household furnishings and building products was very low, 
suggesting suppressed or little demand. Spare production capac- 
ity meant that manufacturers would be able to meet sudden de- 
mand surges. In 1987, following a period of declining production, 
Egypt agreed to import construction materials, and output of ce- 
ment and metal pipes jumped 32 percent and 48 percent, respec- 
tively. Production of paper and cardboard also increased about 36 



152 



Fertilizer plant, Al Aqabah 



percent as the packaging industry developed, but production of de- 
tergent dropped 8 percent and production of textiles dropped 13 
percent, leaving spare capacity. The variability of capacity utili- 
zation indicated the problems that the government had to confront 
in forecasting domestic and foreign demand for manufactured 
goods. 

Electricity Generation 

Between 1980 and 1985, per capita consumption of electricity 
doubled from 500 kilowatt hours per year to 1,000 kilowatt-hours 
per year. The demand increase reflected the doubling in the num- 
ber of households supplied with electricity as rural villages were 
electrified. By 1985 about 400,000 households, or 97 percent of 
the population, had access to electricity. Electricity generation in- 
creased to a 712-megawatt capacity in 1987 and production of 3.2 
million megawatt-hours. After rural electrification was completed, 
growth in capacity outpaced growth in consumption, which was 
limited by conservation measures to about 3 percent to 4 percent 
per year. Roughly 40 percent of the electric power generated was 
used by industry, 30 percent was used by private citizens, 13 
percent was used by commercial businesses, and the remainder was 
used by water pumping stations. The Hussein Thermal Power 
Station at Az Zarqa historically had produced more than 70 
percent of the country's electricity, but at the end of 1987, the 



153 



Jordan: A Country Study 

opening of the Al Aqabah Thermal Power Station added 260 
megawatts, boosting Jordan's generating capacity to 972 megawatts 
and ensuring self-sufficiency into the early 1990s. A 400-kilovolt 
transmission line connected Al Aqabah and Amman. The Al 
Aqabah plant was to be expanded to a total capacity of 520 
megawatts by the mid-1990s, and was planned eventually to sup- 
ply 1,540 megawatts. 

Although Jordan depended entirely on imported oil to fire its 
generating plants in 1988, the government planned to reduce this 
dependency. The 1988 discovery of natural gas at Rishah, near 
the Iraqi border, led to feasibility studies of retrofitting the Az Zarqa 
plant with gas turbine generators. A 20-megawatt hydroelectric sta- 
tion was to be included as part of the planned Al Wahdah Dam 
on the Yarmuk River. Discoveries of shale oil in the southern Wadi 
as Sultani region kindled hopes of a 100-megawatt shale-fired elec- 
tric plant in that area. In 1989 Jordan also was prospecting for 
underground geothermal sources. 

Transportation and Communications 

An underdeveloped system of transportation and communica- 
tions for many years impeded Jordanian economic development, 
hampering in particular efforts to attract foreign direct investment 
and to conduct transit trade. The government lavished spending 
on transportation and communication facilities in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. By 1989 in many respects Jordan had surpassed 
its Arab neighbors in such facilities. Most such development, 
however, has been confined to a narrow north-south corridor be- 
tween Amman and Al Aqabah. 

Transportation 

The transportation system in Jordan comprised roads, railroads, 
airports, and one port. Road quality varied widely, and newer rail- 
road lines were used primarily for transporting phosphates. One 
national airline and two smaller airline companies served the public. 

Roads 

In 1989 the Jordanian road network, administered by the Minis- 
try of Transportation, was more than 7,500 kilometers long. Of 
the total system, 5,500 kilometers were asphalted and the remainder 
were composed of gravel and crushed stone. The backbone of the 
road system was the 320-kilometer-long Desert Highway running 
from Amman to Al Aqabah (see fig. 9). A second major highway 
ran east to west from Al Mafraq to the Iraqi border. Because these 
two highways were also the two main parts of the transit trade route 



154 



The Economy 



between the port of Al Aqabah and Iraq, they often were congest- 
ed by truck traffic. Jordan's road construction plans focused on 
building ring roads, bypasses, and overpasses in the vicinity of 
Amman, Al Aqabah, and other major cities to divert this truck 
traffic and eliminate bottlenecks. 

The quality of the major traffic arteries varied greatly. Only about 
50 percent of the Desert Highway was more than two lanes wide. 
A four-lane highway ran south from the Syrian border near Ar 
Ramtha to Jarash, but the road between Jarash and Amman was 
winding and narrow. Moreover, the common practice among 
freight companies of grossly overloading their trucks had resulted 
in severe damage to many stretches of road. This practice led in 
1988 to increased government enforcement of load limits and the 
imposition of penalties that could effectively put companies that 
violated the limits out of business. 

The freight and trucking sector was overdeveloped in the 1980s. 
Competition among many private freight companies and several 
large government-owned entities led to price-cutting and excess 
capacity. The Iraqi-Jordanian Land Transport Company (IJLTC) 
was the largest of the government-owned freight companies. Estab- 
lished in 1980, in 1987 it carried 1 .3 million tons of goods and almost 
70,000 passengers between Al Aqabah and Iraq. In 1988 the IJLTC 
had a fleet of about 900 trucks, 1,400 employees, and profits of 
over JD3 million. The Jordanian-Syrian Land Transport Com- 
pany, established in 1976, was smaller but organized along simi- 
lar lines. In 1988 trucks made more than 13,000 trips between Al 
Aqabah and Baghdad, of which Jordanian trucks made 7,500 trips. 

In 1987 about 250,000 vehicles were registered in Jordan, an 
increase from 60,000 vehicles ten years previously. This figure in- 
cluded about 131,000 passenger cars, 13,000 taxis, 4,000 buses, 
and 8,500 heavy trucks of various types. 

Railroads 

Jordan had 619 kilometers of single-track narrow gauge (1.05 
meters) railroad tracks. The main system was the Hedjaz -Jordan 
Railway, part of the old Ottoman-era Hijaz Railway that had once 
connected Istanbul and the Arabian Peninsula. It ran north-south 
through the length of the country and lay thirty kilometers east 
of the Desert Highway. Newer spur and branch lines constituted 
the Al Aqabah Railway Corporation, and connected Al Aqabah 's 
port and mines to the main north- south axis. Both railroad enti- 
ties came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Transportation. 
The newer system was used almost exclusively for transport of phos- 
phates from the mines at Al Hasa and Wadi al Abyad to Al Aqabah. 



155 




Figure 9. Transportation System, 1989 



In 1987, about 2.6 million tons of freight and 20,000 passengers 
were conveyed by rail. Rolling stock included 26 locomotives and 
600 freight, passenger, and tanker cars. The government envisioned 
in the late 1980s upgrading capacity to 4.5 million tons a year. 

Ports 

Located on the Gulf of Aqaba, which leads to the Red Sea, Al 
Aqabah was Jordan's only port. The modern port, established in 



156 



The Economy 



the 1950s, was under the authority of the Al Aqabah Ports Corpo- 
ration, part of the Ministry of Transportation. The port grew 
tremendously in the 1970s and especially in the early 1980s as transit 
trade through Al Aqabah became one of Iraq's few lifelines to the 
outside world during its war with Iran. In 1985, according to the 
government, 55 percent to 60 percent of Al Aqabah' s total cargo 
capacity was devoted to transit trade with Iraq. Another estimate 
placed this figure at 70 percent. Port facilities included seventeen 
berths, two of them floating, that were specially equipped for loading 
or unloading general cargo, crude oil, and phosphates. One of the 
newest berths, completed in 1985, was 580 meters long and con- 
figured for handling roll on/roll off cargo and container cargo. As- 
sociated facilities and services included warehouses and railheads. 
Five new tugboats were ordered in 1988 to escort cargo ships in 
the Gulf of Aqaba, which would bring to twelve the total number 
of tugs. In 1987, more than 2,600 vessels called at Al Aqabah, load- 
ing 8.7 million tons of freight and unloading about 11.3 million 
tons. The combined total tonnage represented a 19-percent increase 
over the previous year. 

Jordan has also established a small merchant marine. The Na- 
tional Maritime Company had four merchant vessels with a com- 
bined freight capacity of 71,400 tons. Also, the Syrian-Jordanian 
Marine Transport Company operated two freighters with a com- 
bined capacity of 6,000 tons that transported about 70,000 tons 
of freight annually between the Middle East and Western Europe. 
Since 1985 Jordan and Egypt have jointly operated an intermit- 
tent bridge and ferry service capable of carrying trucks and cars 
from Al Aqabah to the Sinai port of Nuwaybi. The service has cut 
transit time between Al Aqabah and Cairo in half, to about nine 
hours. 

Civil Aviation and Airports 

Royal Jordanian Airlines — known until 1987 as Alia — was the 
national carrier. Wholly owned by the government and operating 
since 1946, Royal Jordanian by 1988 had become one of the major 
Middle Eastern air carriers. From the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, 
passenger and freight traffic and reported profits grew almost 25 
percent annually (although fuel and other hidden subsidies made 
calculation of actual profitability impossible). Annual traffic growth 
tapered off to single-digit figures after 1983 and the airline ex- 
perienced a US$30 million loss in 1984. A budget cut of almost 
10 percent in 1986 resulted in staff and other overhead cuts that 
apparently made the carrier more efficient, and in that year it 
reported a profit of US$5.6 million. In 1986 Royal Jordanian 



157 



Jordan: A Country Study 

carried more than 1 million passengers and 42,500 tons of cargo. 
Load factors averaged over 48 percent. Jordan also had established 
some of the most advanced flight crew training and maintenance 
and repair facilities in the Middle East, and it sold these services 
to African and other Arab airlines. 

In the late 1980s, Royal Jordanian was in the midst of a major 
program of long-term expansion and financial restructuring. The 
program included the low-cost lease and purchase of new Airbus 
Industrie airliners. Royal Jordanian also was negotiating an agree- 
ment to sell and lease back some of its Boeing and Lockheed air- 
craft to cut corporate debt. After restructuring the balance sheet, 
the government planned to offer Royal Jordanian for sale to its 
4,600 employees and to private sector investors, retaining only a 
15-percent stake. 

In 1988 the Royal Jordanian fleet consisted of two Boeing 747- 
200s, eight Lockheed L-1011 Tristars, three Boeing 727-200As, 
and three Boeing 707-320Cs. In 1987 Royal Jordanian acquired 
the first two of six Airbus Industrie A-310-300s, which were to 
replace its Boeing 707s. Royal Jordanian also had an option to pur- 
chase six Airbus Industrie A-320s to replace its Boeing 727s over 
the decade from 1990 to 2000, and planned eventually to phase 
out use of its Lockheeds in favor of new Airbus Industrie A-340s. 

In 1987 Royal Jordanian added Moscow and Calcutta to the 
more than forty worldwide destinations it already served. New 
scheduled flights were planned to East Asia, including Seoul, Tokyo, 
Manila, and Sydney, as well as to Rio de Janeiro via Abidjan. 

Jordan had two other minor airlines: Arab Air Cargo and Arab 
Wings. Arab Air Cargo was owned in equal shares by Royal Jor- 
danian and Iraqi Airways. Arab Wings, a passenger charter ser- 
vice, was owned by Royal Jordanian (88 percent) and the Sultanate 
of Oman (12 percent). The latter company also included a flying 
ambulance service. There were nineteen usable airfields in Jor- 
dan in 1988, of which fourteen had permanent surface runways. 
Of these, two near Amman were major airfields: the Queen Alia 
International Airport, opened in 1983 and located at Al Jizah, thirty 
kilometers south of Amman, and the old international airport at 
Marka, King Abdullah Airport, used primarily by the Royal Jor- 
danian Air Force. 

Telecommunications 

The Jordan Telecommunications Corporation (TCC), a wholly 
government-owned semi-autonomous entity under the Ministry of 
Communications, was in charge of providing domestic and inter- 
national telecommunications services in 1988. Since 1971 the TCC 



158 



Queen Alia International Airport at Al Jizah, south of Amman, 
showing Royal Jordanian Airlines airplanes 

had exercised a monopoly over all forms of public telecommuni- 
cations, including telephone, telex, telegraph, facsimile, and tele- 
vision transmissions. The TCC was profitable and a net contributor 
to the budget. In 1988 the government was moving forward cau- 
tiously with plans to privatize the company in stages — using as its 
model the privatization of British Telecom — and planned eventu- 
ally to sell all or part of the equity to public stockholders. 

In the 1980s, TCC increased the number of connected telephone 
lines by almost 20 percent per year while introducing technologi- 
cal improvements such as digital switching and microwave links. 
International direct dialing was introduced in 1982; in 1989, Jordan 
had one Atiantic Ocean International Telecommunications Satel- 
lite Organization (Intelsat) station, one Indian Ocean Intelsat sta- 
tion, and one Arab Satellite Organization (Arabsat) station. In 1988, 
more than 200,000 direct lines were in service, with about 85,000 
applicants on a waiting list, so that only about 70 percent of de- 
mand was satisfied. A private citizen waited about five years for 
a line, but most businesses could obtain a line quickly by paying 
a surcharge to avoid the waiting list. Line density in 1988 was 7 
percent of the population, better than in most countries with similar 
per capita GNP. Telephone service was concentrated in Amman, 
where more than 60 percent of all lines were installed. Altogether, 
about 75 percent of Jordanian villages and cities had access to 



159 



Jordan: A Country Study 

telephone service. Despite 12 -percent forecast annual demand 
growth, line density was expected to grow to 12 percent of the popu- 
lation by the early 1990s because of a planned US$340 million in- 
vestment in new equipment and services. Local calls in Amman 
were free and were subsidized by exorbitant international rates. 
In 1987, however, because of protests by businesses and private 
citizens, international rates were cut drastically (up to 50 percent, 
depending on the country called). 

Natural Resources 

Jordan's mineral wealth and extractive industries constituted a 
major source of its gross output manufacturing as well as of its total 
value added in manufacturing (see Manufacturing, this ch.). Such 
natural resources also represented a significant element in Jordan's 
exports. 

Phosphates 

Phosphate deposits were Jordan's primary natural resource and 
a major source of export income. Estimates of Jordan's proven, 
indicated, and probable reserves ranged from 1.5 billion to 2.5 bil- 
lion tons. Even if the more conservative figure were the most ac- 
curate, Jordan could produce at its present rate for hundreds of 
years. Total 1987 production was 6.7 million tons, of which 5.7 
million tons were exported as raw rock. The remainder was up- 
graded into fertilizer at several facilities and either retained for 
domestic use or exported. Jordan was the third ranked phosphate 
exporter in the world, after Morocco and the United States, and 
it had the capacity to produce well over 8 million tons annually. 
In 1986 phosphate sales generated US$185 million in income, which 
made up 25 percent of export earnings and gave Jordan a 10-percent 
share of the world market. Sales by volume in 1986 increased 
approximately 14 percent over the previous year, but profits rose 
only 4 percent, an indication of the depressed price for phosphates 
on the world market. In 1986 long-term agreements were concluded 
with Thailand and Yugoslavia that assured the added export of 
almost 1 million tons per year. 

In 1985 the Jordan Phosphate Mines Company closed the coun- 
try's original phosphate mine at Ar Rusayfah near Amman be- 
cause it produced low-grade rock; this left major phosphate mines 
in operation at Al Hasa and Wadi Abu Ubaydah near Al Qatranah 
in central Jordan, and a new high-grade mine at Ash Shidiyah, 
forty kilometers south of Maan, where according to one estimate, 
reserves were more than 1 billion tons. 



160 



The Economy 



Among Jordan's major development projects was the construction 
of a US$450-million processing facility near Al Aqabah, completed 
in 1982, to produce monoammonium phosphate and diammonium 
phosphate fertilizer, and other chemicals such as phosphoric acid 
from raw phosphate rock. The project was envisioned as a boon 
to the extractive industry because it would increase value added 
in its major export commodity. Instead, it became an encumbrance 
as the prices of sulfur and ammonia (which Jordan had to import 
to produce the diammonium phosphate) rose while the price of 
diammonium phosphate on the world market slumped. Produc- 
tion costs of diammonium phosphate at various times between 1985 
and 1987 ranged from 110 percent to 160 percent of world market 
price for the product. Nevertheless, Jordan remained cautiously 
optimistic about the long-term prospects for the fertilizer industry 
because of its geographic proximity to the large Asian markets. 
In 1985 Jordan exported more than 500,000 tons of fertilizer, 
primarily to India and China. 

Potash 

Potash was the other major component of Jordan's mining sec- 
tor. A US$480-million potash extraction facility at Al Aghwar al 
Janubiyah (also known as Ghor as Safi) on the Dead Sea, which 
was operated by the Arab Potash Company, produced 1.2 million 
tons of potash in 1987 and yielded earnings of almost US$100 mil- 
lion. The facility processed the potash into potassium chloride. Fu- 
ture plans included the production of other industrial chemicals 
such as potassium sulfate, bromine, magnesium oxide, and soda 
ash. As in the case of phosphates, India was a major customer, 
buying almost 33 percent of output. Jordan was the world's lowest 
cost producer, in part because it used solar evaporation. There was 
lingering concern that possible Israeli construction of a Medi- 
terranean-Dead Sea canal would dilute the Dead Sea, making 
extraction far more expensive. 

Oil and Gas 

By the late 1980s, a twenty-year-long period of exploration had 
resulted in the discovery and exploitation of three oil wells in the 
Hamzah field in the Wadi al Azraq region west of Amman that 
yielded only a small fraction of domestic energy requirements. 
Jordan also had just discovered gas from what appeared to be a 
field in the eastern panhandle near the Iraqi-Saudi Arabian border. 
Jordan remained almost entirely dependent on oil imported from 
Saudi Arabia and Iraq to meet its energy needs. Jordan refined 
the imported crude petroleum at its Az Zarqa refinery. In 1985 



161 



Jordan: A Country Study 



the Az Zarqa refinery processed about 2.6 million tons of petro- 
leum. Of this total, about 1 .8 million tons came from Saudi Arabia, 
700,000 tons from Iraq, and 2,800 tons from Jordan's Hamzah 
field. An additional 400,000 tons of fuel were imported from Iraq. 
The Saudi Arabian oil was transported to Jordan via the Trans- 
Arabian Pipeline (Tapline). Oil from Iraq was transported by tanker 
truck. About 40 percent of oil imports were used by the transport 
sector, 25 percent to generate electricity, 16 percent by industry, 
and the remainder for domestic use. 

Jordan's oil bill was difficult to calculate and was subject to fluc- 
tuation as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) changed its posted price for crude. Since 1985, barter 
agreements with Iraq to trade goods for crude oil have removed 
some of Jordan's oil bill from the balance sheet. Jordan also varied 
its imports of crude oil and other, more expensive fuels, depend- 
ing on its immediate fuel demand and its refinery capacity, and 
cut consumption through conservation measures and price in- 
creases. 

The oil bill remained very large, however. A major irony of Jor- 
dan's energy dependence was that despite — or because of — its prox- 
imity to its main oil suppliers, it was sometimes obliged to pay 
extremely inflated prices for its oil. In mid- 1986, for example, Saudi 
Arabia charged Jordan the official OPEC price of US$28 per bar- 
rel at a time when oil was selling on the international spot market 
for US$10 per barrel. Saudi Arabia's motives were perhaps as much 
political as economic, in that it wanted to maintain the integrity 
of the OPEC floor price for oil. Dependent on Saudi financial aid, 
Jordan could not alienate its patron by shopping on the world mar- 
ket. In 1985 estimates of Jordan's oil import bill ranged between 
US$500 million and US$650 million. At that time, imported oil 
constituted approximately 20 percent of total imports and offset 
80 percent of the value of commodity exports. In 1986 and 1987, 
Jordan's estimated fuel bill declined considerably, to less than 
US$300 million. The drop resulted from barter with Iraq, decreased 
fuel imports, and OPEC's reduction of its official price of crude 
oil to bring it into line with world market prices. As prices dropped, 
the Jordanian government — which had subsidized domestic fuel 
prices — was able to cut the subsidy from US$70 million to US$14 
million instead of passing on savings to consumers. 

Since 1984 Saudi Arabia has forced Jordan to underwrite the 
entire cost of operating the Tapline. This has added more than 
US$25 million per year to Jordan's oil bill. During the Iran-Iraq 
War, therefore, Jordan tried to persuade Iraq to obtain an alter- 
native oil outlet by building a pipeline across Jordan to Al Aqabah. 



162 



Phosphate mine, southern Jordan 
Unloading phosphates, Al Aqabah Port 



163 



Jordan: A Country Study 

The project foundered because of Iraqi concern that the line was 
vulnerable to Israeli attack and embarrassment over disclosure of 
Jordanian attempts to obtain a secret Israeli pledge not to attack 
the line. 

The 1980 discovery of from 10 billion to 40 billion tons of shale 
oil deposits in the Wadi as Sultani area raised Jordanian hopes of 
greater self-sufficiency, but there were doubts that large-scale ex- 
ploitation of the deposits would be commercially viable in the near 
future. Since 1985 Jordan has attempted to interest Western oil 
companies in exploring for oil. Amoco, Hunt Petroleum, Petro- 
Canada, Petrofina of Belgium, and the Japanese National Oil Com- 
pany were conducting survey work in Jordan in the late 1980s. 
Jordanian planners hoped that potentially extensive natural gas 
reserves discovered at Rishah in eastern Jordan could eventually 
replace oil for electricity generation, cutting imports by one-quarter. 

Water 

The government was concerned that scarcity of water could ulti- 
mately place a cap on both agricultural and industrial development. 
Although no comprehensive hydrological survey had been con- 
ducted by the late 1980s, some experts believed that demand for 
water could outstrip supply by the early 1990s. Average annual 
rainfall was about 8 billion cubic meters, most of which evaporated; 
the remainder flowed into rivers and other catchments or seeped 
into the ground to replenish large underground aquifers of fossil 
water that could be tapped by wells. Annual renewable surface and 
subterranean water supply was placed at 1.2 billion cubic meters. 
Total demand was more difficult to project. In 1985 Jordan con- 
sumed about 520 million cubic meters of water, of which 111 mil- 
lion cubic meters went for industrial and domestic use, and 409 
million cubic meters went for agricultural use. By 1995 it was esti- 
mated that domestic and industrial consumption would almost dou- 
ble and agricultural demand would increase by 50 percent, so that 
total demand would be about 820 million cubic meters. By the year 
2000, projected demand was estimated at 934 million cubic meters. 
Jordan, therefore, would need to harness almost all of its annual 
renewable water resources of 1.2 billion cubic meters to meet fu- 
ture demand, a process that would inevitably be marked by 
diminishing marginal returns as ever more expensive and remotely 
situated projects yielded less and less added water. The process also 
could spark regional disputes — especially with Israel — over ripar- 
ian rights. 

The government had completed several major infrastructure 
projects in an effort to make maximum use of limited water supplies, 



164 



The Economy 



and was considering numerous other projects in the late 1980s. The 
King Talal Dam, built in 1978 on the Az Zarqa River, formed 
Jordan's major reservoir. In the late 1980s, a project to raise the 
height of the dam by ten meters so as to increase the reservoir's 
capacity from 56 million cubic meters to 90 million cubic meters 
was almost complete. A second major construction project under- 
way in 1989 was the Wadi al Arabah Dam to capture flood waters 
of the Yarmuk River and the Wadi al Jayb (also known as Wadi 
al Arabah) in a 17-million cubic meter reservoir. These two dams 
and innumerable other catchments and tunnels collected water from 
tributaries that flowed toward the Jordan River and fed the 
50-kilometer-long East Ghor Canal (see fig. 4). Plans called for 
the eventual extension of the East Ghor Canal to the Dead Sea 
region, which would almost double its length. In 1989 about fifteen 
dams were in various stages of design or construction, at a total 
projected cost of JD64 million. 

By far the largest of these projects was a joint Jordanian-Syrian 
endeavor to build a 100-meter-high dam on the Yarmuk River. 
The project, which had been contemplated since the 1950s but had 
foundered repeatedly because of political disputes, was revived in 
1988 after the thaw in Jordanian-Syrian relations and appeared 
to be progressing in early 1989. Called the Maqarin Dam in previ- 
ous development plans, it was renamed the Al Wahdah Dam to 
reflect the political rapprochement that made construction feasi- 
ble (Al Wahdah means unity). The dam was to create a reservoir 
of 250 million cubic meters. The Jordanian estimate of the cost, 
which Jordan was to bear alone, was US$397 million. Indepen- 
dent estimates placed the figure at more than US$500 million. 
Building time was estimated at two years after the planned 1989 
starting date, but new political problems threatened to stall con- 
struction. In 1988 the United States attempted to mediate between 
Jordan and Israel, which feared the dam would limit its own poten- 
tial water supply; Syria, however, refused to join any tripartite 
negotiations. 

In 1989 serious consideration was being given to two proposals 
to construct major pipelines to import water. Completion of either 
project could be a partial solution to Jordan's water scarcity. Be- 
cause of cost, however, neither project was likely to be constructed 
in the near future. One project was to construct a multibillion dol- 
lar 650-kilometer-long pipeline from the Euphrates River in Iraq. 
The pipeline would supply Jordan with about 160 million cubic 
meters of water per year. The other project, on which feasibility 
studies had been conducted, was to construct a 2,700-kilometer- 
long pipeline from rivers in Turkey, through Syria and Jordan, 



165 



Jordan: A Country Study 

to Saudi Arabia. Jordan could draw an allotment of about 220 mil- 
lion cubic meters per year from this second pipeline. The estimated 
US$20 billion cost of the latter project was thought to be prohibi- 
tive. 

Agriculture 

Agriculture contributed substantially to the economy at the time 
of Jordan's independence, but it subsequently suffered a decades- 
long steady decline. In the early 1950s, agriculture constituted 
almost 40 percent of GNP; on the eve of the June 1967 War, it 
was 17 percent. By the mid-1980s, agriculture's share of GNP was 
only about 6 percent. In contrast, in Syria and Egypt agriculture 
constituted more than 20 percent of GNP in the 1980s. Several 
factors contributed to this downward trend. With the Israeli occu- 
pation of the West Bank, Jordan lost prime farmland. Starting in 
the mid-1970s, Jordanian labor emigration also hastened the decline 
of agriculture. Many Jordanian peasants abandoned farming to 
take more lucrative jobs abroad, sometimes as soldiers in the armies 
of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states or in service indus- 
tries in those countries. Others migrated to cities where labor short- 
ages had led to higher wages for manual workers. Deserted farms 
were built over as urban areas expanded. As the Jordanian govern- 
ment drove up interest rates to attract remittance income, farm 
credit tightened, which made it difficult for farmers to buy seed 
and fertilizer. 

In striking contrast to Egypt and Iraq, where redistribution of 
land irrigated by the Nile and Euphrates rivers was a pivotal 
political, social, and economic issue, land tenure was never an im- 
portant concern in Jordan. More than 150,000 foreign laborers — 
mainly Egyptians — worked in Jordan in 1988, most on farms. 
Moreover, since the early 1960s, the government has continuously 
created irrigated farmland from what was previously arid desert, 
further reducing competition for arable land. Ownership of rain- 
fed land was not subject to special restrictions. Limited land re- 
form occurred in the early 1960s when, as the government irrigated 
the Jordan River valley, it bought plots larger than twenty hec- 
tares, subdivided them, and resold them to former tenants in three- 
hectare to five-hectare plots. Because the land had not been very 
valuable before the government irrigated it, this process was ac- 
complished with little controversy. In general, the government has 
aimed to keep land in larger plots to encourage efficiency and 
mechanized farming. The government made permanently indivisi- 
ble the irrigated land that it granted or sold so as to nullify tradi- 
tional Islamic inheritance laws that tended to fragment land. 



166 



Grain silos, A I Aqabah 



Agricultural Development 

Although the agricultural sector's share of GNP declined in com- 
parison with other sectors of the economy, farming remained eco- 
nomically important and production grew in absolute terms. 
Between 1975 and 1985, total production of cereals and beans rose 
by almost 150 percent, and production of vegetables rose by more 
than 200 percent, almost all of the increase occurring between 1975 
and 1980. Production of certain cash export crops, such as olives, 
tobacco, and fruit, more than quadrupled. Because farming had 
remained labor intensive, by one estimate about 20 percent to 30 
percent of the male work force continued to depend on farming 
for its livelihood. 

Even with increased production, the failure of agriculture to keep 
pace with the growth of the rest of the economy, however, resulted 
in an insufficient domestic food supply. Jordan thus needed to im- 
port such staples as cereals, grains, and meat. Wheat imports aver- 
aged about 350,000 tons per year, ten to twenty times the amount 
produced domestically. Red meat imports cost more than JD30 
million per year, and onion and potato imports cost between JD3 
million and JD4 million per year. Between 1982 and 1985, the total 
food import bill averaged about JD 180 million per year, account- 
ing for more than 15 percent of total imports during the period. 
At the same time, cash crop exports — for example, the export of 



167 



Jordan: A Country Study 

7,000 tons of food to Western Europe in 1988 — generated about 
JD40 million per year, yielding a net food deficit of JD140 mil- 
lion. One emerging problem in the late 1980s was the erosion of 
Jordan's traditional agricultural export market. The wealthy oil- 
exporting states of the Arabian Peninsula, concerned about their 
"food security," were starting to replace imports from Jordan with 
food produced domestically at costs far higher than world market 
prices, using expensive desalinated water. 

Cropping and Production 

Observers expected food imports to remain necessary into the 
indefinite future. Much of Jordan's soil was not arable even if water 
were available; by several estimates, between 6 percent and 7 per- 
cent of Jordan's territory was arable, a figure that was being re- 
vised slowly upward as dry-land farming techniques became more 
sophisticated. In 1989 the scarcity of water, the lack of irrigation, 
and economic problems — rather than the lack of arable land — set 
a ceiling on agricultural potential (see Water, this ch.). Only about 
20 percent of Jordan's geographic area received more than 200 mil- 
limeters of rainfall per year, the minimum required for rain-fed 
agriculture. Much of this land was otherwise unsuitable for agricul- 
ture. Moreover, rainfall varied greatly from year to year, so crops 
were prone to be ruined by periodic drought. 

In 1986 only about 5.5 percent (about 500,000 hectares), of the 
East Bank's (see Glossary) 9.2 million hectares were under culti- 
vation. Fewer than 40,000 hectares were irrigated, almost all in 
the Jordan River valley. Because arable, rain- fed land was exploited 
extensively, future growth of agricultural production depended on 
increased irrigation. Estimates of the additional area that could be 
irrigated were Jordan to maximize its water resources ranged be- 
tween 65,000 and 100,000 hectares. 

Most agricultural activity was concentrated in two areas. In rain- 
fed northern and central areas of higher elevation, wheat, barley, 
and other field crops such as tobacco, lentils, barley, and chick- 
peas were cultivated; olives also were produced in these regions. 
Because of periodic drought and limited area, the rain-fed uplands 
did not support sufficient output of cereal crops to meet domestic 
demand (see table 11, Appendix). 

In the more fertile Jordan River valley, fruits and vegetables 
including cucumbers, tomatoes, eggplants, melons, bananas, and 
citrus crops often were produced in surplus amounts. The Jordan 
River valley received little rain, and the main source of irrigation 
water was the East Ghor Canal, which was built in 1963 with United 
States aid. 



168 



The Economy 



Although the country's ultimate agricultural potential was small, 
economic factors apparently limited production more than environ- 
mental constraints, as reflected by up to 100,000 hectares of poten- 
tially arable land that lay fallow in the late 1980s. The government 
has expressed considerable concern about its "food security" and 
its high food import bill, and it was implementing plans to increase 
crop production in the 1990s. Growth in agricultural output was 
only about 4 percent during the 1980-85 Five-Year Plan, despite 
investment of approximately JD80 million during the period, in- 
dicating the slow pace of progress. 

In the late 1980s, Jordan was implementing a two-pronged 
agricultural development policy. The long-term strategy was to in- 
crease the total area under cultivation by better harnessing water 
resources to increase irrigation of arid desert areas for the cultiva- 
tion of cereal crops, the country's most pressing need. In the short 
term, the government was attempting to maximize the efficiency 
of agricultural production in the Jordan River valley through ra- 
tionalization or use of resources to produce those items in which 
the country had a relative advantage. 

Rationalization started with a controversial 1985 government 
decision to regulate cropping and production, primarily in the Jor- 
dan River valley. Farmers there had repeatedly produced surpluses 
of tomatoes, cucumbers, eggplants, and squashes because they were 
reliable and traditional crops. At the same time, underproduction 
of crops such as potatoes, onions, broccoli, celery, garlic, and spices 
led to unnecessary imports. The government offered incentives to 
farmers to experiment with new crops and cut subsidy payments 
to those who continued to produce surplus crops. In 1986 cucum- 
ber production dropped by 25 percent to about 50,000 tons and 
tomato harvests dropped by more than 33 percent to 160,000 tons, 
while self-sufficiency was achieved in potatoes and onions. 

Production of wheat and other cereals fluctuated greatly from 
year to year, but never came close to meeting demand. In 1986, 
a drought year, Jordan produced about 22,000 tons of wheat, down 
from 63,000 tons in 1985. In 1987 Jordan harvested about 130,000 
tons, a record amount. Because even a bumper crop did not meet 
domestic demand, expansion of dry-land cereal farming in the 
southeast of the country was a major agricultural development goal 
of the 1990s. One plan called for the irrigation of a 7,500-hectare 
area east of Khawr Ramm (known as Wadi Rum) using 100 mil- 
lion cubic meters per year of water pumped from a large under- 
ground aquifer. Another plan envisioned a 7,500-hectare cultivated 
area in the Wadi al Arabah region south of the Jordan River val- 
ley using desalinated water from the Red Sea for irrigation. 



169 



Jordan: A Country Study 
Livestock 

Livestock production was limited in the late 1980s. Jordan had 
about 35,000 head of cattle but more than 1 million sheep and 
500,000 goats, and the government planned to increase their num- 
bers. In the late 1980s, annual production of red meat ranged be- 
tween 10,000 and 15,000 tons, less than 33 percent of domestic 
consumption. A major impediment to increased livestock produc- 
tion was the high cost of imported feed. Jordan imported cereals 
at high cost for human consumption, but imported animal feed 
was a much lower priority. Likewise, the arid, rain-fed land that 
could have been used for grazing or for fodder production was set 
aside for wheat production. Jordan was self-sufficient, however, 
in poultry meat production (about 35,000 tons) and egg produc- 
tion (about 400,000 eggs), and exported these products to neigh- 
boring countries. 

International Trade 

Since independence, Jordan has imported far more than it has 
exported. Throughout the 1970s, the gap widened as imports grew 
faster than exports. 

Trade Balance 

Jordan did not seek to achieve a trade balance with any major 
trading partner. In the mid-1980s, the United States and Western 
Europe supplied almost 50 percent of Jordan's imports, while Arab 
nations purchased nearly half of the country's exports. 

Although Jordan's merchandise trade deficit was always high, 
the total volume of external trade — defined as imports plus 
exports — was much higher, indicating that exports were signifi- 
cant enough to offset part of the large import bill. Between 1982 
and 1985, as economic growth slowed, import volume contracted 
by about 4 percent per year. Exports grew by about 5 percent per 
year during the same period, shrinking the annual trade deficit from 
more than JD800 million in the early 1980s to JD623 million in 
1985. In 1987 the total value of imports was about JD9 16 million 
while total exports were valued at about JD249 million, leaving 
a trade deficit of JD667 million. 

Composition of Exports and Imports 

When it became apparent that Jordan could not shift the trade 
balance in the short term by dramatically reducing imports and 
increasing exports, government economic planners attempted to 
alter the composition and direction of external trade by slowly 



170 



Government agricultural project using underground water 
in Khawr Ramm Desert, southern Jordan 
Hothouse in the Jordan River valley 



171 



Jordan: A Country Study 



pursuing a two-pronged policy. Jordan tried to improve its gross 
barter terms by exporting products with higher value added; f or 
example, prices of consumer goods tended to be higher and more 
stable than those of raw materials. Likewise, Jordan tried to in- 
crease the efficiency of its imports by increasing imports of capital 
goods and raw materials while lowering imports of consumer goods. 
The concept was that Jordan should import relatively more and 
export relatively less of goods that contributed directly toward eco- 
nomic growth. 

The changes in the relative composition of exports were more 
pronounced than changes in the relative composition of imports 
between 1974 and 1986, according to figures compiled by the Cen- 
tral Bank. Nonetheless, changes were not dramatic in either 
category. Consumer goods declined from 45 percent to about 37 
percent of total imports, but capital goods also declined from 26 
percent to 23 percent of total imports. Raw materials increased 
from 19 percent to 34 percent of total imports, but this rise primarily 
reflected a growing oil bill, as Jordan could no longer obtain oil 
at discount prices. Raw material exports declined from 53 percent 
to 38 percent of total exports, capital goods exports were cut in 
half from 12 percent to 6 percent, and consumer goods exports were 
boosted from 35 percent to 56 percent of total exports. Phosphates 
continued to generate 20 percent of export earnings. 

Although the shift in external trade composition appeared to coin- 
cide with government policy, economist Rodney Wilson has pointed 
out that part of the shift was illusory. Customs classifications may 
have been misleading and also may have changed over time. Many 
consumer imports were listed as capital imports, and raw material 
or capital goods exports often were listed as consumer goods ex- 
ports. For example, fertilizers, a major export, were listed as con- 
sumer goods. 

Because the categorization of imports and exports according to 
their value added or ultimate economic disposition was ambigu- 
ous, a more specific breakdown of exports and imports by product 
was warranted. In 1987 energy imports made up approximately 
13 percent of the import bill; food imports constituted about 11 
percent of the import bill. Basic manufactures, such as textiles, iron, 
and steel together represented 9 percent of import cost; machinery 
and transportation equipment constituted 20 percent, and imports 
of miscellaneous manufactured articles constituted 10 percent of 
imports (see table 12, Appendix). In 1987 28 percent of Jordanian 
export earnings were of chemical products, including fertilizers. 
Raw phosphate exports generated about 25 percent of export earn- 
ings, and potash exports accounted for about 1 1 percent of export 



172 



The Economy 



earnings. Food and food products constituted about 8 percent and 
basic manufactures, such as cement, about 4 percent (see table 13, 
Appendix). 

At least some of the shift in import composition appeared to con- 
tribute to economic growth insofar as it was correlated with GNP 
growth. In the early 1980s, the average value of consumer goods 
imports as a percentage of GNP dropped marginally, from 23 per- 
cent to 21 percent, while capital goods imports increased from 15 
percent to 23 percent of GNP. The value of total imports as a per- 
centage of GNP climbed almost 40 percent between 1973 and 1983, 
reaching about 87 percent; however, the rate of this growth slowed 
during the period and was outpaced by GNP growth. 

Direction of Trade 

Whereas almost 50 percent of Jordan's imports came from the 
United States and Western Europe, these same countries bought 
less than 10 percent of Jordanian exports. The direction of exter- 
nal trade generally followed Jordan's self- perceived economic iden- 
tity as an indirect intermediary between the West and the developed 
world on the one hand, and the Arab countries and the Third World 
on the other. But because other Arab nations remained the most 
important customers — buying almost 50 percent of the 1987 ex- 
port total of almost JD249 million — Jordanian markets were in- 
sufficiently diversified to benefit fully from this strategy. In early 
1989, the Arab Cooperation Council, composed of Jordan, Egypt, 
Iraq, and the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen), was estab- 
lished to promote trade. This development, as well as the creation 
of the Joint Syrian-Jordanian Economic Committee, could rein- 
force Jordan's concentration on nearby markets. In the late 1980s, 
Jordan nevertheless sought to expand its export markets and had 
targeted Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa as potential prospects. 

In 1987 Iraq continued to be Jordan's largest export customer. 
Jordan exported nearly JD60 million worth of goods to Iraq, but 
most of this figure resulted from transit and reexport rather than 
from bilateral trade. Saudi Arabia was Jordan's second largest ex- 
port customer. Jordanian exports to Egypt had grown more than 
fourfold since 1985, demonstrating that Egypt was an important 
new outlet. Other major Arab export markets included Kuwait, 
Syria, and the United Arab Emirates (see table 14, Appendix). 

South Asian and East Asian nations were regarded as promis- 
ing markets, particularly for the sale of fertilizer and industrial 
chemicals. In 1987 India was Jordan's third largest export customer. 
Exports to China, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Japan also were grow- 
ing. Furthermore, trade protocols signed in 1987 with both Thailand 



173 



Jordan: A Country Study 



and Turkey may have opened the door to greater exports to both 
the Asian and the European markets. 

Italy was Jordan's only major West European customer. Jorda- 
nian officials envisioned improved prospects in Eastern Europe, 
particularly in Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Jordan regarded 
Africa as a potentially vast market that could constitute one of the 
first experiments with the "South-South" relationship advocated 
in Third- World circles. Whereas exports to Africa remained 
minimal in 1987, Jordan's apparent willingness to consider counter- 
trade and barter remained attractive to such markets. 

Jordan imported about JD9 16 million worth of goods in 1987. 
Iraq was the largest source of imports, but much of the JD99 mil- 
lion worth of products it sent to Jordan were intended for reex- 
port. Imports from Saudi Arabia, Jordan's third largest import 
source in 1987, consisted mainly of oil. Almost 40 percent of Jor- 
dan's total import bill in 1987 came from eight West European 
nations, headed by the Federal Republic of Germany (West Ger- 
many), Britain, and Italy. The United States was Jordan's second 
largest source of imports and Japan was another significant im- 
port source. 

Banking and Finance 

The dominant financial institutions in Jordan were the Central 
Bank and the Amman Financial Market. Jordan's largest commer- 
cial bank was the Arab Bank. Until 1989 many small money- 
changing offices were operated by small proprietors. Jordan also 
had three Islamic banks. 

The Central Bank, established in 1964, was responsible for note 
issue, management of exchange reserves, and regulation of credit. 
It acted as the fiscal agent for the government, regulated the com- 
mercial banking sector, and sponsored the creation of certain new 
financial institutions. In 1985, for example, the Central Bank acted 
jointly with the Egyptian government to establish a new bank to 
finance bilateral trade. The government's presence in the finan- 
cial sector was augmented by several specialized institutions that 
filled voids in commercial lending activity: the Agricultural Credit 
Corporation, the Housing Bank (which provided mortgages), and 
the Industrial Development Bank (which channeled capital to small 
start-up manufacturing businesses). The government also chan- 
neled equity capital to the private sector through large government 
pension and social security funds. 

The banking sector more than doubled loans and deposits be- 
tween the mid-1970s and the early 1980s. During the same pe- 
riod, the number of financial institutions tripled. The government 



174 



The Economy 



encouraged the expansion of banking services as a key to its eco- 
nomic development policy. Deposits were attracted from other Arab 
nations, and the savings and remittances of the many Jordanians 
who traditionally had never used banks were captured. These 
deposits were in turn funneled as loans to growing companies that 
needed capital. Monetization — the use of legal tender as a medium 
of exchange rather than barter — was very successful. By the mid- 
1980s, Jordan was the only Arab country in which the value of 
bank assets exceeded GDP. Total commercial bank assets rose from 
JD1.1 billion in 1980 to JD2.3 billion in 1985. During the same 
period, total deposits increased from about JD800 million toJD1.7 
billion. Demand deposits decreased from about 35 percent to 20 
percent of total deposits, while savings deposits grew. Strict Cen- 
tral Bank consumer credit controls and government success in en- 
couraging savings also were indicated by the growth of the liquid 
money supply at about 7 percent per year from 1980 to 1987. The 
liquid money supply reached about JD900 million during this pe- 
riod, with no significant inflation. 

In the mid-1980s, however, the government became apprehen- 
sive that the banking sector was expanding too rapidly. One con- 
cern was that the proliferation of banks could engender excessive 
competition for assets and risky lending activity; as a result, in 1984 
the Central Bank imposed a moratorium on the establishment of 
new commercial banks. The government also was worried that Jor- 
danian banks preferred making loans to foreign companies rather 
than to Jordanian companies, that the banks avoided long-term 
lending, and that loans often financed trade rather than capital in- 
vestment. In 1985 more than 27 percent of commercial bank credit 
financed trade, whereas less than 10 percent financed corporate 
investment. 

Another concern was that banks had been so successful in at- 
tracting deposits that they were diverting public investment from 
Jordan's stock exchange, the Amman Financial Market. As a result, 
companies were unable to obtain equity finance and had no choice 
but to finance themselves through bank loans. The value of traded 
shares — less than JD70 million in 1984 — had always been dwarfed 
by banking activity. The total value of share prices on the stock 
market grew an average of 20 percent annually from 1978 to 1982. 
From 1983 to 1986, however, share prices dropped an average of 
13 percent annually. Companies in the service and manufacturing 
sectors were especially hard hit, and in 1986 their total share value 
was less than it had been in 1978. In 1987 and 1988, the stock mar- 
ket recovered as investors tried to hedge against the shaky dinar. 
Trading volume reached a record high of JD149 million in 1987. 



175 



Jordan: A Country Study 

To counterbalance fluctuating stock values and the rapid expan- 
sion of banking, the government initiated greater regulation of bank 
activity. Banks were required to invest 8 percent of their deposits 
in government bills and bonds. Investment of at least 15 percent 
of capital in public and mixed sector corporate equity also was man- 
dated, and the minimum capital requirement was increased to JD5 
million. Binding interest rate ceilings were set on both loans and 
deposits, and the dinar exchange rate was fixed by the Central Bank. 

In the late 1980s, thirty major banks and financial institutions 
operated in Jordan, including eight major locally based conven- 
tional commercial banks with numerous branch offices, six foreign 
banks, two major Islamic banks, and a host of smaller or more 
specialized foreign and domestic financial institutions, some of 
which conducted merchant banking, investment banking, and trade 
or agricultural finance. By far the largest locally based commer- 
cial bank was the Arab Bank, a Palestinian institution that moved 
to Amman from Jerusalem in 1948. Because the Arab Bank ca- 
tered mainly to Palestinians throughout the world, it was not a 
dominant force in the local market. In terms of total assets (primarily 
loans) the Jordan National Bank, the Cairo-Amman Bank, the 
Jordan-Kuwait Bank, and the Petra Bank were perhaps more im- 
portant local institutions. Foreign banks included Citibank, Grind- 
lays Bank, the Hong Kong-based British Bank of the Middle East, 
as well as Iraq's Rafidayn Bank and Egypt's Arab Land Bank. 
Chase Manhattan Bank left Jordan following the 1984 government- 
imposed financial regulations. 

The Central Bank had permitted the virtually unsupervised oper- 
ation of hundreds of small money-changing offices by individual 
proprietors. The system had worked well when the dinar was valued 
realistically compared to foreign currencies. But throughout 1988, 
as the government attempted to prop up the value of the dinar by 
freezing the official exchange rate, money changers became an open 
black market that facilitated the slide of the dinar. In February 1989, 
the government abruptly canceled the licenses of all money 
changers, closed their offices, froze their bank accounts, and seized 
their records. 

Jordan also had permitted the establishment of three Islamic 
banks that adhered to Islamic legal tenets proscribing interest rate 
(riba) transactions. The Islamic banks paid no interest on deposits, 
and collected no interest on loans. Instead, they made equity in- 
vestments in companies and then shared in the venture's profit or 
loss, some of which would then be passed on to depositors. The 
Islamic banks also were active in financing rural or low-cost hous- 
ing as well as capital investment by manufacturing companies. 



176 



The Economy 



Typically, Islamic banks built or bought a housing development 
or a piece of equipment and then leased it to a client or company 
on terms that approximated loan repayments. Jordan's Islamic 
banks attracted the savings of pious Muslims from Jordan and other 
Arab countries who would not use conventional, interest-charging 
banks. The Islamic banks also financed socially desirable projects 
that conventional banks regarded as too risky or unprofitable. 

Islamic banks have had mixed success in Jordan. The Jordan 
Islamic Bank for Finance and Investment was created in 1978 as 
a member of the Saudi Arabian-based Al Baraka network of Islamic 
banks, but 90 percent of its capital was Jordanian owned. By 1986 
it had become the sixth largest of Jordan's banks in assets and had 
financed numerous projects. The Islamic Investment House, which 
was established with Kuwaiti backing in 1981, was shut down for 
an indefinite period by the government in 1984 because the projects 
it had financed were losing money and were putting deposits at risk. 

* * * 

The reader interested in more information on the Jordanian econ- 
omy can consult primary as well as secondary sources. The eco- 
nomic reports and statistics published and disseminated by the 
government of Jordan are probably more comprehensive, relia- 
ble, and up-to-date than those produced by any other Arab coun- 
try. Of particular value is the Five-Year Plan For Economic and Social 
Development: 1986-1990, published by the Ministry of Planning, 
which contains in-depth information on all aspects of the economy, 
from macroeconomic national income accounting to infrastructure 
development. 

One of the recognized experts on the Jordanian economy is Ian J . 
Seccombe, who has produced numerous authoritative articles dis- 
cussing Jordanian labor emigration and remittance income. Another 
expert is Rodney Wilson, who has produced excellent work on Jor- 
dan's banking and financial system. In 1987 Seccombe and Wilson 
together produced Trade and Finance in Jordan. Both authors con- 
tributed to The Economic Development of Jordan, an anthology edited 
by Bichara Khader and Adnan Badran, which is arguably the best 
book on the Jordanian economy. Of the many good articles ap- 
pearing in the book, those by Michel Chatelus and Francois Rivier 
are noteworthy for their penetrating and original analysis. Another 
valuable source of information on the Jordanian economy is Jor- 
dan to 1990: Coping with Change by Philip Robins, a special report 
published in 1986 by the Economist Intelligence Unit. It concen- 
trates on information that businesses would want to know about 



177 



Jordan: A Country Study 

Jordan. Pamela Dougherty, a journalist who covers Jordan for the 
Middle East Economic Digest, has produced high quality, informa- 
tive, and timely articles. (For further information and more com- 
plete citations, see Bibliography.) 



178 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 




Mosaic of the city of Amman, or Philadelphia, from the 
Umm ar Rasas pavement in a Byzantine church, ca. 780 



IN LATE 1989, KING HUSSEIN ibn Talal ibn Abdullah ibn 
Hussein Al Hashimi remained in firm control of Jordan's politi- 
cal system as the central policymaker and legislative and execu- 
tive authority. He maintained tight control over key government 
functions, such as national defense, internal security, justice, and 
foreign affairs. Crown Prince Hasan, the king's younger brother 
and heir apparent, complemented the small, Hussein-centered circle 
of power in his role as the king's right-hand man, especially in the 
areas of economy and administration. 

Hussein's main power base continued to rest on the beduin- 
dominated army, which had been loyal to the Hashimite (also seen 
as Hashemite) family for seven decades. Another source of strength 
was his astute ability to balance sociopolitical interests at home. 
Equally important, Hussein was Jordan's most accomplished 
diplomat-negotiator. During the 1980s, Hussein's autocracy also 
was substantially bolstered by his rapprochement with the Pales- 
tine Liberation Organization (PLO). This significant development 
greatly reduced the threat to Hussein's rule posed since 1970 by 
various Palestinian guerrilla groups. Some groups, however, notably 
the Black September and Abu Nidal factions, continued to seek 
the overthrow of the entire monarchical structure. 

The Transjordanians (see Glossary) occupied a dominant place 
in the existing power structure. Hussein's palace staff and his top 
civil, judicial, and military officials were mostly Transjordanians. 
Although there was a Palestinian (see Glossary) presence on the 
periphery of power, the Palestinians' continued exclusion from sub- 
stantive decision-making positions tended to alienate the Palestin- 
ian community and served as a potential source of political 
instability. Hussein's decision in July 1988 to renounce Jordan's 
claim to sovereignty over the West Bank (see Glossary) and his 
subsequent recognition of the PLO's declaration of an indepen- 
dent Palestine may further affect the systemic integrity of Jordan 
because the Palestinians living on the East Bank (see Glossary) must 
choose whether they want Jordanian or Palestinian nationality. 

Another source of political instability for Hussein's regime at 
the close of the 1980s was the continued severe recession that had 
plagued the economy since the mid-1980s. This economic retrench- 
ment was in sharp contrast to the economic growth experienced 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The combination of high 
inflation and high unemployment rates contributed to the pervasive 



181 



Jordan: A Country Study 

sense of dissatisfaction that erupted in major antigovernment riots 
in several cities and towns in April 1989. Although all Jordanians 
were adversely affected by rising prices and falling income, the 
Palestinians living in refugee camps — most of whom were poor be- 
fore the recession — bore the brunt of the economic decline. Their 
economic frustrations helped reinforce their political alienation. 

The Constitution 

The Constitution that was promulgated in 1952 and amended 
in 1974, 1976, and 1984 remained in force in 1989. It declares Jor- 
dan a hereditary monarchy with a parliamentary form of govern- 
ment and defines the people as "the source of all powers." The 
people are officially stated as being part of "the Arab nation. " Islam 
is the official religion of the state and Arabic the official language. 
In nearly forty years of experience with the Constitution, adher- 
ence to the fundamental law of the land has varied in spirit as well 
as in practice from time to time, depending upon domestic and 
external circumstances. 

Articles 5 through 23 of the Constitution stipulate the rights and 
duties of citizens and guarantee a long list of personal freedoms. 
Citizens are assured freedom from compulsory labor or forced loans, 
and no one may be discriminated against for reasons of race, 
religion, or language. Arrest, imprisonment, exile, forced residence, 
and the expropriation of property without due process of law are 
forbidden. Freedom of worship, opinion, and the press and the right 
of peaceful assembly are ensured within the limits of the law. Cen- 
sorship is allowed in time of martial law or when a state of national 
emergency exists. The right of petition is guaranteed, and citizens 
are free to form political parties, trade unions, and associations — 
provided their objectives are lawful. Political refugees may not be 
extradited. For grades one through nine, education is compulsory 
and free in public schools. Every citizen is eligible for appointment 
to public posts, subject only to the candidate's merit and qualifi- 
cation. The Constitution also outlines various principles of labor 
legislation and directs the government to promote work and to pro- 
tect labor. 

Martial law was declared in 1967 and remained in force in 1989. 
The emergency regulations under martial law effectively abridged 
certain constitutionally guaranteed freedoms. These regulations per- 
mitted the martial law authorities and the secret police — popularly 
referred to as the Mukhabarat rather than by its formal name of 
Dairat al Mukhabarat or General Intelligence Department (GID) — 
to arrest persons suspected of security offenses and to detain them 



182 



Government and Politics 



without trial or access to legal counsel for indefinite periods (see 
General Intelligence Department, ch. 5). The emergency regula- 
tions also authorized the government to censor the press and other 
publications, banned political parties, and restricted the rights of 
citizens to assemble for political meetings and peaceful demon- 
strations. 

The powers and functions of the state organs are elaborated in 
articles 41 through 110. The Constitution includes sections on 
finance, enforcement of laws, interpretation of the Constitution, 
and emergency powers and constitutional amendments. An amend- 
ment requires the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members 
of each legislative house, deliberating separately. When an amend- 
ment bill is twice rejected by either house, however, the bill must 
be deliberated in a joint session of the legislature; in this instance, 
a two- thirds vote is required for adoption. An amendment bill takes 
effect only on royal consent. In a move to ensure dynastic stabil- 
ity, the Constitution forbids any amendment concerning the rights 
of the king and his heirs during a period of regency. 

The five amendments to the Constitution that have been ap- 
proved since 1952 all pertain to the National Assembly. Two 
amendments were adopted in November 1974. The first permit- 
ted the king to dissolve the Senate and to dismiss any individual 
senator for behavior unbecoming of the office. The second amend- 
ment permitted the king to postpone elections for the House of 
Representatives for one year. In February 1976, a third amend- 
ment permitted the king to postpone parliamentary elections in- 
definitely. The two amendments adopted in 1984 authorized the 
government to hold parliamentary elections in any part of the coun- 
try where it was feasible, thus, only in the East Bank. Until late 
1988, when Jordan renounced claims to political sovereignty over 
the West Bank, the House of Representatives was empowered to 
select deputies to fill vacant seats from the West Bank. 

The Government 

The Constitution divides the powers and functions of the govern- 
ment into executive, legislative, and judicial categories (see fig. 10). 
The Constitution assigns the legislative power to both the bicameral 
National Assembly and the king, who is also vested with executive 
power. The king exercises his executive authority with the aid of 
his cabinet ministers, collectively known as the Council of Ministers. 
Judicial power is vested in independent courts. The authority and 
services of the central government are extended to all corners of 
the kingdom through the eight governorates or provinces. 



183 



Jordan: A Country Study 



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184 



Government and Politics 



The King 

Under the Constitution, the monarchy is the most important 
political institution in the country. Articles 28 through 40 of the 
Constitution enumerate the king's powers. He appoints the prime 
minister, the president and members of the Senate, judges, and 
other senior government and military functionaries. He commands 
the armed forces, approves and promulgates laws, declares war, 
concludes peace, and signs treaties (which in theory must be ap- 
proved by the National Assembly). The king convenes, opens, ad- 
journs, suspends, or dissolves the legislature; he also orders, and 
may postpone, the holding of elections. He has veto power that 
can be overridden only by a two-thirds vote of each house. The 
Constitution states that the king exercises his jurisdiction by iradah 
(sing. ; pi. , iradat — royal decrees), which must be signed by the prime 
minister and the minister or ministers concerned. As head of state, 
the king is accountable to no one. 

Royal succession devolves by male descent in the Hashimite dy- 
nasty (see fig. 11). The royal mandate is passed to the eldest son 
of the reigning king, to the eldest son of the successor king, and 
by similar process thereafter. Should the king die without a direct 
heir, the deceased monarch's eldest brother has first claim, followed 
by the eldest son of the other brothers according to their seniority 
in age. Should there be no suitable direct heir, the National As- 
sembly selects a successor from among ' the descendants of the 
founder of the Arab Revolt, the late King Hussein ibn Ali" (see 
World War I: Diplomacy and Intrigue, ch. 1). 

The heir apparent to the throne must be sane, a male Muslim, 
the son of Muslim parents, and born of a lawful wife. In addition, 
he must not have been excluded by a royal decree from the suc- 
cession "on the ground of unsuitability." In 1965 Hussein (b. 1935) 
used this rule to exclude from the line of succession his two sons 
by his Muslim but British second wife Princess Muna. He also is- 
sued a royal decree that excluded his next younger brother Muham- 
mad (b. 1945) and designated a second brother, Hasan (b. 1948), 
as crown prince. In June 1978, Hussein designated Prince Ali (b. 
1975), his son from his third wife (Queen Alia, who was killed in 
a helicopter crash in February 1977) to succeed Hasan as heir ap- 
parent on the latter' s succession to the throne. 

When the throne is inherited by a minor, the powers of the king 
are exercised by a regent or by a council of regency, both of which 
may be appointed by a decree of the (previous) reigning king; 
if the king dies without having made such an appointment, the ap- 
pointment is made by the Council of Ministers. The king attains 



185 



Jordan: A Country Study 





HUSSEIN IBN ALI 




1852-1931 




SHARIF OF MECCA 1916-24 







ALI 


1879 

SHARIF C 
192 


1935 

F MECCA 
1-25 



1882-1951 

AMIR OF 
TRANSJORDAN 

1921-46 
KING OF JORDAN 

1946-51 



d. 1950 
MARRIED GHAZI 



1912-58 
REGENT OF 
IRAQ 
1939-53 



1885-1933 
KING OF SYRIA 

1920 
KING OF IRAQ 
1921-33 



TALAL 


190 
KIN( 
JOR 

195 


J-72 
a OF 
DAN 
1-52 



HUSSEIN 



1935- 
KING OF JORDAN 
1953- 



SHARIFA DINA 
(1ST WIFE) 



PRINCESS MUNA 
(2D WIFE) 



QUEEN ALIA 
(3D WIFE) 



QUEEN NUR 
(4TH WIFE) 



GHAZI 



1912-39 
KING OF IRAQ 
1933-39 

MARRIED ALIA 
DAUGHTER OF ALI 



1948- 
CROWN PRINCE] 
1965- 



1935-58 
KING OF IRAQ 
1953-58 



Figure 11. Abbreviated Genealogy of the Hashimite Family, 1989 
186 



Government and Politics 



majority on his eighteenth birthday based on the Muslim lunar 
calendar. Should the king be disabled by illness, his powers are 
exercised by a deputy, by a council of the throne appointed by the 
king, or by the Council of Ministers if the king is incapable of such 
appointment. The deputy or the council of the throne may also 
perform royal duties during the absence of the king from the coun- 
try. If the absence extends to more than four months, the House 
of Representatives is empowered to "review" the matter. 

The king has full responsibility for all matters pertaining to the 
royal household. He appoints the chief of the royal court, an offi- 
cial who can play an influential political role through his control 
of access to the monarch. Although the rank of the chief of the royal 
court is equivalent to that of a cabinet minister, his office is not 
part of the executive branch. 

The Council of Ministers 

The cabinet, consisting of the prime minister and the other 
ministers, is the top executive arm of the state. Its members serve 
at the pleasure of the king, but the Constitution requires every new 
cabinet to present its statement of programs and policies to the 
House of Representatives for approval by a two-thirds vote of the 
members of that house. If the house passes a vote of no confidence, 
the cabinet must resign. 

Traditionally, prime ministers have been recruited from fami- 
lies that have loyally served the Hashimites for many years. Zaid 
ar Rifai, who was prime minister from 1985 to 1989, is the son 
of a prominent Transjordanian politician who had served as prime 
minister to Hussein's grandfather. His successors, Ash Sharif Zaid 
ibn Shakir (April- November 1989) and Mudar Badran (designated 
prime minister in November 1989), have each worked with the king 
in a variety of political capacities. Significantly, both men served 
as chief minister of the royal court prior to becoming prime minister. 

In September 1989, the cabinet included ministers responsible 
for the following portfolios: agriculture; communications; culture 
and information; defense; education; energy and mineral resources; 
finance and customs; foreign affairs; health; higher education; 
tourism and antiquities; interior; justice; labor and social develop- 
ment; municipal, rural, and environmental affairs; planning; 
religious affairs and holy places; supply; trade and industry; trans- 
portation; and youth. In 1989 the government also was served by 
a minister of state for prime ministerial affairs. 

In 1986 the bureaucracy employed 109,523 Jordanians, mak- 
ing the government the principal employer in society. Selection 
generally was based upon merit, although patronage and nepotism 



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Jordan: A Country Study 

remained fairly widespread. The government trained civil servants 
at a school of public administration in Amman, Jordan's capital. 
A majority of them were Palestinians who had opted for Jordanian 
citizenship; at the higher levels of the administrative hierarchy, 
however, Transjordanians probably outnumbered Palestinians. 
Allegiance to the monarchy and the Constitution remained an im- 
portant factor in government service. In the aftermath of the Az 
Zarka affair in 1957 and the civil war of 1970 and 1971, numer- 
ous Palestinian civil servants were dismissed because of suspected 
disloyalty to the throne. 

From the beginning of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank 
in June 1967 until Hussein relinquished Jordan's claim to sover- 
eignty of the territory in July 1988, Amman continued to pay sala- 
ries and pensions to serving and retired West Bank municipal 
government employees. During this period, the West Bank came 
under the jurisdiction initially of the Bureau of Occupied Homeland 
Affairs, attached to the prime minister's office and headed by a 
cabinet-level minister; later this office became the Ministry of Oc- 
cupied Territories. In addition to paying salaries, it was responsi- 
ble for channeling Jordan's loans and development funds to 
Palestinian concerns in the West Bank. Following the decision at 
the Baghdad Summit meeting in November 1978 to set up a spe- 
cial fund for development and other projects in the Israeli-occupied 
territories, this ministry worked jointly with the PLO in administer- 
ing aid funds for Palestinians in both the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip. By 1988, when Jordan terminated payments, more than 
20,000 West Bank Palestinians were estimated to be receiving sala- 
ries from the Jordanian government. All of these employees were 
granted retirement benefits or severance pay according to the num- 
ber of years they had been municipal employees. 

The Legislature 

Under the Constitution, the bicameral legislature is called the 
National Assembly and consists of the thirty-member appointed 
Senate (sometimes called the House of Notables) and the popularly 
elected House of Representatives (also called the Chamber of 
Deputies). Prior to July 1988, both houses had an equal number 
of representatives from each bank of the Jordan River. The Con- 
stitution stipulates that the size of the Senate cannot be more than 
half that of the lower house. Of the two chambers, the Senate is 
regarded as the more elite; but like the lower chamber, it has had 
little real influence in the legislative process. Although the House 
of Representatives was vested with more legislative power than the 



188 



Government and Politics 



upper house, both chambers have been overshadowed by the execu- 
tive side of government. 

The senators are appointed by the king for four-year terms, with 
half the membership retiring every two years at the end of a senate 
session. A senator may be reappointed. Qualifications for a sena- 
tor include a minimum age of forty years and prior government 
or military service in relatively senior positions. Senators have in- 
cluded present and past prime ministers, former members of the 
House of Representatives who had been elected at least twice, 
former senior judges and diplomats, and retired officers who have 
attained the rank of general. 

Members of the House of Representatives are elected to four- 
year terms by secret ballot. Candidates must be Jordanian citizens 
more than thirty years of age. Individuals representing foreign in- 
terests or having material interests in any government contract are 
disqualified. Also excluded are persons who have been debarred 
from public office or who have blood ties to the king within a 
prescribed degree of relationship. Ten of the eighty seats are 
reserved for minorities, including Christians, beduins, and Circas- 
sians (see Ethnicity and Language, ch. 2). 

Voters must be at least nineteen years of age. Suffrage has been 
universal since 1973, when women were enfranchised. All Pales- 
tinian refugees who have adopted Jordanian citizenship enjoy equal 
voting privileges with Transjordanians. 

Prior to the November 1989 elections, the last national elections 
for the House of Representatives had been held in April 1967. In 
1970 Hussein cited the Israeli occupation of the West Bank as rea- 
son for postponing elections, but he decreed that serving members 
would continue in office until circumstances permitted the hold- 
ing of new elections. The 1974 decision by Arab heads of state at 
a summit meeting in Rabat, Morocco, that the PLO was the sole 
representative of the Palestinian people raised questions about the 
political relationship of the West Bank to Jordan. In response to 
this decision, in November 1974 Hussein dissolved the House of 
Representatives, half of whose members represented the West Bank. 
Nevertheless, Hussein was reluctant to sever ties to the Israeli- 
occupied territory, and subsequently he decreed that elections for 
a new house would be held in March 1976. Whether the elections 
would include or exclude the West Bank had serious consequences 
for Jordan's relations with the PLO. Moreover, some Arab states 
interpreted the Rabat decision to mean that Jordan should renounce 
its claims to the West Bank — an interpretation to which Hussein 
did not then subscribe. As the time for the elections drew near, 
Hussein decided that postponing the elections would be the prudent 



189 



Jordan: A Country Study 

course to avoid foreclosing future political options. Consequently, 
in February 1976, he recalled the old house, with its West Bank 
members. It convened briefly to approve the indefinite suspension 
of elections for a new House of Representatives, then it adjourned. 

In 1978, Hussein issued a royal decree that granted some legis- 
lative functions to a newly created sixty-member appointive body, 
the National Consultative Council (NCC). The NCC, which did 
not include any members from the West Bank, had a limited man- 
date to study, debate, and render advice on bills drafted by the 
Council of Ministers. The NCC possessed no authority, however, 
to make policy or to approve, amend, or reject any bill. The NCC 
provided advisory opinions to the Council of Ministers on general 
state policy when requested by the prime minister. The decree es- 
tablishing it stated that the NCC would be "lawfully dissolved when 
the House of Representatives is elected and convened." 

In January 1984, Hussein dismissed the NCC and reconvened 
the suspended National Assembly. He appointed new members to 
the Senate but called back those members of the House of Represen- 
tatives who were serving when the lower house last met in 1976. 
By-elections were held in the East Bank in March to fill eight vacan- 
cies in the house that had resulted from the deaths of members since 
the 1967 elections. In accordance with a January 1984 constitu- 
tional amendment, the house also voted to fill seven vacant West 
Bank seats. In March 1986, the house approved a new electoral 
law that would increase its membership from 60 to 142; 71 mem- 
bers would be elected from the East Bank, 60 from the West Bank, 
and 1 1 from Palestinian refugee camps on the East Bank; this law 
was never implemented. In 1987 the government began register- 
ing Jordanians on the East Bank so that they could vote in 
parliamentary elections scheduled for 1988; these would have been 
the first national elections in more than twenty-one years. At the 
end of 1987, however, registration was halted, and the king issued 
a royal decree that postponed elections for two years. 

In July 1988, Hussein renounced Jordan's claims to the West 
Bank. In light of the new political situation, the king dissolved the 
House of Representatives. A royal decree issued in October post- 
poned indefinitely elections for a reorganized legislature. A subse- 
quent decree in December abolished the ministerial-level Office of 
Parliamentary Affairs. Following antigovernment riots in April 1989, 
however, outgoing Prime Minister Rifai promised that the interim 
government would concentrate on carrying out the long delayed 
parliamentary elections. In July Prime Minister Shakir scheduled 
the elections for November. They were the first national elections 
for the House of Representatives in more than twenty- two years. 



190 



Government and Politics 



The Judiciary 

The legal system of Jordan is based on sharia (Islamic law) and 
laws of European origin. During the nineteenth century, when Jor- 
dan was part of the Ottoman Empire, some aspects of European 
law, especially French commercial law and civil and criminal proce- 
dures, were adopted. English common law was introduced in the 
West Bank between 1917 and 1948, during most of which time 
the area was incorporated into the British-administered Mandate 
of Palestine, and introduced in the East Bank during the years 1921 
to 1946, when the East Bank comprised the British Mandate of 
Transjordan. Under the Court Establishment Law of 1951 and the 
Constitution, the judiciary is independent. There are three kinds 
of courts: civil courts, religious courts, and special courts. The civil 
courts adjudicate all civil and criminal cases not expressly reserved 
to the religious or special courts. 

The civil jurisdiction is exercised at four levels: the magistrates' 
courts, the courts of first instance, the Court of Appeal, and the 
Court of Cassation (the supreme court of the land). There are four- 
teen magistrates' courts throughout the country. They exercise juris- 
diction in civil cases involving small claims of no more than JD250 
(JD or Jordanian dinar; for value of the dinar — see Glossary) and 
in criminal cases involving maximum fines of JD100 or maximum 
prison terms of one year. The seven courts of first instance exer- 
cise general jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal. A panel 
of three judges sits for all felony trials; two judges sit for mis- 
demeanor and civil cases. The courts of first instance also exercise 
limited appellate jurisdiction in cases involving judgments or fines 
under JD20 and JD10 respectively. 

There is a three-judge panel Court of Appeal that sits in Amman. 
Its appellate review extends to judgments of the courts of first in- 
stance, the magistrates' courts, and the religious courts. The highest 
court is the Court of Cassation in Amman; its president, who is 
appointed by the king, serves as the country's chief justice. All seven 
judges of the court sit in full panel when important cases are being 
argued. For most appeals, however, only five judges hear and rule 
on the cases. 

The religious courts are divided into sharia courts for Muslims 
and ecclesiastical courts for the minority Christian communities. 
These courts are responsible for disputes over personal status (mar- 
riage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance) and communal en- 
dowment among their respective communities. One judge, called 
a qadi, sits in each sharia court and decides cases on the basis of 
Islamic law. Three judges, usually members of the clergy, sit in 



191 



Jordan: A Country Study 



each ecclesiastical court and render judgments based on various 
aspects of canon law as interpreted by the Greek Orthodox, 
Melchite, Roman Catholic, and Anglican traditions (see Religious 
Minorities, ch. 2). Appeals from the judgments of the religious 
courts are referred to the Court of Appeal sitting in Amman. If 
any dispute involves members of different religious communities, 
the civil courts have jurisdiction unless the parties mutually agree 
to submit to the jurisdiction of one of the religious courts. In case 
of jurisdictional conflicts between any two religious courts or be- 
tween a religious court and a civil court, the president of the Court 
of Cassation appoints a three-judge special tribunal to decide juris- 
diction or to hear the case. 

Special courts include the High Tribunal (or High Council or 
Supreme Council), which interprets the Constitution at the request 
of the prime minister or of either chamber of the National Assem- 
bly; the Special Council, which may be called on by the prime 
minister to interpret any law that has not been interpreted by the 
courts of law; and the High Court of Justice, which is to be con- 
stituted when necessary by the Court of Cassation. The High Court 
of Justice hears habeas corpus and mandamus petitions and may 
issue injunctions involving public servants charged with irregular- 
ities; it is also empowered to try cabinet ministers charged with 
offenses. There is also a special court known as the Land Settle- 
ment Court. After 1976 when tribal law was abolished, tribal mat- 
ters came under the formal jurisdiction of the regular courts, but 
adjudication apparently was still handled informally in traditional 
ways by local intermediaries or tribal authorities. 

Local Administration 

In 1989 local government authorities were essentially an exten- 
sion of the central government seated in Amman. Under the general 
supervision and control of the Ministry of Interior, the local units 
operated at the governorate (sing., liwaa; pi., alwiyah), municipal- 
ity, township and village (or town) levels. The East Bank was 
divided into the eight governorates of Amman, Al Balqa, Irbid, 
Az Zarqa, Al Mafraq, Al Karak, At Tafilah, and Maan (see fig. 
1). Each governorate was subdivided into districts (sing., qada) and 
subdistricts (sing., nahiya). The subdistricts comprised towns, vil- 
lages, and rural areas. Each of the eight governorates was headed 
by an appointed commissioner. These commissioners were the prin- 
cipal agents of the king and supervised and coordinated the activi- 
ties of various central government functions within their respective 
administrative divisions. 



192 



Government and Politics 



The basic administrative unit was the village or town. The towns 
and larger villages had municipal councils elected by popular vote. 
The normal practice was for the minister of municipal, rural, and 
environmental affairs to confirm as mayor the council member who 
received the highest number of votes in each municipal election. 
Smaller villages continued to be governed by traditional headmen 
known as mukhtars. The village and town authorities had limited 
responsibilities for administration of markets, law and order, sani- 
tation, and other community activities. 

The central government provided for local-level social services 
such as education, health, welfare, and public works. The multi- 
plication and extension of government services during the 1970s 
and 1980s increased the influence of central authorities through- 
out the country. The elimination of tribal law in 1976 attested to 
the all-pervasiveness of central government penetration even in rural 
areas where tribal leaders traditionally had provided security and 
limited welfare services. 

The Political Setting 

In 1989 the Jordanian political system continued to revolve 
around Hussein, who ruled firmly and tolerated no opposition. He 
had acceded to the throne in 1953, and the longevity of his tenure 
has been almost unparalleled in the contemporary Middle East. 
His reign, however, has been marked by numerous political crises: 
abortive coups, assassination attempts, and the disastrous conse- 
quences of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Undoubtedly the most 
serious threat to his rule was the civil war with the PLO guerrillas 
in 1970 and 1971 (see The Guerrilla Crisis, ch. 1; The Palestinian 
Factor, ch. 5). Hussein's ability to remain in power for nearly four 
decades can be attributed to his own political acumen and a for- 
tuitous combination of domestic and external situations. Neverthe- 
less, the continued absence of institutions through which citizens 
could participate in the political process raised questions about the 
ultimate stability of his regime. 

The Political Elite 

In 1989 Hussein remained the single most important person in 
Jordan's politics. His political preeminence derived in part from 
his skill in dealing with various domestic and external problems. 
He has traveled frequently to keep in touch with cross sections of 
the population and to establish rapport with his troops, with univer- 
sity students, and with members of tribes. Hussein's personalized 
approach has tended to counterbalance the virtual lack of indepen- 
dent, institutionalized channels that could serve as barometers of 



193 



Jordan: A Country Study 

popular sentiments and attitudes toward the government. Also, 
Hussein's frequent visits to foreign capitals have enabled him to 
keep abreast of external developments and to obtain needed financial 
and technical assistance for his kingdom. His ability to maintain 
generally cordial relations with foreign states has been a critical 
asset for Jordan, in view of the country's heavy dependence on 
external aid. 

Hussein has relied upon various political options to consolidate 
his power. He has used his constitutional authority to appoint prin- 
cipal government officials as a critical lever with which to reward 
loyalty and performance, neutralize detractors, and weed out in- 
competent elements. The Hussein-centered power structure com- 
prised the cabinet ministers, members of the royal family, the palace 
staff, senior army officers, tribal shaykhs, and ranking civil ser- 
vants. King Hussein has filled most of the sensitive government 
posts with loyal Transjordanians. Since the early 1950s, he also 
has appointed to responsible positions Palestinians supportive of 
the Hashimites. Beginning in the 1970s, he permitted an increas- 
ing number of Palestinians from families not traditionally aligned 
with the Hashimites to be co-opted into government service. 

The Hashimites, the royal family headed by Hussein, form an 
extended kinship group related through marriage to several promi- 
nent Transjordanian families. The Hashimite family traces its an- 
cestry back to the family of the Prophet, and for centuries it had 
been politically prominent in what is now Saudi Arabia. Abdullah 
ibn Hussein Al Hashimi (1882-1951), a son of Sharif Hussein of 
Mecca (1851-1931), established the Jordanian branch of the fam- 
ily in 1921 after Britain had created the Mandate of Transjordan 
and confirmed him as amir. London also permitted Abdullah's 
younger brother, Faisal (1885-1933), to assume the kingship of 
Iraq, another future state set up after World War I as a British- 
administered mandate. Abdullah changed his title from amir to 
king in 1946, when Transjordan was granted independence. Fol- 
lowing his assassination in 1951 , Abdullah's son Talal (1909-1972) 
ruled briefly. 

Hussein was Talal 's oldest son. Before succeeding his father as 
king in 1953, Hussein was educated at Victoria College in Alex- 
andria, Egypt and at Harrow School and the Royal Military Acad- 
emy, Sandhurst, both in Britain. In 1955, Hussein married his 
first wife, Dina Abdul Hamid al Aun, an Egyptian of Hashimite 
ancestry. They had one daughter before their marriage ended in 
divorce. His second wife, Antoinette Gardiner of Britain, converted 
to Islam and took the name Muna al Hussein. She and Hussein 
had four children, two sons and twin daughters. Hussein divorced 



194 




195 



Jordan: A Country Study 

Princess Muna in 1973 and married his third wife, Palestinian Alia 
Tukan. Hussein and Queen Alia had one daughter and one son 
before her February 1977 death in a helicopter crash. In June 1978 
Hussein married his fourth wife, Elizabeth Halaby, an American 
of Arab and Swiss descent. He proclaimed her Queen Nur al Hus- 
sein (light of Hussein). Hussein and Queen Nur have four chil- 
dren, two sons and two daughters. Throughout the 1980s, Queen 
Nur had a visible and active role promoting educational, cultural, 
social welfare, architectural, and urban planning projects in Jordan. 

Hussein has two younger brothers and one sister. His brothers 
Muhammad and Hasan had significant political roles in 1989. The 
most important Hashimite after Hussein was Hasan, whom the 
king had designated as crown prince through royal decree in 1965. 
Muhammad was a businessman and was active politically behind 
the scenes. Families that were related to the Hashimites included 
the politically prominent Sharaf and Shakir families. Hussein's cous- 
in, Sharif Abdul Hamid Sharaf, was a close political adviser 
throughout the 1970s and served briefly as prime minister before 
his death in 1980. Another member of the family, Layla Sharaf, 
was Jordan's first woman cabinet officer, serving as minister of 
culture and information in 1984-85. A third cousin, Field Mar- 
shal Ash Sharif Zaid ibn Shakir, was a longtime political confidant 
who served the king in many sensitive positions. In December 1988, 
Hussein appointed Shakir chief of the royal court and director of 
the secret police (Mukhabarat); beginning in late April 1989 he 
served for seven months as prime minister (see Political Dissent 
and Political Repression, this ch.). 

Hussein has been supported throughout his reign by the origi- 
nal Transjordanian population, particularly the beduin tribes who 
revered him as a descendant of the family of the Prophet Muham- 
mad and as a ruler imbued with those qualities of leadership they 
valued most — courage, self-reliance, valor, and honesty. The beduin 
have formed a prominent segment within the army, especially 
among the senior ranks of the officer corps. Their loyalty helped 
Hussein survive a number of crises and thereby served as a stabiliz- 
ing force within the country. Nevertheless, since the mid-1980s there 
has been evidence of erosion of beduin and Transjordanian sup- 
port for Hussein's regime. Significantly, it was primarily East 
Bankers, rather than Palestinians, who participated in widespread 
antigovernment riots that swept several towns of Jordan in 1989. 

Other politically influential individuals were affiliated with the 
old East Bank families. For example, Zaid ar Rifai, appointed prime 
minister in 1985, was the son of Samir ar Rifai, a politician who 
had served several terms as prime minister under the rule of 



196 



Government and Politics 



Abdullah during the 1930s and 1940s and subsequently was a prime 
minister for Hussein. Many members of the Abdul Huda, Majali, 
Badran, Hashim, Tal, and Qassim families also served the Hashi- 
mites loyally. 

Another element of the political elite were the non-Arab Circas- 
sians, the descendants of Muslim immigrants who came from the 
Caucasus Mountains in the late nineteenth century and settled in 
Amman and its environs. The Circassians allied with the Hashim- 
ites in the 1920s, and since that time leading Circassian politicians 
have held important and sensitive positions in the government and 
military. The Al Mufti family has been one of the most politically 
prominent Circassian families, and one of its members, Said al 
Mufti, served as prime minister. 

In the 1980s, the influential scions of traditional and aristocratic 
Palestinian families known for their Hashimite sympathies were 
outnumbered by Transjordanians in almost all top government 
posts. The distinction between Transjordanians and Palestinians 
tended to be played down, however, because officially the Pales- 
tinians of the East Bank have been accepted as Jordanian citizens. 
Palestinians continued to hold an important place in society as lead- 
ing merchants, financiers, professionals, educators, and technocrats. 

Political Dissent and Political Repression 

All political parties were banned in 1957 and have been illegal 
since the establishment of martial law in 1967. In addition, Marxist- 
oriented parties were forbidden under the Anti-Communist Law 
of 1953. Evidence of illegal political activity is monitored by the 
Mukhabarat, or secret police. Persons suspected of engaging in po- 
litical activities are arrested by the Mukhabarat and may be de- 
tained without charges for prolonged periods. In 1989 several 
Jordanian political parties existed in exile and were believed to have 
many secret sympathizers and underground cells operating in Jor- 
dan. These parties included the Arab Constitutionalist Party, the 
Communist Party of Jordan, the Palestine Communist Party, the 
Islamic Liberation Party, the National Jordanian Movement, the 
Muslim Brotherhood, and the Unionist Democratic Association. 
In addition, the various Palestinian guerrilla organizations clan- 
destinely recruited in the refugee camps. 

Up to mid- 1989, observers concluded that the Mukhabarat con- 
tinued to be generally effective in discouraging the expression of 
political dissent or political activities within Jordan. It remained 
unclear how extensive the political liberalization inaugurated in 
the summer of 1989 would become and what role the Mukhabarat 
would have. It was also uncertain how greater tolerance of dissident 



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Jordan: A Country Study 

views would affect political groups outside the country. As late as 
1988, several Jordanian and Palestinian political groups engaged 
in terrorism directed against Jordanian officials and government 
offices. The Black September group, formed by Palestinians to 
avenge the Jordanian army attack on Palestinian guerrilla bases 
in Jordan in September 1970, remained committed to the over- 
throw of the Hashimite monarchy. Throughout the 1980s, it 
claimed responsibility for assassinations of Jordanian diplomats in 
various cities of Asia and Western Europe; in 1988 it claimed 
responsibility for several bombings that took place in Amman. 

Although the government did not officially permit the banned 
political parties to participate in the fall campaign for the Novem- 
ber 1989 House of Representatives elections, it ignored the claims 
of many candidates that they actually represented such parties. The 
campaign for the eighty contested seats was relatively free of voter 
intimidation, with the Mukhabarat keeping an uncharacteristically 
low profile. A total of 647 candidates took part, including several 
former political prisoners who were released from detention in the 
summer. The Muslim Brotherhood supported twenty- six candi- 
dates, of whom twenty actually won seats. Candidates affiliated 
with other Islamist groups won an additional fourteen seats. Thus, 
Islamists emerged as the largest bloc in Parliament, controlling more 
than 42 percent of the seats. Candidates representing various secular 
groups opposed to the government won a total of ten seats. As a 
result, the House of Representatives convened with a majority of 
forty-four members upon whom the government could not count 
for support, thirty-three government supporters, and three seats 
to be determined. 

The Palestinians and the Palestine Liberation Organization 

Palestinians have been a complicating factor in the Jordanian 
political process since the annexation of the West Bank in 1950. 
Transjordanians tended to fear that the numerically preponder- 
ant Palestinians could emerge as a dominant force if competitive 
politics were permitted to resume. For years many Palestinians 
openly opposed Hussein's monarchical absolutism and demanded 
equality and proportional participation in the political process. Their 
frustrations under Hussein's rule, at least through the 1960s and 
early 1970s, provided a fertile ground for their empathy and sup- 
port for the PLO. Since 1971 , when the PLO guerrilla forces were 
crushed and driven out of Jordan, Palestinians generally have been 
politically dormant. Given the authorities' effective discouragement 
of political expression critical of the regime, it was difficult in 



198 



Government and Politics 



1989 to ascertain what the political aspirations or preferences of 
the Palestinians in Jordan might be. 

The Palestinian equation became further complicated after Oc- 
tober 1974 as external pressures were brought to bear on Jordan. 
The catalyst was the unanimous decision of the Arab states meet- 
ing in Rabat to recognize the PLO as the sole authorized represen- 
tative of the Palestinian people. Strongly prodded by Egypt, Syria, 
and other Arab states, Hussein was obliged to assent to the Rabat 
decision although he still claimed the West Bank as Jordanian terri- 
tory until 1988. This development has portended uncertain impli- 
cations for Jordan's domestic politics and its relationship with the 
West Bank. 

Following the Rabat Summit, Hussein and PLO leader Yasir 
Arafat met to reconcile relations, strained since the 1970-71 civil 
war. Their discussions resulted in the decision in early 1975 for 
Jordan and the PLO to cease mutual recriminations. Hussein re- 
jected, however, a PLO demand that it be permitted to reestab- 
lish its military and political presence in the East Bank. After 1974 
there was a noticeable resurgence of Palestinian empathy for and 
identification with the PLO in many parts of the world. This sen- 
timent was nowhere more evident than in the West Bank. There, 
in the municipal elections that Israel permitted to be held in April 
1976, candidates supporting the PLO defeated most of the candi- 
dates identified with Hussein. The outcome was a reversal of the 
municipal elections held in 1972, when pro-Hussein candidates 
handily won over pro-PLO candidates. 

The process of reconciliation also was complicated by the link- 
age of the Jordanian-PLO equation to the broader configuration 
of Middle East problems. In March 1977, Hussein and Arafat met 
in Cairo as part of the Egyptian- Syrian efforts to prepare for an 
upcoming Geneva peace conference on the Middle East. The two 
leaders addressed, inter alia, the question of future relations be- 
tween Jordan and a proposed Palestinian state on the West Bank. 
Their discussions focused on whether the PLO should be repre- 
sented as an independent delegation at the conference in Geneva 
or as part of Jordan's delegation. The latter course was preferred 
by Hussein. 

The Hussein-Arafat contact became more frequent in the wake 
of Egyptian president Anwar as Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 
November 1977 and his signing of the United States-mediated 
Camp David Accords in 1978 and the Treaty of Peace Between 
Egypt and Israel in 1979. Nevertheless, Arafat and other PLO lead- 
ers were suspicious of Hussein's ultimate intentions vis-a-vis 
the Camp David Accords. Although Jordan had no part in the 



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Jordan: A Country Study 

Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, it was directly linked to the process 
for settling the future of the West Bank. The first agreement, called 
"A Framework for Peace in the Middle East," stipulated that Egypt 
and Israel would negotiate with Jordan and Palestinian represen- 
tatives for a transitional self-governing authority to administer the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a noncontiguous Palestinian en- 
clave on the Mediterranean Sea that also was occupied by Israel. 
Jordan declared it was neither legally nor morally obligated to this 
agreement and refused to participate in the negotiations, which con- 
sequently made no progress. Hussein's decision to maintain a di- 
alogue with the United States, however, fueled the fears of some 
Palestinians that the monarch tacitly supported the Camp David 
Accords and was seeking ways to preclude the PLO from gaining 
control of the West Bank. 

The expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon in the wake of Israel's 
1982 invasion of that country brought the contradictory Jordanian 
and PLO objectives into open conflict. Initially, relations improved 
because Hussein agreed to accept a small contingent of expelled 
fighters and to permit the reopening of PLO political offices for 
the first time since the 1970-71 civil war. In several face-to-face 
meetings held between September 1982 and April 1983, Hussein 
and Arafat discussed Jordan's role in future negotiations over the 
fate of the West Bank. Because neither the United States nor Israel 
was willing to talk with the PLO at this time, Hussein tried to ob- 
tain Arafat's endorsement for Jordan to serve as spokesman for 
the Palestinians. More extreme Palestinian guerrilla leaders — often 
called "rejectionists" because they rejected any compromises that 
would circumscribe their goal of an independent Palestinian state 
that included all of pre- 1948 Palestine — distrusted Hussein and 
would not be assuaged by Arafat's reassurances. Without a broad- 
based consensus within the PLO, Arafat apparently felt he could 
not agree to a common negotiating strategy with Hussein. Conse- 
quently, Hussein broke off the talks in April 1983>; for the remainder 
of the year, Jordan's relations with the PLO were strained. 

Violent factional feuding engulfed the PLO beginning in May 
1983, inducing the moderate elements (who generally coalesced 
around Arafat) to revive contacts with Hussein. By this time, Jor- 
dan had decided to assert its influence in the West Bank more 
aggressively, albeit within the limits tolerated by the Israeli occu- 
pation authorities. The National Assembly, dissolved following the 
Rabat decision in 1974, was recalled in January 1984 and deputies 
were appointed to fill vacant West Bank seats in the House of 
Representatives. Nevertheless, Hussein seemed to welcome the rap- 
prochement with the moderate faction of the PLO and gave his 



200 



Government and Politics 



blessing to the holding of a Palestine National Council (PNC) meet- 
ing in Amman in November 1984. The PNC meeting was an his- 
toric event that was broadcast on Jordanian television and picked 
up by viewers in the West Bank. The meeting strengthened Arafat's 
authority as leader of the PLO and enabled him to negotiate with 
Hussein without fear of the inevitable recriminations from extremist 
factions who had boycotted the Amman meeting. 

Hussein and Arafat continued to cooperate after the PNC meet- 
ing, both leaders speaking of the need for Jordan and a Palestin- 
ian state to maintain a special relationship. In February 1985, 
they announced a joint Jordanian-Palestinian agreement on a 
peace framework. This agreement called for the convening of an 
international peace conference whose participants would include 
the five permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security 
Council and all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although the 
PLO would represent Palestinians, its PLO delegates would not 
attend the conference separately but rather as part of a joint Jor- 
danian-Palestinian contingent. The agreement stipulated that the 
Palestinian people would have the right to exercise national self- 
determination within the context of a proposed confederated state 
of Jordanians and Palestinians. 

Following his agreement with Arafat, Hussein pursued two poli- 
cies simultaneously. While trying to serve as a spokesman for the 
Palestinians in talks with the United States, and eventually even 
with Israeli politicians, Hussein also tried to persuade Arafat to 
make a public declaration of PLO support for UN Security Coun- 
cil resolutions 242 and 338, both of which implicitly recognized 
Israel's right to exist. Arafat, who still felt he had to be wary of 
the influence of the more extreme factions in the PLO, was un- 
willing to be pushed as far toward moderation as Hussein had 
hoped. The extremist guerrilla groups criticized Arafat for the agree- 
ment, claiming that it would deny Palestinians the right to estab- 
lish a sovereign state within the pre- 1948 boundaries of Palestine. 
Some of the extremists demonstrated their potential for undermin- 
ing any possible compromise solutions by carrying out sensational 
terrorist acts in September and October of 1985. The international 
response to these incidents, especially the Israeli aerial bombing 
of PLO headquarters in Tunisia, increased Arafat's reluctance to 
make the political concessions that Hussein believed were required 
to obtain United States support for an international conference. 

Hussein's disappointment in Arafat contributed to an erosion 
of their political relationship. In February 1986, Hussein announced 
that he was terminating the year-old Jordan-PLO agreement. Ten- 
sions with the PLO were exacerbated in May by the student 



201 



Jordan: A Country Study 

demonstrations at Yarmuk University in the northern Jordanian 
city of Irbid. In July Hussein ordered the offices of Arafat's Al Fatah 
organization closed following criticisms of the harsh manner in 
which Jordanian security forces had put down the Yarmuk demon- 
strations. 

During 1986 both Hussein and Arafat intensified their compe- 
tition for influence in the West Bank. The king appeared to have 
the upper hand in this contest because Jordan's banking system 
controlled the disbursement of pan- Arab funds earmarked for West 
Bank (and also Gaza Strip) development projects. However, the 
Palestinian uprising, the intifadah, which began in December 1987, 
exposed the fragility of Hussein's influence in the occupied terri- 
tories. It became obvious during the first half of 1988 that, com- 
pared with the PLO, pro-Hashimite sympathizers had little support. 
Hussein decided that political circumstances required a bold move 
that would preserve Jordan's interests. Thus, in July he renounced 
all claims to sovereignty over the West Bank. By doing so, Hus- 
sein apparently hoped to enhance the Jordanian position in a post- 
intifadah era. If the PLO succeeded in consolidating its influence 
in the occupied territories and in winning international support 
for its claim to rule the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, then Hus- 
sein's abdication of responsibility would stand Jordan in good stead. 
It would enable Jordan to forge political and economic links with 
a new state, which, because of its small area and lack of natural 
resources, would be dependent in various ways on its only neigh- 
bor to the east. If the PLO failed to deliver on the political aspira- 
tions being expressed by the intifadah, then Hussein would be ready 
to offer Jordan's services as negotiator in terminating the Israeli 
occupation. 

The PLO accepted Hussein's challenge. Arafat met with the king 
during the late summer and early fall to discuss strategy. Among 
the practical measures agreed to was a scheme for the PLO to as- 
sume responsibility for payment of the salaries of West Bank and 
Gaza Strip municipal employees through Jordanian financial in- 
stitutions. Subsequently, at an historic PNC meeting in Algiers 
in November 1988 at which all major factions were represented, 
the PNC declared the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to be the in- 
dependent state of Palestine. The PNC also renounced the use of 
terrorism, accepted UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 
(both of which recognized the existence of Israel), and declared its 
willingness to negotiate the end of the occupation. Jordan was one 
of the first nations to recognize the new state and announced its 
readiness to discuss how the two countries could maintain a spe- 
cial relationship. 



202 



Government and Politics 



In 1989 the PLO remained essentially an umbrella organization 
of numerous civilian and military groups (see fig. 12). It was origi- 
nally founded in 1964 as a political organization to represent the 
interests of Palestinians. The various Palestinian guerrilla groups 
were formed independently of the PLO, and they initially were 
critical of the PLO's objectives and policies. In 1968-69, however, 
most of the guerrilla groups joined the PLO, and their leaders as- 
sumed dominant roles in the organization. Although the PLO has 
greatly expanded its various service functions in the cultural, diplo- 
matic, economic, educational, health, humanitarian, political, so- 
cial, and welfare fields since 1969, for most Western observers these 
functions have been overshadowed by the military and terrorist 
activities associated with the guerrilla groups. 

The PLO guerrilla groups recruited most of their fighters from 
the Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. 
Although some of these camps were established as early as 1948 
and all have long since been transformed into permanent villages 
or urban neighborhoods, high levels of poverty and unemployment 
remain dominant characteristics. Many young men raised in these 
camps found the guerrillas' idealization of Palestinian nationalism 
and politico-military organization appealing alternatives to the 
despair fostered by routine idleness and lack of opportunity. Join- 
ing one of the guerrilla groups enabled such men to assert their 
identity and channel their energies. Although the various guerrilla 
organizations differed in temperament, ideology, and tactics, they 
all shared the objective of establishing an independent Palestinian 
state. 

The oldest, largest, and best equipped of the PLO guerrilla 
groups was Al Fatah — the Palestine National Liberation Move- 
ment as the group was officially known. Arafat (also called Abu 
Ammar) has led Al Fatah since its formation in 1957. Since 1969, 
Arafat has also been chairman of the PNC's fifteen-member Execu- 
tive Committee — and hence the dominant figure of the PLO leader- 
ship. For more than thirty years, Al Fatah has been a coalition 
of moderate, conservative, and radical nationalists who accepted 
the tactical necessity of cooperating with Arab governments, in- 
cluding those they regarded as reactionary, to help achieve their 
goals. Predominantly Muslim in membership, Al Fatah generally 
has eschewed commitment to radical ideologies such as Islamic revo- 
lution or Marxism and refrained from interference in the internal 
affairs of Arab states. 

The progressive moderation of Al Fatah's goals after 1973 led 
to major splits within the organization. The original objective to 
liberate all of pre- 1948 Palestine was replaced in 1974 with the aim 



203 



Jordan: A Country Study 



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Government and Politics 



of establishing a transitional state on the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip. Sabri Khalil al Banna, known by his code name of Abu Nidal, 
vehemently opposed this change. Abu Nidal and a small group of 
his supporters defected from Al Fatah and formed the Al Fatah 
Revolutionary Council. A more serious split occurred in 1983 when 
Said Musa Muragha (also known as Abu Musa) organized Al Fatah 
fighters in Lebanon who feared Arafat's reconciliation with Egypt 
would lead eventually to recognition of Israel. The supporters of 
Arafat and Abu Musa fought each other for control of Palestinian 
refugee camps in Lebanon during 1983 and 1984, with heavy 
casualties on both sides. The anti- Arafat forces received support 
from Syria that helped them expel Arafat loyalists from camps in 
areas occupied by the Syrian army. Abu Musa and the Al Fatah 
dissidents eventually formed a new group called Al Fatah Uprising. 

From a tactical and ideological standpoint, the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was the principal counter- 
point to Al Fatah. George Habash and Ahmad Jibril founded the 
PFLP after the June 1967 War. The PFLP was a consciously 
Marxist-Leninist organization. It defined as enemies not just Israel 
and Zionism, but also imperialism and the Arab regimes that 
cooperated with the United States, the country it proclaimed to 
be the main imperialist power. It called such Arab regimes reac- 
tionary, advocated their overthrow and the establishment of progres- 
sive, democratic, and secular governments in all Arab states, 
including Palestine. Habash and the other PFLP leaders soon were 
divided, however, on the issue of whether armed struggle or polit- 
ical considerations should take precedence in achieving their ob- 
jectives. Jibril broke with Habash in 1968 and formed a rival 
organization, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine- 
General Command (PFLP-GC), which placed primary emphasis 
on armed struggle. The following year Nayif Hawatmah, who was 
an East Bank Jordanian, also split from the PFLP and organized 
the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). 
Hawatmah' s DFLP tended to stress exploring political options be- 
fore resorting to armed struggle. 

The PFLP, PFLP-GC, and DFLP held attitudes toward reac- 
tionary Arab regimes that precluded cooperation with Hussein, 
whose government they regarded as a prime candidate for revolu- 
tionary overthrow. Their openly professed ideology and main- 
tenance of armed bases within Jordan's Palestinian refugee camps 
were major factors in precipitating the 1970 conflict between the 
guerrillas and the Jordanian army. After the guerrillas were sup- 
pressed, Habash, Hawatmah, and Jibril remained hostile and 
unforgiving toward Hussein. When Arafat began the process of 



205 



Jordan: A Country Study 

reconciliation with Hussein in 1973, they opposed any PLO ties 
or even dialogue with Jordan and publicly called for Hussein's over- 
throw. Habash and Jibril were the principal organizers in 1974 
of the rejectionist front of guerrilla groups, which refused to ac- 
cept the PLO decision to establish a Palestinian state on the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip. The rejectionists were those groups that 
rejected any negotiations or compromises with Israel and insisted 
on using armed struggle to liberate all of historic Palestine. In 1983 
Jibril supported Abu Musa and the Al Fatah dissidents, joining 
with them to form the National Alliance, which opposed any diplo- 
matic initiatives or cooperation with Hussein. 

In addition to Al Fatah and the Marxist groups, several smaller 
guerrilla organizations were active in 1989. The most important 
of these were As Saiqa, the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), the Popu- 
lar Struggle Front (PSF), and the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF). 
As Saiqa was formed in 1968 in Damascus and has continued to 
be politically and financially dependent upon Syria. Palestinians 
who lived outside of Syria generally perceived As Saiqa as a tool 
of the Syrian government. As Saiqa' s counterpart was the ALF, 
formed in Baghdad in 1969. In the 1970s, the ALF supported the 
rejectionist front, as did Iraq. In the 1980s, however, the ALF 
aligned itself with Arafat's Al Fatah, a position consistent with that 
of Iraq. The PSF has consistently advocated armed struggle since 
it was founded in 1967. Prior to 1980, the PSF was supported by 
Iraq, but since 1980 Syria has been its principal backer. The PLF 
was formed in 1977 as a result of a split within the PFLP-GC. 
Originally part of the rejectionist front, since 1983 it has been one 
of the groups trying to effect a reconciliation between Arafat and 
Abu Musa. 

The PLO's organizational equivalent to a parliament was the 
Palestine National Council (PNC), in 1989 based in Algiers. The 
PNC's 301 deputies represented the Palestinian diaspora. Included 
among them were representatives of the Palestinian parties (the 
political wings of the various guerrilla groups); the six guerrilla 
groups that accepted the policies of the PLO (Al Fatah, PFLP, 
DFLP, ALF, PLF, and the Palestine Communist Party); student 
and educational groups; youth and women's groups; professional 
associations; labor unions; and the Palestine Red Crescent Soci- 
ety. In addition, the Palestinian communities in various Arab and 
non-Arab countries were represented. 

The PNC was supposed to meet once a year, but political com- 
plications often forced the postponement of annual gatherings. The 
factional strife that plagued the PLO following the sixteenth PNC 
conclave in February 1983 prevented convening a full session for 



206 



Government and Politics 



four years. Although a PNC meeting was held in Amman in 
November 1984, its legitimacy was questioned because several of 
the guerrilla leaders, including Habash of the PFLP and Hawat- 
mah of the DFLP, refused to attend. The eighteenth PNC, which 
met in Algiers in April 1987, represented the first effort to heal 
the rift in the PLO and achieve a consensus on policy. Although 
the PFLP-GC, As Saiqa, the PSF, and the Abu Musa faction did 
not participate, the PFLP, DFLP, and the Palestine Communist 
Party — the three guerrilla groups that, like Al Fatah, had a repu- 
tation for independence of Arab governments — did attend and 
agreed to accept PNC decisions. Abu Nidal also attended the eigh- 
teenth PNC. However, the other leaders voted not to grant his 
group representation on the PNC because they believed his repu- 
tation as a notorious terrorist would tarnish the PLO's image at 
a time when the organization was seeking diplomatic support for 
an international peace conference. 

The 1987 PNC meeting adopted several significant resolutions 
pertaining to the PLO's conflict with Israel. It voted to endorse 
an international peace conference on the basis of UN General 
Assembly resolutions that recognized the PLO and the right of the 
Palestinians to self-determination; it called for PLO participation 
in such a conference as a full partner, and not as part of a Jordan- 
ian delegation; it abrogated the PLO-Jordan accord of 1985, but 
also advocated maintaining "special" ties between Jordanians and 
Palestinians; and it authorized the PLO to develop relations with 
groups in Israel that supported Palestinian self-determination. These 
decisions were a prelude to the even more significant resolutions 
that were passed at the historic nineteenth PNC meeting in Algiers 
in November 1988. 

Between PNC congresses, the Palestine Central Committee 
(PCC), created in 1973, set policies and carried out specific 
programs and actions undertaken by the PLO's cabinet, the fif- 
teen-member Executive Committee. The PCC's actual function, 
however, was limited to a consultative role; its sixty members, ap- 
pointed by the PNC based on the recommendation of the Execu- 
tive Committee, included representatives from the Executive 
Committee and the major guerrilla groups. The PNC's speaker 
or chairman presided over PCC meetings. The legislative and 
executive functions of these top PLO bodies were in accordance 
with the principles and policies contained in three key documents: 
the Palestinian National Charter; the Fifteen-Point Political Pro- 
gram; and the National Unity Program. 

Although the PNC was officially described as the highest 
policymaking body and supreme organ of the PLO, the real center 



207 



Jordan: A Country Study 

of power was the fifteen-member Executive Committee. The com- 
mittee's members were elected by and collectively responsible to 
the PNC . The manner of their election ensured representation of 
the major guerrilla and political groups on the committee. Arafat 
was re-elected chairman of the Executive Committee in 1988, a 
position he has held since 1969. Al Fatah had three seats on the 
committee; in addition, Arafat generally obtained the support of 
the seven "independents," the committee members who were not 
affiliated with any of the guerrilla groups. 

The administration of the PLO was grouped under nine main 
functions that were carried out in different countries depending 
on local Palestinian needs. These were supported by funds collected 
and distributed by the PLO's treasury and financial arm, the Pales- 
tine National Fund. The fund obtained its revenues from payments 
made by Arab governments in accordance with agreements made 
at the summit level (i.e. , the Baghdad Summit of 1978); from volun- 
tary contributions by Palestinians; from the 3 to 6 percent income 
tax levied by some Arab states on the salaries of resident Palestin- 
ian workers; and from loans and grants by Arab as well as non- 
Arab countries. Iraq and Syria provided financial aid directly to 
particular guerrilla groups despite persistent efforts by the PLO 
to terminate this practice and to centralize fund-raising and fund- 
distributing procedures. 

In 1989 the PLO maintained "diplomatic" missions in more 
than 120 countries that recognized it as the legitimate representa- 
tive of the Palestinian people. Although the PLO had not proclaimed 
a government-in-exile for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, more 
than twenty-five countries recognized it as the de jure government 
of the independent state of Palestine, declared at the 1988 PNC 
meeting in Algiers. The PLO has maintained a mission at UN head- 
quarters in New York since being granted observer status in 1974. 
The PLO also operated numerous "information offices" in the 
major cities of the world. In 1988 the United States government 
ordered the closure of PLO's information office in Washington. 

The PLO's nearest equivalent to a Red Cross Society was called 
the Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS). The PRCS supported 
hospitals and clinics for Palestinians in Arab countries as well as 
in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Prior to the Israeli invasion 
of Lebanon in 1982, the PRCS operated ten major hospitals and 
eleven clinics in that country. These facilities provided a broad 
range of medical services to Palestinian refugees at no cost or for 
nominal fees. The hospitals and clinics were severely damaged dur- 
ing the occupation of south Lebanon and the siege of Beirut. Since 
1983, the periodic fighting in Lebanon has seriously impeded the 



208 



Government and Politics 



PRCS' s efforts to reconstruct medical centers and provide health 
services. 

The PLO also sponsored numerous educational and cultural 
projects and operated an economic enterprise called the Palestine 
Martyrs' Works Society, better known by its Arab acronym 
SAMED, which ran small factories. SAMED's workshops produced 
such items as blankets, tents, uniforms, civilian clothes, shoes, handi- 
crafts, furniture, and toys. SAMED was originally established in 
1970 to provide vocational training for the children of Palestinian 
men and women killed in service to the Palestinian national cause. 
After 1976 SAMED decided to accept any Palestinian needing em- 
ployment if work were available. Most SAMED workshops were 
in the refugee camps in northern Lebanon and thus were not af- 
fected by the Israeli invasion of south Lebanon in 1982. SAMED 
workshops and activities were disrupted, however, during the 
1983-84 fighting between Arafat loyalists and dissidents in Pales- 
tinian camps in northern Lebanon. 

The military function of the PLO was under the supreme com- 
mand of the chairman of the Executive Committee. The PLO's 
regular military arm was called the Palestine Liberation Army 
(PLA). Its units were stationed in various Arab countries where 
they coordinated their activities with those of Arab armies. The 
coordination was centrally handled by the Palestinian Armed Strug- 
gle Command, which also was responsible for law and order in 
Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. 

Foreign Policy 

Jordan's foreign policy has been a function mainly of its response 
to developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Its generally moder- 
ate and carefully measured response has been based on its appraisal 
that effective Arab unity is a precondition for substantive peace 
negotiations with Israel. The persistence of intra- Arab differences 
over the form and substance of pan-Arab cooperation has con- 
strained Jordan to steer a flexible and prudent course. In addition, 
the scarcity of domestic resources and the consequent heavy de- 
pendence on outside powers for economic and military support have 
contributed to Jordan's caution in foreign policy. Moreover, the 
PLO's enhanced stature since the mid-1970s as a key factor in the 
processes of Middle East reconciliation and peace has been a fur- 
ther compelling reason for Jordan's generally pragmatic responses 
to an uncertain foreign policy milieu. 

Relations with Israel 

In 1989 Jordan still refrained from establishing diplomatic rela- 
tions with Israel. The absence of formal relations notwithstanding, 



209 



Jordan: A Country Study 



the two countries had cooperated directly or indirectly since 1967 
in a multiplicity of matters pertaining to the West Bank, the Israeli- 
occupied territory whose Palestinian population retained Jordan- 
ian citizenship until 1988. Hussein's aim was to maintain influence 
and eventually regain control of the West Bank, a goal that had 
not been realized by 1988, when he renounced Jordan's claim to 
sovereignty of the area. Hussein's ambitions were frustrated by 
Israel's unwillingness to negotiate seriously any withdrawal from 
the West Bank and by the increasing popularity of the PLO. As 
early as 1974, Israel's refusal to consider a United States-mediated 
disengagement agreement with Jordan, similar to the ones that had 
then been concluded with Egypt and Syria, weakened Hussein's 
image as a leader who could recover occupied Arab land. Israel's 
refusal also helped to strengthen pan- Arab support for the PLO's 
claim to represent West Bank Palestinians. Later that year, Arab 
heads of state meeting in a summit conference in Rabat, Morocco, 
agreed to recognize the PLO's right to establish an independent 
state in the West Bank once the latter was liberated from Israel. 

Although Hussein paid lip service to the 1974 Rabat decision, 
he continued to hope Jordan would recover the West Bank. His 
hopes were nurtured by Israel's refusal to deal with the PLO. To 
maximize Jordan's political leverage from the new situation, Hus- 
sein pursued simultaneously a highly visible policy of reconcilia- 
tion with the PLO and a less perceptible policy of cultivating 
pro-Hashimite politicians in the West Bank. The measures intended 
to preserve Jordan's traditional links to the West Bank actually 
were undertaken with the tacit approval of Israel. These measures 
included authorizing the continuation of the long-standing economic 
and family ties between the East and West banks under the "open 
bridges" policy; continuing payment (until 1988) of salaries to 
Palestinian officials on the government payroll before and since 
1967; strengthening economic links by increased imports from the 
West Bank and by continued extension of development grants and 
loans to Palestinian firms in the West Bank; and providing govern- 
ment guarantees for private Jordanian loans to West Bank munic- 
ipalities. 

After 1977, when Egypt's President Anwar as Sadat initiated 
direct negotiations with Israel that led to a separate peace agree- 
ment (and Egypt's temporary ostracism from the Arab world), Hus- 
sein was unwilling to follow Sadat's lead without prior pan- Arab 
acquiescence. Hussein apparently believed that in the absence of 
broad Arab support to legitimize any political talks with Israel, his 
own rule in the East Bank could be threatened. Consequently, he 
refused to participate in the Camp David process and was skeptical 



210 



View of Amman, Jordan's capital 



211 



Jordan: A Country Study 

of President Reagan's 1982 proposal for a West Bank "entity" 
in association with Jordan. Israel's rejection of the Reagan Plan 
provided Hussein the boon of not needing to respond to an initia- 
tive that the Palestinians claimed would deny them genuine self- 
determination. Two years later, when Shimon Peres became prime 
minister of Israel, in September 1984, he offered to negotiate directly 
with Jordan without the participation of the PLO. Hussein decided 
the state of pan-Arab politics precluded his consideration of a 
"Jordanian option" at that time. Instead, he called for an interna- 
tional peace conference that would include a joint Jordan-PLO dele- 
gation. Hussein perceived an international forum that brought 
together both the United States and the Soviet Union as well as 
the principal Arab states and Israel as a protective umbrella under 
which he could enter into negotiations with the Israelis. 

Peres, whose Labor Party was willing to consider Israeli with- 
drawal from at least part of the West Bank, endorsed Hussein's 
idea of an international peace conference in an October 1985 speech 
before the United Nations. Subsequently, he initiated secret meet- 
ings with Hussein to discuss procedures for convening such a con- 
ference and ways to finesse the issue of PLO participation. Peres 
opposed the presence of the PLO at a possible conference, but did 
not object to non-PLO representatives of Palestinians attending. 
Hussein was not able to obtain firm Israeli commitments, however, 
because Peres' s coalition partner, Likud Bloc leader Yitzhak 
Shamir, opposed the convening of an international conference and 
prevented the government from achieving consensus on the issue. 
After Shamir became prime minister in late 1986, Peres, as for- 
eign minister, continued his diplomatic efforts on behalf of an 
international conference. Peres had at least one publicized meet- 
ing with Hussein in London, but he lacked support from his own 
government. Hussein, who believed that Peres was interested in 
substantive negotiations over the West Bank while Shamir was not, 
took the unprecedented step during the Israeli elections of 1988 
of announcing that a Labor Party victory would be better for the 
peace process. 

Relations with Arab States 

In 1989 Jordan maintained relatively cordial relations with most 
other Arab states. Jordan's closest ties were with Egypt, Iraq, 
Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. King Hussein made frequent trips to 
these countries to confer with their leaders on regional and inter- 
national strategy. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Arab oil- 
producers provided Jordan with financial aid in accordance with 
guidelines originally agreed on at the November 1978 Baghdad 



212 



Government and Politics 



Summit. The total amount of these grants had declined dramati- 
cally by 1984 because of the budgetary problems that depressed 
oil prices caused in petroleum-producing countries. Nonetheless, 
they remained an important source of total government revenue 
for Jordan (see GDP by Sector, ch. 3). 

Jordan's close relations with Iraq developed as a result of Hus- 
sein's strong support for President Saddam Husayn during the lat- 
ter' s eight-year war with Iran (1980-88). The monarch's ardent 
backing of Saddam was attributable at least in part to his fears that 
a collapse of the Iraqi regime could result in Jordan's eastern neigh- 
bor being ruled by a radicalized Shia religious government allied 
to Iran. The relationship also benefited Jordan in various ways. 
For example, Jordan's only port, Al Aqabah, served throughout 
the war as a major transshipment center for Iraqi imports. Goods 
off-loaded at Al Aqabah were trucked overland to Iraq by Jorda- 
nian transportation companies, in the process generating local em- 
ployment, handling fees, and profitable business. Jordan also 
exported a variety of light consumer goods to Iraq, although the 
value and volume of this trade fluctuated in accordance with Iraqi 
foreign exchange problems. Both during and after the war, Iraq, 
whose army used primarily Soviet-made equipment, periodically 
gave to Jordan United States- and British-made military hardware 
captured from Iran, including at least sixty United States- 
manufactured M-47 tanks (see Military Cooperation with Other 
Arab States, ch. 5). 

In 1984 Jordan became the first Arab state to reestablish diplo- 
matic relations with Egypt. Hussein had begun advocating Egypt's 
reintegration into the Arab community of nations as early as 1981 . 
The king perceived Egypt as an effective bulwark against the spread 
of radical Islamic political movements that he believed were being 
engendered by the Iran-Iraq War. Following the 1982 Israeli in- 
vasion of Lebanon and the expulsion of the PLO from that coun- 
try, unofficial consultations with Egypt on regional security issues 
became routine. PLO chief Arafat's trip to Egypt in December 
1983 — the first by an Arab leader since the Baghdad Summit of 
November 1978 — paved the way for Jordan's resumption of offi- 
cial relations without fear of being branded a traitor to Arab na- 
tionalism. 

Following the reestablishment of diplomatic relations, Jordan and 
Egypt became extremely close allies. Hussein frequently praised 
Egyptian president Husni Mubarak as one of the Arab world's great 
leaders. Mubarak supported Hussein's pro-Iraq policy, his efforts 
to involve moderate Palestinians in the peace process, and his call 
for an international peace conference. Hussein and Arafat met 



213 



Jordan: A Country Study 

several times on "neutral" Egyptian territory; when their personal 
relations were tense, such as in 1986-87, Mubarak mediated and 
kept them on civil terms. Hussein reciprocated Mubarak's diplo- 
matic support by trying to persuade other Arab heads of state that 
Egypt should be readmitted to the League of Arab States (Arab 
League). In February 1989, Egypt and Jordan joined with Iraq 
and the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) to form a new Arab 
Cooperation Council, a regional organization modeled after the 
Gulf Cooperation Council. 

Jordan's relations with Syria were correct in 1989, although there 
had been considerable strain between them during most of the previ- 
ous two decades. In September 1970, a Syrian military unit had 
crossed into Jordan to aid the Palestinian guerrillas who were fight- 
ing the Jordanian army. The Syrian force was repulsed, but rela- 
tions remained tense and were severed in July 1971 . Relations with 
Syria improved briefly following the October 1973 War, but de- 
teriorated again by the late 1970s. Syria apparently feared Hus- 
sein's close ties with Washington would involve Jordan in the Camp 
David process. When religiously inspired disturbances broke out 
in Aleppo and other Syrian cities during the winter of 1979-80, 
the government immediately suspected — and accused — Jordan of 
complicity. In addition, Syria had a bitter rivalry with Iraq. Damas- 
cus perceived Amman's support of Iraq in that country's war with 
Iran (initiated by an Iraqi invasion of Iran in September 1980) as 
confirmation of conspiracy theories about Baghdad trying to en- 
circle Syria. By the end of 1980, relations between Jordan and Syria 
had deteriorated to such an extent that military clashes appeared 
possible along the common border where both countries had massed 
troops. The escalating tension eventually was defused by Saudi 
Arabian diplomatic intervention, although relations remained 
strained. 

Jordan broke diplomatic relations with Syria in 1981, charging 
Damascus with plotting to assassinate its prime minister and kid- 
napping its ambassador to Lebanon. For the next five years, the 
two neighbors were estranged. Amman accused Syria of assisting 
radical Palestinian groups who carried out several political killings 
of Jordanian diplomats in Europe and the Middle East. Tentative 
efforts to improve relations in 1983-84 were aborted by Syrian 
denunciation of Jordan's resumption of relations with Egypt. 
Finally, in the fall and winter of 1985-86, Saudi Arabia mediated 
reconciliation talks that led to a restoration of diplomatic ties. In 
May 1986, the Jordanian prime minister became the first high- 
ranking official from Amman to visit Syria since 1977. Relations 
between Jordan and Syria gradually improved since then. 



214 



Government and Politics 



Jordan maintained cordial relations with the Arab states of the 
Persian Gulf in 1989. These countries — Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates — were col- 
lectively Jordan's most important source of foreign financial aid. 
The level of their assistance, especially that from Kuwait, has fallen, 
however, since 1981. Thousands of Jordanians and Palestinians 
holding Jordanian passports continued to work in the Persian Gulf 
in business, government, education, and engineering. The remit- 
tances they sent to their families in Jordan, especially those living 
in the refugee camps, represented a significant proportion of Jor- 
dan's foreign exchange earnings. The Persian Gulf countries also 
were markets for Jordanian agricultural and consumer exports. 

Jordan's relations with the other Arab states — excepting Libya — 
were generally good in 1989. Tensions existed over economic policy 
between Jordan and Morocco, however, as both countries exported 
phosphates. The amount of Jordan's reserves of these minerals and 
the value of its exports were significantiy less than those of Morocco, 
a major international producer. Jordan, which traditionally ex- 
ported its phosphates to Southeast Asia, complained that Morocco 
had stolen its Asian markets between 1985 and 1987 by deliber- 
ately selling its phosphates at prices lower than it cost Jordan to 
mine and transport the minerals. 

Jordan had a history of tense relations with Libya, deriving from 
Libyan support since 1970 for Palestinian guerrilla groups opposed 
to Hussein. The most serious incident between the two countries 
occurred in February 1984, when the Jordanian embassy in Tripoli 
was destroyed during demonstrations organized by the Libyan 
government to protest Hussein's support of Arafat and his call for 
reconciliation with Egypt. Jordan broke diplomatic relations fol- 
lowing this episode. In 1988 Jordan received a Libyan delegation 
sent to Amman to discuss normalizing relations between the two 
countries. 

Relations with the United States 

Although Amman established diplomatic relations with Washing- 
ton in 1949, the United States did not become actively involved 
in Jordan until 1957, when it replaced Britain as the Hashimite 
Kingdom's principal Western source of foreign aid and political 
support. Jordan and the United States never entered into treaty 
commitments, but Washington's policy was to ensure Jordan's con- 
tinued independence and stability. Thus, the United States assisted 
Jordan in equipping and training its military forces. During the 
civil war of 1970-71, the United States firmly supported Hussein, 
although it did not become directly involved in the conflict. After 



215 



Jordan: A Country Study 

Jordan's army had defeated the PLO guerrillas, Washington ex- 
tended substantial budgetary and military aid to the Hashimite 
Kingdom. This aid contributed significantly toward Jordanian 
recovery from the damages suffered not only in the civil war but 
also in the June 1967 War and during the intensive Israeli shelling 
of the Jordan Valley between 1968 and 1970. Hussein's close align- 
ment with the United States before and after the civil war predict- 
ably aroused strong anti-American sentiment among Palestinians 
in Jordan and elsewhere. 

The October 1973 War, in which Jordan was not a direct par- 
ticipant, brought Jordan and the United States much closer in the 
peace process that began after the conflict. Jordan joined with the 
United States in support of UN Security Council Resolution 338. 
This resolution called on the parties involved in the October 1973 
War to cease their hostilities and to implement UN Security Council 
Resolution 242 of 1967 providing for a peace based on Israeli with- 
drawal from occupied territories. Hussein hoped to obtain Ameri- 
can backing for a return of the West Bank to Jordanian control. 
His expectations were buoyed by Washington's success in negotiat- 
ing disengagement and limited withdrawal of forces agreements 
between Egypt and Israel and Syria and Israel. 

The failure of the United States during 1974 to persuade Israel 
to pull back its forces from part of the West Bank as an initial step 
toward a peace agreement with Jordan disillusioned Hussein with 
respect to the ability of the Americans to pressure Israel on the 
issue of withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian territories. 
Although he continued to value Washington's reaffirmations of sup- 
port for Jordan's security and economic progress, Hussein became 
increasingly skeptical of American assurances that the West Bank 
would be reunited with the East Bank. Consequently, he refrained 
from participation in the Camp David process, which he was con- 
vinced would be used by Israel to perpetuate its control of the West 
Bank. After Egyptian and Israeli negotiations on the autonomy 
plan had stalled, Hussein tried to rekindle United States interest 
in an international conference to deal with territory for the Pales- 
tinians. 

Throughout the 1980s, the United States continued to assign 
Jordan a key role in a resolution of the status of the West Bank. 
Hussein believed, however, that Washington did not understand 
how essential it was for the stability of his regime to regain full 
control over all of the West Bank and how politically dangerous 
it would be for him to agree to any partial measures. For exam- 
ple, Hussein did not publicly criticize President Reagan's September 
1982 proposal for Middle East peace; but since this plan restricted 



216 



Government and Politics 



self-determination for Palestinians on the West Bank to an "autono- 
mous authority" in association with Jordan, he regarded Ameri- 
can expectation of his endorsement as unrealistic. Hussein accepted 
that political developments since 1974 made it impossible to ignore 
the PLO in any peace negotiations. Thus, one of his policy aims 
vis-a-vis the United States became to convince Washington to 
deal — at least unofficially — with the PLO. From the end of 1982 
until the end of 1988, Hussein served as an intermediary between 
the United States and the PLO, attempting to get both parties to 
make the kind of political concessions that were necessary before 
a dialogue could be initiated. 

During the early 1980s, Hussein seriously considered expand- 
ing Jordan's military relations with the United States. He gave ten- 
tative approval for the creation of an unpublicized 8,000-strong 
Jordanian strike force that would respond to requests for assistance 
from Arab countries within a 2,400-kilometer radius of Jordan. 
The intended target of this special force was to be the Persian Gulf, 
where the traditional allies of both Jordan and the United States 
feared the potentially destabilizing consequences of the Iran-Iraq 
War. The United States agreed to provide the special Jordanian 
unit with weapons and other military equipment. In an apparent 
effort to obtain approval of the United States Congress for the extra 
funding needed to arm the strike force, in early 1984 the Reagan 
administration disclosed its formation. This unexpected disclosure 
caused consternation in Amman, and news of the Jordanian strike 
force provoked harsh criticism from Syria and from Palestinian 
guerrilla groups opposed to Hussein. In order to minimize nega- 
tive repercussions, Hussein tried to distance his country from the 
strike force by portraying it as a United States initiative in which 
Jordan had no real interest or substantive involvement. Congress 
did not approve the requested funds, and the plan was subsequently 
abandoned. 

Hussein's disappointment with American policy increased when 
Congress later refused to authorize selling weapons to Jordan and 
voted to reduce the amount of aid the administration requested 
as punishment for its perception that Amman had failed to cooperate 
with Israel. Hussein resented these measures because he believed 
he had exerted great efforts in persuading Palestinian and other 
Arab leaders to adopt more moderate and flexible positions and 
had himself agreed to several private meetings with Peres. In 1989 
Jordan's relations with the United States remained friendly and 
cooperative in economic and military matters but were clouded by 
Hussein's lack of confidence in Washington's policy toward Israel 
and the occupied territories. 



217 



Jordan: A Country Study 

Relations with Other Countries 

In the years after independence, Jordan followed a generally pro- 
Western foreign policy as a result of its special relationship with 
Britain, to which the Hashimite Kingdom owed its existence and 
which became the principal supplier of financial and other aid. 
Jordan's special relationship with Britain ended, for all practical 
purposes, in 1957, when the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1948 was 
terminated by mutual agreement. Thereafter, the United States 
became actively involved in Jordan, replacing Britain as the prin- 
cipal Western source of foreign aid and political support but without 
treaty commitments. Nevertheless, Britain and Jordan continued 
to maintain cordial relations. Hussein made annual official visits 
to London to discuss Middle East policy. In 1984, Queen Elizabeth 
II made the first trip ever by a British monarch to Jordan. Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher subsequently visited Amman in 1985. 
During the 1980s, Britain again became a major weapons supplier 
for Jordan. As of 1989, the most recent sale (in September 1988) 
was an agreement to provide Jordan with the advanced Tornado 
aircraft. 

In 1989 Jordan maintained friendly relations with the Soviet 
Union. Amman first established relations with Moscow in 1963. 
Two years later, Jordan signed its first cultural and technical cooper- 
ation agreement with the Soviet Union. Hussein made his first state 
visit to Moscow in the wake of the June 1967 War. Since then there 
have been numerous exchanges of high-level visits, including several 
official trips by Hussein. Jordan has purchased military equipment 
from the Soviet Union periodically since 1980 as part of a policy 
to diversify military supply sources. In 1985 Jordan bought a major 
Soviet air defense system after the United States Congress canceled 
a planned sale of Stinger antiaircraft missiles to the country. Jordan 
and the Soviet Union have signed several accords pertaining to cul- 
tural, economic, and scientific cooperation. In his advocacy of an 
international peace conference to deal with the occupied Palestin- 
ian territories, Hussein has insisted that the Soviet Union be in- 
cluded. 

In 1989 Jordan had friendly relations with most other countries, 
including those in both Eastern Europe and Western Europe. The 
major exception was Iran, with which Jordan had severed diplo- 
matic relations in 1981 as a demonstration of solidarity with Iraq. 
The countries of the European Economic Community and Japan 
were major sources of Jordan's imports. France also sold weapons 
to Jordan, including twenty Mirage-2000 aircraft in 1988. 



218 



Government and Politics 



Membership in International Organizations 

In 1989 Jordan was a member of the League of Arab States and 
the Arab Cooperation Council, a regional economic pact that in- 
cluded Egypt, Iraq, and North Yemen. Jordan was a member of 
the International Committee of the Red Cross and had been a mem- 
ber of the UN since 1955. The United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine Refugees in the Near East main- 
tained ten refugee camps in Jordan (see fig. 6). UNRWA' s biggest 
task was the provision of primary, secondary, and vocational schools 
for Palestinian refugee children living in the camps. UNRWA also 
operated health clinics and provided food for indigent refugees. 

Media 

In 1989 Jordan had four daily newspapers, all published in 
Amman. One, The Jordan Times, was printed in English. The three 
Arabic dailies were Sawt ash Shaab (Voice of the People), Ar Rai 
(Opinion), and Ad Dustur (The Constitution). The press was mostly 
privately owned and subject to censorship. The Arabic-language 
papers had been suspended at various times throughout the 1980s 
for publishing articles that the government considered objectiona- 
ble. In 1988 the government ordered the dissolution of the board 
of directors of all three Arabic papers. The Ministry of Culture 
and Information was responsible for most press censorship on a 
daily basis and frequently provided editors with guidance on how 
to report on sensitive foreign policy and security matters. In prac- 
tice, editors generally exercised self-censorship to minimize con- 
flicts with the authorities. 

The government also tried to control individual journalists by 
rewarding those deemed cooperative and by punishing those whose 
stories it considered critical. The most common punishment was 
the withdrawal of government-issued press credentials, which all 
writers were required to have in order to work for a newspaper 
or news agency. This procedure was used to prevent several jour- 
nalists (including a principal writer for The Jordan Times) from pub- 
lishing during 1987 and 1988. Journalists also have been subjected 
to house arrest. In June 1987, the government dissolved the Writers' 
Association, a professional organization of journalists, charging that 
it had become a political group and had contacts with illegal par- 
ties. The Ministry of Culture and Information subsequently spon- 
sored an official union, the Journalists' Association, and required 
all writers to join it. 

The government attempted to discourage the Arabic press of East 
Jerusalem from publishing critical stories, especially about Hussein's 



219 



Jordan: A Country Study 

relations with the PLO, by such means as banning single issues 
of papers and magazines, refusing to renew the passports of West 
Bank journalists, and sending messages through discreet channels 
that certain writers or editors would be arrested if they entered Jor- 
dan. Foreign publications and journalists also were banned when 
their articles criticized Jordan. In 1986 Western correspondents 
expressed concern about the government's interference with press 
freedom during and after the disturbances at Yarmuk University. 
In 1988 the government expelled an American correspondent for 
National Broadcasting Company (NBC) because he had reported 
on political repression in Jordan. 

The government operated an official news agency known as 
PETRA. Several international news services maintained offices in 
Amman, including Agence France-Presse, Associated Press, Reuters, 
and TASS. Radio and television broadcasting were controlled by 
the government. Jordan Radio and Television had twenty hours 
of Arabic radio programs daily, and fifteen hours in English. There 
were an estimated 700,000 privately owned radio receivers in 1989; 
also, radio reception in village cafes was popular. Jordan Radio and 
Television also broadcast ninety hours weekly of television programs 
in Arabic and English. In 1989 there were an estimated 250,000 
television sets in the country. Both radio and television accepted ad- 
vertisements. 

The literature on Jordanian government and politics since the 
early 1970s is relatively scarce. Among the readily available studies 
in English that merit reading are Peter Gubser's Jordan: Crossroads 
of Middle Eastern Events and Clinton Bailey's Jordan's Palestinian 
Challenge, 1948-1983: A Political Challenge. Both books were writ- 
ten in the early 1980s and thus do not cover events from 1983 on. 
Middle East Insight, Middle East International [London], and Middle 
East Report are magazines that regularly feature articles about Jor- 
dan's politics, relations with the PLO, and foreign policy. Lamis 
Andoni, Naseer H. Aruri, Rashid Khalidi, and Robin Wright are 
the principal writers who specialize on Jordanian affairs. Articles 
by these authors also may be found in various other journals that 
deal with international relations and Middle East politics. (For fur- 
ther information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



220 



Chapter 5. National Security 




Mosaic of a walled city, called Castron Mephaon, 

from the Umm ar Rasas pavement in a Byzantine church, ca. 780 



IN ASSESSING THE DIMENSIONS of national security in 
Jordan, it is essential to recall that for centuries conflicts and rivalries 
of differing political and religious ideologies have generated ten- 
sion and crisis in this region. Since achieving sovereignty in 1946, 
Jordan has experienced such destabilizing traumas as the assassi- 
nation of the country's first king and subsequently of two prime 
ministers, five Arab-Israeli wars, a vicious civil war with Palestin- 
ian (see Glossary) guerrillas, and repeated assassination attempts 
targeting King Hussein ibn Talal ibn Abdullah ibn Hussein Al 
Hashimi. 

Jordan not only has survived in this volatile climate but also, 
as of 1989, the thirty-sixth year of Hussein's reign, had achieved 
a degree of stability in its domestic situation and in its relations 
with its neighbors. The king's position has been strongly reinforced 
by the allegiance of the Jordan Arab Army, the former Arab Legion. 
A highly motivated, disciplined force with impressive firepower and 
mobility despite its compact scale, the Jordan Arab Army has been 
regarded as the most competent of any Arab army in the Middle 
East. In contrast to the Syrian, Iraqi, or Israeli armies, however, 
Jordanian troops have not been tested by exposure to major con- 
flict for many years. 

Jordan's international security situation in 1989 seemed less 
precarious than it had been at almost any time in the past. Rela- 
tions with surrounding states were on a relatively solid footing. The 
border facing Israeli-held territories was peaceful. Jordan had suc- 
ceeded in suppressing attacks from its land that might bring Israeli 
retaliation, except for isolated incursions into Israeli-held territory 
by extremist elements of the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO). Although differences remained between Jordan and vari- 
ous Palestinian leaders over the approaches to Arab-Israeli peace 
negotiations, Jordan's relations with the dominant Yasir Arafat 
wing of the PLO were less strained than with Syrian-supported 
extremists such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine- 
General Command. Disruptive actions by Palestinian militants in 
Jordan were curbed quickly by the security forces. Worries that 
the uprising (intifadah) among Palestinians under Israeli occupa- 
tion might spill over to the Palestinian population of Jordan had 
not materialized. Unrest arising from the deteriorating economic 
situation in 1989 had been directed against the prime minister rather 
than the institutions of the monarchy. 



223 



Jordan: A Country Study 

Jordan's military posture was based primarily on the possibility 
of conflict with Israel, although on its own Jordan would be unable 
to counter a full-scale Israeli attack. The country's borders also 
were exposed to a long-term threat from a potentially hostile Syria. 
Jordan retained sufficient capability to give an aggressively inclined 
neighbor pause, but it did not have the resources to keep pace with 
the buildup of modern arms by nearby countries of the Middle East. 
As of 1989, however, most observers considered the prospect of 
armed conflict between Jordan and Israel, Syria, or other states 
in the region as remote. 

Jordan has had a tradition of military cooperation with Britain 
and the United States, and its organizational pattern, the outlook 
of its military leaders, training concepts, and weapons arsenal have 
reflected these links. The United States Congress had prevented 
the executive branch from providing Jordan with certain advanced 
ground and air weapons in the late 1980s. Forced to shift to other 
sources of equipment, Jordan turned to France as the principal sup- 
plier of combat aircraft and to the Soviet Union for an array of 
air defense missile systems. Even with heavy reliance on financial 
backing from other Arab countries, notably Saudi Arabia, defense 
imposed a heavy burden on the nation's frail economy. By the late 
1980s, Jordan's deepening domestic economic plight had combined 
with the tapering off of Arab aid to place severe pressure on the 
military budget. 

Backed by a traditionally loyal military and the efficient forces 
of public order, Hussein's throne appeared to be secure. Nonethe- 
less, in an era of rapidly evolving weapons technology, a constant 
effort would be necessary to maintain the credibility of national 
security institutions as the guarantors of Jordan's domestic stabil- 
ity, its territorial integrity, and its role as a moderating factor in 
Middle East peace efforts. 

Security: A Perennial Concern 

From the beginning of Hussein's reign in 1953, the king's posi- 
tion as a pro-Western moderate in the continuing struggle between 
Middle East Arab states and Israel has kept him in the forefront 
of political uncertainty. He has had to deal with the preeminent 
strategic drawback of sharing a longer common border with Israel 
than any other Arab country. To compound the unease generated 
by this 345-kilometer frontier, repeated Arab-Israeli wars demon- 
strated that Israeli forces always fielded vastly superior military 
capability. As a consequence, the king for many years has avoided 
engaging Israel in battle and has prevented provocations launched 
from Jordanian territory by PLO militants that could spark Israeli 



224 



National Security 



retaliation. Domestically, the danger posed to Hussein's rule by 
armed Palestinian groups during the 1960s had by the late 1980s 
given way to new sources of potential instability — the increasing 
militancy of the Islamic revival movement and the frustration of 
lowered economic expectations, together with civilian impatience 
over the limits on political expression. For the immediate future, 
however, the security forces seemed sufficiently well equipped to 
suppress agitation and organized attempts to subvert the monarchy. 

Dimensions of the Military Threat 

As of mid- 1989, the Jordan River valley, forming the boundary 
zone with Israel and the Israeli-occupied West Bank (see Glossary), 
had been quiet for nearly two decades. In 1970 Hussein's army 
had begun its drive against the PLO militia that was using Jordan 
as a base for attacks on Israeli positions in the West Bank (see The 
Palestinian Factor, this ch.). The Israeli leadership has acknowl- 
edged that pacification of this border has been the result of Jorda- 
nian measures taken to prevent PLO terrorism. Jordan was not 
a declared belligerent in 1973 when Egypt and Syria simultane- 
ously attacked Israel; however, Jordan did commit armored units 
to support Syrian defenders on the Golan Heights during the last 
stages of the war in actions confined to Syrian territory (see The 
Military Heritage, this ch.). Jordan did not join Syria and the PLO 
in contesting Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982. 

Although Israel throughout the 1980s exercised restraint in its 
military conduct with respect to Jordan, the destructive potential 
of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to preoccupy the Jor- 
danian command. Despite the long period intervening since raids 
and bombardments by Israel in retaliation for attacks by PLO guer- 
rillas, the ferocity of Israel's earlier punitive actions — most of the 
victims being Jordanians with no links to the PLO — had left a per- 
manent impression of Israeli belligerence and hostility, Jordan was 
also conscious of the sentiment in Israel that favored solving the 
West Bank Palestinian problem by ejecting all Arabs from the area 
and sending them to Jordan. Any attempt to execute such a plan 
would inevitably require military intimidation or the direct appli- 
cation of Israel's military superiority. 

In the event of renewed hostilities between Israel and Syria, it 
was also possible that Israel would try to outflank Syrian positions 
in the Golan Heights area by swinging south into Jordan. Such 
an action would present its own problems, including a difficult river 
crossing. During the 1973 conflict, neither Israel nor Syria vio- 
lated Jordanian territorial integrity in spite of Jordan's efforts to 
reinforce the Syrian defenses. 



225 



Jordan: A Country Study 

Jordan was also obliged to take account of Syrian military power. 
The aggressive Damascus regime had frequently been at odds po- 
litically with Hussein until an easing of bilateral relations began 
in late 1985. Syrian tank units had crossed into Jordan in 1970 
to aid the Palestinian militia defying the government. The Syri- 
ans had massed three divisions and more than 800 tanks on the 
Jordanian border in 1 980 in a dispute over military training camps 
in Jordan for opponents of the Syrian regime. Only pressure from 
the United States and Saudi Arabia, together with Hussein's 
promise to limit anti-Syrian activity inside the kingdom, caused 
Damascus to back down. Syrian-sponsored terrorist activity be- 
ginning in 1983 was intended to intimidate Hussein in his efforts 
to get the peace process under way between the PLO and Israel. 

Like Israel's, Syria's military establishment vastly outmatched 
that at Hussein's command. Syria had a quantitative personnel 
advantage over Jordan by a ratio of four to one, its tank and ar- 
tillery inventory exceeded Jordan's by a ratio of four to one, and 
it had four times as many combat aircraft, most of them of more 
advanced design. A corresponding disparity of scale existed between 
the Jordanian and Israeli armed forces. The normal personnel 
strength of the IDF was about 60 percent larger than that of Jor- 
dan 's armed forces, but Israel could rapidly expand its personnel 
by mobilizing well-trained reserve units (see fig. 13). 

Jordan also had common borders with Saudi Arabia and Iraq 
and was separated from Egypt only by a narrow strip of Israeli 
territory in the Negev Desert. The 1988 cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq 
War left Iraq with a large number of experienced fighting units. 
As a revolutionary Arab state opposed to settlement with Israel, 
Iraq had in the past been perceived as a potential threat by the 
Amman government. Relations between Jordan and Iraq had been 
good, however, throughout the 1980s. Jordan viewed Iraq as a 
buffer against the strict Islamic interpretations expounded by Iran's 
leaders and provided tangible support to the Iraqi war effort. Saudi 
Arabia, with an armed establishment about the size of Jordan's 
but with no combat experience, was not regarded as a military 
rival. To the contrary, the Saudi government had been the primary 
financial source for equipment acquisitions by the Jordanian forces. 
During the 1960s, Egypt's militant Arab nationalist leader Gamal 
Abdul Nasser had tried to destabilize Hussein's rule. Since that 
time, however, Egypt had not been a source of concern mili- 
tarily to Jordan. Under the political conditions prevailing in the 
late 1980s, Egypt was perceived as a peaceful neighbor against 
which no special security precautions were required. Rather, the 



226 



National Security 



Jordanian- Egyptian rapprochement had progressed so far that joint 
military exercises were held by the two countries in 1985. 

Further evidence of Jordan's intention to increase its coopera- 
tion with other Arab states were the meetings in Amman on Febru- 
ary 12, 1989, and in Baghdad on February 16, 1989, that resulted 
in the founding of an Arab economic association. King Hussein 
took the lead in creating this organization, to be known as the Arab 
Cooperation Council, consisting of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and the 
Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen). The permanent secretariat 
of the body, which is patterned on the European Economic Com- 
munity and the Gulf Cooperation Council, will probably be lo- 
cated in Amman. 

Except for the Jordan River valley separating Jordan from the 
West Bank, no major terrain features present a barrier to an in- 
vading army. Jordan shares a 375-kilometer border with Syria, and 
the Syrian frontier is only 60 kilometers from Amman. The Yar- 
muk River, which forms the western part of the boundary between 
the two countries, falls into a deep gorge to Lake Tiberias (Sea 
of Galilee), but farther east a number of major roads link the two 
countries across undulating terrain with no natural obstacles. The 
city of Irbid and the air base at Al Mafraq are fewer than twenty 
kilometers from the border, vulnerable to surprise attack or artillery 
bombardment. The 742-kilometer border with Saudi Arabia and 
the 134-kilometer border with Iraq are in open desert areas to the 
south and east. 

The bulk of Jordan's population and its most productive agricul- 
ture have concentrated in the northwestern corner of the country, 
an area only about 60 kilometers wide and 160 kilometers long. 
In the event of conflict, Amman and other cities would have only 
a few minutes' warning against air attack from either Syrian or 
Israeli planes based nearby. Israeli ground forces advancing from 
the West Bank would face a major terrain obstacle in the form of 
the escarpment about 800 to 1,200 meters above the floor of the 
Jordan River valley. Although a number of surfaced roads lead 
to the top of it, a well-entrenched defending force could make the 
operation very costly. In the end, however, Israel's superior air 
power, possibly combined with a helicopter assault on key high 
points, would almost certainly succeed in dislodging the Jordani- 
ans blocking an advance up the main routes to the central plateau . 
Israel also would have the option of seizing Jordan's sole port of 
Al Aqabah in the south, although its army would face long and 
exposed supply lines in a subsequent drive north toward Amman. 

In the event of aggression by one of Jordan's stronger neigh- 
bors, the modest forces at Hussein's command might be obliged 



227 



Jordan: A Country Study 




228 



National Security 



to confine resistance to the vital northern upland region, holding 
the heights above the East Bank (see Glossary) or defending the 
likely invasion routes from Syria. The army combat units and most 
of the air bases were concentrated in the northwest. Jordan's vul- 
nerability, particularly its limited defense against sustained air 
strikes, would make it difficult for even a well-trained and highly 
motivated army to prevail for long against a strong invading force. 

The overall national defense strategy was to maintain forces that 
could give a good account of themselves, even when faced by su- 
perior attackers. A potential aggressor might thereby be deterred, 
realizing that a move against Jordan would be a costly venture. 
Moreover, a strong defensive posture by Jordan would oblige any 
aggressor to precede its attack by a mobilization in expectation of 
major conflict, thus obviating the danger of a surprise takeover. 
If an invasion nevertheless occurred, the Jordanian strategy would 
be to conduct a stubborn delaying action to allow time for pres- 
sure to be brought to bear by Jordan's friends and the interna- 
tional community for abandonment of the aggression. 

Internal Security 

Violence and political murder were hallmarks of the early years 
of the Hashimite (also seen as Hashemite) Kingdom. Hussein was 
present and was himself a target when his grandfather, King 
Abdullah ibn Hussein Al Hashimi, was shot to death in Jerusalem 
in 1951. Two prime ministers were murdered, one in 1960 and 
the other in 1971. As of 1989, Hussein had survived at least nine 
attempted assassinations that could be documented; numerous other 
plots had been rumored but denied by the Jordanian authorities. 
The monarchy was beset by attempts at subversion, conspiracy, 
and assassination and by smoldering tensions in many parts of the 
society. The principal sources of these threats to overthrow or dis- 
credit Hashimite rule were Arab militants openly hostile to the 
king's position as a pro-Western moderate in the Arab-Israeli con- 
flict. Hussein's pragmatic change of attitude in the late 1970s, when 
he joined other Arab states in rejecting the Egyptian-Israeli peace 
treaty, ended his estrangement and diminished Arab hostility to his 
regime. Since that time, the internal security risk has assumed two 
forms — leftist, anti-Hashimite factions of the PLO and extremist 
groups associated with the Islamic revival. Most of these movements 
were small and scattered and, as of 1989, appeared to be effectively 
controlled and contained by the efficient Jordanian security apparatus 
(see General Intelligence Department, this ch.). 

Military support was so integral to the monarchy that the sta- 
bility of the regime was assumed to be in no danger unless the armed 



229 



Jordan: A Country Study 

forces themselves were to be subverted. Although episodes of dis- 
content over conditions of service had occurred from time to time, 
the beduin-dominated army as a whole was one of the most stable 
institutions in the kingdom. The only open insurrection in the army 
occurred early in Hussein's reign, in 1957, when a group calling 
itself the Free Officers (possibly in imitation of the Egyptian 1952 
movement by that name) attempted to wrest the throne from the 
king. The loyalty of most officers and enlisted personnel, together 
with Hussein's own decisive action, defeated the plot and ushered 
in much stricter security precautions (see Hussein's Early Reign, 
ch. 1). The last known conspiracy to involve military personnel 
occurred in 1972 when 300 army and civilian personnel were 
arrested after Palestinian militants bribed the acting commander 
of an armored car unit to stage a coup d'etat. 

The Islamic revival was growing in strength in Jordan as in other 
Arab countries but, as a security problem, appeared to be under 
control as of 1989. The Muslim Brotherhood, the most important 
of the politico-religious movements, had appeared in Jordan as early 
as 1946. It was officially recognized by the government and had 
rights of expression denied to other groups. It was believed to have 
many thousands of members as of 1988, enjoying the support of 
perhaps 10 percent of the population. The Muslim Brotherhood 
had gained a foothold in certain government ministries and was 
also believed to have insinuated itself into the police and intelli- 
gence organizations. Proselytizing had occurred in the armed forces. 
Although hitherto not a source of antigovernment protests and dis- 
turbances (as in Egypt and elsewhere), the Muslim Brotherhood 
had adopted an increasingly activist and critical tone in its 
pronouncements by the mid-1980s. Other, more militant, Islamic 
groups remained small and fragmented. Jordanians were uncer- 
tain of the potential danger of the Islamic movement to the stabil- 
ity of the monarchy and whether its adherents might make a bid 
for power should the regime falter. 

In late 1985, the government cracked down on the Muslim 
Brotherhood as a warning against its growing stridency and polit- 
ical involvement. The action was also linked to Hussein's efforts 
to normalize relations with Syria. Syrian members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood who had been forced to flee to camps in Jordan were 
accused by the king of subversion aimed against the Damascus 
government. They were rounded up and extradited to Syria. A 
new law enacted in the same year prohibited political incitement 
and accusations by imams and speakers in the mosques. The Minis- 
try of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs was designated 
to review Friday sermons and religious education in the mosques. 



230 



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Since Jordan's population adhered overwhelmingly to the main- 
stream Sunni (see Glossary) form of Islam, the militancy of the 
Shia (see Glossary) branch emanating from Iran had made no in- 
roads. Unlike most neighboring Arab countries, Jordan had no 
significant minority groups that were perceived as problems for 
the security forces. The 25,000 Circassians, whose forebears had 
migrated from the Caucasus region of southern Russia, were Sunni 
Muslims and traditionally loyal supporters of the monarchy (see 
Ethnicity and Language, ch. 2). Many Circassians served in the 
higher ranks of the military or were engaged in security work. 

Student activism was carefully controlled through restrictions on 
political organizations, demonstrations, and meetings. At the two 
major institutions of higher learning, the University of Jordan in 
Amman and Yarmuk University in Irbid, the student groups were 
segmented into small organizations, generally associated with some 
form of Islamic activism. Student protest rallies occurred at Yarmuk 
University in 1986, a few days after the United States bombing 
of installations in Libya. The students rallied against rising tui- 
tion costs, dismissals for low grades, and King Hussein's relation- 
ship with the United States. The protests were put down violently 
by government forces, with a number of student deaths and many 
injuries. 

Concerned over the possible ideological indoctrination of the 
several thousand Jordanian students attending universities in 
Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and the People's Democratic 
Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), the government followed a 
policy of strict passport controls and withdrawal of passports from 
students believed to have questionable contacts abroad. 

In April 1989, young people in several southern towns rioted 
for five days over the sharp price rises on gasoline, cigarettes, and 
other consumer goods attendant upon certain economic measures 
agreed to between Jordan and the International Monetary Fund 
(see Glossary). The demonstrations were aimed at the prime 
minister and the cabinet, but there was apprehension that the result- 
ing political disequilibrium could escalate into attacks on the monar- 
chy itself. The Palestinian population did not join the protesters, 
who consisted primarily of beduins (normally considered the base 
of the king's support). Observers claimed that Islamic activists 
exerted some influence over the young demonstrators. 

Various small underground groups that formed the core of leftist 
opposition to the Hashimite regime were carefully watched by the 
security services. They included the Soviet-oriented Communist 
Party of Jordan (Al Hizb ash Shuyui al Urduni) and the Jordan- 
ian Baath Party (Arab Socialist Resurrection Party), linked to the 



231 



Jordan: A Country Study 

socialist movement of Syria. These movements in turn backed other 
groups that opposed Jordan's association with the West and with 
the United States, and called for closer relations with Syria and 
other Arab leftist elements. In addition to supporting some of these 
groups, Syria had been linked to a number of assassination attempts 
on Jordanian diplomats abroad, rocket attacks on Jordanian 
airliners, and grenade and bomb attacks within Jordan between 
1983 and 1985. The attacks by Black September, Abu Nidal, or 
other terrorist groups under Syrian control apparently were cal- 
culated to intimidate Jordan into abandoning its Middle East peace 
initiatives, which ran contrary to Syria's policies. Although the at- 
tacks ceased as relations with Syria improved in 1985, the govern- 
ment remained alert to the danger of renewed destabilizing attempts 
by radical Arab groups. 

The Communist Party of Jordan, led by General Secretary 
Yaqub Zayadin, had been illegal since 1957, although the organi- 
zation enjoyed periods of toleration by the regime, interspersed 
with periods of repression. A tightly organized network of small 
cells, its membership was believed to be about 500, but through 
the party's organ it published steady attacks on the government's 
Middle East policies and restrictions on civil rights. In an effort 
to fix blame for the 1986 riots at Yarmuk University, the govern- 
ment arrested the entire seventeen-member politburo. They were 
released several months later, but the party remained banned. Dur- 
ing the April 1989 protests against the government's price increases 
for many consumer goods, 120 members of the Communist Party 
were detained after circulating leaflets calling for general strikes. 

The Palestinian Factor 

Over a long period, the most serious threat to Hussein's con- 
tinuance in power had been posed by the militant and rejectionist 
elements of the PLO that were supported by Syria and Libya. 
Although the PLO's avowed goal was to regain the traditional Pales- 
tinian homeland for millions of Palestinians scattered throughout 
the Middle East, the PLO's actions at times had given the impres- 
sion that the initial phase of its program was to gain control over 
Jordan. In the aftermath of the June 1967 War, Hussein was per- 
suaded by fellow Arab leaders to permit the PLO to station some 
of its military forces in the East Bank. By 1970 the fedayeen (Pales- 
tinian guerrillas) had acquired a powerful presence in the country 
and had become openly defiant of Hussein's government. They 
threatened to topple the monarchy and replace it with a regime 
that would not interfere with guerrilla operations against Israel. 
After a series of crises during which Palestinian behavior became 



232 



National Security 



increasingly disruptive, a fierce civil war broke out in September 
1970. By the summer of 1971 , after suffering heavy losses, the or- 
ganized PLO militia was forced to withdraw to new bases primar- 
ily in Lebanon (see The Guerrilla Crisis, ch. 1). 

Having ended the Palestinian military threat, Hussein was de- 
termined not to permit its reappearance. The departure of the PLO 
meant relief from Israeli retaliatory shelling and incursions in 
reprisal for PLO raids and rocket attacks on the West Bank. Hostil- 
ity between Hussein and the PLO gradually abated after the Octo- 
ber 1973 War. The king reluctantly assented to a decision taken 
at a conference of Arab leaders in 1974 to designate the PLO as 
the sole authorized representative of the Palestinian people, in effect 
relinquishing his traditional role as representative of Palestinians 
residing on the West Bank. In 1988 the king formally renounced 
Jordanian claims to sovereignty over the West Bank. At the same 
time, Hussein intensified his efforts to promote national unity in 
the East Bank by encouraging the integration of Palestinians into 
the indigenous political and social structure. Many Palestinian resi- 
dents had by 1989 become well absorbed into Jordanian society, 
achieving prominence in government, business, finance, and in- 
dustry, with an investment in the stability of the Hashimite regime. 
But there was still widespread discrimination against Palestinians 
in favor of Transjordanians, and thousands of Palestinians remained 
in Jordan as impoverished refugees. 

As of 1989, the remaining potential for political subversion among 
the Palestinians appeared to be confined to scattered and poorly 
organized extremist groups operating mostly out of refugee camps. 
These groups included radical factions of the Syrian-supported 
anti- Arafat wing of the PLO, such as the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) and the 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). In late 
1987 and early 1988, the government detained without charge or 
expelled more than 100 Palestinians to prevent them from agitat- 
ing in support of the intifadah (the Palestinian uprising in the West 
Bank) and against Hussein's inaction. The Black September ter- 
rorist group claimed responsibility for bomb explosions in Amman 
later in 1988 and charged the king with "conspiring against the 
Palestinian revolution." 

The Military Heritage 

When the Amirate of Transjordan was formed in 1921, the small 
scattered police elements left over from Ottoman days were inade- 
quate to maintain order and establish central government control. 
The police units were expanded, and a small mobile force of 



233 



Jordan: A Country Study 



balanced elements of infantry, cavalry, and artillery was created. 
Two years later the police, numbering about 300, and the mili- 
tary force of about 1 ,000 were combined under the command of 
British Captain F.G. Peake. The establishment was originally 
known as the Arab Army (Al Jaysh al Arabi) — a perpetuation of 
the military force led by the Hashimites in World War I against 
the Turks — and this Arabic title has been retained. In English, 
however, the name became the Arab Legion, a designation that 
lasted until 1956 (see Transjordan, ch. 1). 

Historical Role 

From the Arab Legion's inception, its primary mission was the 
establishment of the central government's authority through the 
maintenance of public order and the preservation of internal secu- 
rity. It was originally composed of Arabs from the defeated Otto- 
man armies and others from outside the amirate. Under the early 
agreements between Transjordan and Britain, defense of the borders 
against external attack remained a British responsibility. To this 
end, a British Royal Air Force (RAF) squadron and British army 
armored car unit were stationed in the country. In 1924 they joined 
with the Arab Legion to beat back a Wahhabi invasion from the 
area to the south that within a few years became Saudi Arabia. 
The ability of the legion to protect the amirate from outside raids 
helped to cement the legitimacy of Hashimite rule. 

By 1926 the Arab Legion had established an image as the pro- 
tective arm of the central government, functioning as an agency 
for tax collection as well as for security. The beduins remained wary 
and hostile, however, convinced that the legion strengthened the 
hand of the regime, whose purposes they mistrusted. Initially the 
beduins refused to join the legion, thus forcing reliance on villagers 
and townspeople to replenish its personnel. 

In early 1926 the British high commissioner for Palestine created 
the Transjordan Frontier Force (TJFF) to defend Transjordan' s 
northern and southern borders. The legion immediately incurred 
a loss of more than half of its forces when they were transferred 
as cadre for the new border security force. In addition to the drop 
in personnel, the legion also was stripped of its machine guns, artil- 
lery, and communications troops. The much reduced force reverted 
to a role of policing the towns and villages. The TJFF (roughly 
1 ,000 officers and men) never was part of the legion and was respon- 
sible to the British high commissioner in Jerusalem rather than to 
Amir Abdullah of Transjordan. All officers above the rank of major 
were British. Officers of lesser rank were Arabs, Circassians, and 



234 



National Security 



Jews, but the promotion system precluded the advancement of any 
Middle Easterners to a position of command over British troops. 

With its effectiveness reduced by creation of the TJFF, the Arab 
Legion was unable to cope with raids by tribal groups in the vast 
desert regions of Transjordan during the late 1920s and early 1930s. 
To counter these disturbances, a British captain was transferred 
to the legion as second in command to Peake. This officer — later 
to become known as Lieutenant General Sir John Bagot Glubb, 
or Glubb Pasha, the strongman of Jordan — had previously faced 
similar pacification problems while serving in the Iraqi government. 
Glubb understood the beduins and had acquired a knowledge of 
strategy and tactics required for long-range desert operations. Under 
his command a camel-mounted Desert Mobile Force was organized 
in 1930, reflecting its leader's concepts of a military unit function- 
ing in a desert environment. The Desert Mobile Force, which even- 
tually merged with the Arab Legion, attracted principally beduins 
to its ranks, establishing the identification of the beduins with the 
monarchy that has persisted through Hussein's reign. 

World War II to 1967 

The Arab rebellion that occurred in Palestine from 1936 to 1939 
led to additional measures to strengthen the legion, which on the 
eve of World War II consisted of about 1,350 officers and men. 
One thousand of these troops were organized for police duties and 
the remaining 350 made up the Desert Mobile Force, which then 
comprised two mechanized cavalry companies, having as its mis- 
sion the prevention of Arab rebel incursions from Palestine. 

Although the Arab Legion saw little action in the war, the mo- 
bile force became part of the tiny British columns that marched 
against Iraq and the Vichy French in Syria and Lebanon in 1941 . 
It established an excellent record that prompted its expansion to 
a mechanized infantry brigade but, by the time this unit was ready 
for action, the war in the desert was over. The Arab Legion was 
subsequently detailed to strategic guard duties as individual com- 
panies throughout the Middle East. These operations provided ex- 
perience that was to prove valuable when Arab-Israeli difficulties 
erupted in the postwar era. By the end of the war, the legion had 
expanded to a force of about 8,000, but postwar economy mea- 
sures reduced its size to 6,000 by May 1948, when the British gave 
up their Palestine Mandate. At the same time, the TJFF was dis- 
banded, and many members of the unit were absorbed into the 
legion. 

About 4,500 legionnaires were combat troops at the time the 
Arab-Israeli War began in 1948. Moving across the Jordan River, 



235 



Jordan: A Country Study 

the legion occupied most of the West Bank and assumed control 
of the strategic Jerusalem-Tel Aviv highway. Commanded by Glubb 
and about forty British officers, the legion fought better than any 
other Arab force and held its positions longer when Israel took the 
offensive in January 1949. The fighting left the legion in occupa- 
tion of the Old City of Jerusalem and much of the Arab areas of 
Palestine that made up the West Bank. 

During the 1948 war, the legion's strength was expanded hur- 
riedly to approximately 8,000. As a consequence of the British with- 
drawal, for the first time the legion had to develop its own technical 
support services. A small air force unit was created for logistics, 
reconnaissance, and liaison purposes, then enlarged in 1955 to in- 
clude a modest combat element (see Air Force, this ch.). By early 
1956, when Hussein dismissed Glubb as commander of the mili- 
tary establishment, the legion had grown to about 23,000 officers 
and men. After Glubb 's departure it was redesignated the Jordan 
Arab Army, and the national police element of about 6,000 was 
shifted from the military to be brought under the supervision of 
the minister of interior. 

Between 1951 and 1956 an entirely new National Guard was 
formed, originally consisting merely of armed Palestinians in vil- 
lages of the West Bank vulnerable to Israeli raids. It was later built 
up within Jordan proper by a conscription system, forming a ter- 
ritorial reserve army. Guardsmen, predominantiy Palestinians, were 
unpaid except for a small wage during their annual training period 
under officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) of the legion. 
In 1965 the National Guard, by then a force of 30,000, was dis- 
banded because of its unreliability and susceptibility to PLO in- 
fluence. About 40 percent of these troops, after passing careful 
screening for loyalty to the monarchy, were allowed to join the Jor- 
dan Arab Army. 

Although Jordan had signed a tripartite military treaty with Egypt 
and Syria in October 1956, a few days before Israel's attack on 
Egypt in the Sinai Peninsula, the conflict was confined to the Egyp- 
tian front. Israeli troops were positioned along the borders with 
Syria and Jordan in the event that these countries joined the fight- 
ing, but the alliance was not invoked. 

June 1967 War and Aftermath 

At the onset of the June 1967 War, Jordan had four infantry 
brigades and one armored brigade in the Jerusalem-Ram Allah- 
Hebron sector, two infantry brigades reinforced by armor and ar- 
tillery in the Nabulus area, and one infantry brigade and one ar- 
mored brigade in the Jordan River valley as reserve for the Nabulus 



236 



National Security 



forces. After fighting from June 5 to June 7, the overwhelmed Jor- 
danians were forced to abandon Jerusalem and the entire West 
Bank, withdrawing across the Jordan River to prevent the annihi- 
lation of their army. The Jordanians fought tenaciously, but the 
Arab air forces were destroyed on the first day of battle by con- 
tinual Israeli air attacks, leaving the Jordanian army without air 
cover. Mauled by Israeli jets, those reserve armored units from 
the Jordan River valley that were able to reach the battie zone were 
in poor condition to support the infantry. In the Old City of Jerusa- 
lem, where Israeli air power could not be brought to bear, Jor- 
dan's defense caused almost half the Israeli casualties in the war. 
Confusion and discord resulted from the Jordanian army's place- 
ment under an Egyptian commander and from false reports received 
from President Nasser claiming Egyptian successes in air and land 
fighting. Expected reinforcements from Syria, Iraq, and Saudi 
Arabia failed to reach the battle area in time, leaving the Jordan- 
ian army to fight almost entirely alone. Jordan suffered 7,000 killed 
and wounded and the destruction of its entire air force and 80 per- 
cent of its armor. 

Since the June 1967 War, the Jordanian armed forces have not 
been involved in major hostilities, except for the bloody internal 
battles in 1970 and 1971 that ended with the withdrawal of the 
PLO's fedayeen from Jordan. The Palestinians were armed with 
light modern weapons and were entrenched in central Amman and 
in refugee camps surrounding the city. During three days of stiff 
fighting in September 1970, one Jordanian infantry division and 
one armored division gradually gained control of the core of the 
city. But the course of the conflict shifted when a Syrian division 
reinforced with armor and a brigade of the Palestine Liberation 
Army crossed the border at Ar Ramtha. Dug-in Jordanian tanks 
battered about 200 advancing Syrian tanks before retiring to new 
positions. The next day Hawker Hunters of the Royal Jordanian 
Air Force decisively blunted the Syrian attack against a new Jor- 
danian defensive line. The failure of the Syrians to commit their 
air force enabled the Jordanians to turn back the invasion, taking 
a severe toll in destroyed Syrian armor. Iraq had deployed a 
12,000-man force near Az Zarka but began to withdraw it when 
the fighting broke out. 

Returning its attention to the entrenched PLO militias, the Jor- 
danian army was able to clear Amman and the city of Irbid, which 
the PLO had also occupied, within a week. A fragile cease-fire was 
negotiated with the help of surrounding Arab states but intermit- 
tent fighting continued in early 1971 . The remaining fedayeen were 
gradually pushed back into a mountain defensive complex in the 



237 



Jordan: A Country Study 

north. A four-day attack launched in July 1971 resulted in the dis- 
persal of the last PLO holdouts. 

Jordan was not a formal belligerent in the October 1973 War 
when Syria and Egypt joined in attacking Israel. Hussein was asked 
to open a third front but merely placed his army on alert, defend- 
ing his action by claiming that Jordan had few combat aircraft and 
no antiaircraft missile protection. By the fifth day of fighting, the 
Syrian drive had been broken and Syrian troops, abandoning their 
tanks and artillery, had fallen back to their Golan Heights defen- 
sive line, Jordanian armor was moved into position at the southern 
end of the line and, along with Iraqi forces, took part in one lim- 
ited attack before a United Nations (UN) cease-fire commenced. 
Jordanian losses were twenty-eight soldiers killed and eighteen tanks 
destroyed. The Jordanian forces fought well but again lacked air 
cover, and their actions were poorly coordinated with the Syrians 
and Iraqis. 

The Military in National Life 

Among the various social, economic, and political institutions 
affecting Jordanian national life, none — with the exceptions of the 
monarchy itself and the Muslim religion — has been more perva- 
sive than the presence and power of the armed forces. This condi- 
tion has persisted since the formation of the first military units early 
in the country's political evolution. Soon after becoming king in 
1953, Hussein remarked that "everywhere I go in Jordan I find 
the Arab Legion doing everything." Throughout Hussein's reign, 
the armed forces have been an indispensable instrument for the 
protection of the monarchy. The government has periodically 
turned to the army to prevent internal disruption and to maintain 
law and order. The loyalty of the army during periods of stress 
has permitted the king latitude in the conduct of foreign policy by 
offsetting domestic constraints on his actions. 

The king spent eight months at the British Royal Military Acad- 
emy at Sandhurst at age sixteen, soon after ascending the throne. 
He continued to take a close interest in military affairs, cultivat- 
ing the armed forces and identifying himself with the performance 
of their national security mission. A number of foreign observers 
and knowledgeable Jordanians have testified that Hussein was sel- 
dom as relaxed or as filled with confidence as when he visited his 
military units, attired in suitable uniform. Hussein made frequent 
visits to army units where he knew many of the officers by name. 
Even privates felt they might approach the king directly, often tug- 
ging at his sleeve for attention. The empathy that existed between 
him and his troops was enhanced by his fascination for modern 



238 




239 



Jordan: A Country Study 

weapons, such as jet aircraft, tanks, self-propelled artillery, and 
missiles. The king was a qualified pilot who often personally tested 
new planes. He made the final decision on equipment acquisitions 
and other matters affecting the modernization of the military es- 
tablishment. 

Since the 1957 coup attempt, the armed forces have conducted 
themselves in a professional manner, accepting their subordina- 
tion to civil legal authority. No officer caste has developed with 
ambitions to interfere with or dominate the government, although 
the king has called upon trusted individual officers to serve in im- 
portant civilian posts. The continued acceptance by the military 
of Hussein's political and religious legitimacy has been a founda- 
tion stone of national stability. Authorities on Jordanian politics 
believed that, in the event of the king's death, the army would act 
to guarantee the legitimate Hashimite succession (see The King, 
ch. 4). 

The consensual relationship between the state and the army was 
cemented by the privileges and economic benefits accruing to the 
career military. This situation was particularly true for the beduin 
constituency, which felt a special affinity to the throne. Its powers 
and privileges were unlikely to survive if the monarchy were 
replaced by a Palestinian-controlled government. Even soldiers of 
Palestinian origin perceived a greater certainty of their status under 
Hussein than under any regime that might replace his. During the 
civil war in 1970 and 1971 , units staffed exclusively with Palestin- 
ians showed no hesitancy in mounting assaults on the Palestinian 
guerrillas. 

Key officers and senior NCOs continued to be disproportion- 
ately of beduin background in the mid- to late 1980s. A consider- 
able number of Palestinian officers had always been present, 
although they were more heavily represented in the technical units 
such as signals and engineering, and they did not often rise above 
battalion-level command in the main combat units. The social com- 
position was changing, however, as a higher proportion of recruits 
originated from nontribal sectors. Younger personnel, although bet- 
ter educated and more cosmopolitan, were less imbued with the 
zealous loyalty of the past. As the army modernized and became 
more professional, the tribal basis of support for the king was a 
diminishing factor. Nevertheless, the army had become a valua- 
ble adjunct to Hussein's efforts to foster a sense of national character 
and patriotism. As changes in structure took place both within the 
military and in civilian society, it was difficult to foresee how these 
would ultimately affect the intimate relationship between the king 
and his soldiers. Observers predicted, however, that the political 



240 



National Security 



reliability of the Jordan Arab Army would remain intact through 
the 1990s. 

In addition to their basic security role, the armed forces have 
participated in a variety of civic action programs designed to benefit 
the country's development efforts — projects that at the same time 
have enhanced the public image of the military. Public services 
by the armed forces have included such major items as bridge and 
road construction and disaster relief, organized campaigns against 
locust infestation, and such lesser actions as repair of wells and res- 
cue of people lost or stranded in the country's vast desert region. 

Technical skills learned in the service eased the transition to 
civilian life. Persons with army or air force training in mechanics, 
electronics, or engineering were looked upon as technically profi- 
cient, disciplined additions to the civilian work force. The mili- 
tary was, moreover, a channel for upward mobility. It was one 
of the few institutions in the country that provided a means for 
those from the lower strata of society to embark on a respected career 
and earn a measure of personal prestige. 

The Armed Forces 

Composed of both regular or career personnel and conscripts, 
the armed forces in 1988 had an active-duty strength estimated at 
85,300 officers and enlisted personnel. Included in this total were 
an army of 74,000, an air force of 11,000, and a naval element 
of 300. The naval force, with a coast guard-type mission, was or- 
ganizationally part of the army. The air force, which enjoyed high 
prestige arising in part from Hussein's avid personal interest in 
aviation, had semi-autonomous status. 

Command Structure 

Article 32 of the Constitution states that "the king is the Supreme 
Commander of the Army, Naval, and Air Forces. ' ' The words here 
have a connotation similar to commander in chief as applied to 
the president of the United States. King Hussein has, however, 
generally exercised close control over the armed forces and has even 
assumed direct command of the army on many occasions. The king 
has the constitutional right to declare war, conclude peace, and 
sign treaties. The declaration of a state of emergency may be made 
by decision of the Council of Ministers and is promulgated by royal 
decree when required to "ensure the defense of the realm." In such 
situations, the country's ordinary laws are suspended. As of 
mid- 1989, Jordan had been formally in a state of martial law since 
1967, enabling the king to legislate by the issuance of decrees. 



241 



Jordan: A Country Study 

Broad policy issues relating to security were decided by the king, 
advised by a small circle of officials and personal associates. These 
included his brother, Crown Prince Hasan, senior palace officials, 
and the prime minister. The post of minister of defense customar- 
ily had been held by the prime minister. The Ministry of Defense 
had mainly administrative functions, including logistics, mobili- 
zation, conscription, and preparation of the defense budget. The 
operational commander of the armed forces was theoretically 
responsible to the minister of defense, but in reality the minister 
did not issue directives of an operational nature unless they had 
the king's approval. The commanding officer of the armed forces 
had invariably been a confidant of the king and was generally a 
leading member of a prominent beduin clan. Until he was appointed 
a ranking palace official — chief of the royal court — in late 1988, 
Field Marshal General of the Army Ash Sharif Zaid ibn Shakir, 
a cousin of the king, had been commander in chief for more than 
twelve years. Zaid ibn Shakir' s family had always been close to 
the royal family, and Zaid ibn Shakir himself had been personally 
linked with Hussein throughout his military career. In addition 
to his high palace position, he also filled a newly created post of 
adviser to the king on national security. The new position implied 
that Shakir would retain considerable influence over military 
policies. 

Operational command of the armed forces was assumed by the 
chief of staff, Lieutenant General Fathi Abu Talib, after the depar- 
ture of Zaid ibn Shakir. It was expected that the title of commander 
in chief of the armed forces would be eliminated. Accordingly, the 
senior military commander under the king would henceforward 
bear the title of chief of staff of the armed forces. 

The chief of staff presided over a headquarters in Amman known 
as the Armed Forces General Command. Subordinate to him were 
the air force commander and chiefs of staff for personnel, intelli- 
gence, operations, and administration, corresponding roughly to 
the G-l, G-2, G-3, and G-4 functional sections of the general 
staff under the United States system. These positions were nor- 
mally held by officers of major general rank (see fig. 14). By legis- 
lation enacted in 1983, Jordan was divided into eight military 
regions corresponding to the eight governorates, although it was 
not clear how these regions fitted into the overall military com- 
mand structure. 

The commander of the semi-autonomous Royal Jordanian Air 
Force — subordinated to the chief of staff — derived some logistical 
support from the army and carried out a degree of policy coordi- 
nation with the principal officers of the Armed Forces General 



242 



National Security 



Command staff. The air force, however, had a separate headquar- 
ters at King Abdullah Air Base near Amman. The headquarters 
had its own staff for the specialized operations, training, logistic, 
and other requirements of the air force. 

Army 

The 74,000 troops of the Jordan Arab Army were organized into 
two armored divisions, two mechanized divisions, two indepen- 
dent brigades, and sixteen independent artillery battalions. After 
the June 1967 War, Hussein and his government undertook a major 
rebuilding and modernization program for the army. As of 1989, 
it was still considered to be the best trained of all the Arab armies 
and was larger and better equipped than at any time in its exis- 
tence. Nevertheless, it had long been outstripped in equipment by 
the nearby Israeli and Syrian armies, which had been expanded 
and re-equipped with modern armor and missile systems after the 
October 1973 War. 

The basic organization was pyramidal, with three brigades to 
a division and three battalions in each brigade. Each of the two 
armored divisions consisted of two tank brigades and one 
mechanized infantry brigade. The two mechanized divisions were 
made up of two mechanized infantry brigades and one tank brigade. 
The independent brigades consisted of a Royal Guards Brigade 
and a Special Forces Brigade, the latter made up of three airborne 
battalions. Some significant units were missing from each division, 
and the weapons inventory of each division was closer to that of 
a reinforced brigade. For economy, the divisions did not have fully 
integrated organic logistics and support units but depended on main 
bases for supplies. Although the ratio of combat to support strength 
was favorable, the capability of independent brigades to operate 
at a distance from these bases was seriously impaired. 

The bulk of the ground forces were concentrated in the north, 
at base complexes at Amman and Az Zarqa and at other installa- 
tions in the vicinity of Irbid and Al Mafraq. Smaller bases were 
at Maan and Al Aqabah to the south (see fig. 15). No Jordanian 
forces were deployed in the Jordan River valley, where they would 
have been exposed to Israeli air power and artillery. They were 
instead emplaced on the heights above the valley where they could 
obstruct enemy movement up the routes to the central plateau lead- 
ing to the main cities. The most forward troop dispositions were 
at Umm Qays overlooking the Jordan River in the northwest corner 
of the country to counter any potential Israeli flanking movement 
around the strong Syrian defenses concentrated in the Golan 
Heights. 



243 



Jordan: A Country Study 







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244 



National Security 



In spite of years of American training, British military concepts 
continued to influence individual units. British forms of organiza- 
tion were particularly evident in administration, maintenance, and 
many technical units. The weapons inventory was predominantly 
of United States and British origin. Jordan's tank force consisted 
of the United States M-60 model, together with its own conver- 
sion of the obsolete British Centurion, known as the Tarik, and 
an improved version of the British Chieftain called the Khalid. 
Armored personnel carriers were the familiar United States M-l 13 
model. In 1988 Jordan benefited from a substantial gift of Chief- 
tain and Scorpion tanks and M-l 13s captured by Iraq from Iran, 
but it was not known whether the equipment could be introduced 
into the armored inventory without extensive repair or recondi- 
tioning. The artillery battalions were equipped by the United States 
with guns ranging from 105mm to 203mm, both towed and self- 
propelled (see table 15, Appendix). 

The ground forces were considered to be insufficiently protected 
from attack from the air, although efforts were being made to over- 
come the problem by the introduction of Soviet air defense sys- 
tems. When the United States refused to replace obsolete forward 
air defense weapons, Jordan turned to the Soviet Union for help 
in 1981. Initial Soviet deliveries consisted of the SA-8 truck- 
mounted surface-to-air missile (SAM) with a range of between ten 
and fourteen kilometers and the ZSU-23 radar-controlled gun 
mounted on a lightly armored carriage. Both weapons had proved 
vulnerable to suppression measures by Israel in fighting against 
Syria. In spite of this, additional SA-8s were acquired in 1984, 
together with infantry SAMs, the shoulder-fired SA-7, and the 
SA-9. In 1985 the SA-13 and SA-14 were purchased as succes- 
sors to the SA-9 and SA-7, respectively. Separate air defense 
brigades (actually, battalion size) were being equipped with the 
larger Soviet SAMs to be attached as needed to ground formations 
to provide close, mobile tactical air defense. 

Antitank defense was based on the TOW (tube-launched, 
optically- sighted, wire-guided) antitank missile and the man- 
portable Dragon system, both from the United States, together with 
more recent acquisition of the Apilas rocket launcher from France. 
The LAW-80 antitank missile was acquired from Britain in 1987 
to replace the Dragon. In 1985 the air force began taking delivery 
of twenty-four Cobra AH- IS helicopters equipped with TOW mis- 
siles; these were eventually to be transferred to the army. 

The naval element of the armed forces, although designated the 
Royal Jordanian Navy, remained an integral part of the army. Per- 
forming essentially a coast guard mission, it had 300 officers and 



245 



Jordan: A Country Study 




Figure 15. Major Military Installations, 1988 



men based at Al Aqabah, the country's only port, with access to 
the Red Sea. The navy operated five coastal patrol boats of United 
States manufacture armed with light machine guns. The navy as- 
sisted in the maintenance of harbor security, operating in conjunc- 
tion with customs and immigration personnel to ensure the 
enforcement of the country's laws and regulations. In late 1987, 
three larger craft of ninety-five tons each were ordered from Brit- 
tain. When introduced, each would have a crew of sixteen and 



246 



National Security 



would be armed with 20mm and 30mm guns. Israeli units at the 
adjacent Israeli naval facility at Elat similarly consisted of small, 
lightly-armed patrol boats. 

Air Force 

The Royal Jordanian Air Force was charged with the missions 
of air defense of territorial integrity, close support of the army, 
tactical bombing, and airlift of troops and supplies. The air force 
began operations in 1949 as a component of the Arab Legion. Desig- 
nated initially as the Arab Legion Air Force, the service depended 
in large part on pilots and other technical personnel seconded to 
the legion from the RAF. Eventually, selected volunteers from the 
legion were trained at the unit's airfield near Amman, and some 
were sent to flight and technical schools operated by the RAF in 
Britain. Growing unrest in the Middle East soon convinced the 
Jordanian government of the need to expand the air force's mis- 
sion to include combat capability, which was achieved in 1955 with 
a British gift of nine Vampire MK 9 fighter-bombers. 

Since its inception, the air force has struggled to develop and 
maintain a level of combat capability that would be viable against 
potential enemies in the region. The primary perceived threat has 
been the superior air power of Israel. The constant modernization 
of aircraft and associated weaponry essential to afford Jordanian 
pilots some chance of success has posed a severe challenge. 

From the late 1950s through the mid-1960s, the primary com- 
bat airplanes of the air force inventory consisted of Hawker Hunter 
fighter-bombers that were transferred from the RAF but paid for 
by the United States. During the first few hours of the June 1967 
War, Israeli pilots destroyed all but one of Jordan's serviceable 
combat airplanes as well as three Hunters on loan from Iraq. To 
assist Jordan in its recovery from the loss of virtually its entire air 
arm, additional Hunter aircraft were supplied by Britain and Saudi 
Arabia. In mid- 1969, the United States provided twenty F-104 
Starfighters to form the first Jordanian fighter- interceptor squadron. 
To preclude a future recurrence of the 1967 disaster, Jordan in- 
stalled surveillance radars to cover most of the country, constructed 
hardened shelters to protect all combat aircraft, and implemented 
plans for the emergency dispersal of the air force. 

When the October 1973 War broke out, Israel refrained from 
attacking the Jordanian bases and Hussein's air force did not play 
an active role in the war. In 1974 the United States began deliver- 
ies of F-5s. The F-5 was well regarded as a light fighter plane but 
lacked modern avionics, thus limiting it to daylight, fair-weather 
combat. Unable to obtain an American replacement for the obsolete 



247 



Jordan: A Country Study 

Starfighters because of United States congressional opposition, 
Hussein turned to France, acquiring between 1981 and 1983 more 
than thirty Mirage F-ls, with Saudi Arabian financial assistance. 
Armed with Matra and Magic air-to-air missiles, the Mirage air- 
craft were an improvement in terms of range and avionics but were 
considerably inferior to the American F-15s and F-16s in the Israeli 
inventory and to the more advanced MiG-25 and MiG-29 Soviet 
fighters in the Syrian inventory. 

During the 1980s, repeated efforts were made to include an air 
defense version of the F-16 or the F-20 in United States military 
assistance packages, but these were vetoed by Congress because 
of Israeli objections (see Military Cooperation with the United 
States, this ch.). In early 1988, it was announced that an order 
had been placed with France for the purchase of twenty Mirage 
2000 fighters and for the modernization of fifteen of the Mirage 
F-ls. The transaction included an option for the acquisition of a 
further twenty Mirage 2000s. The cost, estimated at US$1.3 bil- 
lion, was to be repaid under generous credit terms offered by the 
French and may have involved partial funding by Saudi Arabia. 
It was also announced that Jordan had contracted to buy eight Tor- 
nado strike aircraft from Britain but, according to a subsequent 
report, Jordan canceled the transaction for cost reasons. 

In 1988 the air force was organized tactically into four fighter- 
ground-attack squadrons of F-5Es and F-5Fs, two fighter squad- 
rons of Mirage F-ls, an advanced training squadron of F-5As and 
F-5Bs, a transport squadron, and four helicopter squadrons (see 
table 16, Appendix). The main air bases were King Abdullah Air 
Base at Marka near Amman, King Hussein Air Base at Al Mafraq, 
and Prince Hasan Air Base at pumping station H5 in the desert 
east of Amman. These bases were all in the north within a few 
minutes' flight time of either Israel or Syria. Other bases were at 
Azraq ash Shishan, also in the eastern desert, and dispersal bases 
at King Faisal Air Base, Al Jafr and at Al Aqabah in the south. 
The tactical fighter squadrons operated from the bases at Azraq 
ash Shishan, Al Mafraq, and pumping station H5. In addition to 
serving as home for the air force headquarters, King Abdullah Air 
Base near Amman accommodated the service's transport squadron 
and its liaison and air rescue units. 

Training of flight personnel, formerly accomplished in the United 
States and Britain, in the later 1980s was conducted in Jordan. 
The Royal Jordanian Air Academy at King Abdullah Air Base 
provided cadets with both military instruction and an academic 
education over a twenty- seven-month period preparatory to being 
commissioned as second lieutenants. Initial flight training consisted 



248 



Flight simulator used in pilot training 
at Royal Jordanian Air Force Academy 

of 250 flying hours in British Bulldogs, followed by training on 
Spanish C-101 Aviojets that could be fitted as light fighters and 
reconnaissance aircraft. Pilots who qualified for jets progressed to 
F-5As and F-5Bs at Al Mafraq in a five-month course in tactics 
and weapons employment before being assigned to combat squad- 
rons. 

The new Mirage 2000s on order and the upgrading planned for 
the Mirage F-ls and the F-5s helped to compensate in some degree 
for Jordan's weaknesses in comparison to the air power of its Israeli 
and Syrian neighbors. As of 1989, however, both potential adver- 
saries maintained a decisive advantage, rendering Jordan extremely 
vulnerable to air attack. The main Jordanian base at Al Mafraq 
was only fifty-five kilometers from Israel and only twelve kilometers 
from the Syrian frontier. Even pumping station H5 in the eastern 
desert was only 120 kilometers from Israel and 30 kilometers from 
Syria. Although the aircraft were sheltered against surprise attack, 
bombardment of the runways could make the bases inoperative. 
Radar coverage was being improved but, because of the rough ter- 
rain features, gaps remained that experienced Israeli pilots could 
exploit as attack corridors. 

Ground-based strategic air defense was the responsibility of the 
air force rather than the army. The air force operated fourteen 



249 



Jordan: A Country Study 

Improved Hawk SAM batteries (126 launchers) that were sited to 
afford protection to key military and civil targets. The Hawk was 
a high-quality, all-weather system with reliable target detection and 
resistance to electronic countermeasures. Being immobile and at 
well-known sites, however, the Hawks were considered vulnera- 
ble to low-level Israeli air attack. Plans by the United States to pro- 
vide upgrading and mobility packages for these batteries and to 
sell additional Hawk systems to Jordan had been frustrated by con- 
gressional opposition, and as of 1989 no comparable air defense 
system was being considered as an alternative. 

Defense Spending 

Jordan's defense outlays have been burdensome for a small coun- 
try without major resources or a highly developed industrial base. 
Offsetting this burden to some degree has been the positive im- 
pact of defense spending on the national economy. Soldiers' pay, 
the employment created by the military and security forces, and 
the contracts and support services generated in the name of na- 
tional security provided important stimulation for what generally 
has been regarded as a sluggish economy. The financial and mili- 
tary subsidies that Jordan traditionally has received from other Arab 
states have represented a net benefit to the economy while reduc- 
ing the actual burden of the military effort to somewhat less than 
it appeared to be in statistical terms. Nevertheless, the Jordanian 
defense effort was facing acute budgetary and financial difficulties 
in the late 1980s, as a consequence of decreased financial aid from 
the oil-producing Persian Gulf states and reduced remittance levels 
from Jordanian workers in other Middle Eastern countries. 
Together, these sources had brought in as much as US$2.5 billion 
annually in earlier years. Although other Arab states had pledged 
at the Baghdad Summit in 1978 to provide Jordan with more than 
US$1 .2 billion annually for ten years, only Saudi Arabia had ful- 
filled its commitment (see GDP by Sector, ch. 3; Military Rela- 
tions with Other Countries, this ch.). 

The 1988 defense budget of JD256 million (US$763 million) was 
about 60 percent higher than the allocation of a decade earlier. 
When inflation was taken into account, however, officially acknowl- 
edged defense costs appeared to have remained fairly steady until 
1986, when an upward trend became evident. Possible explana- 
tions for this rise included moderate increases in the number of 
men under arms, pay raises, some domestically absorbed equip- 
ment outlays, sharp increases in the international price of arma- 
ments, and a higher amortization level of foreign military debt. 
Published government figures were incomplete since they did not 



250 



National Security 



include important elements of defense spending and were there- 
fore understated. The United States Department of State estimated 
that a little more than half of the subsidies from other Arab states 
was reflected in the budget, with the remainder applied to off-budget 
defense expenditures. 

The military debt had become a serious problem by early 1989, 
as the difficulties of meeting the kingdom's overall debt-servicing 
obligations continued to mount, placing additional strains on the 
balance of payments. It was reported that Jordan was running about 
eleven months behind on its military debt payments, with more 
than US$95 million overdue. 

In 1988 the officially acknowledged defense budget constituted 
15.4 percent of gross national product (GNP — see Glossary). In 
a comparative analysis by the United States Arms Control and Dis- 
armament Agency (ACDA) covering 1987 defense outlays, the 
proportion of Jordan's GNP absorbed by defense in that year (13.9 
percent) was near the average for the Middle East, which was 11 
percent, and among the highest in the world, although below that 
of Israel (16.6 percent of GNP). Nevertheless, defense expendi- 
tures as a ratio of GNP have followed a declining trend from 35 
percent in the early 1970s to 20 percent in the early 1980s. Ac- 
cording to the same ACDA study, Jordan's defense expenditures 
in 1987 were 22 percent of total government expenditures, well 
below the Middle East average of 32 percent. The portion of Jor- 
dan's government spending devoted to the military also reflected 
a steady decline during the 1970s and 1980s. Military expenditures 
of US$285 per capita in 1987 were also lower than the average of 
US$396 per capita for the Middle East as a whole. Jordan had one 
of the highest proportions in the world of men under arms, with 
36.4 uniformed personnel per 1 ,000 of population. Its ratio of armed 
forces to population was exceeded only by such countries as Iraq, 
Israel, Syria, and North Korea. 

Personnel: Composition, Recruitment, and Training 

Because such heavy reliance was placed on the military to 
safeguard the monarchy, the composition and attitudes of armed 
forces personnel have been of vital importance to Hussein. Recruit- 
ment policies and promotion of senior personnel were subject to 
the approval of the king. During the early years of the Hashimite 
regime, a traditional system of recruitment was followed that grew 
out of British practices associated with the formation and main- 
tenance of the Arab Legion. The legion was officered, trained, and 
financed by Britain. The enlisted personnel were all locally recruited 
villagers and tribesmen. Most British officers detached to serve with 



251 



Jordan: A Country Study 

the legion were contract employees of the Transjordanian govern- 
ment; others were simply seconded from the British army. 

Initial public reaction to the Arab Legion was indifferent or at 
times even hostile, and recruiting was difficult. The military es- 
tablishment, however, soon developed high standards of organi- 
zation, discipline, and training. Tribal uprisings and raiding 
practices were suppressed, and criminal activity by restive tribal 
elements diminished. Civic assistance activities enhanced the 
legion's public image, and it evolved into a proud and respected 
professional force. Its well-trained regulars gained a reputation for 
firm and effective action, as well as for discipline and justice in 
dealing with the civilian population. As a result, recruiting became 
easy, with the further incentive of generous pay scales in the en- 
listed ranks in relation to other Middle Eastern armies. 

The flow of volunteers made it possible to impose a system of 
selection that strengthened confidence in the army as a stabilizing 
factor in defense of the monarchy. As Glubb later wrote, "The 
character and antecedents of every recruit were checked by the 
police before his acceptance. Then again, in the Arab Legion, a 
confidential report was submitted on every officer and man every 
year." This careful screening to exclude potential subversives and 
those of doubtful loyalty was expensive and time-consuming. But 
support of a monarchy was at stake, and the background investi- 
gation of even the lowest recruit was an important detail in the 
process. The long-term success of the effort was evident in the de- 
votion the armed forces demonstrated to Hussein through three 
decades of conflict with Israel, internecine Arab strife, and repeated 
assassination attempts. 

The system produced good soldiers, as the legion's record of per- 
formance amply demonstrated, and this tradition has persisted. Jor- 
danian troops have proved to be tough and resilient fighters. Men 
of beduin origin, long accustomed to living in a harsh physical en- 
vironment and enduring Spartan conditions, showed a particular 
affinity for and pride in military service. For many years, the sys- 
tem of carefully selected volunteers resulted in an army in which 
the beduin element constituted the vast majority, particularly in 
infantry and armored units. According to Glubb 's account, nearly 
all of the legion's troops before and during World War II were 
recruited from the beduins of southern Transjordan. After the war, 
enlistment of beduins of northern Transjordan as well as residents 
of the West Bank was also encouraged. 

Following the dissolution of the National Guard in 1965, many 
of its Palestinian members were accepted into the Jordan Arab 



252 



Women military personnel receiving instruction 

Army after careful security screening. Palestinians formed about 
40 percent of the armed forces. The Palestinian component fell to 
15 percent during the 1970s, when the country was wracked by 
internal turbulence (highlighted by the assassination of the prime 
minister in 1971 and the coup attempt financed by Palestinian bribes 
in 1972). As many as 5,000 Palestinians were estimated to have 
succumbed to PLO pressure to defect during the 1970-71 civil war, 
but approximately 20,000 remained loyal to the king and the armed 
forces. Although no official statistics were available, observers be- 
lieved that the proportion of Palestinians in the armed forces had 
risen to between 30 percent and 40 percent by 1986. Observers 
expected this percentage would probably continue to rise as a result 
of conscription and as doubts over Palestinian loyalty further sub- 
sided. Although education standards among the beduins had risen 
sharply, there continued to be a premium in the late 1980s on the 
educational and technical attainments that Palestinian recruits could 
more readily offer. 

Families of traditional background still dominated among senior 
military officers. The principal tribes were well represented, but 
a balance was deliberately maintained so that no one group en- 
joyed a prevailing influence. A significant portion of lower eche- 
lon officer positions, excluding first-line combat units, were held 
by Palestinians. In the upper reaches of the officer corps, however, 
Palestinians still constituted well under 10 percent. 



253 



Jordan: A Country Study 
Conscription 

After an Israeli raid on a West Bank border village in 1966, the 
government passed an emergency conscription act under which 
physically fit males would be drafted for training and service with 
regular military units for periods of up to two years. The same law, 
however, provided the loophole of a fixed fee payable in lieu of 
service, as well as other exemption provisions. In practice, mili- 
tary units kept their original character, recruiting continued for 
a time to be more than adequate, and the law became inoperative. 

On January 1, 1976, a new National Service Law was issued 
by royal decree, establishing a service commitment of two years 
for men called to active duty by the General Directorate of Con- 
scription and Mobilization of the Ministry of Defense. The new 
law coincided with government plans to modernize the army, which 
was to be completely mechanized within eighteen months. 
Moreover, the projected acquisition of sophisticated aircraft and 
missiles for the air force had brought into sharp focus the need to 
upgrade the skills and technical abilities of active-duty personnel. 
The new military service law was an effort to reduce reliance on 
the less educated beduin servicemen by incorporating the better 
educated and skilled city dwellers — most of them Palestinians — to 
meet personnel needs in an era of modern weaponry. 

The new law provided for conscription at the age of eighteen 
but encouraged students to continue their schooling through univer- 
sity level by a complex system of service postponements. Once an 
academic degree was received or the student reached the age of 
twenty-eight, the two-year service commitment had to be fulfilled. 
Jordanians working abroad also could postpone their military ob- 
ligation. Exemptions were limited to those who could not pass the 
required medical examination because of permanent disability, 
those who were only sons, and the brothers of men who had died 
while in service in the armed forces. Any male of conscription age 
was prohibited from being employed unless he had been exempted 
from service or unless his call-up had been deferred because the 
armed forces had a temporary sufficiency. The law established an 
extensive system of veterans' rights, including job seniority, for 
men who had fulfilled their service commitment. 

Of approximately 30,000 Jordanians who reached military age 
annually, about 20,000 were available for compulsory service, 
although the actual number called up was limited by the prevail- 
ing budgetary situation. The conscription system also assisted in 
filling gaps that had developed as a result of insufficient recruitment 
by inducing a greater number of young men to join the regular 



254 



National Security 



army. Volunteers for an initial five-year enlistment were paid on 
an adequate scale instead of the very low wage of conscripts and 
could aspire to higher positions and training opportunities. 

Women in the Armed Forces 

Although they were not subject to compulsory service and did 
not serve in combat-related positions, women had been recruited 
at both officer and enlisted levels. Most of the female service per- 
sonnel occupied administrative or secretarial positions or served 
in communications units. Women also were employed as doctors 
and nurses in military hospitals. In 1989 the highest ranking 
woman, a colonel, was in the Medical Corps. The facilities for- 
merly occupied by the Jordanian Military Academy near Az Zarqa 
had been converted to a training school for women soldiers. 

Conditions of Service 

Because of their critical role in safeguarding the monarchy, mem- 
bers of the armed forces have always enjoyed privileged status. The 
few occasions of discord have almost invariably been caused by 
dissatisfaction with the failure of pay increases to keep up with in- 
flation or the perception that rising living standards in the private 
sector were outdistancing military compensation. With the more 
heterogeneous ethnic composition of the armed forces rendering 
traditional loyalty to the Hashimites less reliable, the king has been 
personally concerned to ensure adequate, if not generous, finan- 
cial provision for service personnel. As a consequence, maintain- 
ing income levels of existing personnel has remained a priority even 
if this meant restrictions on the size of the armed forces and a delay 
in improving the reserve system. 

As of 1989, remuneration of the career military was extremely 
modest by the standards of the United States armed forces. Pay 
scales were low, although the total compensation and benefits for 
an enlisted soldier were calculated to be worth three times the basic 
wage. Conscript pay was far lower than that of career personnel, 
amounting to only about JD20 (for value of the Jordanian dinar — 
see Glossary) per month — barely sufficient to cover personal ex- 
penses. In addition to salary, military personnel were entitled to 
family allowances and access to subsidized post exchanges. Full 
medical services were provided to soldiers, their immediate family, 
and their parents. Free transportation was available; the military 
had its own fleet of buses to convey soldiers between their posts 
and their home communities. Family housing normally was not 
provided on post, but a system of thirty-year loans on generous 



255 



Jordan: A Country Study 



terms enabled many officers and NCOs to purchase or build their 
own homes. 

Most officers of the rank of major and above were provided with 
automobiles for both official and private use, including free fuel 
and maintenance. Successful completion of training and education 
courses also resulted in a significant supplement to income. In the 
case of a senior officer receiving a master's degree after comple- 
tion of the War College course, the increase could amount to as 
much as 60 percent of base pay. The minimum period of pension- 
able service was twenty years. Taking into account all forms of com- 
pensation, it was estimated that military personnel enjoyed a 
standard of living superior to that of civilian government officials 
in equivalent positions. 

Ranks and Insignia 

The rank structure of the Jordanian army and air force was iden- 
tical to that of the United States and British armies. There were, 
however, fewer enlisted grades (see fig. 16). Insignia of rank were 
worn on shoulder straps by officers; chevrons with points down 
were worn by enlisted men on upper right and left sleeves. Desig- 
nation of officer ranks was based on combinations of seven-pointed 
stars (sometimes called pips), the Hashimite crown, crossed sabers, 
and wreaths. The system was similar to that of the British army 
with minor differences in design. In the army the basic color of 
the metal of insignia and buttons was gold; in the air force, silver. 

Many units were authorized to wear identifying shoulder patches 
or flashes, but these were not worn during periods of combat or 
civil disturbance. In the field, branch and service were indicated 
by the color of the beret: chocolate brown for infantry, black for 
armor, navy blue for artillery, light blue for engineers, dark green 
for the Royal Guards, maroon for the Special Forces, and red for 
military police. 

Training and Education 

Army basic training in primary military skills and discipline was 
conducted over a fourteen-week period for both volunteers and con- 
scripts. More advanced training in individual weapons, as well as 
in artillery, engineering, communications, and other specialties, 
was provided after recruits were assigned to their permanent units. 
Soldiers qualifying for promotion attended a general NCO school 
providing instruction in leadership techniques. Additional courses 
for NCOs were offered at training centers specializing in armor, 
artillery, engineering, and logistics. A branch of the infantry school 



256 



National Security 



trained Special Forces personnel in techniques of night patrol, 
demolition, map reading, and hand-to-hand combat. 

With the exception of a very limited number of officers com- 
missioned from NCO ranks, officer candidates were selected from 
applicants who were graduates of the country's secondary schools. 
Until the early 1980s, the cadets attended a two-year course of in- 
struction at the Jordanian Military Academy, where they pursued 
a program modeled on that of Sandhurst. In 1987, however, the 
first graduates of the four-year program at Mutah Military Univer- 
sity in the town of Mutah (also seen as Moata) south of Amman, 
were commissioned as second lieutenants. The curriculum at Mutah 
has been described as similar to that of the Citadel in Charleston, 
South Carolina, a military college offering bachelor of arts and 
bachelor of science degrees in a number of fields. 

Two general courses of advanced officer training were available, 
one at the Jordanian Staff College and the other at the War College, 
both located near Amman. Both programs were one year in length. 
The Staff College course was offered to senior captains, majors, and 
lieutenant colonels. The War College course was offered to senior 
lieutenant colonels, colonels, and brigadier generals. Virtually all 
officers attended the Staff College or its equivalent abroad. Both 
institutions were affiliated with Mutah. Graduates of the Staff Col- 
lege were awarded bachelor of arts degrees in military science from 
Mutah, and graduates of the War College earned masters degrees. 

Many Jordanian officers also attended the United States Army 
Command and General Staff College or the British Army Staff Col- 
lege. Both officers and NCOs also could attend more specialized 
technical schools in the United States and Britain. Some training posi- 
tions continued to be available at Sandhurst for selected army cadets. 

The training offered at Jordan's military schools was considered 
to be of high quality. The schools attracted several hundred mili- 
tary officers and enlisted personnel annually from nearby Arab 
countries (see Military Cooperation with Other Arab States, this 
ch.). The armed forces also administered a high school in Amman 
and a number of schools in other areas of the country, particularly 
at the more remote posts in the south, to educate children of mili- 
tary personnel. The schools were conducted on semimilitary lines 
and provided some introductory training, but the curriculum was 
comparable to that used in civilian schools and was coordinated 
with the Ministry of Education. 

People's Army and Reserves 

In 1983 the Jordanian parliament approved a People's Army 
Law requiring male and female students in high schools and colleges 



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Jordan: A Country Study 




258 



National Security 



and males between the ages of sixteen and fifty-five who had not 
undergone military service (including government employees and 
farm workers) to become members of an auxiliary force called the 
People's Army. Women between the ages of sixteen and forty-five 
who were not students could volunteer for the program. Special 
uniforms and insignia were worn. Training included weapons han- 
dling and indoctrination in patriotism, although some emphasis 
was placed on civil defense and rescue work and first aid in the 
event of natural disasters. Persons employed in vital areas of produc- 
tion were exempt. Instruction for members of the People's Army 
was administered at secondary schools and colleges by visiting teams 
of regular uniformed personnel, although annual refresher train- 
ing was given at military camps. Exercises were carried out jointly 
with regular military units. Women's training occurred in school- 
yards under the supervision of female teachers. Islamic activists 
in parliament had opposed compulsory service for women and any 
mixing of the sexes in training. The prime minister rejected the 
criticism, however, noting that women had participated in the 
Prophet Muhammad's conquests. 

The original intention was to raise a people's militia of about 
200,000 people comprising students and persons deferred from mili- 
tary service. By the close of 1986, however, the program had been 
introduced in only one governorate, and no more than 10,000 in- 
dividuals had been enrolled. The Military Balance, 1989-90, pub- 
lished by the London-based International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, estimated enrollment in the People's Army to be more 
than 15,000 as of 1989. The People's Army was equipped with light 
weapons obtained from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, in- 
cluding the Soviet AK-47 assault rifle (the regular army continued 
to use the United States M-16 as its basic infantry weapon). 

A separate reserve program was maintained but was reported 
to enjoy lower priority after the formation of the People's Army. 
The estimated 30,000 army and 5,000 air force reservists were con- 
scripts who, having completed their two years of service, remained 
on call for another five years. Reservists had assignments to fill 
in existing regular units if called up during a crisis. Mobilization 
plans based on the development of separate reserve elements were 
reportedly in abeyance because of the lack of funds for regular train- 
ing and equipment. 

Military Relations with Other Countries 

Given Jordan's limited resources and state of development, the 
maintenance of its modern armed establishment has been possible 
only with extensive reliance on foreign aid. The sources of military 



259 



Jordan: A Country Study 

assistance have shifted somewhat during the different periods of 
the country's existence; however, until the 1980s, Jordan had looked 
primarily to Britain and the United States for military materiel. 
During the 1980s, France emerged as an increasingly important 
supplier of combat aircraft, and the Soviet Union increasingly sup- 
plied air defense systems. To a great extent, major acquisitions 
have been purchased on generous credit terms, with financing of 
the military debt made possible by grants from other Arab countries. 

From the time the amirate was created in 1921 , British aid took 
the form of direct annual subsidies in conformance with a special 
treaty relationship. Britain continued to underwrite the entire cost 
of the Arab Legion until early 1957, when the defense treaty was 
dissolved by mutual consent. During the last years of the subsidy, 
the annual payment for the legion was the equivalent of about 
US$33.6 million. After 1957 a British-reinforced army brigade and 
an RAF squadron remained in Jordan for a short period and con- 
tributed significantly to the preservation of political stability and 
internal security. British aid, no longer part of a treaty commit- 
ment, eventually tapered off to a moderate level of military sales. 

American military aid began on a small scale in 1950, but in 
1957 the United States became the kingdom's principal source of 
assistance in meeting its national security needs. In the mid-1970s, 
however, conditions imposed by the United States during lengthy 
negotiations leading to the sale of Hawk SAMs initiated a period 
of increasing strain in the relations between the two countries. 

Hussein's growing independence in purchasing military materiel 
was facilitated in part by his strengthened ties to other Arab coun- 
tries after Jordan joined them in opposing the United States- 
sponsored 1978 Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt. 
During the Baghdad Summit of Arab leaders in that year, oil- 
producing Arab states of the Persian Gulf area, plus Libya and 
Algeria, pledged to compensate Jordan in the form of US$1 .25 bil- 
lion annually for ten years for its rejection of the accords. Follow- 
ing the precipitous drop in oil prices, however, most countries 
reneged on their commitments or made only partial payments. By 
1984, it was estimated that Jordan was receiving only US$550 mil- 
lion annually, and only Saudi Arabia was current on its pledge. 
When the Baghdad Summit commitments expired in 1988, Jor- 
dan continued to look to Saudi Arabia, which in that year sup- 
plied an estimated US$350 million in assistance. 

Meeting Jordan's Equipment Needs in the 1980s 

When problems were encountered with supply from the United 
States, Jordan's preferred alternative source for weaponry has been 



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Western Europe. Increasingly, however, Hussein has purchased 
weapons from the Soviet Union, which has been willing to pro- 
vide weapons at low prices and on attractive credit terms. Accord- 
ing to AC DA, the Soviet Union was the largest single source of 
Jordanian weapons imports between 1982 and 1986, supplying 
weaponry valued at US$1 . 1 billion. France was second, with US$825 
million. The United States was third, with US$725 million, followed 
by Britain with US$575 million. The initial Soviet arms agreement, 
concluded in 1981, was for US$360 million — partially underwrit- 
ten by Iraq — and covering SA-8 vehicle-mounted SAMs and air 
defense artillery systems. This agreement was followed in 1984 by 
a further purchase of US$300 million worth of SAMs and in 1985 
by additional contracts for unspecified quantities of equipment, in- 
cluding the SA- 1 3 low-altitude SAM and the SA- 1 4 shoulder-fired 
SAM (regarded as a substitute for the Stinger, which Hussein had 
been unable to obtain from the United States). 

France has actively promoted sales of military equipment to Jor- 
dan since the 1970s. In addition to the Mirage F-l, it has sup- 
plied Alouette helicopters and air-to-air missiles. Since 1980, France 
has sold considerable quantities of munitions and artillery to Jor- 
dan and in 1988 won a major aircraft contract to supply the Mirage 
2000 and to upgrade Mirage F-ls in Jordan's existing inventory. 

Significant purchases from Britain included the Chieftain and Cen- 
turion tanks, plus Bulldog trainer aircraft. In 1985 a government- 
subsidized credit of US$350 million was extended by a consortium 
of British banks for Jordanian purchases of ammunition, light trans- 
port, communications, avionics, and other equipment. In 1987 Spain 
for the first time became a substantial supplier, receiving a Jorda- 
nian contract estimated at about US$90 million for twenty aircraft, 
including transports and jet trainers. 

Military Cooperation with the United States 

United States military assistance to Jordan began on a small scale 
in 1950, but in 1957 the United States became Jordan's principal 
source of equipment following the termination of the British sub- 
sidy. A large-scale purchase of ground force equipment in 1965 
was followed in 1967 by orders for F-l 04 Starfighter aircraft and 
support gear. After the disastrous losses of military equipment dur- 
ing the June 1967 War, United States military aid, most of which 
had been supplied on a credit basis, was shifted to grant form. Ad- 
ditional purchases of American hardware were made possible by 
massive postwar financing from friendly Arab states. 

Although Jordanian forces played only a token role in the October 
1973 War with Israel, Arab losses renewed Hussein's determination 



261 



Jordan: A Country Study 

to expand and modernize Jordan's military capabilities. An im- 
proved air defense system had the highest priority. After a study 
of Jordan's air defense needs, the United States Department of 
Defense recommended supplying Jordan a mixture of American 
weapons, including the Improved Hawk SAM, the Vulcan 20mm 
radar- guided antiaircraft gun, and the Redeye shoulder- fired mis- 
sile. The proposal resulted in protracted negotiations in Washing- 
ton between the United States Congress and the executive branch. 
The Israeli Embassy in Washington and American Jewish organi- 
zations applied strong pressure on Congress to reject the sale, ar- 
guing that the twenty-one Hawk batteries Jordan wanted would 
reinforce the Soviet-supplied SAM capability of Syria, making all 
of Israel vulnerable to the combined weapons coverage. Hussein 
threatened publicly to withdraw the request and accept an offer 
of comparable missiles from the Soviet Union. Inasmuch as the 
weapons were to be paid for by strongly anticommunist Saudi 
Arabia, however, Hussein was obliged to reject Moscow's offer. 
Ultimately a compromise was reached under which the United 
States would provide fourteen Improved Hawk batteries to be per- 
manently emplaced as defensive weapons in the Amman- Az Zarqa 
area and at airfields and radar installations east and south of 
Amman. Final agreement was reached on the US$540 million ar- 
rangement in September 1976. 

Not only did the negotiations over the Hawk system prove hu- 
miliating to Hussein, but also the system as finally negotiated did 
not fully meet Jordan's need because of the limited coverage af- 
forded by the missiles and their extreme vulnerability at fixed sites. 
Disagreement persisted over the scope and cost of other United 
States weapons systems that Jordan could buy with funds under- 
written by other Arab countries. In 1979 Jordan sought to acquire 
moderate numbers of F-16 fighter aircraft and approximately 300 
M-60 tanks. The United States delayed in responding because of 
a new policy designed to reduce the amount of weapons transfers 
to Third World countries. A much reduced shipment of 100 M-60 
tanks was eventually made available to Jordan but without impor- 
tant modern features such as night sights and advanced fire con- 
trol. Hussein accordingly turned to Britain for Chieftain tanks and 
modernization kits for Jordan's existing Centurion tanks, and to 
France for Mirage aircraft as substitutes for the F-16s. 

In early 1984, President Ronald Reagan proposed selling 315 
Stinger launchers and 1,600 missiles to Jordan but was forced to 
withdraw the proposal because of continued congressional opposi- 
tion. Hussein's biting criticisms of American policy contributed 
to the negative attitude in Congress. In 1985 the administration 



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National Security 



put before Congress a new package valued at US$1 .9 billion, which 
would have included 40 F-16s or F-20 aircraft, 300 advanced air- 
to-air missiles, 72 Stingers, and 32 Bradley infantry fighting vehi- 
cles. The most controversial feature of the package was a proposal 
to upgrade the existing fixed Hawk batteries by converting them 
to mobile units and adding six new mobile Hawk batteries. 

Congress effectively blocked this transaction as well by setting 
conditions on the Jordanian-Israeli peace process that Hussein was 
unprepared to meet. In early 1986, the administration suspended 
indefinitely its efforts to supply major systems to Jordan. Military 
assistance has since been carried on at a pace adequate to sustain 
existing readiness levels by providing selective upgrading of equip- 
ment, together with training, spare parts, and service, and help 
in building up ammunition stocks. Close relationships continued 
to be maintained with the Jordanian military in spite of differences 
over new equipment items. The United States and Jordan expanded 
senior officer exchanges. The United States has supplied technical 
assistance teams and instructor training programs, and has devel- 
oped specialized training courses tailored to Jordanian needs. Joint 
military exercises also have been held annually on Jordanian ter- 
ritory. 

From 1950 through 1988, the United States furnished a total 
of about US$1.5 billion in military aid, US$878 million in loans 
and US$631 million in grants. The grant program amounted to 
US$26.5 million in FY 1988. For FY 1989, the administration pro- 
posed US$48 million in military sales credits but Congress approved 
only US$10 million. For FY 1990, the administration again re- 
quested US$48 million. The United States also planned to provide 
funds for military training and education amounting to US$1.8 
million in fiscal year 1989. This money would enable a total of 452 
Jordanian military personnel to receive training or professional edu- 
cation in military colleges in the United States during FY 1989. 

Military Cooperation with Other Arab States 

Jordan traditionally has considered that it shared responsibility 
for the security of the Middle East, particularly that of Saudi Ara- 
bia and the Persian Gulf states. For many years, Jordan has sup- 
plied these countries with advisers, mostly personnel in reserve 
status who had completed their active duty. A total of 565 army 
officers and 1,420 NCOs served in other Arab countries between 
1970 and 1984. The loan of military personnel was regarded as 
a form of compensation to the Persian Gulf states that have provided 
Jordan with subsidies over the years. Jordan also has acted as a 



263 



Jordan: A Country Study 

consultant to these countries in matters such as weapons selection 
and organization of military forces. 

As of 1988, Jordanian personnel were serving in a training or 
operational capacity in Kuwait, North Yemen, Qatar, Oman, the 
United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. Many officers from these 
countries, the majority Saudi Arabs, were undergoing training in 
Jordan at Mutah Military University and the Jordanian Staff Col- 
lege. Between 1970 and 1984, more than 4,000 officers and 7,000 
enlisted personnel from Arab states had attended military institu- 
tions in Jordan. 

Jordan has supplied combat troops to assist Persian Gulf states 
confronting security threats. In 1975 Jordan deployed two squad- 
rons of fighter aircraft and a Special Forces battalion to Oman at 
that country's request to help defeat an uprising supported by South 
Yemen. Hussein offered to send a division to assist Saudi Arabia 
when the main mosque in Mecca was seized by Islamic activists 
in 1979. Although the division was never sent, the incident alerted 
Jordanian commanders to the problems of rapidly transporting a 
large body of troops in a Middle East emergency. Jordan turned 
to the United States for assistance in providing transport airplanes, 
missiles, and special equipment to move and maintain a Jorda- 
nian rapid deployment force of two brigades (8,000 men) in the 
event of a threat to the stability of the Persian Gulf area. When 
the proposal became public in early 1983, it faced so many objec- 
tions in Congress — where it was seen as a means to circumvent 
curbs on military aid to Jordan — that it had to be abandoned. The 
Israelis pointed out that there was no assurance that the new equip- 
ment would not be used against them. Finally, the Gulf states 
resented the public airing of their own security needs, and partic- 
ularly the involvement of one of the superpowers in such planning. 

During the Iran-Iraq War of 1980 to 1988, Jordan sided with 
Iraq because of Hussein's desire to contain Iran's revolutionary 
Islamic movement. The Jordanian port of Al Aqabah became an 
important transshipment point for military supplies essential to the 
Baghdad government's conduct of the war. In early 1982, Hus- 
sein announced that the Yarmuk Brigade, a force of 3,000, would 
be raised to fight alongside Iraqi forces in the conflict against Iran. 
A number of recruiting offices were opened to seek volunteers. No 
definite information was subsequently made available on the role 
this force played in the fighting. As a reciprocal gesture, the Iraqis 
transferred to Jordan on at least two occasions quantities of Ameri- 
can and British armored equipment captured from Iran. 

Although Jordan had no significant defense industry, it was 
reported in 1983 that components of the Chinese J-6 fighter aircraft, 



264 



National Security 



a variant of the Soviet MiG-19, were shipped to the King Faisal 
Air Base at Al Jafr for assembly and subsequent delivery to Iraq. 
The United States had assisted in the construction of an armor 
rebuild facility suitable for work on the M-60, Chieftain, and Cen- 
turion tanks, and on armored personnel carriers and self-propelled 
artillery. The capacity of the rebuild plant exceeded Jordan's own 
needs with the expectation that orders for the rehabilitation of ar- 
mored equipment might be obtained from other Arab nations. 

The Internal Security System 

The concept of public order founded on the supremacy of law 
has been stressed by Hussein throughout his reign as a prerequi- 
site to internal stability and the achievement of national develop- 
ment goals. In accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, 
public order has been successfully maintained through legally es- 
tablished instruments: comprehensive codes of law enforced by a 
professional police force and an independent judiciary. The police 
and the General Intelligence Department (GID), generally known 
as the Mukhabarat from the Arabic name Dairat al Mukhabarat, 
a civilian agency, exercised broad powers to monitor disruptive 
segments of the population. The scope of police and GID powers 
at times have become a source of contention from a human rights 
standpoint, although in nonsecurity cases legal norms had been 
generally observed by police and judicial authorities. 

Police Forces 

In 1989 primary responsibility for the routine maintenance of 
law and order was exercised by the Public Security Force, the coun- 
try's national police establishment. Centralized in time of peace 
within the Public Security Directorate of the Ministry of Interior, 
the police were subordinated to the Ministry of Defense and under 
the control of the army commander in the event of war. Tradi- 
tionally, the police have been commanded by an officer with the 
title of director general of public security, usually a senior army 
general, who reported to the minister of interior. Officers assigned 
to this important position were personally selected by Hussein on 
the basis of their military record, leadership qualifications, and 
loyalty to the crown. As of early 1989, the head of the police or- 
ganization was Lieutenant General Abdul Hadi al Majali, formerly 
chief of the general staff. 

An outgrowth of the Arab Legion, the Public Security Force was 
created by law in July 1956, when the legion was separated into 
distinct police and army elements. During the twenty months of 
martial law instituted by Hussein from April 1957 to November 



265 



Jordan: A Country Study 

1958, the police were again subordinated to army control. As 
domestic and external threats to Hashimite rule were brought under 
better control, a new law in July 1958 reestablished the separation 
of the two security forces. 

The strength of the Public Security Force was estimated to be 
about 4,000 personnel in the late 1980s. A considerable augmen- 
tation of the Desert Police Force was reported to be planned in 
1988. The relatively large size of the force, combined with the army 
support, testified to the importance of the internal security function. 

The police were classified broadly according to areas of geographic 
responsibility. The three major divisions were the metropolitan 
(Amman), rural (small towns and villages), and desert contingents. 
Police headquarters in Amman provided both an administrative con- 
trol point for the countrywide system and an array of centralized 
technical functions that supported police activities throughout the 
kingdom. A reorganization of the Public Security Directorate an- 
nounced in 1987 reduced the previous five-tiered structure to only 
three tiers. Below the central headquarters, with its overall respon- 
sibility for police, security, and law enforcement activities, were 
ten regional directorates. Eight of the directorates corresponded 
to the governorates, and one covered the city of Amman and its 
suburbs. The desert region was a separate directorate and was 
patrolled by the Desert Police Force. Under the 1987 plan, the ten 
regions were to be subdivided into fifty-nine security centers, each 
of which typically would be responsible for an area of five to ten 
square kilometers and serve 50,000 people. 

Public Security Force missions included the usual tasks of main- 
tenance of public order, protection of life and property, investiga- 
tion of criminal activity, and apprehension of suspected offenders. 
In addition to these basic functions, special elements of the force 
performed such duties as traffic control, licensing of vehicles and 
certain business activities, enforcement of trade prohibitions and 
zoning ordinances, locating missing persons, guarding shrines and 
other public places, assisting customs and immigration officials in 
the performance of their duties, and operating the country's penal 
institutions. In announcing the 1987 reorganization, the director 
general of public security emphasized an increased social role for 
the police and strengthened police relations with the local commu- 
nity. He described the police as the conduit through which the public 
could seek assistance from various government authorities in resolv- 
ing social problems. 

Functionally, the responsibilities assigned to the police were car- 
ried out according to a tripartite division of responsibilities at the 
headquarters level — administrative, judicial, and support operations. 



266 



Traffic policeman, Amman 




Administrative police were charged with prevention of crime and 
routine maintenance of security and public order. Criminal offenses 
were under the jurisdiction of judicial police, who conducted crimi- 
nal investigations, apprehended suspects, and assisted the public 
prosecutor's office in prosecuting accused offenders. Support police 
performed budget, planning, training, public affairs, communi- 
cations, and logistic functions. Insofar as was possible, regional 
police activities throughout the country conformed to this division 
of responsibilities. Modern communications facilities connecting 
regional directorates with the headquarters in Amman provided 
a direct link to specialized elements such as the Criminal Investi- 
gation Department's modern police laboratory, which also assisted 
regional and local police in their investigations. 

The Special Police Force within the Public Security Directorate 
had principal responsibility for countering terrorism. As part of 
its antiterrorism program, the Jordanian government cooperated 
with various international bodies in sharing information and 
resources. A multimillion dollar project to improve police commu- 
nications, announced in 1988, was another element of the anti- 
terrorist campaign. In connection with this project, the Special 
Police Force had participated in bomb detection programs for dogs 
and their handlers offered by the United States. The Desert Police 
Force, which had responsibility for detecting and stopping drug 
and gun smuggling, had also been greatly expanded. 



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Jordan: A Country Study 



Depending on their location, the police were armed with pistols, 
rifles, nightsticks, or light automatic weapons. In Amman and the 
larger towns, special crowd and riot control equipment and armored 
vehicles were available. The police force was fully motorized, had 
good communications facilities, and operated much on the pattern 
of European law enforcement agencies. Police units in rural areas 
were assigned less modern equipment, and in the desert areas the 
traditional system of camel-mounted desert patrols survived, sup- 
plemented by improved communications gear and four-wheel-drive 
vehicles. 

Police personnel have been recruited throughout the service's 
existence through voluntary enlistments. The National Service Law 
of 1976 ensured that most younger members of the force would 
have had some military training before entering police work. Train- 
ing for both officers and enlisted ranks was provided primarily by 
the staff of the Royal Police Academy in Amman, but some recruits 
received their instruction at the separate Police Training School 
in Az Zarqa. The school at Az Zarqa also welcomed large num- 
bers of police trainees from friendly Arab countries. In addition 
to courses in general and administrative police work, cadets at the 
academy studied the country's legal system, underwent physical 
training, and were instructed in the use of firearms and other police 
equipment. Judicial training included courses in criminal investi- 
gation procedures, court operations, and the criminal code. As part 
of efforts to improve the general education level of the Public Secu- 
rity Force, the government announced in 1987 that officer recruits 
would be required to have university degrees and NCO recruits 
would be required to be graduates of high schools or vocational 
schools. 

The first Arab country to admit women to its police establish- 
ment, Jordan opened a women's police academy in Amman in 
1972. Before being assigned to positions in law enforcement, the 
women recruits completed a four-month classroom course followed 
by one month of practical training in the field. Assignment oppor- 
tunities expanded steadily after the program began. Women served 
primarily in the police laboratory, in budgeting and accounting, 
public relations, licensing, and in prison operations. Some served 
in street patrols and traffic control in Amman and in border security. 

Ranks and insignia of the Public Security Force were identical 
with those of the army, although job titles were necessarily differ- 
ent. Police uniforms in the Amman metropolitan area were dark 
blue in winter and light tan in summer, resembling in style those 
of the Royal Jordanian Air Force. Rural police wore an olive drab 
uniform lighter in shade than that of the army but otherwise similar. 



268 



Desert policeman on a camel Desert policemen making coffee, 

Khawr Ramm 



The Desert Police Force retained their traditional Arab garb. Police 
pay scales were about the same as those of the army but differed 
somewhat in the special allowances authorized. The conditions of 
service were sufficiently favorable to attract and retain enough per- 
sonnel to staff the force fully. 

General Intelligence Department 

Internal security, intelligence, and counterintelligence matters 
were the concern of the police, the armed forces, and the GID, 
a civilian organization with principal responsibility for dealing with 
perceived domestic and foreign threats to security. The GID cus- 
tomarily was headed by a high-ranking army officer answerable 
directly to the prime minister and concurrently a close personal 
adviser of Hussein. 

The GID was a large organization, although its personnel 
strength was not a matter of public knowledge. Its members were 
almost invariably persons of proven loyalty to the monarchy and 
of East Bank origin. It was generally regarded as an effective in- 
ternal security agency, alert to any evidence of activity that might 



269 



Jordan: A Country Study 

have subversive implications. Although Jordan had been the tar- 
get of clandestine operations by other countries, the GID was not 
known to have a covert branch that engaged in clandestine activ- 
ity against its Arab neighbors or Israel. The GID was particularly 
occupied with rooting out Palestinian militant groups and illegal 
or underground political organizations. It scrutinized activities in 
the mosques and among student groups. A GID office was located 
in each refugee camp. The GID's methods and oppressive tactics 
frequently have been the subject of criticism among Jordanians, 
although some of its measures, such as checkpoints to monitor 
domestic travelers, were less obtrusive during the 1980s than they 
had been in the tense period following the 1970-71 conflict with 
the PLO. 

The widely employed system of identity documents facilitated 
GID control over the population. A passport was needed both for 
travel and to obtain employment. Passports could only be obtained 
by producing other identity documents issued by the Ministry of 
Interior and had to be authorized by the GID. In addition, a cer- 
tificate of good conduct from the GID was required for public sec- 
tor jobs, for many private sector jobs, and for study abroad. A 
young person studying in a communist country might, on return- 
ing for a visit to Jordan, find his or her passport confiscated if the 
GID harbored suspicions concerning the student's conduct abroad. 
Furthermore, GID approval was required for public gatherings or 
activities sponsored by private organizations. 

The GID had authority under martial law to detain persons 
without trial for indeterminate periods, often lasting from several 
weeks to many months. Such security detainees normally were held 
incommunicado for interrogation at GID headquarters in Amman. 
According to the 1988 annual report of the human rights organi- 
zation Amnesty International, various forms of torture or ill treat- 
ment were believed to have been inflicted at GID headquarters on 
detainees or arrested persons later transferred to ordinary prisons 
for trial by martial law courts. 

Criminal Justice 

Until the nineteenth century, the only source of law considered 
to be valid in controlling criminal activity in the region that was 
to become Jordan was Islamic religious law, or sharia. This law 
and its application had remained static for centuries, subject only 
to interpretation by the ulama (pi.; sing, dim, religious scholars) 
and enforcement by Muslim judges (qadis) in sharia courts. Tem- 
poral rulers could not, in theory, legislate rules to govern social 



270 



National Security 



behavior; they could only hand down edicts to implement the im- 
mutable divine law. 

In the mid- 1800s, reforms of the system were instituted to en- 
hance Ottoman control of the area. Comprehensive codes of law 
based on European models became the basis of a new legal sys- 
tem, and in 1858 a criminal code was adopted to support the re- 
form movement. The new code was based on French law, but in 
effect it complemented sharia inasmuch as the French code was 
modified to accommodate Muslim customs. For example, the 
Ottoman criminal code imposed the payment of blood money in 
addition to imprisonment for acts of homicide or bodily injury, 
and the death penalty for apostasy was retained. 

When the Ottoman Empire ceased to exist after World War I 
and Britain became the mandatory power for Palestine and Trans- 
jordan, the Ottoman laws in force were supplemented by British 
statutes. In Palestine the 1858 criminal code was replaced by a new 
penal code and a code of criminal procedure patterned on those 
used in British colonies. The Palestinian courts, staffed by British 
and British- trained judges, used their power to apply English com- 
mon law, and decisions could be appealed to the judicial commit- 
tee of the Privy Council in London. The influence of English law 
was weaker in Transjordan, however, where there were no British 
judges, and common law was not applied in the courts. Instead, 
the laws that dealt with criminal behavior retained the European 
flavor of the Ottoman code of 1858. 

When the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was proclaimed in 
1949, the ancient Ottoman code had been largely modified at the 
insistence of moderates who believed that the sharia provisions on 
which it had been based should be supplemented by — and, if neces- 
sary, subordinated to — laws that could deal with modern problems. 
The period of British tutelage did not significantly change the sub- 
stantive law, but it had the effect of weakening the absolutist tra- 
ditions of sharia in the field of criminal jurisprudence. In the early 
1950s, a committee of leading Muslim scholars and jurists of several 
Arab countries convened with the purpose of drafting new codes 
of criminal law and procedure to replace the 1858 Ottoman code, 
which had been almost entirely amended during the century it had 
been in force. In 1956 the Jordanian National Assembly adopted 
a new criminal code and code of criminal procedure. Both were 
based on the Syrian and Lebanese codes, which in turn were mod- 
eled on French counterparts. 

Within the realm of criminal jurisprudence, Jordan retained only 
nominal application of sharia. Although the codified laws were based 
on Islamic principles and customs, these were largely modified and 



271 



Jordan: A Country Study 

extended along European lines in an effort to adapt to the require- 
ments of a changing economy and culture. 

Criminal Code 

The criminal code adopted in 1956, which had been amended 
many times, contained the bulk of the country's criminal law. In 
addition, certain codified civil statutes also prescribed penalties for 
acts such as libel, adultery, and publication of material endanger- 
ing the security of the kingdom. Individuals could not be punished 
except for acts made criminal by virtue of penalties prescribed by 
law. Other than where specified, a person also could not be punished 
for committing a criminal act in the absence of criminal responsi- 
bility or intent, both of which were defined by the code. As a 
safeguard of personal liberty, the government had the burden of 
proving both the defendant's commission of the act and the ad- 
missible intent of the defendant before guilt could be established. 

The criminal code, in traditional French form, divided crimi- 
nal offenses into three categories according to the severity of the 
applicable punishments. In English common law these categories 
equated roughly to felonies, misdemeanors, and minor violations. 
Punishments for felonies ranged from death by hanging to imprison- 
ment for periods ranging from three years to life. Punishments for 
misdemeanors included imprisonment for periods ranging from 
three weeks to three years and a variety of fines. Minor violations 
could be punished by imprisonment for less than three weeks, small 
fines, or reprimands by the court. In cases involving misdemeanors 
or minor violations, a judge also could invoke preventive measures 
including detention for psychiatric examination, forfeiture of mate- 
rial goods, or closure of a place of business. The criminal code 
provided for minimum penalties for all major infractions rather 
than relying on the discretion of the courts. 

The death penalty was authorized for murder, arson of an in- 
habited building, assassination of the king (or attempts on his life), 
and a broad range of serious crimes defined as threats to the secu- 
rity of the state. These latter offenses included acts such as trea- 
son, espionage on behalf of an unfriendly foreign power, and armed 
insurrection. The act of selling land in the West Bank to occupy- 
ing Israeli authorities was considered high treason and therefore 
a capital offense. Some Palestinians had been sentenced in absen- 
tia to death under this decree but as of 1989 these sentences had 
never been carried out. Executions were rare and politically sensi- 
tive in Jordan. Three death sentences for murder were carried out 
in 1985, none in 1986, and only one in 1987. In the 1987 case, 



272 



National Security 



the assassin of a PLO Executive Committee member in the West 
Bank was put to death. 

Imprisonment for life was imposed for such felonies as lesser 
crimes against national security, homicide during commission of 
a misdemeanor or that resulted from torture, and the more seri- 
ous forms of theft. Shorter imprisonment was prescribed for these 
same offenses if mitigating circumstances warranted. Such punish- 
ment also was authorized for terrorist activity, membership in sub- 
versive organizations, counterfeiting, forgery of official documents, 
and abduction. 

Misdemeanors included such offenses as gambling in public 
places, bribery, perjury, simple forgery, slander, embezzlement, 
assault and battery, and disturbing the peace. The influence of 
sharia was still evident in the imposition of prison sentences for 
desertion of a child, abortion, marrying a girl under the age of six- 
teen, openly ridiculing the Prophet Muhammad, and breaking the 
fast of Ramadan. Sharia also was important in the criteria for justifi- 
able homicide. No penalty was imposed for the immediate killing 
of someone who defiled a person's or a family's honor. 

Minor violations covered by the code included traffic violations, 
seeking redress for a crime without recourse to civil authorities, 
public drunkenness, and violations of administrative regulations 
such as licensing and safe housing requirements. These infractions 
were punishable with or without proven intent. Most minor viola- 
tions resulted in fines being assessed against the offender. 

Incidence of Crime 

Detailed criminal statistics were not customarily available but 
fragmentary data has been released from time to time that pro- 
vided limited information on the nature and scope of criminal ac- 
tivity in Jordan. According to a Jordanian submission to the 
International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), national 
criminal statistics recorded 16,215 offenses for 1984. Although it 
was not clear what offenses constituted this total, the number of 
cases in the following categories was supplied: ordinary theft (3,859 
cases reported), aggravated theft (1,208 cases), breaking and en- 
tering (1 , 164 cases), car theft (1 78 cases), robbery and violent theft 
(44 cases), other forms of theft (2,473 cases), serious assaults (437), 
homicide (70), and rape (24). Frauds numbered 276 and currency 
or counterfeiting violations numbered 31. Only sixty-five drug 
offenses were reported. 

According to Interpol, the total number of criminal offenses 
reported by Jordanian authorities constituted a rate of 630 crimes 
per 100,000 people. This rate was far lower than that reported by 



273 



Jordan: A Country Study 

most countries of Western Europe but was typical of some Middle 
Eastern countries, and higher than many countries of the Third 
World. The validity of this index was linked to the reliability of 
the reports of criminal activity submitted to Interpol. 

The Public Security Directorate released similar data for 1986. 
In that year, 19,618 criminal offenses were reported. Under the 
category of thefts and robberies, the directorate listed 4,269 viola- 
tions. According to the directorate, most such crimes were com- 
mitted by unemployed males and by low-paid laborers between 
the ages of eighteen and twenty-seven. There were 549 offenses 
listed as "moral" crimes, including rape, abduction, and various 
forms of public misbehavior. A total of 348 cases of fraud and em- 
bezzlement were recorded, reflecting a rising trend attributed by 
the police to poor economic conditions and financial difficulties of 
individuals and companies. The sixty-four murders reported 
represented a decline from eighty-one in the previous year. Gen- 
erally, such crimes were the result of personal disputes, family 
problems, and seeking revenge. Again, the perpetrators of homi- 
cides were predominantly in the eighteen to twenty- seven-year-old 
age-group. The police reported that 71 deaths and 513 injuries had 
resulted from guns fired in celebration or accidentally. 

Procedures in Criminal Law 

When the police believed that a person had committed a crime 
or when someone was caught committing a criminal act, the sus- 
pect was taken to the nearest police station for registration and 
interrogation. Usually a warrant was required for an arrest; 
however, in cases where delay would be harmful or when a person 
was apprehended in a criminal offense, the accused could be de- 
tained without a warrant of arrest for as long as forty-eight hours. 
After forty-eight hours, a court order was required to continue de- 
tention of the suspect. 

A warrant of arrest could be issued by a magistrate only if there 
were a presumption that the person had committed the offense for 
which he or she was charged and if there were reason to believe 
that the accused intended to escape, destroy traces of the crime, 
or induce witnesses to make false statements. A warrant also could 
be issued for offenses against national security or other grave acts 
specified in the criminal code. 

The police magistrate first informed the accused of the charges 
and questioned the accused and any available witnesses to deter- 
mine if there were a prima facie case against the detained person, 
who had the right to counsel at this preliminary investigation. If 
the magistrate found evidence of guilt, the case was transmitted 



274 



National Security 



to the local prosecutor for further investigation. A prosecutor was 
attached to every magistrate's court and court of first instance (see 
The Judiciary, ch. 4). The magistrate then could either issue an 
arrest warrant to bind over the suspect for trial or release the sus- 
pect on bail. Release on bail was a matter of right when the maxi- 
mum penalty prescribed for the offense was imprisonment not 
exceeding one year and where the accused had an established resi- 
dence within the country and had not previously been convicted 
of a felony or sentenced to more than three months in jail. 

The right of habeas corpus was provided for under the Consti- 
tution, but in practice it had not afforded the same protection as 
in English common law. The police usually managed to establish 
the need to detain suspects charged with serious offenses. Persons 
could be detained pending investigation for fifteen days or longer 
if the court approved a request by the public prosecutor for an ex- 
tension. The power of detention had been used effectively by the 
police to forestall disorder. For example, police occasionally dis- 
persed crowds before a disturbance merely by threatening to ar- 
rest those who disobeyed an order to leave the scene. 

On deciding that legal action against the accused was necessary, 
the public prosecutor instituted a trial by issuing an indictment 
to the appropriate court. The fourteen magistrates' courts handled 
only those criminal offenses for which the maximum fine was not 
more than JD 100 or the maximum prison sentence was not more 
than one year. The seven courts of first instance tried cases involving 
misdemeanors before two judges and major felonies before three 
judges. Trials were open to the public except in certain cases, such 
as those involving sexual offenses. The defendant had the right to 
legal counsel, but defendants often were unaware of this right and 
failed to exercise it. The court appointed a lawyer for those who 
could not afford one if the potential sentence was execution or life 
imprisonment. Defendants had the right of cross-examination and 
were protected against self-incrimination. There was no jury sys- 
tem in Jordan. The judge, therefore, decided questions of fact, based 
entirely on the weight of the evidence, as well as questions of the 
interpretation and application of the criminal law. 

Trials began with opening statements by the prosecutor and the 
defense counsel, followed by an interrogation of the defendant by 
the presiding judge. After examination of witnesses for the state 
and for the accused and the submission of documentary evidence, 
closing arguments by the prosecutor and defense counsel completed 
the presentation. Decisions were announced in open court and, 
if the defendant were found guilty, sentence would be pronounced. 



275 



Jordan: A Country Study 

Either the public prosecutor or the defendant could appeal the deci- 
sion to the court of appeal and, ultimately, to the Court of Cassation. 

Martial Law Courts 

A state of martial law, in effect since 1967, gave the government 
authority to detain individuals without charge and to adjudicate 
specified crimes in the martial law courts. These courts consisted 
of a panel of three military officers trained in the law. Designated 
martial law crimes included espionage, bribery of public officials, 
trafficking in narcotics or weapons, black marketing, and security 
offenses. Security detainees could be held without charge or brought 
before the martial law courts for trial. Detainees did not have the 
right to communicate with their family or legal counsel. 

Although the martial law courts were not bound to observe nor- 
mal rules of evidence or procedures, in practice these military courts 
observed the law of criminal procedure and defendants were given 
most of the rights they were entitled to in civilian courts. Trials 
were held in public; defendants were represented by counsel and 
could cross-examine witnesses. It was not customary to grant bail, 
however, and there was no provision for habeas corpus. Normal 
avenues of appeal were not open from decisions of the military 
courts, but such court actions were subject to ratification by the 
prime minister in his capacity as military governor. The prime 
minister had the authority to increase, reduce, or annul sentences. 
Before acting, the prime minister received recommendations on 
the fairness of a sentence by a legal adviser or the minister of justice. 

In its annual report for 1988, Amnesty International asserted 
that some proceedings in the martial law courts failed to meet in- 
ternational standards for fair trials. It noted that in some cases it 
appeared that confessions allegedly extracted under torture or ill 
treatment were accepted as evidence. The United States Depart- 
ment of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1986 
observed that the very quick trials and subsequent sentencing of 
the Communist Party of Jordan leadership suggested that there 
were politically motivated exceptions to the norms of criminal proce- 
dures and rights in the martial law courts. 

Military courts also adjudicated all crimes committed by military 
personnel, applying military regulations promulgated by the Ministry 
of Defense pursuant to relevant laws. In these cases, the command- 
ing officer of the armed forces was required to ratify the sentence. 

Penal System 

The penal system, a responsibility of the Ministry of Interior, 
was administered by the Prisons Department of the Public Security 



276 



National Security 



Directorate. The system was composed of roughly twenty-five 
prisons and jails. All except Amman Central Prison — the system's 
major institution — were under the management of regional police 
chiefs and were sometimes referred to as police jails. In addition 
to the Amman facility, area prisons were located at Irbid and at 
Al Jafr, east of Maan in the south-central desert region. The smaller 
jails were located at or near regional and local police offices. Gener- 
ally, convicted offenders with more than one year to serve were 
transferred to the central prison in Amman, those with terms of 
three months to one year were sent to regional prisons, and those 
sentenced to three months or less were kept in local jails. Some 
exceptions were made to this pattern in the case of Palestinian ac- 
tivists or other security prisoners who had been detained for long 
periods of time in the Al Jafr facility, largely because of its re- 
moteness. 

Penal institutions were used to detain persons awaiting trial as 
well as prisoners serving sentences. Convicted offenders were usually 
housed separately from those yet to be tried. Major prisons had 
separate sections for women prisoners, as did a few of the police 
jails in the larger communities. A juvenile detention center in 
Amman housed young offenders who had been convicted of criminal 
offenses. When juveniles reached the age of nineteen, if they had 
further time to serve, they were transferred to one of the larger 
prisons for the remainder of their sentences. 

All institutions operated in accordance with the provisions of the 
Prison Law of 1953, as amended. This law provided for decent 
treatment of prisoners and included comprehensive regulations 
governing the facilities, care, and administration of the prison sys- 
tem. Jordan was one of the first Arab countries to recognize the 
theory of rehabilitation, rather than retribution, as the basis for 
punishment of lawbreakers. This concept emphasized that crime 
was caused by human weakness resulting from poor social condi- 
tions rather than by willfulness and immorality. As such, the ap- 
proach was in many ways alien to the traditional Muslim custom 
of personal revenge by the family of the victim, which demanded 
that the culprit pay for his crime. Although Jordan's penal system 
was designed to provide punishments suited to bring about the re- 
habilitation of the wrongdoers, in practice these efforts were ham- 
pered by the lack of facilities and professionally trained staff. Some 
effort was made to provide literacy and limited industrial training 
classes to prisoners in Amman Central Prison, but few modern tech- 
niques of rehabilitation were found in other penal institutions. 

According to the annual human rights reports of the United States 
Department of State, prison conditions were harsh but not 



277 



Jordan: A Country Study 

intentionally degrading. There appeared to be no discrimination 
according to religion or social class in treatment of prisoners. 
Crowded conditions in some prisons were relieved by a royal am- 
nesty in 1985 that resulted in the release of more than 1,000 in- 
mates. In 1986, a new central prison, Juwaidah, was opened in 
Amman. It replaced the obsolete and cramped Al Mahatta pris- 
on, which was scheduled to be closed. 

In its 1988 report, Amnesty International cited a number of cases 
of apparent mistreatment in prisons, notably at Al Mahatta and 
at the Az Zarqa military prison. The report also questioned the 
authorities' motives in forcing four students and a writer convicted 
in the martial law court of membership in illegal leftist organiza- 
tions to serve their sentences under the harsh conditions found at 
Al Jafr. 

* * * 

The general survey of Jordan by Arthur R. Day, East Bank/West 
Bank: Jordan and the Prospects for Peace, includes a chapter apprais- 
ing the Jordanian military establishment, as well as a number of 
observations relative to Jordan's internal security. The analysis by 
Anthony H . Cordesman, Jordanian Arms and the Middle East Balance, 
published in 1983, together with a supplement published in 1985, 
provides assessments of the military and geostrategic situation of 
Jordan. The analyses also present arguments for equipping Jor- 
danian forces with advanced weapons to enable the country to resist 
military pressure from neighboring powers. The problems Jordan 
encountered with the United States in meeting its desire for these 
new weapons, especially in the area of air defense, are also reviewed 
in detail. The Has hemite Arab Army, 1908-1979, by S.A. El-Edroos, 
a Pakistani brigadier who served as adviser to the Jordan Arab 
Army, is a thorough study of military operations and battles through 
the October 1973 War. John Bagot Glubb's autobiography, A Soldier 
with the Arabs, provides detail on the evolution of the Arab Legion 
and the fighting in 1948. Troubles on the East Bank: Challenges to the 
Domestic Stability of Jordan by Robert B. Satloff reviews existing and 
potential internal security problems, with emphasis on the Mus- 
lim Brotherhood. 

The discussion of military strengths, formations, and equipment 
in this chapter is based principally on estimates compiled in The 
Military Balance, 1988-89, by the International Institute for Stra- 
tegic Studies in London. (For further information and complete 
citations, see Bibliography.) 



278 



Appendix 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Schools, Students, and Teachers in the East Bank, 1986-87 

3 Enrollment by Education Level and Sex, 1965 and 1985 

4 Medical Care and Medical Personnel, 1987 

5 Balance of Payments, 1983-87 

6 Summary of Central Government Budget Financing, 1983-87 

7 Central Government Expenditures, 1983-87 

8 Domestic Revenue of the Central Government, 1983-87 

9 Labor Force by Sector, 1987 

10 Industrial Production of Selected Commodities, 1984-87 

11 Agricultural Production and Cultivated Area, 1987 

12 Imports of Selected Commodities, 1983-87 

13 Exports of Selected Commodities, 1983-87 

14 Principal Trade Partners, 1986-87 

15 Major Army Equipment, 1988 

16 Major Air Force Equipment, 1988 



279 



Appendix 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know Multiply by To find 



Millimeters 0.04 inches 

Centimeters 0.39 inches 

Meters 3.3 feet 

Kilometers 0.62 miles 

Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 2.47 acres 

Square kilometers 0.39 square miles 

Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet 

Liters 0.26 gallons 

Kilograms 2.2 pounds 

Metric tons 0.98 long tons 

1.1 short tons 

2,204 pounds 

Degrees Celsius 9 degrees Fahrenheit 

(Centigrade) divide by 5 

and add 32 



Table 2. Schools, Students, and Teachers in the East Bank, 1986-87 



Category Number 



Schools 

Coeducational 1,372 

Male 1,017 

Female 977 

Total schools 3,366 

Students 

Male . 479,682 

Female 439,963 

Total students '. 919,645 

Teachers 

Female 23,612 

Male 15,995 

Total teachers 39,607 



Source: Based on information from Jordan, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 
1987, 38, Amman, 1988, 167. 



281 



Jordan: A Country Study 



Table 3. Enrollment by Education Level and Sex, 
1965 and 1985 
(in percentages) 



Level 1965 1985 



Primary 

Male 100 98 

Female 83 99 

Both sexes 92 99 

Preparatory- 
Male 52 80 

Female 23 78 

Both sexes 38 79 

Secondary 

Male n.a. n.a. 

Female n.a. n.a. 

Both sexes 2 37 



n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from World Bank, World Development Report, 1988, New York, 
1988, 281. 



282 



Appendix 



Table 4. Medical Care and Medical Personnel, 1987 



Category 1987 



Hospitals 

Government 14 

Private . . 21 

Total hospitals 35* 

Hospital beds 

Government 3,994 

Private 1,563 

Total hospital beds 5,557 

Physicians 

Government 1,702 

Private n.a. 

Nurses 

Government 434 

Private n.a. 

Mid wives 

Government 275 

Private n.a. 

Pharmacists 

Government 96 

Private n.a. 

Dentists 

Government 110 

Private n.a. 



* Figures for 1981. 
n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from Jordan, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 
1987, 38, Amman, 1988, 213-14; and "Jordan" in George Thomas Kurian (ed.), 
Encyclopedia of the Third World, 2, New York, 1987, 1029. 



283 



Jordan: A Country Study 



Table 5. Balance of Payments, 1983-87 
(in millions of Jordanian dinars) 1 



1983 1984 1985 1986 2 1987 2 

Net trade balance in 

goods and services -436.25 - 382.89 - 414.91 - 253.95 - 317.64 

Net unrequited 

transfers 3 + 294.93 +278.76 + 315.01 + 238.00 + 199.29 

Current account 

balance - 141.32 - 104.13 -99.90 - 15.95 - 118.35 

Capital account 

balance 4 + 156.76 +64.37 + 137.64 + 50.95 + 75.94 

Overall balance 5 + 15.44 - 39.76 + 37.74 + 35.00 - 42.41 

Net errors and 

omissions +34.90 -29.54 - 19.25 - 16.72 + 5.86 

Net reserves 6 -50.34 +69.30 - 18.49 - 18.28 +36.55 



1 For value of the Jordanian dinar — see Glossary. 

2 Preliminary figures. 

3 Includes net private and net government unrequited transfers (i.e., worker remittances and foreign 
aid, respectively). The combination of net trade in goods and services and net unrequited transfers 
gives the current account balance. 

4 Consists of net government borrowing as well as long- and short-term net private investment. 

5 Consists of the current and capital account balances combined. 

6 Includes reserves held by the Central Bank, commercial banks, and other financial institutions, as 
well as International Monetary Fund reserves. 

Source: Based on information from Jordan, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 
1987, 38, Amman, 1988, 362-63. 



284 



Appendix 



Table 6. Summary of Central Government Budget Financing, 1983-87 
(in millions of Jordanian dinars) 1 





1983 


1984 


1985 


1986 


1987 


Revenue 












Domestic revenue 


. . . 400.6 


415.0 


440.8 


514.4 


549.7 


Foreign assistance 


. . . 197.0 


106.1 


187.8 


143.7 


134.0 


Internal borrowing 


28.8 


25.5 


35.3 


74.8 


149.3 




if, ft 


1 99 9 


1 fi9 A 


1 ft 


ftQ Q 


Other revenue 2 


2.3 


9.6 


18.4 


12.8 


14.6 


Total revenues 


705.5 


678.4 


844.8 3 


905.4 3 


937.5 


Expenditure 














, . , 453.7 


488.1 


542.5 


570.5 


604.5 


Capital budget 


. 251.6 


232.7 


263.2 


410.8 


404.2 


Total expenditures . . . 


705.3 


720.8 


805.7 


981.3 


1,008.7 


Deficit or surplus 


+ .2 


-42.4 


+ 39.1 


- 75.9 


-71.3 



1 For value of the Jordanian dinar — see Glossary. 

2 Principal of loans repaid to the central government. 

3 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. 

Source: Based on information from Jordan, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 
1987, 38, Amman, 1988, 312. 



285 



Jordan: A Country Study 



Table 7. Central Government Expenditures, 1983-87 
(in millions of Jordanian dinars) 1 





1983 


1984 


1985 


1986 


1987 2 


Current budget 














. . . . 168.0 


168.0 


190.2 


209.0 


209.0 




. . . . 32.6 


33.5 


39.3 


47.0 


50.4 




128.4 


154.6 


171.3 


158.2 


174.5 




15.3 


14.3 


15.2 


16.7 


18.1 




. . . . 80.0 


82.7 


89.7 


98.6 


110.2 


Transportation and 












communications 


11.7 


16.3 


17.1 


18.6 


19.1 


Other 


17.7 


18.7 


19.8 


22.5 


23.4 


Total current expenditures . . . 


453.7 


488.1 


542.6 


570.6 


604.7 


Capital budget 














88.8 


86.2 


99.0 


225.7 


189.0 




. . . , 130.6 


122.5 


144.4 


162.9 


178.4 


Transportation and 












communications 


20.2 


12.7 


7.1 


8.1 


12.0 




6.9 


5.1 


5.5 


6.5 


10.1 



















Other 


5.1 


6.2 


7.2 


7.6 


14.7 


Total capital expenditures .... 


. . . . 251.6 


232.7 


263.2 


410.8 


404.2 


TOTAL 


. , . 705.3 


720.8 


805.8 


981.4 


1,008.9 



1 For value of the Jordanian dinar — see Glossary. 

2 Preliminary estimate. 

Source: Based on information from Jordan, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 
1987, 38, Amman, 1988, 315-16. 



286 



Appendix 



Table 8. Domestic Revenue of the Central Government, 1983-87 
(in millions of Jordanian dinars) 1 



Revenue Source 


1983 


1984 


1985 


1986 


1987 


Tax revenues 














121 


118 


118 


112 


105 




35 


37 


46 


52 


61 




68 


73 


71 


71 


85 




1 9 


1 7 
1 / 


ID 


1 A 
1$ 


ID 




9**7 


94. R 


9^0 
ZDU 


94.Q 


ZOO 




A C. 




Z.A 


A O 


A O 




10 


12 


13 


12 


17 




56 


61 


67 


60 


65 




294 


305 


317 


309 


331 


Nontax revenues 














23 


33 


38 


46 


48 




59 


36 


44 


40 


49 


Other 


24 


40 


41 


120 


123 


Total nontax revenues 3 


107 


110 


124 


205 


219 




401 


415 


441 


514 


550 



1 For value of the Jordanian dinar — see Glossary. 

2 Preliminary figures. 

3 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. 

Source: Based on information from Jordan, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 
1987, 38, Amman, 1988, 313. 



Table 9. Labor Force by Sector, 1987 
(in thousands of workers) 



Sector Number 



Agriculture 37.7 

Construction 53.4 

Financial and business services 16.9 

Mining and manufacturing 53.6 

Social services and military personnel 242.5 

Trade 49.7 

Transportation and communications 47.1 

Utilities 8.5 



Total active labor force 509.3 * 



* Figures may not add to total because of rounding. Total excludes foreign guest workers. 

Source: Based on information from Jordan, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 
1987, 38, Amman, 1988, 69. 



287 



Jordan: A Country Study 



Table 10. Industrial Production of Selected Commodities, 1984-87 



Commodity 


Unit 


1984 


1985 


1986 


1987 


Phosphstcs (dry) 


1,000 


tons 


6,120 


6,067 


6,249 


6,841 


Potash 


1,000 


tons 


486 


908 


1,104 


1,203 




1,000 


tons 


541 


511 


551 


1^656 


Cement 


1,000 


tons 


1,994 


2,022 


1,837 


2,472 




1,000 


tons 


2,272 


2,182 


2,083 


2,229 




1,000 


tons 


112 


136 


126 


219 




1,000 


liters 


7,573 


5,638 


5,321 


4,851 




1,000 


batteries 


50 


50 


55 


55 






tons 


5,027 


3,905 


3,731 


4,378 




1,000 


tons 


12 


8 


28 


27 




1,000 


tons 






15 


21 



means negligible. 



Source: Based on information from Jordan, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 
1987, 38, Amman, 1988, 123-24. 



Table 11. Agricultural Production and Cultivated Area, 1987 
(in thousands of tons and by thousands of hectares) 



Crop Harvest Area 



Field Crops 

Wheat 79.8 84.3 

Barley 33.0 51.1 

Lentils 5.2 5.1 

Vetch 1.3 1.5 

Chick peas 1.2 1.6 

Corn 3.0 0.5 

Onions 21.6 0.8 

Garlic 2.0 0.4 

Tobacco 29.1 3.0 

Clover 9.1 0.6 

Vegetables 

Tomatoes 236.8 6.0 

Squash 34.3 2.2 

Eggplants 56.6 2.5 

Cucumbers 64.9 1.3 

Potatoes 61.7 2.4 

Fruits 

Olives 20.4 38.1 

Grapes 18.6 5.4 

Citrus fruit 118.4 5.6 

Melons 41.1 5.1 

Figs 1.3 0.6 

Almonds 1.1 0.5 

Peaches 1.4 0.7 



Source: Based on information from Jordan, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 
1987, 38, Amman, 1988, 80, 84, 93. 



288 



Appendix 



Table 12. Imports of Selected Commodities, 1983-87 
(in millions of Jordanian dinars) * 



Commodity 


1983 


1984 


1985 


1986 


1987 




21.6 


5.9 


8.6 


2.9 


3.6 


Meat 


24.6 


23.0 


33.2 


24.3 


27.0 


Dairy products 


15.5 


16.8 


17.9 


17.0 


15.8 


Wheat and flour 


32.8 


39.1 


28.2 


15.8 


28.7 


Sugar 


6.5 


5.2 


3.6 


8.7 


9.3 


Fruit*! ^ n rl vpcrpt^nlps 


32 3 


27.8 


25.4 


25.4 


16.5 




. . . 205.5 


204.0 


192.6 


92.8 


118.6 


Other crude materials 


31.4 


29.9 


33.1 


28.6 


28.5 




57.8 


79.9 


67.6 


74.9 


91.7 




40.7 


37.1 


41.8 


41.9 


51.1 




32.0 


30.1 


29.2 


26.1 


29.5 




167.0 


122.8 


112.8 


103.2 


103.0 


Transportation equipment 


95.0 


93.0 


94.6 


73.4 


83.3 


Miscellaneous manufacturing . . . 


92.3 


95.9 


105.2 


79.9 


87.7 


Other 


218.3 


260.8 


280.6 


235.3 


221.2 


TOTAL 


1,103.3 


1,071.3 


1,074.4 


850.2 


915.5 



* For value of the Jordanian dinar — see Glossary. 



Source: Based on information from Jordan, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 
1987, 38, Amman, 1988, 349-50. 



Table 13. Exports of Selected Commodities, 1983-87 
(in millions of Jordanian dinars) * 



Commodity 


1983 


1984 


1985 


1986 


1987 




7.6 


8.4 


7.5 


8.5 


5.2 


Vegetables 


17.6 


18.6 


16.6 


13.3 


14.8 


Olive oil 


1.0 


0.9 


0.1 


1.4 


0.2 




51.6 


69.6 


66.1 


64.8 


61.0 


Potash 


0.1 


14.9 


30.9 


31.4 


28.0 




20.7 


44.0 


30.6 


29.1 


30.1 


Other chemical products 


16.1 


23.6 


20.4 


15.4 


39.8 


Cement 




2.9 


7.1 


4.0 


10.5 


Machinery and transportation 














2.0 


2.0 


2.0 


1.4 


2.5 




2.1 


5.1 


10.0 


3.31 


1.2 




9.2 


23.4 


18.5 


7.3 


9.9 


Other 


32.1 


47.7 


45.5 


45.7 


35.6 


TOTAL 


160.1 


261.1 


255.3 


225.6 


248.8 



- - - means negligible. 

* For value of the Jordanian dinar — see Glossary. 



Source: Based on information from Jordan, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 
1987, 38, Amman, 1988, 347-48. 



289 



Jordan: A Country Study 



Tables 14. Principal Trade Partners, 1986 and 1987 
(in thousands of Jordanian dinars) * 



Country 1986 1987 



Exports 

China 7,570 10,044 

Egypt 3,9791 3,448 

India 34,126 22,034 

Iraq 42,458 59,865 

Italy 7,099 9,266 

Kuwait 8,813 8,614 

Pakistan 3,456 10,253 

Saudi Arabia 27,817 26,204 

Imports 

Britain 68,786 58,303 

Iraq 80,274 99,401 

Italy 50,220 46,647 

Japan 66,642 55,664 

Saudi Arabia 49,670 76,761 

Turkey 27,467 35,021 

United States 75,529 93,389 

West Germany 65,114 70,504 



* For value of the Jordanian dinar — see Glossary. 

Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Jordan, No. 
3, 1988, Appendix 2. 



290 



Appendix 



Table 15. Major Army Equipment, 1988 



Type and Description 



Country of 
Origin 



In 

Inventory 



Tanks 

M-60A1/A3 United States 

Khalid (Chieftain) Britain 

Tariq (Centurion) -do- 

M-47, M-48A5 United States 

Armored personnel carriers 

M-113 United States 

Saracen Britain 

EE- 11 Urutu Brazil 



218 
270 
291 

200 (in storage) 



1,200 
34 
n.a. 



Reconnaissance vehicles 
Ferret scout car . . . 



Britain 



140 



Towed artillery 

105mm M-101A1 United States 



155mm M-114 . . . 

M-44 

M-59 

203mm M-115 . . . 

Self-propelled artillery 
155mm M-109A2 . 
203mm MHO 



-do- 
-do- 
-do- 
-do- 



-do- 
-do- 



36 
38 
20 
17 

4 (in storage) 



108 
24 



Mortars 

107mm and 120mm 



-do- 



Antitank weapons 





-do- 


330 


Apilas 112mm rocket launcher 


.... France 


n.a. 


BGM-71A TOW missile 




330 




-do- 


310 


LAW-80 




n.a. 



Antiaircraft guns 

20mm M-163 Vulcan 

23mm self-propelled ZSU-23- 
40mm self-propelled M-42 . 



United States 
Soviet Union 
United States 



Surface-to-air missiles 

SA-7 B2 shoulder-fired Soviet Union 

SA-8 -do- 

SA-13 -do- 

SA-14 shoulder-fired -do- 
Redeye United States 



100 
36 
264 



n.a. 
20 
20 

n.a. 

n.a. 



Naval vessels 

Coastal patrol craft, 8 ton -do- 5 

Vosper coastal patrol craft, 95 ton Britain 3 (ordered) 

n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1988-89, London, 1988, 104; and 
Jane's Fighting Ships, 1988-89, London, 1988, 332. 



291 



Jordan: A Country Study 



Table 16. Major Air Force Equipment, 1988 



Type and Description 



Country of 
Origin 



In 

Inventory 



Fighter-bombers 

F-5E/F United States 

Fighter-Interceptors 

Mirage F-l France 

Mirage 2000 -do- 
Jet fighter conversion training 

F-5A/B United States 

Transports 

C-130 Hercules United States 

CASA C-212A Spain 

An- 12 Cub Soviet Union 

Helicopters 

Bell AH- IS Cobra, with TOW missiles . United States 
Sikorsky S-76 -do- 
Aerospatiale Alouette III France 

Aerospatiale SA-342L Gazelle -do- 
Hughes 500D United States 

Training 

CASA C-101 Aviojet Spain 

CASA C-212 Aviocar Spain 

BAe Bulldog Britain 

Piper (12 Warrior-II and 6 Seneca-II) . . United States 



59 



35 



20 (ordered 1988) 



20 



24 
18 
5 
8 



Strategic air defense 

Improved Hawk surface-to-air missile 



United States 



126 



Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1988-89, London, 1988, 105; and 
Aviation Advisory Services, International Air Forces and Military Aircraft Directory, Es- 
sex, United Kingdom, 1988. 



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gust 1988, 325-44. 

Wilson, Rodney J. "The Role of Commercial Banking in the Jor- 
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Badran (eds.), The Economic Development of Jordan. London: Croom 
Helm, 1987. 

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in 
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Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Jordan [London]; For- 
eign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Near East and South 
Asia; Jordan Times [Amman] ; Middle East Economic Digest [London] ; 
Middle East Reporter; Syrie et Monde Arabe [Damascus] ; and Washing- 
ton Post.) 



301 



Jordan: A Country Study 



Chapter 4 

Amnesty International. Amnesty International Report, 1988. London: 
1988. 

Andoni, Lamis. * 'Hussein Throws Out a Multiple Challenge," 
Middle East International [London], No. 331, August 1988, 3-4. 

Aruri, Naseer H. "The PLO and the Jordan Option," Middle East 
Report, No. 131, March-April 1985, 3-9. 

Bailey, Clinton. Jordan's Palestinian Challenge, 1948-1983. Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1984. 

Devlin, John. "Syria and Its Neighbors." Pages 321-41 in Robert 
O. Freedman (ed.), The Middle East after Irangate. Baltimore: Bal- 
timore Hebrew University, 1988. 

Drysdale, Alasdair. "The Asad Regime and Its Troubles," MERIP 
Reports, No. 110, November-December 1982, 3-11. 

Eilts, Hermann. "Reviving the Middle East Peace Process: An 
International Conference?" Middle East Insight, 5, No. 3, August- 
September 1987, 4-13. 

Fernea, Elizabeth, and Robert Fernea. The Arab World: Personal En- 
counters. New York: Anchor Press, 1985. 

Garfinkle, Adam M. "The Importance of Being Hussein: Recent 
Developments in Jordanian Foreign Policy and Their Implica- 
tions for Peace in the Middle East." Pages 291-320 in Robert 
O. Freedman (ed.), The Middle East after Irangate. Baltimore: Bal- 
timore Hebrew University, 1988. 

Gubser, Peter. Jordan: Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events. (Profiles: 
Nations of the Contemporary Middle East Series.) Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1983. 

Hirst, David. The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in 
the Middle East. London: Futura, 1983. 

"Jordan." Pages 1523-38 in The Europa Yearbook, 1986: A World 
Survey, 1. London: Europa, 1986. 

Khalidi, Rashid. "PNC Strengthens Palestinian Hand," Middle 
East Report, No. 147, July-August 1987, 38-39. 

Matusky, Gregory, and John Hayes. King Hussein. New York: 
Chelsea House, 1987. 

Peaslee, Amos J. Constitutions of Nations, 2. (3d ed.) The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1966. 

Peretz, Don. The Middle East Today. (2d ed.) Hinsdale, Illinois: 
Dryden Press, 1971. 

Political Handbook of the World, 1986. (Ed., Arthur S. Banks.) Bing- 
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"Political Rights and Censorship in Jordan," Middle East Report, 
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Pollock, David. "Israel's National Unity: Solution or Stalemate?" 
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Rubenberg, Cheryl. The Palestine Liberation Organization: Its Institu- 
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Satloff, Robert B. "Repression in Irbid: Raising the Stakes in Jor- 
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Sennitt, Andrew G. (ed.). World Radio TV Handbook, 1989. 
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Tyler, Patrick. "Hussein Shuffles Cabinet, Putting Palace Loyalists 
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United States. Department of State. "Jordan." Pages 1200-1208 
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Wilson, Rodney J. "Jordan's Trade: Past Performance and Fu- 
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Wright, Robin. "Three New Dimensions of Palestinian Politics," 
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"The Middle East and the Cost of the Politics of Force," 

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Glubb, John Bagot. A Soldier with the Arabs. London: Hodder and 
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International Air Forces and Military Aircraft Directory. Stapleford Air- 
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Wilson, Mary C. "Jordan's Malaise," Current History, 86, No. 517, 
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305 



Glossary 



dinar — Basic currency unit consisting of 1 ,000 fils; created in 1950 
as replacement for the Palestinian pound. Dinar's value was 
established at parity with the British pound sterling, or a value 
of US$2.80 equal to JD1 . Jordan, as a member of the sterling 
area, maintained parity with the British pound until 1967 when 
the British devalued their currency. Jordan did not follow the 
pound, retaining the dinar at US$2.80 equal to JD1 through 
1972. When United States currency was devalued in 1973, the 
dinar was unlinked from the dollar, since which time the rate 
has fluctuated. Beginning in February 1975, the dinar was 
pegged to the special drawing right (SDR — q.v.). According 
to International Monetary Fund (IMF — q.v.) data, the aver- 
age conversion rate of the dinar for trade and other purposes 
was US$3.04 in 1987, US$2. 10 in 1988, and US$1.54 in 1989. 

East Bank — The area east of the Jordan River, the Dead Sea, and 
the series of wadis from the Dead Sea to the Gulf of Aqaba. 
Roughly the former Amirate of Transjordan. 

GDP (gross domestic product) — A value measure of the flow of 
domestic goods and services produced by an economy over a 
period of time, such as a year. Only output values of goods 
for final consumption and for intermediate production are 
assumed to be included in final prices. GDP is sometimes aggre- 
gated and shown at market prices, meaning that indirect taxes 
and subsidies are included; when these have been eliminated, 
the result is GDP at factor cost. The word gross indicates that 
deductions for depreciation of physical assets have not been 
made. 

GNP (gross national product) — GDP (q.v.) plus the net income 
or loss stemming from transactions with foreign countries. GNP 
is the broadest measurement of the output of goods and ser- 
vices by an economy. It can be calculated at market prices, 
which include indirect taxes and subsidies. Because indirect 
taxes and subsidies are only transfer payments, GNP is often 
calculated at factor cost, removing indirect taxes and subsidies. 

imam — A word used in several senses. In general use and lower- 
cased, it means the leader of congregational prayers; as such 
it implies no ordination or special spiritual powers beyond suffi- 
cient education to carry out this function. It is also used figura- 
tively by many Sunni (q. v. ) Muslims to mean the leader of the 
Islamic community. Among Shia (q.v.) Muslims, the word is 



307 



Jordan: A Country Study 

usually upper-cased and takes on many complex and controver- 
sial meanings; in general, however, it indicates that particular 
descendant of the Party of Ali who is believed to have been 
God's designated repository of the spiritual authority inher- 
ent in that line. The identity of this individual and the means 
of ascertaining his identity have been the major issues causing 
divisions among Shias. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with the 
World Bank (q. v. ) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency 
affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabiliz- 
ing international exchange rates and payments. The main busi- 
ness of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members 
(including industrialized and developing countries) when they 
experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans fre- 
quently carry conditions that require substantial internal 
economic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are de- 
veloping countries. 

Palestinian — Narrowly, a citizen of the British mandated territory 
of Palestine (1922-48). Generally, a Muslim or Christian native 
or descendant of a native of the region between the Egyptian 
Sinai and Lebanon and west of the Jordan River-Dead Sea-Gulf 
of Aqaba line who identifies himself primarily as a Palestinian. 

sharia — Body of Islamic law. Courts applying this law are known 
as sharia courts. 

sharif (Arabic pi., ashraf) — An individual who claims to be and is 
accepted as a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad through 
his daughter Fatima. 

shaykh — Leader or chief. Word used to mean either a political 
leader or a learned religious leader. Also used as an honorific. 
Frequently spelled sheikh or sheik. 

Shia (also Shiite, from Shiat Ali, the Party of Ali) — A member of 
the smaller of the two great divisions of Islam. Shias supported 
the claims of Ali and his line to presumptive right to the caliph- 
ate and leadership of the Muslim community, and on this issue 
they divided from the Sunnis (q. v.) in the first great schism 
within Islam, Later schisms have produced further divisions 
among the Shias over the identity and number of Imams (q. v.). 
Shias revere Twelve Imams, the last of whom is believed to 
be in hiding. 

special drawing right(s) (SDR) — a monetary unit of the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund (IMF — q. v. ) based on a basket of inter- 
national currencies consisting of the United States dollar, the 
German deutschmark, the Japanese yen, the British pound ster- 
ling, and the French franc. 



308 



) 



Glossary 



Sunni (from sunna, orthodox) — A member of the larger of the two 
great divisions of Islam. Sunnis supported the traditional 
method of election to the caliphate and accepted the Umayyad 
line. On this issue they divided from the Shia (q. v.) Muslims 
in the first great schism within Islam. 

Transjordanian — Narrowly, a citizen of the Amirate of Transjordan 
(1921-46). Generally, a Muslim or Christian native of the 
region east of the Jordan River-Dead Sea-Gulf of Aqaba line 
and within the approximate boundaries of the contemporary 
state of Jordan, that is, of the East Bank (q.v.). 

West Bank — The area west of the Jordan River and the Dead Sea, 
which was annexed by Jordan in 1950. Area has been under 
Israeli occupation since the June 1967 War. In July 1988, King 
Hussein renounced Jordan's claim to the West Bank. 

World Bank — Informal name used to designate a group of three 
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International 
Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the 
primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for 
productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but 
administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to 
furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much 
easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, 
founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD 
through loans and assistance specifically designed to encourage 
the growth of productive private enterprises in the less devel- 
oped countries. The president and certain senior officers of the 
IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The three institu- 
tions are owned by the governments of the countries that sub- 
scribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, 
member states must first belong to the International Mone- 
tary Fund (IMF— q.v.). 



309 



Index 



Abbasids, 12 

Abdul Hamid II (sultan), 18, 20 

Abdul Huda family, 197 

Abdullah (king of Jordan), xxi, 3-4, 29, 
194; accepts UN partition plan (1947), 
28; as amir, 26, 92; becomes king of 
Jordan (1948), xxi, 29; early career of, 
18, 20, 21, 23, 25; as leader of Arab 
forces (1948), 28; role in formation of 
Arab League by, 27 

Abraham (Ibrahim), 5, 107 

Abu Ammar. See Arafat, Yasir 

Abu Bakr, 12, 105 

Abu Daud. Daud Auda, Muhammad 
Abu Musa: leads Al Fatah Uprising, 205, 

207; role in Al Fatah of, 205 
Abu Nidal, 205, 207 
Abu Nidal faction, 181, 232 
Abu Nuwar, Ali, 32, 33, 34 
Abu Talib, Fathi, 242 
ACDA. See United States 
Achaemenid Empire, 7 
Afghanistan, 55, 56 
Africa, 174 

agreements: Arab Solidarity Agreement 
(1957), 32-33; armistice (1949), 28-29; 
for arms with Soviet Union, 261; be- 
tween Britain and Transjordan, 26-27; 
cease-fire in Jordanian civil war, 42-43; 
Hadda Agreement (1925), 67; between 
Jordanian government and PLO, xxvi, 
41 ; Jordanian-Palestinian peace frame- 
work (1985), 201; long-term trade, 160; 
for Saudi Arabia and Jordan border, 
37; Sykes-Picot (1916), 21; trade, 
173-74 

Agricultural Credit Corporation, 174 

agricultural sector: development policy 
for, 169; economic performance of, 
130, 166; factors limiting potential of, 
xxiv, 168-69; foreign guest workers in, 
166; incentives and subsidies in, 169; 
introduction of, 5; irrigation in, 166; 
livestock production in, 170; produc- 
tion in, 167 

air bases, 227, 248-49 

aircraft assembly industry, 264-65 

airfields, 158 



air force. See Royal Jordanian Air Force 
airline, 157-58 
airports, 158 

AJNDB. See Arab Jordanian Nationalist 

Democratic Bloc (AJNDB) 
Al Ahd (The Covenant Society), 18 
Al Aqabah (port) (see also entrepot status; 

Iraq), xxiv, xxix, 155, 156-57, 213, 264 
Al Aqabah Ports Corporation, 157 
Al Aqabah Railway Corporation, 155 
Al Aqabah Thermal Power Station, 154 
Alexander the Great, 7 
ALF. See Arab Liberation Front (ALF) 
Al Fatah (Palestine National Liberation 
Movement) (see also Palestine Libera- 
tion Organization), 37, 40; ALF aligns 
with, 206; composition and objectives 
of, 203, 205; demands government 
overthrow, 43; as guerrilla group, 203; 
representation on PNC Executive 
Committee of, 208 
Al Fatah Revolutionary Council, 205 
Al Fatah Uprising, 205 
Al Fatat (The Young Arabs), 18 
Algeria, 131 

Al Ghawr. &<? Jordan Valley 

Al Ghor. See Jordan Valley 

Algiers Arab summit (1988), xxvii 

Alia (queen of Jordan), 196 

Ali (caliph), 12, 105 

Allenby, Edmund, 22 

Al Mafraq air base, 227, 248-49 

Al Mufti family, 197 

Al Wahdah Dam, 165 

Amirate of Transjordan (see also Abdul- 
lah (king of Jordan)): administration of, 
26; Arab Army (Al Jaysh al Arabi) of, 
234; established (1921), 3, 26; police 
units and military force in, 233; popu- 
lation composition of, 65 

Amman (see also Philadelphia): history of, 
92; population composition in, 92- 
93 

Amman Arab summit (1981), 4, 56 
Amman Central Prison, 277-78 
Amman Financial Market, 139, 174, 

175-76 
Ammon, 6 



311 



Jordan: A Country Study 



Amnesty International, 270, 276, 278 
Amorites, 5 
Anatolia, 5 

Anglo-Jordanian Agreement (1948), 33, 
218 

Anti-Communist Law (1957), 197 

antiterrorism program, 267 

Antoun, Richard, 87 

AOPEC . See Arab Organization of Petro- 
leum Exporting Countries (AOPEC) 

Arab Air Cargo, 158 

Arab Army (Al Jaysh al Arabi). See 
Amirate of Transjordan; Arab Legion 

Arab Bank, 174, 176 

Arab Company for Maritime Transport, 
138 

Arab Constitutional Alignment, 59 

Arab Constitutionalist Party, 197 

Arab Cooperation Council (1989), xxv, 
173, 214, 219, 227 

Arabia as Roman province, 9 

Arabian Peninsula, 10 

Arabic language, 12, 65, 79; dialects of, 
80; of Semitic origin, 80-81; three 
forms of, 80 

Arab International Hotels, 138 

Arab Investment Company, 138 

Arab Islamic Coalition, xxix 

Arab-Israeli wars: in 1948, xxi, 235-36; 
effect of, 224; June 1967, or Six-Day 
War, xxii, 3-4, 38, 66, 216, 236-38, 
247; October 1973, 45-46, 216, 225, 
238, 247, 261-62 

Arab Jordanian Nationalist Democratic 
Bloc (AJNDB), xxix, xxx 

Arab Land Bank, 176 

Arab League. See League of Arab States 
(Arab League) 

Arab Legion (see also Jordan Arab Army), 
3, 27; air force unit of, 236; in Arab- 
Israeli war (1948), 235-36; composi- 
tion and role in Jordan of, 30, 31, 
234; development of support for, 252; 
effect of Transjordan Frontier Force 
on, 235; invades Israel (1948), 28; 
Public Security Force as outgrowth of, 
265; recruitment for, 252; strength- 
ening of, 235; subsidy from Britain for, 
xxi, 251-52, 260; Transjordan police 
and reserve force in, 26 

Arab Legion Air Force (see also Royal Jor- 
danian Air Force), 247 

Arab Liberation Front (ALF), 206 



Arab National Party, 59 

Arab nations: foreign relations with, 
212-15; military cooperation with, 
263-65; reject Camp David Accords, 
53; trade relations with, 173 

Arab Organization of Petroleum Export- 
ing Countries (AOPEC), 131 

Arab Pharmaceutical Manufacturing 
Company, 138, 152 

Arab Potash Company, 149, 161 

Arab revival, 17 

Arab Revolt, 3, 21, 22 

Arab Satellite Organization (Arabsat), 
159 

Arabs in Jordan, 76-77 

Arab Solidarity Agreement (1957), 

32-33, 34 
Arab Union, 35 
Arab Wings, 158 

Arafat, Yasir: addresses UN General As- 
sembly, 47; as chairman of PNC Ex- 
ecutive Committee, 203, 208; as 
commander of PL A, 42; endorses Sad- 
dam Husayn, xxx; as leader of Al 
Fatah, 37, 203; as leader of PLO, 40; 
opposition to, 205, 233; relations with 
King Hussein of, xxvi, 60, 199-201; 
visits Egypt (1983), 213 

Aramaic language, 7 

Arif, Abd as Salaam, 35 

armed forces (see also Jordan Arab Army): 
compared to Syrian and Israeli, 226; 
devotion to King Hussein of, 252; 
Palestinians in, 253, 254; pay scales and 
benefits of, 255-56; as protection for 
monarchy, 238; public services by, 
241; ranks and insignia of, 256; recruit- 
ment policy of, 251; relative size of, 
251 

Armed Forces General Command staff, 
242-43 

Armenians in Jordan, 78 

armor rebuild facility, 265 

army. See Arab Legion; Jordan Arab Army 

Asia Minor Agreement. See Sykes-Picot 
Agreement 

Assad, Hafiz al, 4; objection to Hussein's 
proposals (1979), 54; relations with Jor- 
dan of, 50-51 

As Saiqa, 206, 207 

assassinations: of Abdullah, king of Jor- 
dan, xxi, 29-30, 229; attempted, 229, 
232; claims of Black September for, 



312 



Index 



198; of Faisal (Iraq), 35; of Majali (1958), 
36; of Sadat (1981), 61; of Tal, 44 
Assyria, 7 

austerity program, xxiv, xxviii, 137, 141 
Ayatollah Khomeini. ^Khomeini, Say- 

yid Ruhollah Musavi 
Ayyubid Sultanate, 13 
Azraq ash Shishan air base, 248 
Az Zarqa affair, 34 
Az Zarqa River, 68 

Babylon, 7 

Badran, Mudar, xxvi, xxix, 49-50, 60, 
187 

Badran family, 197 

Baghdad Conference (summit) (1978), 53, 
131, 188, 212-13, 250, 260 

Baghdad Pact (see also Central Treaty Or- 
ganization (CENTO)), 31, 32 

Baghdad summit (1990), xxvii 

Bahai religion, xxvi, 114 

Bahrain, 215 

balance of payments, xxviii, 127, 131, 251 
Balfour Declaration (1917), 3; opposition 

to, 23; provisions of, 22 
banking system, xxiv, 127, 129, 133, 

174-76; disbursement of West Bank aid 

funds, 202 
Banna, Sabri Khalil al. See Abu Nidal 
Barhoum, Mohammad, 102 
Bashan, 6 

Battle of Hattin (1187), 13 

Battle of Uhud (636), 10 

beduins (see also tribalism): in army and 
Arab Legion, 85, 252; effect of chang- 
ing circumstances on, 82-83; honor 
(ird) among, 82; importance of tribal- 
ism among, 76, 81-86; in Jordan, 30; 
nomadic and seminomadic, 75, 81-82; 
support for monarchy by, 196, 235, 
240, 252 

Begin, Menachem, 53, 59 

Begin administration (Israel), 5 

Bernadotte, Folke, 28 

Bevin, Ernest, 27 

black market, xxiv, 137 

Black September faction, 44, 181, 198, 
232, 233 

border: with Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Ara- 
bia, 67, 226, 227; with Israel (de jure), 
xxii, 66, 224; between Jordan and Sau- 
di Arabia, 37 



border dispute: with Israel, 31, 32, 66; 
Syria-Israel, 37 

Brezhnev, Leonid, 47, 52 

Britain: defeats Turks (1918), 23; eco- 
nomic assistance from, 260; mandate 
for Palestine and Iraq of, 3, 23, 24-25, 
235; Middle East policy of (1916), 
20-22; military presence (1924), 234; 
relations of Jordan with, 29-32, 174, 
218; role in Palestine Mandate deci- 
sions of, 20-25; role in Transjordan of, 
26-28; sells military equipment, 260, 
262; withdraws all troops from Jordan 
(1957), 33 

British Army Staff College, 257 

British Bank of the Middle East, 176 

budget deficit, 141 

buffer zone, 3 

Bunche, Ralph, 28 

Bureau of Occupied Homeland Affairs (see 
also Ministry of Occupied Territories), 
49-50, 188 

Bush, George, xxix 

Byzantine Empire, 10, 13 



cabinet. See Council of Ministers 
Cairo-Amman Bank, 176 
Cairo Conference (1964), 36 
Cairo summit (1973), 45 
Cairo summit (1976), 49 
camel herding, 81 

Camp David Accords (1978), xxii, 4, 53, 
199; effect on PLO of, xxvi; Hussein's 
alternative to, 54; process for, 53, 210, 
216 

Canaan, 5, 6 

canal, 165, 168 

capital flows, 127, 130, 133, 136, 175 
Carter, Jimmy, 52, 53 
Catholic Church: Greek, 113; Roman, 
113 

censorship, 219 

CENTO. See Central Treaty Organiza- 
tion (CENTO) 
Central Bank of Jordan, 135, 140, 174 
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 
31 

charitable organizations, 121-22 
Chase Manhattan Bank, 176 
Chelhod, Joseph, 84 
chemical industry, xxiv, 151 
China, People's Republic of, 161, 173 



313 



Jordan: A Country Study 



Christianity: in Byzantine Empire, 10; 
Jordanians practicing, xxvi, 77-78, 
104; as religious minority, 112 

Christian sects: Catholic, 112-13; Eastern 
Orthodox, 112; Protestant, 113-14; re- 
ligious courts for, 191 

Churchill, Winston, 25 

Circassians: among political elite, 197; in 
Jordan, 16, 78-79, 92, 231 

Citibank, 176 

civil courts, 191 

civil servants, 187-88 

civil war: in Lebanon, 51; with PLO 
guerrillas (1970-71), xxii, 42, 193, 
198-99, 215-16, 233 

class structure. See social structure 

climate, 71-72 

colleges, 116-17 

commodity distribution, 140 

communism, 34, 197, 206, 207, 231-32 

Communist Party of Jordan (Al Hizb ash 
Shuyui al Urduni), 197, 231-32 

community colleges, 116-17 

conscription system, xxviii, 236; after re- 
form, 254-55; emergency act for 
(1966), 254 

Constantinople, 10, 13 

Constitution: Jordan (1952), 30; amend- 
ments in 1974, 1976, and 1984, 182- 
83, 190; electoral system under, 189; 
legislative powers and responsibilities 
of, 188-89; powers and functions of 
government under, 183; powers of king 
under, 185, 187, 241; provision for in- 
struments for internal security in, 265; 
provisions related to religion in, 103, 
112, 182; right of habeas corpus under, 
275 

constitution: Transjordan (1928), xxi, 26 
constitution: Transjordan (1946), 27, 29 
construction sector, 130 
consulting services industry, 127 
consumption: government, 130; private, 
130 

contraception, 73-74 

corruption, xxviii 

Council of Ministers, 183, 241 

coups d'etat: attempt in Jordan (1957), 
240; in Egypt (1952), 31; in Iran 
(1979), 55; in Iraq (1958), 35 

Court of Appeal, 191-92 

Court of Cassation (supreme court), 
191-92, 276 



courts of first instance, 191, 275 

court system (see also civil courts; courts 
of first instance; magistrates' courts; re- 
ligious courts; special courts), 191-92, 
275-76 

crime, 273-74 

criminal code, 271-73 

criminal law procedures, 274-76 

Crusade, First, 13 

crusaders, 13 

cultural influence: of Palestinians, 76; of 
Western countries, 93 

cultural tradition, Arab-Islamic, 65 

currency, 133; devaluation and depreci- 
ation of, 134, 136-37 

current account. See balance of payments 

Cyrus II (king of Persia), 7 



dam, 165 

Damascus Protocol, 20 

Daud, Muhammad, 42 

Daud Auda, Muhammad, 44 

David (king), 6 

Dead Sea, 66, 71, 161 

debt: external, xxiv, 128, 135-36; inter- 
nal, 142; military, 251, 260 

Decapolis, 9 

defense burden, 128 

defense spending. See spending, govern- 
ment 

defense strategy, 249-50 

deflation, 134 

Democratic Bloc, xxvi 

Democratic Front for the Liberation of 

Palestine (DFLP), 205, 207, 233 
Democratic Unity and Justice Party, xxix 
Department of Social Affairs, 121 
Desert Highway, 154-55 
Desert Mobile Force, 235 
Desert Police Force, 266, 267, 269 
desert region, xxiv, 67-68, 71, 168-69 
DFLP. See Democratic Front for the 

Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) 
Dina Abdul Hamid al Aun, 194 
disease, 119-20 
divorce, 97 
drainage network, 68 
drought, 168, 169 
Druze religion, xxvi, 79, 114 
Dulles, John Foster, 34 



314 



Index 



East Bank, 3; conflict of Jews and Seleu- 
cids in, 9; conversion to Islam in, 10, 
12; decline in importance of, 13; eth- 
nic groups in, 77; neolithic culture set- 
dements in, 5; under Ottoman rule, 16; 
population composition, volume, and 
density of, 65, 72, 74-75; refugees in, 
38; rift with West Bank of, 34 

Eastern Europe, 117 

Eastern Orthodox Church, 112 

East Ghor Canal, 165, 168 

ecclesiastical courts, 191-92 

economic assistance (see also military as- 
sistance): from Arab League nations, 
xxiv, 39, 58, 260; from Arab oil- 
producing countries, xxiv, xxvii, 131, 
212-13, 215, 250, 260, 261; from 
Britain, 31-33, 35, 39, 58, 218; depen- 
dence on, 259-60; estimates of require- 
ments for (1991), xxxi; from European 
Community (EC), 133; foreign, 127, 
130-31, 134, 136, 142; from Iraq 
(1978), 53, 56; from Jordan to Iraq, 
56; from multilateral organizations, 
131; proportion of revenue from, xxv; 
from Qatar and Abu Dhabi, 39; from 
United States, 34-35, 131, 168, 215, 
218; used for development planning, 
142-43; to West Bank Palestinians, 
xxvii, 57; from West Germany, 39 

economic development, 129 

economic performance, 127-29, 181-82, 
223-24, 250 

economic planning. See Five-Year Plans 

economic policy (see also austerity pro- 
gram; import substitution): austerity 
measures of, xxiv, xxxviii, 137, 141; for 
industry and manufacture, 149-53; of 
self-sufficiency, xxiv, 47-48, 128; for 
subsidies, 140-41 

economy: effect of West Bank loss (1967) 
on, 128; government role in, xxiv, 
137-41, 174; recession in, 181-82 

Edom, 6 

Edomites, 6 

education (see also students): for children 
of military personnel, 257; effect of 
modern, 101-3, 110; government 
spending for, 114; students studying 
abroad, 117, 231 

education system (see also community 
colleges; literacy; military training; 
schools; universities), 66; in Amirate of 



Transjordan, 114-15; effect of upgrad- 
ed, xxiii, 76; opportunities for females 
in, 100, 102-3; universities and com- 
munity colleges in, 116-17 
Egypt: Arab ostracism of (1978-79), 
xxvii, 4; attacked by Britain (1956), 32; 
attacks Israel (1948), 28; attacks Israel 
(1973), 45; conflict with Hittites of, 5-6; 
forms United Arab Republic with Syria, 
35; military alliance with Jordan of 
(1967), 38; ostracized from Arab League 
(1978), 53, 56; payments to Jordan 
(1957), 32-33; relations of Jordan with, 
xxvii, 53-54, 133, 212-14, 226-27; as 
republic (1952), 31; trade relations with, 
173 

Egyptian Free Officers movement, 31 

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 34 

Eisenhower Doctrine, 34 

Elat as ancient port, 6 

elections, 1989-90, xxv, xxviii-xxix 

electoral system, 189-90 

electricity: delivery of, 153-54; demand 

for, 153; hydroelectric station for, 154 
Encouragement of Investment Law (1984), 

140 

endogamy, 82, 86, 96-97 
engineering industries, 129, 152 
entrepot status, xxiv, xxviii, xxx, 127, 133, 
264 

Enver Pasha, 18 

Eshkol, Levi, 38, 40 

European Community (EC): economic as- 
sistance from, 133; imports from, 218 

exchange rate system, xxiv, 137, 176 

exports: changes in composition of, 
172-73; development of industries for, 
xxiv; economic performance of, 58, 170; 
of food supplies, 167-68; incentives for, 
xxv; to Iraq, 213; to Persian Gulf coun- 
tries, 215; of phosphates, 127, 160, 215; 
as proportion of GDP, 130; reexports of 
entrepot products, xxiv, xxviii, xxx, 127, 
133, 264 



Fahmi, Ismail, 46 

Faisal I (son of Hussein Ali Al Hashimi), 

18, 20-23; as king of Iraq, 25, 194 
Faisal II (king of Iraq), 35 
Faisal (king of Saudi Arabia), 45 
family planning, 73 

family structure: allocation of household 



315 



Jordan: A Country Study 



space in, 98; honor (ird) in, 99; house- 
hold in, 95-96, 98-99; individual 
subordinate in, 96 

Fatimids, 12, 13 

fedayeen. See guerrillas 

Federal Republic of Germany. See Ger- 
many, West 

fertility rates, 73-75, 92 

fertilizer industry, 160-61 

Fifteen-Point Political Program. See Pales- 
tine Liberation Organization (PLO) 

financial sector, 174-77 

firms: semipublic, xxiv, 138; state-owned, 
149 

fiscal policy (see also budget deficit; reve- 
nues; spending, government; tax poli- 
cy), 129; revenue and taxation of, 142; 
spending estimates in, 141-42 

Five- Year Plans: for 1980-85, 139, 143; 
for 1986-90, 142-44, 148 

Ford, Gerald R., 47 

foreign aid. See economic assistance 

foreign policy, 209-18 

France: mandate for Syria and Lebanon 
of, 23; protection of Catholics by, 16; 
selling of military aircraft and equip- 
ment to Jordan by, 218, 248, 260-62 

Free Officers, 230 

freight companies, 155 

Gardiner, Antoinette, 194 
Gaza Strip, 188 

GDP. See gross domestic product (GDP) 
General Intelligence Department (GID), 
or Dairat al Mukhabarat, xxviii, 
182-83, 196, 197-98; methods of con- 
trol of, 270; responsibilities of, 269-70; 
secret police (Mukhabarat), 182, 196, 
197-98 

General Syrian Congress, 25 

Geneva Conference on the Middle East 

(1977), 50, 52 
geographic location, 3, 59, 66, 127 
Germany, West: broken relations with, 

36-37; proposed new loans from, xxiv; 

trade relations with, 174 
Ghassanids, 10 

GID. General Intelligence Department 

(GID), or Dairat al Mukhabarat 
Gilead, 6, 7 

Glubb, John Bagot (Glubb Pasha), 26-27, 
32, 235, 236, 252 



GNP. See gross national product (GNP) 

Golan Heights, 5, 45, 225 

government: criticism of (1989), xxv, 
xxviii-xxix; executive power of, 183- 
88; judicial power of, 183, 191-93; 
legislative power of, 183, 188-90 

government administration: central, 193; 
governorates or provinces of, 183, 192; 
local, 192-93 

government intervention: in economic ac- 
tivity, xxiv, 137-41; in financial sector, 
174; in media activities, 219-20 

governorates. See government adminis- 
tration 

Greek Catholic Church, 113 
Greek Orthodox Church, 112 
Greek people, 7 
Grindlays Bank, 176 
gross domestic product (GDP), 127-30 
gross national product (GNP), 127 
Gubser, Peter, 79, 81 
guerrilla organizations, 37, 40, 198-209 
guerrillas (see also Black September): Al 
Fatah as organization of, 37, 40; arms 
and funds for, 40; fedayeen as another 
name for, xxii, 37, 40, 232; offensive 
in Jordan by, 41-42; Palestinian, 4, 38, 
197; of PLO, 40, 203; repelling of Is- 
raeli attackers (1968) by, 40-41; Syri- 
an assistance during civil war to, 42 
Gulf Cooperation Council, 214 
Gulf crisis and war (1990-91): effect on 
Jordan of, xxx-xxxi; role of King Hus- 
sein in, xxix-xxx 
Gulf of Aqaba, 38, 66, 67 



Habash, George, 40, 205-6, 207 
Hadda Agreement (1925), 67 
hadith, 104 

hajj (see also Id al Adha), 107-8 

Hajj Amin al Husayni, 29-30 

Halaby, Elizabeth (see also Nur al Hus- 
sein (queen of Jordan)), 196 

hamula or clan, 86-87 

Hasan (crown prince), xxiv, 146, 181, 
196, 242 

Hashim, Ibrahim, 34 

Hashim family, 197 

Hashimite branch (Quraysh tribe), 3,4, 
18, 20 

Hashimite family, 194, 196 
Hashimite kingdoms, 35 



316 



Index 



Hasmonean Dynasty, 9 

Hawatmah, Naif, 205, 207 

health care program: discrimination in 
provision of, 121; family planning 
aspect of, 73; health facilities in, 119; 
hospitals in, 119; personnel in, 118-19; 
physicians in, 118 

Hedjaz-Jordan Railway (see also Hijaz 
Railway), 155 

Hellenistic culture, 7, 9 

Herod (king of Judah), 9 

Herzl, Theodor, 17 

Hiatt, Joseph, 82-83, 84 

High Court of Justice, 192 

Higher Council for Science and Technol- 
ogy, 151 

Higher Jordanian-Palestinian Committee 

(1982), 60 
highlands, 68, 71 

High Tribunal (High Council, or Su- 
preme Council), 192 
Hijab, Nadia, 102 
Hijaz, 20, 21 
Hijaz Railway, 16, 155 
Hittite people, 5 
hoarding, 140 

honor (ird) concept: among beduins, 82; 
in family, 99-100 

House of Islam (Dar al Islam), 10 

Housing Bank, 174 

human rights, 277-78 

Husayn, Saddam, xxiii, xxix, xxx, 213 

Hussein ibn Ali Al Hashimi, 18, 20-24 

Hussein ibn Talal ibn Abdullah ibn Hus- 
sein Al Hashimi (king of Jordan). See 
Hussein (king of Jordan) 

Hussein (king of Jordan), xxii, 4, 29-30; 
advocacy of UN Resolution 242 by, 39; 
agreements with PLO of, xxvi, 42-43; 
assassination attempts against, 223, 
229; attitude toward Palestinians of, 
57-58; biography of, 194, 196; control 
by (1989), 181, 193; criticism of, 
xxviii-xxix; forms military alliance with 
Egypt, 38; government role after June 
1967 War, 38; opposition to, xxvii, 33, 
35, 111-12, 229, 231-22, 232-33; plan 
for Arab federation, 45; plan for Jor- 
danian National Union, 44; political in- 
stability of regime of (1980s), 181-82; 
position on Camp David peace process 
of, 53, 210, 216; proposes strike force 
(1980s), 217; pro- Western position of, 



xxii; relations with Arafat and PLO of, 
xxvi-xxvii, 46-48, 50, 60, 186, 199- 
202, 205-6, 213-14, 232-33; relations 
with beduins of, 84-86, 181, 240; re- 
lations with Egypt of, xxvii, 53-54, 61; 
relations with PFLP, PFLP-GC, and 
DFLP of, 205; relations with PLO of, 
37; relations with Saddam Husayn of, 

xxiii, xxix; relations with Syria of, 
xxvii, 50-56; relations with United 
States of, 215-17; relinquishes sover- 
eignty over West Bank, xxvii, xxviii, 
181, 188, 210, 233; reorganization by, 
48; requests assistance from Iraq 
(1958), 35; role in Arab politics of, 4-5; 
role in Persian Gulf War (1990-91), 
xxix-xxx; seeks to disarm refugee 
camps, 41; stresses self-sufficiency, 

xxiv, 47-48, 128; supports Iraq in 
Iran-Iraq War, xxiii, 56, 111, 213, 
264; supports shah of Iran, 111 

Hussein-McMahon correspondence, 
21-22 

Hussein Thermal Power Station, 153 
Hyksos people, 5 

Id al Adha, 108 
Id al Fitr, 108 
imam, 109 

immigrants in Jordan (see also refugees), 
79, 90, 147 

imports, 127; barriers to entry of, xxiv, 
149-50; changes in composition of, 
172-73; cost of, 134; dependence on, 
128, 134; excess over exports of, 130; 
of food supplies, 167-68; higher duties 
for, 137, 140; of oil, xxx, 134, 154, 
161-62, 174; revenues from, 142; sub- 
sidies for, 150; from United States and 
Western Europe, 170 

import substitution, xxiv, 150 

India, 161, 173 

Indonesia, 173 

Industrial Development Bank, 174 
industrial policy. See economic policy 
inflation, 101, 134, 140, 146, 181 
infrastructure (see also airports; canal; 
dam; port facilities; railroad system): 
development in Transjordan of, 26; loss 
with seizure of West Bank (1967), 128; 
underdevelopment of, 154 
insurance industry, xxiv, 127, 133 



317 



Jordan: A Country Study 



interest rate regulation, 140 

International Committee of the Red 
Cross, 219 

International Criminal Police Organiza- 
tion (Interpol), 273 

International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
xxiv, xxviii 

International Telecommunications Satel- 
lite Organization (Intelsat), 159 

Interpol. See International Criminal Police 
Organization (Interpol) 

intifadah. See Palestinian uprising {intifadah) 

investment: domestic, 130, 139; foreign 
direct, 127, 133, 140; of Jordanian cap- 
ital abroad, 133 

Iran: overthrow of shah in, 4; relations 
with, 218; support in Iran-Iraq War 
for, 4 

Iranian Revolution, 55 
Iran-Iraq War, 4, 56, 60-61, 129, 157; 
effect on Jordan of, xxiv; Hussein sup- 
ports Iraq in, xxiii, xxvii, 56, 111, 213, 
264; Iraqi fighting units after, 226 
Iraq: British mandate for, 23; coup d'etat 
in, 35-36; economic assistance from, 
53, 56, 131; forces invade Israel (1948), 
28; gives military equipment to Jordan, 
213; invades Kuwait (1990), xxviii, 
xxix, xxx ; military strength after Iran- 
Iraq War, 226; proclaims independence 
(1919), 25; relations with, xxvii, 56, 
136, 212-14, 226; support in Iran-Iraq 
War for, 4; trade relations with, 129, 
133, 157, 162, 173 
Iraqi-Jordanian Joint Committee for 
Economic and Technical Cooperation 
(1981), 56 
Iraqi-Jordanian Land Transport Compa- 
ny (IJLTC), 155 
irrigation system, 166, 168-69 
Islam {see also Muslims; Shia Islam; Sun- 
ni Islam): as established religion, 103; 
Jordanians practicing, 77; preparation 
for, 10; in social life, 109; split into two 
branches, 12; spread of, 10, 106; as way 
of life, 104 
Islamic banks, 176-77 
Islamic courts. See sharia courts 
Islamic Investment House, 177 
Islamic law (sharia). See sharia (Islamic 
Law) 

Islamic Liberation Party, 197 

Islamic revival {see also Muslim Brother- 



hood), 110-12, 225, 226, 230 
Israel {see also Arab-Israeli wars; Caza 
Strip; West Bank): accepts UN Reso- 
lution 242 , 40; annexes Golan Heights, 
5; attacked by Syria and Egypt, 45, 
225; bombs PLO Tunisian headquar- 
ters (1985), 201 ; border incidents with 
Jordan of, 31-32; buys U.S. aircraft, 
60; defeats Jordan (1967), 38; establish- 
ment of (1948), 3, 28; foreign policy of 
(1981-82), 5; influence of ancient, 6; 
invaded by Arab forces (1948), 28; 
invades and occupies Lebanon (1982), 
59-60; Likud government of, 4; mili- 
tary forces of, 224; perspective on 
Palestinians of, 39-40; PLO and Al 
Fatah raids against, 37; PNC reso- 
lutions related to (1987), 207; recogni- 
tion by West Germany of, 36-37; 
relations of Jordan with, 209-10, 212; 
retaliation against Jordan by, 31, 32, 
37, 40-41 ; seizes West Bank (1967), 4; 
as threat, xxvii-xxviii, xxxi, 224-25 
Israel Defense Forces (IDF), 225 
Israeli-occupied territories. See Gaza. Strip; 

West Bank 
Israelites: conquer Canaan, 66; deporta- 
tion of, 7 
Italy, 174 



Jabal Ramm (peak), 68 

Jamiat al Arabiyah al Fatat (The Young 

Arab Society). See Al Fatat (The Young 

Arabs) 
Japan, xxiv, 173, 218 
Jardanah, Basil, xxxi 
Jarring, Gunnar, 41, 42 
Jerusalem {see also Latin Kingdom of 

Jerusalem): captured by crusaders, 13; 

occupation by Arab armies (638), 10; 

under Ottoman Empire, 13; partition 

after June 1967 War, 66; reunified 

(1967), 4; seized by Romans, 9; Trans- 

jordan control of, 3 
Jerusalem, East, xxii 
Jesus (Isa), 107 

Jewish kingdoms {see also Judah (Judea)), 
6 

Jewish people, 7 
Jibril, Ahmad, 205-6 
jihad, 108 

Eric Johnston Plan, 31 



318 



Index 



Joint Syrian-Jordanian Economic Com- 
mittee, 173 

Jordan: annexes West Bank (1950), 3, 29; 
East and West Bank elections in (1949), 
29; official name of, 29; peace agree- 
ment with PLO (1985), xxvi; role in 
1973 attack on Israel of, 45; Roman 
ruins in, 9-10 

Jordan Arab Army, 32, 33, 42; accepts 
National Guard members, 252-53; al- 
legiance of, 223, 229-30; beduin- 
dominated, 85, 181, 240; formation 
from Arab Legion of, 236; in October 
1973 War, 238; organization of, 243; 
Palestinians in, 240, 253; quality of, 
xxvii; reform (1976), 254; role in June 
1967 Arab-Israeli War of, 236-38; size 
of, 241 

Jordan Cement Factories Company, 138, 
149 

Jordan Ceramic Company, 138 
Jordan Fertilizer Industries Company, 
149 

Jordanian Baath Party (Arab Socialist 

Resurrection Party), 32, 231 
Jordanian Democratic Unity Party, xxix 
Jordanian Highlands, 68 
Jordanian Military Academy, 257 
Jordanian National Union, 44, 49 
Jordanians: Christians among Arab, 77; 
distinction between Arab and Palestin- 
ian, 76-77; as officials of government, 
181 

Jordanian Staff College, 257, 264 
Jordanian-Syrian dam project, 165 
Jordanian-Syrian Land Transport Com- 
pany, 155 

Jordan Islamic Bank for Finance and In- 
vestment, 177 

Jordan-Kuwait Bank, 176 

Jordan Medical Association, 118 

Jordan National Bank, 176 

Jordan Phosphate Mines Company, 149, 
160 

Jordan Radio and Television, 220 
Jordan Refinery Company, 138 
Jordan region: Muslims in, 12; under Ot- 
toman rule, 13 
Jordan River, 31, 36, 68 
Jordan River valley, 5, 66, 68, 71, 

168-69, 227 
Jordan Technology Group, xxiv, 151 
Jordan Telecommunications Corporation 



(TCC), 158 

Jordan University of Science and Tech- 
nology, 116 

Joshua, 6 

Journalists' Association, 219 
Judah Qudea), 6-7, 9 
Judaism, 9 

Judas (Judah) Maccabaeus, 9 
June 1967, or Six-Day War, xxii, 3-4, 38; 
border with Israel after, 66; damage to 
Jordan from, 216, 247; economic as- 
sistance after, 216; partition of Jerusa- 
lem after, 66; role of Jordan Arab Army 
in, 236-38 
jury system, 275 

Khalid ibn al Walid, 10 
khamsin wind, 72 

Khomeini, Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah 

Musavi, 55, 111 
King Abdullah Air Base, 248 
King Abdullah Airport, 158 
King-Crane Commission, 23 
King Faisal Air Base, 248 
King Hussein Air Base (Al Mafraq), 248 
King Talal Dam, 165 
kinship {see also hamula or clan; family 

structure), 82, 86-87, 95-97 
Kitchener, H. H., 20-21 
Kurds in Jordan, 79 
Kurian, George T., 115 
Kuwait, 131, 173; economic assistance 

from, xxvii; Iraq invades (1990), xxviii, 

xxix; relations with, 212, 214 



labor force {see also labor unions; remit- 
tances): demand for skilled and educat- 
ed, xxiii, 144-46; education of, xxiii, 
127; export of, xxiii, xxiv, xxviii, 58, 
73, 93-94, 100, 127, 144-47, 166, 215, 
250; foreign guest workers in, 58, 

144- 47, 166; government employment 
of, xxv, 129-30, 187-88; in manufac- 
turing, 148; motivation for migration 
in, 76; predicted underemployment in, 
147; shortages in, 102, 146-47; unem- 
ployment in, xxviii, 66, 102, 134, 

145- 47, 181; women in, 98, 101-3, 147 
labor unions, xxix 

Lake Tiberias (Sea of Galilee), 66, 227; 
formed by Jordan River, 68; Israeli 



319 



Jordan: A Country Study 



plan for water from, 36 
land ownership: reform for, 166; tenure 
of, 166 

Land Settlement Court, 192 

languages: Arabic, 12, 65, 79-81; Ara- 
maic, 7, 12; area of Semitic, 5; Greek, 
12 

Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, 13 

law. See sharia (Islamic law); tribal law 

Lawrence, T. E., 21, 23, 25 

Layne, Linda, 85-86 

League of Arab States (Arab League): 
Arab League Council of, 28; Collective 
Security Pact of, 30; formation of 
(1945), 27; membership in, 219; lack 
of recognition of West Bank annexation 
(1950), 29; ostracizes Egypt (1978), 
xxvii, 53; result of 1967 conference of, 
39 

League of Nations, 23, 25 

Lebanon: effect of civil war in, xxiv, 51; 

expulsion of PLO from, xxvi, 200; 

forces invade Israel (1948), 28; French 

mandate for, 23; invaded by Israel, 5; 

Israel invades and occupies part of 

(1982), 59-60; PLO forced to go to, 

233; United States troops in (1958), 36 
legal system {see also criminal code): new, 

271; sharia law under, 12, 16, 104-5, 

191, 270-71 
Libya, xxvii, 131, 215 
lineages, 87 
Lisan Peninsula, 71 
literacy, 115 
livestock, 170 
Lloyd George, David, 22 
loans: from commercial banks, 136; from 

multilateral organizations, 135-36; 

from United States, 39 
luzum, 87 



Macedonia, 7 
McMahon, Henry, 21 
magistrates' courts, 275 
Majali, Abdul Hadi al, 265 
Majali family, 197 
Majali, Habis al, 42 
Majali, Hazza al, 31-32, 36 
Majali tribe, 90 
malnutrition, 121 
Mamluks, 13 

manufacturing sector: chemical and fer- 



tilizer production in, 151; consumer 
goods in, 151; GDP contributions of, 
147; growth of, 130; partially or whol- 
ly state-owned firms in, 149 

marriage {see also divorce; endogamy; 
polygyny), 82, 96-97, 100 

martial law, xxii, xxv, xxviii, 182, 241, 
276 

martial law courts, 276 
Marxism-Leninism, 205 
media, 219-20 

medical equipment companies, 152 
Mediterranean Sea, 71 
Mehmed V (sultan), 18 
merchant marine, 157 
Mesopotamia, 7 

Middle East: Arabic language as force for 
unity in, 65; Geneva Conference on 
(1977), 50, 52; UN Resolution 242 
(1967) for, xxvi-xxvii, 39, 46, 50, 60, 
201, 216; UN Resolution 338 for, xxvii, 
46, 50, 201, 216 

migration, 75, 92-95 

military assistance: from Britain, 218, 
260; dependence on, 259-60; from 
United States, 39, 131, 260 

military equipment: purchases from 
France of, 218; purchases from Soviet 
Union of, 218; purchases from United 
States of, 224 

military power: of Israel, 224-25; of Syr- 
ia, 226 

military regions, 242 

military service. See conscription system 

military training: for air force, 248-49; 
army basic and advanced, 256-57; of 
foreign nationals, xxviii; quality of 
schools for, 257; in United States, 263 

militia. See People's Army 

millet system, 16, 106 

mining sector {see also phosphate industry; 
potash industry), 130 

Ministry of Communications, 158 

Ministry of Culture and Information, 219 

Ministry of Defense, 242; General Direc- 
torate of Conscription and Mobilization 
of, 254; Public Security Force under, 
265 

Ministry of Education, 115, 257 

Ministry of Finance, 141 

Ministry of Health, 118 

Ministry of Higher Education, 117 

Ministry of Interior, xxviii, 192, 270; 



320 



Index 



Public Security Directorate of, 265, 

266, 267, 274, 276-77 
Ministry of Labor, 147 
Ministry of Occupied Territories, 188 
Ministry of Planning, 101 
Ministry of Religious Endowments and 

Islamic Affairs, 230 
Ministry of Supply, 140-41 
Ministry of Transportation, 155, 157 
minority groups, 231 
Moab, 6 

Modern Standard Arabic, 80 
monetary policy, 146 
monetization, 175 
Morocco, 215 
mortality rate, 72, 121 
Moses (Musa), 6, 107 
Muawiyah (caliph), 12, 105 
Mubarak, Husni, xxvii, 61, 213-14 
muezzin, 107 

Mufti, Said al, 33-34, 197 
Muhammad Ali (pasha of Egypt), 16 
Muhammad (prince of Jordan), 196 
Muhammad (prophet) {see also hadith; 

sunna), 10, 12, 104-5, 106-7, 196 
Mukhabarat. See General Intelligence 
Department (GID) or Dairat al Muk- 
habarat 

multilateral organizations {see also Inter- 
national Monetary Fund (IMF)): eco- 
nomic assistance from, 131 ; loans from, 
135-36 

Muna al Hussein (princess), 194 
Muragha, Said Musa. See Abu Musa 
Muslim Brotherhood, xxv-xxvi, xxix, 4, 

55, 111, 197-98, 230 
Muslims, 10; duties of, 107; religious 
courts for, 191; Sunni and Shia bran- 
ches, 12, 105-7 
Mutah (Moata) Military University, 257, 
264 

Mutah University, 116 

Nabataean people, 7, 9 

Nabulsi, Sulayman, 32-33 

Naif (prince in Jordan), 30 

Nasser, Gamal Abdul, 31, 32; attempts 
to destabilize Hussein, 226; leads sum- 
mit discussing water distribution 
(1964), 36; role in 1967 War of, 37-38 

National Alliance, 206 

National Assembly, 188-90, 200 



National Charter (Mithaq al Watani), 

xxvi, xxix 
National Consultative Council (NCC), 

58-59, 190 
National Front Party (Communist Party 

of Jordan), 32 
National Guard, 236, 252 
nationalism: of Arab revival, 17-18, 20; 

of Arabs in Jordan, 31 ; of Palestinians, 

91; of Turks, 18; of Zionism, 17 
National Jordanian Movement, 197 
National Maritime Company, 157 
national police. See Public Security Force 
national security policy, 223-25, 229 
National Service Law (1976), 254, 268 
National Socialist Party, 32 
National Unity program. See Palestine 

Liberation Organization (PLO) 
natural gas, xxiii, 154, 164 
natural resources, xxiii, 160-64 
naval force, 241 

NCC. See National Consultative Council 
(NCC) 

Nebuchadnezzar, 7 

Negev Desert, 36 

Neo-Babylonian Empire, 7 

neolithic culture, 5 

news agency (PETRA), 220 

newspapers, 219 

Nixon, Richard M., 45 

nomads. See beduins 

North Yemen. See Yemen Arab Repub- 
lic (North Yemen) 

Nur al Hussein (queen of Jordan), 196 

Occupied Enemy Territory Administra- 
tion, 24-25 

October 1973 War, 46, 216, 225, 238, 
247, 261-62 

officer corps, 253, 257 

oil industry {see also oil refining; shale oil 
deposits), xxiii, 161-62, 164 

oil price downturn, xxiv, xxviii, 4, 58, 93, 
128-29, 145, 260 

oil refining, 138, 149, 161-62 

Oman, 214, 264 

Organic Law: 1928 (Transjordan), xxi, 
26, 27 

Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) {see also Arab Or- 
ganization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (AOPEC)), 162 



321 



Jordan: A Country Study 



Ottoman Decentralization Party, 18 
Ottoman Empire {see also Sublime Porte), 
administrative divisions of, 13, 16; con- 
quers area, 3; opposition of Arabs to, 
18 

Ottoman Turks, 13 

Outre Jourdain (Beyond Jordan), 13 



packaging and container industry, 152-53 
Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Shah. See 

Iran 
Pakistan, 173 

Palestine, 3; Arab rebellion (1936-39), 
235; as British mandate, 23; derivation 
of name of, 6; under Ottoman Empire, 
13; PLO declaration for independent, 
181; proposed United Nations partition 
of, 27-28; strategic geographic location 
of, 22; under Sykes-Picot Agreement, 
21-22 

Palestine Central Committee (PCC), 207 
Palestine Communist Party, 197, 206, 
207 

Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), 42, 49, 
209 

Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), 206 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
{see also guerrillas; Palestine Central 
Committee (PCC)), 36, 37; administra- 
tion of, 208; agreements with Hussein 
of, 42-43; bombing of Tunisian head- 
quarters of, 201; in civil war (1970-71), 
198; declaration of Rabat summit relat- 
ed to, 47; effect on nationalism of, 91; 
expulsion from Lebanon of (1982), 200; 
Fifteen-Point Political Program of, 207; 
guerrilla groups accepting policy of, 
206; lack of support from Hussein for 
(1966), 37; National Unity Program of, 
207; opposition of Jordan and Syria to, 
51; Palestine Liberation Army of, 42, 
209; Palestine Martyrs' Works Socie- 
ty (SAMED), 209; Palestine National 
Fund of, 208; Palestinian National 
Charter of, 207; Palestininan Armed 
Struggle Command of, 209; peace 
agreement with Jordanian government 
(1985), xxvi-xxvii; peace agreement 
with Jordanian government of (1970), 
41; recruitment in refugee camps by, 
197, 203; relations with Jordan of, 223; 



response to endorsement of Saddam 
Husayn, xxx; role in administering aid 
funds to occupied territory, 188; role 
in 1989 elections of, xxv 

Palestine Mandate: exclusion of Jews 
from Transjordan section of, 25; ob- 
jective of administration of, 24-25; 
opposition to, 23; partition of, 3; relin- 
quished by British (1948), 235; subdi- 
vision of (1921), xxi, 25; terms of, 23 

Palestine National Council (PNC) {see also 
Palestine Central Committee (PCC)), 
48-49, 201; declares independent state 
of Palestine, 202; Executive Commit- 
tee of, 203, 208; meets in Jordan (1984), 
xxvi; as representative of Palestinian di- 
aspora, 206-7; resolutions related to Is- 
rael (1987), 207 

Palestine National Fund. See Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) 

Palestine National Liberation Movement. 
See Al Fatah (Palestine National Liber- 
ation Movement) 

Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS), 
208-9 

Palestinian Armed Struggle Command, 
209 

Palestinian National Charter. See Pales- 
tine Liberation Organization (PLO) 

Palestinians: anti- American sentiment of, 
216; in attack against Israel (1973), 45; 
citizenship in Jordan of, 189, 197; cre- 
ate a state within Lebanon (1970-75), 
51; defined, 65; differences in political 
identity of, 91; differing views of 
problem of, 39-40; in East Bank, 65; 
economic assistance from Jordan to, 57; 
as guerrillas (fedayeen), xxii, 37, 225, 
232; human and economic capital of, 
90-91, 253, 254; integration of and dis- 
crimination against, xxiii, 233; in Jor- 
dan (1953), 31; Jordanian alternative 
for problem of, 54; in Jordanian army, 
240; Majali tribe as, 90; National 
Guidance Committee of, 54; national- 
ism of, 91; opposition to absolutist 
monarchy by, 198; place in social struc- 
ture of, 77; position of King Hussein 
toward, 48; reasons for lack of assimi- 
lation of, 76; in refugee camps, 182; 
role in government of, 181, 188; role 
in Jordanian society of, 197; working 
abroad, 93-94 



322 



Index 



Palestinian uprising (intifadah) , xxvii, 66, 

92, 223, 233 
Pan-Arabism, 91 

paper and cardboard production, 152-53 
Peake, F. G. (Peake Pasha), 26, 27, 234 
penal system, 276-78 
People's Army, 257, 259 
People's Army Law (1983), 257 
Peraea, 7 

Peres, Shimon, 212 
Persia, 7 

Persian Gulf states, 56 
Petra Bank, 176 
PETRA (news agency), 220 
Petra (Sela), 9 

PFLP. See Popular Front for the Libera- 
tion of Palestine (PFLP) 

PFLP-GC. See Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine-General Com- 
mand (PFLP-GC) 

pharmaceutical industry, xxiv, 152 

Philadelphia, 7, 9 

Philistines, 6 

phosphate production and export, xxiii, 

127, 160, 215 
pilgrims, Muslim, 16 
pipeline: oil, 162; proposals for water, 

165-66 
plateau country, 68 

PLF. See Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) 
PLO. See Palestine Liberation Organiza- 
tion (PLO) 
PNC. See Palestine National Council 
(PNC) 

police. See Public Security Force 
Police Training School, 268 
political groups: appearance of, (1989- 
90), xxix 

political organizations, 44, 58; Democrat- 
ic Bloc as, xxvi; restrictions on activi- 
ties of, 231 

political parties, 59; xxix; banned, xxv; 
in exile, 197 

political structure: Islamic opposition to, 
111-12; role of kinship in, 87-88; role 
of tribalism in, 82-86 

political system: elite in, 193-97; National 
Charter principles for, xxvi; repression 
and dissent in, 197-98 

polygyny, 97 

Pompey, 9 

Popular Front for the Liberation of Pales- 
tine-General Command (PFLP-GC), 



205, 207, 223, 233 

Popular Front for the Liberation of Pales- 
tine (PLFP) (see also Jordanian Demo- 
cratic Unity Party), xxix, 40, 207; air- 
plane high-jacking campaign of, 42 

Popular Struggle Front (PSF), 206, 207 

population: age distribution in, 72-73; 
concentration of, xxiii, 227; of East and 
West Bank combined (1950), 90; of 
East Bank (1988), 65; effect of size of, 
xxiii; growth of, xxiv-xxv, 72, 134, 
147; of Jordan (1953), 30-31, 128; no- 
madic and seminomadic, 75; Palestin- 
ians in, xxiii; ratio of beduins to total, 
83; of Transjordan (1921), 65 

port facilities, 67, 155, 156-57 

potash industry, xxiii, 161 

price system: levels in, 134, 140-41; price 
setting in, 140-41 

Prince Hasan Air Base, 248 

Prison Law (1953), 277 

Prisons Department. See Ministry of In- 
terior, Public Security Directorate 

prison system, 276-78 

private sector, 138-39 

privatization, 159 

protectionism, 149-50 

Protestant denominations, 113-14 

PSF. See Popular Struggle Front (PSF) 

Ptolemaic Dynasty, 7 

Ptolemy Philadelphus, 9 

Public Security Force (see also Desert 
Police Force), xxviii; control in peace 
and war for, 265; duties and responsi- 
bilities of, 266-67; geographic organi- 
zation of, 266-67; judicial, administra- 
tive, and support for police of, 266-67; 
as outgrowth of Arab Legion, 265; 
ranks and insignia of, 268-69; recruit- 
ment for, 268; size of, 266 

pumping station H5 air base, 248, 249 



qadis (religious judges), 12, 191 
Qasim, Abd al Karim, 35 
Qassim family, 197 
Qatar, 131, 215 

Queen Alia International Airport, 158 
Quran, 12, 104, 107, 109 
Quraysh of Mecca, 12 
Quraysh tribe, 18 



323 



Jordan: A Country Study 



Rabat Summit (1974), 46-47, 91, 189, 

199, 210 
radio broadcasting, 220 
Rafldayn Bank, 176 
railroad system, 16, 155-56 
rainfall, 71, 164, 168 
Ramadan (see also Id al Fitr), 107-8 
Reagan, Ronald, 57, 59, 262 
Reagan Plan, 59-60, 212, 216-17 
recession, 181-82 

Red Cross. See International Committee 

of the Red Cross 
Red Sea, 66 

refugee camps: established after 1948 
Arab-Israeli War, 29, 76; established 
after June 1967 War, 76; GID repre- 
sentation in, 270; guerrilla recruitment 
in, 203; maintained by UNRWA, 219; 
militance in, 40, 91-92; political re- 
cruitment in, 197; population of East 
Bank, 90; role of Palestinian Armed 
Struggle Command in, 209 

refugees: impoverished, 233; from Iraq 
and Kuwait (1990-91), xxx; problem 
of, 40; from West Bank, 38, 90-92, 147 

religion (see also Christianity; Druze 
religion; millet system; Shia Islam; 
Sunni Islam), 103-9 

religious courts, 191 

religious minorities, 112-14 

religious sects, 114 

remittances, 58, 93-94, 127, 130-31, 215, 
250; decline in, 134, 136, 147; revenues 
from, 145-47; used for development 
planning, 142-43 

reserves, international, 134-35, 136 

revenues: from economic assistance, xxv; 
from imports, 142; from remittances, 
58, 93-94, 127, 130-31, 215, 250 

Rifai, Abd al Munim, 41 

Rifai, Samir ar, 196-97 

Rifai, Zaid ar, 48, 49, 137, 187, 190, 196 

rift valleys, 67-68, 71 

riots: in 1986, xxv, 231, 232; in 1989, 
182, 190, 196 

road system, 154-55 

Robins, Philip, 145 

Roman Catholic Church, 113 

Roman Empire: absorption of Judah into, 
9; administrative division of, 10 

Royal Jordanian Air Academy, 248-49 

Royal Jordanian Air Force: organization 
of, 248; semi-autonomous nature of, 



242-43; size of, 241 
Royal Jordanian Airlines, 139, 157-58 
Royal Police Academy, 268 
Russia, 16 



Sadat, Anwar as, 46, 53; signs Camp 
David Accords, xxiii; visits Jerusalem, 
52, 199 

Saladin, 13 

Salah ad Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub. See 
Saladin 

SAMED. See Palestine Liberation Or- 
ganization (PLO) 

Samuel, Herbert, 25 

San Remo Conference (1920), 23, 25 

Sassanian Empire, 10 

Saudi Arabia: boundary with, 67; eco- 
nomic assistance from, xxiv, xxvii, 131, 
250, 260; forces invade Israel (1948), 
28; Jordanians in, 93-94; oil sales by, 
162; payments to Jordan (1957), 32-33; 
relations with, xxx-xxxi, 173-74, 212, 
214 

Saul (king), 6 

schools: for police training, 268; religious, 

114-15; of UNRWA, 115 
Seccombe, Ian J., 145 
security, internal. See General Intelligence 

Department (GID) 
Seleucids, 9 

Selim I (Ottoman sultan), 13 

Seljuk Turks, 12-13 

seminomads. See beduins 

semisedentary groups. See beduins 

Semitic language, 5, 7 

Semitic nomads (see also Amorites): 

Amorites as, 5; habiru (Hebrews) as, 5 
service sector, xxiv, 127, 129, 133 
Shakir, Ash Sharif Zaid ibn, xxvi, 187, 

190, 196, 242 
Shakir family, 196 
shale oil deposits, 154, 164 
Shalmaneser (king of Assyria), 7 
Shami, Senteny, 74 
Shamir, Yitzhak, 212 
shammal wind, 72 
Sharaf, Abdul Hamid, 196 
Sharaf, Layla, 86, 196 
Sharaf family, 196 

sharia courts (see also qadis (religious 

judges)), 191, 270 
sharia (Islamic law), 12, 16, 104-5, 191, 



324 



Index 



270-72, 273; enforcement under Ottoman 
rule of, 16 

Sharon, Ariel, 5, 54 

Shia Islam, 12, 105; Ismaili branch of, 
114; in minority in Jordan, xxvi, 231 

Shia Muslims: Jordanians as, 104; Shi- 
shans as, 79, 114 

Shia radicals, 4 

Shiat Ali (Party of Ali), 105 

Shishans (Chechens) in Jordan, xxvi, 79 

Shukairi, Ahmad. See Shuqayri, Ahmad 

Shuqayri, Ahmad, 36-37 

Sinai Peninsula: Egyptian military build- 
up in, 37-38; as home of Israelites, 6 

Social Security Corporation, 122 

Social Security Law (1978), 122 

social services, 122 

social structure (see also endogamy; ham- 
ula or clan; kinship; marriage; tribal- 
ism; villages): changing relations in, 
100; class structure and distinctions in, 
77, 93; elite in, 31; fragmentation of, 
65; mobility in, 76, 95; status in, 95; 
in Transjordan, 81; tribalism as ele- 
ment of, 76, 81-86; in villages, 86-90 

social welfare, 121-22 

Solomon (king), 6 

Southern Ghawr, 68 

Soviet Union: invades Afghanistan, 55, 
56; Jordanians studying in, 117; rela- 
tions with, 218; sells air defense systems 
and other equipment, 260, 261; sup- 
ports proposed UN partition of Pales- 
tine (1947), 27 

Spain, 261 

Special Council, 192 

special courts, 191-92 

Special Police Force. See Ministry of In- 
terior, Public Security Directorate 

spending, government: cuts in, 137; for 
defense (1988), 250-51 ; for defense and 
national security, xxvii, 128, 250; for 
education, 114; for social security, 
housing, and welfare, 122 

standard of living, 117-22, 128, 134 

Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, 
54-55, 56 

stock exchange. See Amman Financial 

Market 
Strait of Tiran, 38, 40 
students, 231 
Sublime Porte, 16 

subsidies, 140-41; for imports, 150; re- 



quirement to reduce, xxiv 
Suez Canal, 20, 22, 40 
sunna, 104 

Sunni Islam (see also hadith; hajj; imam; 
jihad; Ramadan; sunna), 12, 65, 105; 
Circassians practicing, 16, 78; as main- 
stream form in Jordan, xxvi, 231; ra- 
tio of those adhering to, 103; tenets of, 
106 

Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916), 21-22 

Syria: after war in Lebanon, 61; as ally, 
50-51, 225; attacks Israel (1973), 45; 
financial support for As Saiqa, 206; 
forces invade Israel (1948), 28; French 
mandate for, 23; joint ventures with, 
138; Jordanian uneasiness toward, 226; 
military aid to fedayeen (1970), 42, 
226; occupied by Arabs by 640, 10; op- 
position to Jordanian military training 
(1980), 226; in and out of United Arab 
Republic, 35, 36; payments to Jordan 
(1957), 32-33; proclaims independence 
(1919), 25; relations with Iraq of, 56; 
relations with Jordan of, xxvii, 50-56, 
173, 214; as Roman province, 9; sup- 
ports Iran, 4; takes side in Lebanon, 51 

Syrian-Jordanian Marine Transport 
Company, 157 

Syrian (or North Arabian) Desert, 67 



Tal, Wasfi at, 36, 43-44 

Talal (prince (later king) of Jordan), xxi- 

xxii, 30, 194 
Tal family, 197 
Talhuni, Bahjat at, 36 
Taminian, Lucine, 74 
Tapline. See Trans- Arabian Pipeline 

(Tapline) 
tax policy, 142 

TCC. See Jordan Telecommunications 
Corporation (TCC) 

telecommunications system, 158-60 

television broadcasting, 220 

terrorism: by Black September, 44, 198; 
of extreme PLO groups, 201; by 
fedayeen, 37; by Jordanian and Pales- 
tinian political groups, 198; Special 
Police Force role for countering, 267; 
Syrian-sponsored, 226, 232 

Thailand, 160, 173 

Thatcher, Margaret, 218 

thermal power stations, 153-54 



325 



Jordan: A Country Study 



TJFF. See Transjordan Frontier Force 

topography, 67-68, 71 

tourism industry, xxxi 

trade policy {see also entrepot status; ex- 
ports; imports; import substitution; 
protectionism): to alter composition 
and direction of, 170, 172; barter agree- 
ments with Iraq, 162; entrepot status 
in, xxiv, xxviii, xxx, 127, 133, 264; for 
imports, 137, 149-50; for transit to and 
from Iraq, 129, 133 

trade unions. See labor unions 

trading partners, 173-74 

Trajan (emperor of Rome), 9 

Trans- Arabian Pipeline (Tapline), 162 

transfer payments. See economic assis- 
tance; remittances 

Transjordan {see also Amirate of Trans- 
jordan; Jordan): exclusion of Jewish 
settlement in (1922), 25; forces invade 
Israel (1948), 28; granted independence 
(1946), 194; under Palestine Mandate, 
xxi, 25; Palestinian Arabs in, 29; 
preparation for independence of, 26; 
treaties and agreements with Britain of, 
26-27 

Transjordan Frontier Force (TJFF), 26, 
234-35 

Transjordanians. See Jordanians 

transportation system, xxiv, xxviii, 
154-58, 162, 213 

treaties, 16; between Britain and Trans- 
jordan, 26-27; related to religious af- 
filiation, 16 

Treaty of London (1946), xxi, 27 

Treaty of Peace Between Egypt and Is- 
rael (1979), 4, 53, 111, 199 

treaty with Egypt and Syria (1957), 236 

tribalism, 76, 79; forces related to decline 
in, 85; foundation for, 82; importance 
in social and political structure of, xxiii, 
83-86; in Transjordan, 81 

tribal kingdoms, 6 

tribal law, 16, 193 

tribesmen, Arab, 18 

Truman, Harry, 29 

Tunisia, 201 

Tunis summit (1979), 54 
Turkey, 174 

Umar (caliph), 12, 105 
Umayyad Dynasty, 12 



unemployment, 66, 102, 118, 134, 181 
Unionist Democratic Association, 197 
United Arab Command, 36, 37 
United Arab Emirates, 131, 173, 215 
United Arab Kingdom (proposed), 45 
United Arab Republic (UAR), 35, 36 
United Nations (UN): Emergency Force 
(UNEF) of, 38; membership in, 219; 
PLO observer status in, 208; recognizes 
PLO, 47; Relief and Works Agency 
(UNRWA) for Palestine Refugees in 
the Near East, 29, 73, 90, 115, 122, 
131, 219; resolution to partition Pales- 
tine Mandate, 3; sanctions against Iraq 
(1990), xxix; Security Council Resolu- 
tion 242, xxvi-xxvii, 39, 46, 50, 60, 
201, 216; Security Council Resolution 
338, xxvii, 46, 50, 201, 216; Special 
Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), 
27; Truce Supervision Organization- 
Palestine (UNSTOP), 28 
United States: Arms Control and Dis- 
armament Agency (AC DA), 251, 261; 
Congress opposes military sales to Jor- 
dan, 247-48, 250, 262-63, 264; De- 
partment of State, 277; diminished aid 
and arms sales of, 217; economic as- 
sistance from, 34-35, 131, 168, 215-16; 
Eric Johnston water distribution plan 
of, 31; imports from, 170; Jordanians 
studying in, 117; loans from, 39; mili- 
tary assistance from, 39, 215-16, 217, 
261-63; military training and techni- 
cal assistance from, 263; Point Four 
program in Jordan of, 29; political sup- 
port from, 215; relations with, 51-52, 
60-61, 215-17; sells military equipment 
and aircraft to Jordan, 52, 247, 261-63; 
supports proposed UN partition of 
Palestine (1947), 27; trade relations 
with, 174 

United States Army Command and 

General Staff College, 257 
universities {see also community colleges), 

116, 231, 257 
University of Jordan, 116, 231 
UNRWA. See United Nations (UN) 
UNSCOP. See United Nations (UN) 
UNSTOP. See United Nations (UN) 
urban centers: population concentrations 

in, 65, 74-75; rise of modern, 92-93 
Uthman (caliph), 12, 105 
utilities industry, 130 



326 



Index 



veterans' rights, 254 

veterinary medicine industry, 152 

villages, 86-90, 193 



Wadi al Arabah (Wadi al Jayb), 68 
Wadi al Arabah Dam, 165 
wages, 146 

Wahhabi sectarians, 25, 26, 234 
War College, 257 

wars: Arab-Israeli, xxi, xxii, 3-4, 38, 46, 
66, 216, 224-25, 235-38, 247, 261-62; 
civil (1970-71), xxii, 42, 193, 198-99, 
215-16, 233; civil, Lebanon, 51; Gulf 
(1991), xxix-xxxi; Iran-Iraq, 4 

water demand, xxiv-xxv, 118, 127, 164 

water distribution: Israeli plan for, 36; 
proposal for Lebanon and Syria for, 36; 
proposed plan by Iraq for, 56; United 
States plan for, 31 

water resources, xxiv-xxv, 164-66, 168- 
69 

Weizmann, Chaim, 23 

West Bank: annexed by Jordan (1950), 
3, 29, 66; economic assistance to Pales- 
tinians in, xxvii; elections (1976), 199; 
expanding Israeli settlements in, 4, 59; 
Israel assaults villages in (1966), 37; Is- 
raeli plans to retain, 53-54; Jordan 
relinquishes sovereignty over (1988), 
xxvii, xxviii, 181, 188, 210, 233; neo- 
lithic culture in, 5; Palestinian Arabs 
in, 29; pan- Arab aid funds for oc- 
cupied, 188, 202; PLO territorial 
claims to, 47; seizure by Israel (1967), 
xxii, 4, 38, 128, 166 

Western Europe: imports from, 170; Jor- 
danians studying in, 117 



WHO. See World Health Organization 
(WHO) 

Wilson, Rodney, 172 

Wilson, Woodrow, 23 

winds (khamsin; shammal), 72 

women: in armed forces, 255; effect of so- 
cial changes on, 100-101; enfranchise- 
ment of (1973), 189; honor concept for, 
99-100; in labor force, 98, 101-3, 147; 
Palestinian position on role of, xxiii; in 
police organization, 268; practicing 
traditional health remedies, 120; 
proposals for motivation to work, 102; 
religious practices of, 110-11; role in 
family of, 96-99, 100; role in social 
structure of, 95; targeted for health 
care, 121; as volunteers in People's 
Army, 259 

worker remittances. See remittances 

World Bank, xxiv, 131 

World Health Organization (WHO), 118 

Writers' Association, 219 



Yarmuk Brigade, 56, 264 
Yarmuk River, 68, 154, 165, 227 
Yarmuk University, 116, 231 
Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen), 

214, 219 
Young Turks, 18, 20 
Yugoslavia, 160 



Zayadin, Yaqub, 232 
Zionist Congress, First, 17 
Zionist General Council, 28 
Zionist Organization, 17, 23 
Zionists, 17, 22 



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Pakistan 


550-153 


Ghana 


550-46 


Panama 



329 



550-156 


Paraguay 


550-53 


Thailand 


550-185 


Persian Gulf States 


550-89 


Tunisia 


550-42 


Peru 


550-80 


Turkey 


550-72 


Philippines 


550-74 


Uganda 


550-162 


Poland 


550-97 


Uruguay 


550-181 


Portugal 


550-71 


Venezuela 


550-160 


Romania 


550-32 


Vietnam 


550-37 


Rwanda and Burundi 


550-183 


Yemens, The 


550-51 


Saudi Arabia 


550-99 


Yugoslavia 


550-70 


Senegal 


550-67 


Zaire 


550-180 


Sierra Leone 


550-75 


Zambia 


550-184 


Singapore 


550-171 


Zimbabwe 


550-86 


Somalia 






550-93 


South Africa 






550-95 


Soviet Union 






550-179 


Spain 






550-96 


Sri Lanka 






550-27 


Sudan 






550-47 


Syria 






550-62 


Tanzania 







330 



PIN: 004199-000 



